update: Disable Internal Tools or Feature in Registry - More registry modifications associated with feature change of windows internal tools added
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
new: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
update: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - PowerShell Module
update: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
update: Potential Persistence Attempt Via Run Keys Using Reg.EXE
update: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
update: Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys
update: Direct Autorun Keys Modification
update: Suspicious Run Key from Download
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Co-authored-by: frack113 <62423083+frack113@users.noreply.github.com>
update: COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value - Add {603D3801-BD81-11d0-A3A5-00C04FD706EC}
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Co-authored-by: frack113 <62423083+frack113@users.noreply.github.com>
fix: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack - Registry - Tune the rule for specific registry values in order to reduce FP rate.
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Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
update: COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value - Add 2 new additional built-in COM object GUID that were seen being used for hijacking
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
update : COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value - Add new suspicious locations and builtin CLSID
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
new: Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image - A detection replacement for `e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79`
remove: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand - Auditd - Moved to "unsupported" folder, due to the need of correlation.
remove: Potential Persistence Via COM Search Order Hijacking - Moved to "deprecated" in favour of `790317c0-0a36-4a6a-a105-6e576bf99a14`.
update: Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters - Moved to "threat-hunting" due to the nature FPs
update: Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity - Moved to "threat-hunting" as its meant as an enrichment rule.
chore: change tags, date, modified fields to comply with v2 of the Sigma spec.
chore: update the related type from `obsoletes` to `obsolete`.
chore: update local json schema to the latest version.
update: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page - Update the logic to account for additional sub keys.
update: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Today Page - Update the logic to account for the "URL" value.
---------
Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
fix: Dllhost.EXE Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP Address - Filter out additional Microsoft IP block and moved to the threat hunting folder due to large amount of matches based on VT data
fix: Forest Blizzard APT - File Creation Activity - Fix typo in filename
fix: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder - Enhance filter to fix new false positive found in testing
new: COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value
new: CVE-2023-1389 Potential Exploitation Attempt - Unauthenticated Command Injection In TP-Link Archer AX21
new: DPAPI Backup Keys And Certificate Export Activity IOC
new: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets
new: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock
new: HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay Execution
new: HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay Secrets Dump Module Indicators
new: HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution
new: Hypervisor Enforced Paging Translation Disabled
new: PDF File Created By RegEdit.EXE
new: Periodic Backup For System Registry Hives Enabled
new: Renamed Microsoft Teams Execution
new: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID
remove: Potential Persistence Via COM Hijacking From Suspicious Locations - Deprecated because of incorrect logic, replaced by "790317c0-0a36-4a6a-a105-6e576bf99a14"
update: DLL Call by Ordinal Via Rundll32.EXE - Reduced level to "medium" and moved to the threat hunting folder due to the fact that calling by ordinal can be seen by many legitimate utilities. An initial baseline needs to be set for the rule to be promoted.
update: Msiexec.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over HTTP - Reduced level to low and moved to the threat hunting folder due to large amount of matches based on VT data
update: MSSQL Add Account To Sysadmin Role - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: MSSQL Disable Audit Settings - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: MSSQL Server Failed Logon - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: MSSQL Server Failed Logon From External Network - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: MSSQL SPProcoption Set - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: MSSQL XPCmdshell Option Change - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: MSSQL XPCmdshell Suspicious Execution - Update the "Provider_Name" to use a contains in order to account for other third party providers.
update: Network Connection Initiated By AddinUtil.EXE - increase level to "high" and promote the status to "test" based on VT data
update: Network Connection Initiated To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process - Reduced the level to "medium" and added filters for "null" and empty values based on VT data
update: Office Application Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Ports - Add port "143" based on Microsoft "Microsoft 365 URLs and IP address ranges" document
update: Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP - Add "outlook.exe" to the list of processes and filter multiple IP ranges based on Microsoft "Microsoft 365 URLs and IP address ranges" document
update: Password Protected Compressed File Extraction Via 7Zip - Reduced level to "low" and moved to the threat hunting folder due to large amount of matches based on VT data
update: Potential Dead Drop Resolvers - Add filters for "null" and empty values based on VT data
update: Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP - Update metadata information
update: Potential Shellcode Injection - Reduced level to "medium" and moved to the threat hunting folder due multiple FP with third party softwares
update: Potential Suspicious Execution From GUID Like Folder Names - Reduced level to "low" and moved to the threat hunting folder
update: Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities - Add additional EventLog and ETW providers to increase coverage
update: Potentially Suspicious Execution From Parent Process In Public Folder - Update logic to add Image names in addition to the previous CommandLines
update: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes - Reduced level to "medium" and moved to the threat hunting folder due to large amount of matches based on VT data. As well as the logic doesn't look for anything suspicious but "child processes" that might be "uncommon".
update: Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder - Update metadata and remove "\Users\Public" to avoid false positives
update: Recon Command Output Piped To Findstr.EXE - Update the logic to user "wildcards" instead of spaces to cover different variants and increase the coverage.
update: Suspicious Electron Application Child Processes - Remove unnecessary filters
update: Suspicious Non-Browser Network Communication With Google API - Add filters for "null" and empty values based on VT data
update: System File Execution Location Anomaly - Enhance filters
update: Uncommon Child Process Of Setres.EXE - Update logic and metadata
update: Uncommon Link.EXE Parent Process - Enhance the filters and metadata
update: Windows Defender Threat Detection Service Disabled - Add french keyword for "stopped" to increase coverage for windows os that uses the french language
---------
Thanks: cY83rR0H1t
Thanks: CTI-Driven
Thanks: BIitzkrieg
Thanks: DFIR-jwedd
Thanks: Snp3r
chore: update Microsoft references link to use the "learn" subdomain instead of "docs".
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
Thanks: @ryanplasma
chore: delete "Pipfile" and "Pipfile.lock"
fix: Filter Driver Unloaded Via Fltmc.EXE - Add exclusion for ManageEngine
fix: Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE - Exclude "WerConCpl.dll"
new: DNS Query To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process
new: Files With System DLL Name In Unsuspected Locations
new: HackTool - Evil-WinRm Execution - PowerShell Module
new: HackTool - LaZagne Execution
new: Network Connection Initiated To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process
update: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data - Use "windash" modifier
update: Explorer Process Tree Break - Use "windash" modifier
update: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations - Remove old filter
update: Lolbin Unregmp2.exe Use As Proxy - Use "windash" modifier
update: LSASS Process Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE - Use "windash" modifier
update: New Remote Desktop Connection Initiated Via Mstsc.EXE - Use "windash" modifier
update: Potential Proxy Execution Via Explorer.EXE From Shell Process - Update metadata and moved to Threat Hunting folder
update: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename - Enhance logic
update: Renamed ProcDump Execution - Add new flag option
update: Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location - Use "windash" modifier
---------
Thanks: @qasimqlf
Thanks: @celalettin-turgut
Thanks: @cY83rR0H1t
update: RDP Sensitive Settings Changed - Add DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias and DisableSecuritySettings as seen used by DarkGate malware
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Co-authored-by: nasbench <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
Grégory Wychowaniec