# T1036.005 - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: `svchost.exe`). Alternatively, a Windows Registry key may be given a close approximation to a key used by a legitimate program. In containerized environments, a threat actor may create a resource in a trusted namespace or one that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Backdoor 2023)
## Atomic Tests - [Atomic Test #1 - Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory](#atomic-test-1---execute-a-process-from-a-directory-masquerading-as-the-current-parent-directory) - [Atomic Test #2 - Masquerade as a built-in system executable](#atomic-test-2---masquerade-as-a-built-in-system-executable) - [Atomic Test #3 - Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe](#atomic-test-3---masquerading-cmdexe-as-vedetectorexe)
## Atomic Test #1 - Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`) **Supported Platforms:** macOS, Linux **auto_generated_guid:** 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24 #### Inputs: | Name | Description | Type | Default Value | |------|-------------|------|---------------| | test_message | Test message to echo out to the screen | string | Hello from the Atomic Red Team test T1036.005#1| #### Attack Commands: Run with `sh`! ```sh mkdir $HOME/... cp $(which sh) $HOME/... $HOME/.../sh -c "echo #{test_message}" ``` #### Cleanup Commands: ```sh rm -f $HOME/.../sh rmdir $HOME/.../ ```

## Atomic Test #2 - Masquerade as a built-in system executable Launch an executable that attempts to masquerade as a legitimate executable. **Supported Platforms:** Windows **auto_generated_guid:** 35eb8d16-9820-4423-a2a1-90c4f5edd9ca #### Inputs: | Name | Description | Type | Default Value | |------|-------------|------|---------------| | executable_filepath | File path where the generated executable will be dropped and executed from. The filename should be the name of a built-in system utility. | string | $Env:windir\Temp\svchost.exe| #### Attack Commands: Run with `powershell`! ```powershell Add-Type -TypeDefinition @' public class Test { public static void Main(string[] args) { System.Console.WriteLine("tweet, tweet"); } } '@ -OutputAssembly "#{executable_filepath}" Start-Process -FilePath "#{executable_filepath}" ``` #### Cleanup Commands: ```powershell Remove-Item -Path "#{executable_filepath}" -ErrorAction Ignore ```

## Atomic Test #3 - Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application. The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary. This technique may be used to evade detection by mimicking legitimate software names or locations. **Expected Output:** - A new process named VEDetector.exe appears in the process list, but its behavior matches cmd.exe. - SIEM/EDR systems may detect this as suspicious process activity (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 1 for process creation, or Event ID 13 for registry modifications). - Registry modification in HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run may trigger persistence alerts in XDR platforms. **References:** - [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/) - [Sysmon Process Creation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon) **Supported Platforms:** Windows **auto_generated_guid:** 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8 #### Inputs: | Name | Description | Type | Default Value | |------|-------------|------|---------------| | ved_path | Directory path where VEDetector.exe will be created | Path | $env:TEMP| | source_file | Path to the source cmd.exe file | Path | $env:SystemRoot\System32\cmd.exe| #### Attack Commands: Run with `powershell`! Elevation Required (e.g. root or admin) ```powershell # Copy and rename cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe Copy-Item -Path "#{source_file}" -Destination "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force # Create registry run key for persistence New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -Value "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -PropertyType String -Force # Start the renamed process Start-Process -FilePath "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" Start-Sleep -Seconds 5 ``` #### Cleanup Commands: ```powershell # Remove registry key Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue # Stop the process Stop-Process -Name "VEDetector" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue # Remove the file Remove-Item -Path "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Write-Host "[+] Cleaned up VEDetector artifacts" ``` #### Dependencies: Run with `powershell`! ##### Description: The source cmd.exe file must exist on the system. ##### Check Prereq Commands: ```powershell if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") { exit 0 } else { exit 1 } ``` ##### Get Prereq Commands: ```powershell Write-Host "[-] Source file not found: #{source_file}. Ensure cmd.exe exists in the specified path." exit 1 ```