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blue-team-tools/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_diskshadow.yml
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title: Execution via Diskshadow.exe
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id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2
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status: test
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description: Detects using Diskshadow.exe to execute arbitrary code in text file
author: Ivan Dyachkov, oscd.community
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references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
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- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
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date: 2020/10/07
modified: 2021/11/27
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon ProcessCreation logging must be activated and Windows audit must Include command line in process creation events'
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detection:
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selection:
Image|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/s'
- '-s'
condition: selection
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fields:
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- CommandLine
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falsepositives:
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- False postitve can be if administrators use diskshadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts.
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level: high
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tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1218