diff --git a/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_cli_escape.yml b/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_cli_escape.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..601613a1e
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+++ b/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_cli_escape.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+title: Detects Suspicious Commandline escape
+description: Detects suspicious process that use escape characters
+status: experimental
+reference: 
+    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/885545634958385153
+    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885553465417756673
+    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885570278637678592
+    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html
+    - http://www.windowsinspired.com/understanding-the-command-line-string-and-arguments-received-by-a-windows-program/
+author: juju4
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+    description: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Detailed Tracking > Audit Process creation, Group Policy : Administrative Templates\System\Audit Process Creation'
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 4688
+        CommandLine: 
+            - '^'
+            - '@'
+# 0x002D -, 0x2013 , 0x2014 , 0x2015 ― ... FIXME! how to match hexa form?
+            - '-'
+            - '―'
+            - 'c:/'
+            - '<TAB>'
+            - '^h^t^t^p'
+            - 'h"t"t"p'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives: 
+    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
+level: medium