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blue-team-tools/rules/cloud/aws/aws_attached_malicious_lambda_layer.yml
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title: AWS Attached Malicious Lambda Layer
id: 97fbabf8-8e1b-47a2-b7d5-a418d2b95e3d
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status: test
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description: |
Detects when an user attached a Lambda layer to an existing function to override a library that is in use by the function, where their malicious code could utilize the function's IAM role for AWS API calls.
This would give an adversary access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html
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author: Austin Songer
date: 2021/09/23
modified: 2022/10/09
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
logsource:
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product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: lambda.amazonaws.com
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eventName|startswith: 'UpdateFunctionConfiguration'
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condition: selection
falsepositives:
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- Lambda Layer being attached may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- Lambda Layer being attached from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium