2019-02-27 15:55:39 +11:00
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title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
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2019-11-12 23:12:27 +01:00
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id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
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2019-03-06 17:09:43 +01:00
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status: experimental
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2019-02-27 15:55:39 +11:00
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description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving file polyglotism
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2020-04-02 10:00:00 +02:00
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date: 2019/02/22
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2020-08-25 01:09:17 +02:00
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modified: 2020/08/23
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2019-05-18 17:43:31 +02:00
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author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
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2019-02-27 15:55:39 +11:00
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references:
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- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
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- https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
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- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
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- https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.t1140
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2020-08-25 01:09:17 +02:00
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- attack.t1218.005
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2019-02-27 15:55:39 +11:00
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logsource:
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2019-03-06 17:09:43 +01:00
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category: process_creation
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2019-02-27 15:55:39 +11:00
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product: windows
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2019-03-06 17:09:43 +01:00
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falsepositives:
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- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
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level: high
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2019-02-27 15:55:39 +11:00
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detection:
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2019-03-06 17:09:43 +01:00
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selection1:
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2020-10-15 15:49:26 -03:00
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Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
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CommandLine|contains:
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- 'vbscript'
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- '.jpg'
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- '.png'
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- '.lnk'
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2020-10-15 15:49:39 -03:00
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# - '.chm' # could be prone to false positives
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2020-10-15 15:49:26 -03:00
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- '.xls'
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- '.doc'
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- '.zip'
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2019-03-06 17:09:43 +01:00
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condition:
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2019-05-18 17:43:31 +02:00
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selection1
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