fix: System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE - Move to threat hunting and add additional filter to reduce noise coming from VMware Tools
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
update: Hacktool Execution - Imphash - Add additional imphash values to increase coverage
update: Findstr Launching .lnk File - Increase coverage by adding cases where the commandline ends with a double or a single quote.
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Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
new: Potential Persistence Via AppCompat RegisterAppRestart Layer
update: Uncommon Extension Shim Database Installation Via Sdbinst.EXE - Add additional commandline flag that might trigger FPs
update: Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity Disabled - Add additional path for the HVCI config
update: Creation Of Non-Existent System DLL - Remove driver anchor and the System32 filter. The reason behind this is that an attacker can copy the file elsewhere and then use a system utility such as copy or xcopy located in the system32 folder to create it again. Which will bypass the rule.
update: Potential System DLL Sideloading From Non System Locations - Remove the driver anchor from the filter to catch cases where the system is installed on non default C: driver
update: Potential DLL Sideloading Of Non-Existent DLLs From System Folders - Add SignatureStatus in the filter to exclude only valid signatures and decrease bypass.
remove: Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack - Deprecated in favor of the rule 6b98b92b-4f00-4f62-b4fe-4d1920215771. The reason is that for legit cases where the DLL is still present we can't filter out anything. We assume that the loading is done by a non valid/signed DLLs which will catch most cases. In cas the attacker had the option to sign the DLL with a valid signature he can bypass the rule.
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Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
update: System Information Discovery Using Ioreg - enhanced coverage with additional flags and cli options
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
fix: Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Application - Enhance FP filters
fix: Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Application - Enhance FP filters
fix: Amsi.DLL Load By Uncommon Process - Moved to threat hunting folder and update false positive filters to remove hardcoded C:
fix: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments - Typo in condition
fix: Credential Manager Access By Uncommon Application - Enhance FP filters
fix: Elevated System Shell Spawned From Uncommon Parent Location - Enhance FP filters
fix: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension - Add new extensions to reduce FP
fix: Important Windows Eventlog Cleared - Update selection to remove "Application" log as it was generating a lot of FP in some environments
fix: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock - Remove some part of the selection due to FP matches as they were generic cmdlet names
fix: Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess - Add "Adobe" filter
fix: Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE - Update FP filter for "iisexpressshim" sdb
fix: Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASS - Add new FP filter for "procmon" process
fix: PowerView PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock - Remove some part of the selection due to FP matches as they were generic cmdlet names
fix: PSScriptPolicyTest Creation By Uncommon Process - Add new filter for "sdiagnhost"
fix: Relevant Anti-Virus Signature Keywords In Application Log - Update false positive filters
fix: Remote Access Tool Services Have Been Installed - Security - Fix typo in field name
fix: Suspicious File Creation Activity From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder - Remove RECYCLE.BIN\ as it was added as a typo and is a legitimate location.
fix: Uncommon Child Process Of Conhost.EXE - Add new FP filters
fix: Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder - Add new extension to filter out FP generated with MS Access databases
fix: Uncommon PowerShell Hosts - Moved to threat hunting folder and updated false positive filter list
fix: Use Of Remove-Item to Delete File - ScriptBlock - Moved to threat hunting folder and Update logic to be more accurate
fix: User with Privileges Logon - Move to placeholder rules and update the FP filter to account for different workstations
fix: Windows Event Auditing Disabled - Enhance list of false positive filters with additional GUID
fix: WMI Module Loaded By Uncommon Process - Moved to threat hunting folder and update and restructure false positive filters
new: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports
new: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension
remove: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
remove: New Service Uses Double Ampersand in Path
remove: Powershell File and Directory Discovery
remove: PowerShell Scripts Run by a Services
remove: Security Event Log Cleared
remove: Suspicious Get-WmiObject
remove: Windows Defender Threat Detection Disabled
update: Access To Browser Credential Files By Uncommon Application - Increase level to medium and enhance filters and selections
update: Add Potential Suspicious New Download Source To Winget - Reduce level to medium
update: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool - Enhance coverage by improving paths selection
update: CodeIntegrity - Unmet Signing Level Requirements By File Under Validation - Reduce level to low
update: Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder - Enhance selection to be more accurate
update: Eventlog Cleared - Update FP filter to remove "Application" log and increase coverage
update: Failed Code Integrity Checks - Reduce level to informational
update: HH.EXE Execution - Reduce level to low
update: Locked Workstation - Reduce level to informational
update: Malicious Driver Load By Name - Increase coverage based on LOLDrivers data
update: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security - Reduce level to high and restructure selections
update: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System - Reduce level to high and restructure selections
update: Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS - Reduce level to medium and comment out noisy access masks
update: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering - Remove "RemoteSigned" as it doesn't fit with the current logic
update: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location - Reduce level to medium and update logic
update: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication - Increase coverage by adding new additional ports
update: PUA - Nmap/Zenmap Execution - Reduce level to medium
update: PUA - Process Hacker Execution - Reduce level to medium
update: PUA - Radmin Viewer Utility Execution - Reduce level to medium
update: Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension - Enhance DLL extension list
update: SASS Access From Non System Account - Reduce level to medium and enhance false positive filters
update: Suspicious Executable File Creation - Enhance coverage by removing hardocded "C:"
update: Suspicious Program Location with Network Connections - Increase accuracy by enhancing the selection to focus on the start of the folder and partition
update: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder - Reduce level to medium
update: Suspicious Shim Database Patching Activity - Add new processes to increase coverage
update: Uncommon Extension Shim Database Installation Via Sdbinst.EXE - Reduce level to medium
update: Whoami Utility Execution - Reduce level to low
update: Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option - Reduce level to medium
update: Windows Defender Malware Detection History Deletion - Reduce level to informational
update: WMI Event Consumer Created Named Pipe - Reduce leve to medium
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Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
Thanks: @Blackmore-Robert
Thanks: @swachchhanda000
Thanks: @celalettin-turgut
Thanks: @AaronS97
new: Access To Sysvol Policies Share By Uncommon Process
new: Access To Potentially Sensitive Sysvol Files By Uncommon Application
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
new: System Information Discovery Using Ioreg
new: System Information Discovery Using sw_vers
new: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
new: System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE
update: Uncommon System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE - Updated logic to focus on more specific WMIC query sequence to increase the level and added a related rule to cover the missing gaps in d85ecdd7-b855-4e6e-af59-d9c78b5b861e
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
new: DLL Names Used By SVR For GraphicalProton Backdoor
new: Enable LM Hash Storage
new: Enable LM Hash Storage - ProcCreation
new: Scheduled Tasks Names Used By SVR For GraphicalProton Backdoor
new: Scheduled Tasks Names Used By SVR For GraphicalProton Backdoor - Task Scheduler
update: Compress-Archive Cmdlet Execution - Reudced Level to low and moved to Threat Hunting folder.
update: Disabled Volume Snapshots - Update logic by removing the reg string to also account for potential renamed executions
update: Folder Compress To Potentially Suspicious Output Via Compress-Archive Cmdlet - Update logic to be more specific
update: Potential Recon Activity Via Nltest.EXE - Add dnsgetdc coverage and enhance logic by removing /
update: Potential System DLL Sideloading From Non System Locations - Enhance logic by removing hardcoded C: value to account for other potential system locations
update: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation - Update logic the logic to not care about the data. As this registry value has use cases either be it "0" or "1"
update: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - Update logic the logic to not care about the data. As this registry value has use cases either be it "0" or "1"
update: Write Protect For Storage Disabled - Update logic by removing the reg string to also account for potential renamed executions
update: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Module - Update logic to be more specific
update: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell - Update logic to be more specific
update: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Script - Update logic to be more specific
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Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
fix: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections - Enhanced the filter by adding new ports that cause FP with SMTP and IMAP communications
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
fix: Potential NT API Stub Patching - Tune FP filter
new: Credential Dumping Activity By Python Based Tool
new: HackTool - Generic Process Access
remove: Credential Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory
update: Credential Dumping Activity Via Lsass - Update selection to increase coverage and filters to tune false positives
update: Credential Dumping Attempt Via WerFault - Update title
update: Function Call From Undocumented COM Interface EditionUpgradeManager - Reduce level to medium
update: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern - Update title
update: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle - Update title
update: HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection - Update title
update: HackTool - SysmonEnte Execution - Add additional location of Sysmon, update title and filters
update: HackTool - winPEAS Execution - Add additional image names for winPEAS
update: LSASS Access From Potentially White-Listed Processes - Update title and description
update: LSASS Access From Program In Potentially Suspicious Folder - Update filters to take into account other drivers than C:
update: LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name - Update title and description
update: Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs DLL - Reduce level and remove path from filter to account for any location of rundll32
update: Malware Shellcode in Verclsid Target Process - Move to hunting folder
update: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Via PowerShell - Reduce level to medium, update description and move to hunting folder
update: Potential Defense Evasion Via Raw Disk Access By Uncommon Tools - Update filters and metadata
update: Potential Process Hollowing Activity - Update FP filter
update: Potential Shellcode Injection - Update title and enhance false positive filter
update: Potentially Suspicious GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS -
update: Remote LSASS Process Access Through Windows Remote Management - Update title, description and filter to account for installation other than C:
update: Suspicious Svchost Process Access - Enhance filter to account for installation in non C: locations
update: Uncommon GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS - Enhance false positive filter
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Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
Thanks: swachchhanda000
update: Suspicious Network Connection to IP Lookup Service APIs - add several external IP lookup services to existing list
update: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs - add several external IP lookup services to existing list
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Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
new: Uncommon Extension In Keyboard Layout IME File Registry Value
new: Suspicious Path In Keyboard Layout IME File Registry Value
new: Wusa.EXE Executed By Parent Process Located In Suspicious Location
update: Wusa.EXE Extracting Cab Files From Suspicious Paths - Tune the list of paths to be less FP prone
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Co-authored-by: frack113 <62423083+frack113@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
tr0mb1r