Add Exploit::Powershell::DotNet namespace with compiler and
runtime elevator.
Add compiler modules for payloads and custom .NET code/blocks.
==============
Powershell-based persistence module to compile .NET templates
with MSF payloads into binaries which persist on host.
Templates by @hostess (way back in 2012).
C# templates for simple binaries and a service executable with
its own install wrapper.
==============
Generic .NET compiler post module
Compiles .NET source code to binary on compromised hosts.
Useful for home-grown APT deployment, decoy creation, and other
misdirection or collection activities.
Using mimikatz (kiwi), one can also extract host-resident certs
and use them to sign the generated binary, thus creating a
locally trusted exe which helps with certain defensive measures.
==============
Concept:
Microsoft has graciously included a compiler in every modern
version of Windows. Although executables which can be easily
invoked by the user may not be present on all hosts, the
shared runtime of .NET and Powershell exposes this functionality
to all users with access to Powershell.
This commit provides a way to execute the compiler entirely in
memory, seeking to avoid disk access and the associated forensic
and defensive measures. Resulting .NET assemblies can be run
from memory, or written to disk (with the option of signing
them using a pfx cert on the host). Two basic modules are
provided to showcase the functionality and execution pipeline.
Usage notes:
Binaries generated this way are dynamic by nature and avoid sig
based detection. Heuristics, sandboxing, and other isolation
mechanisms must be defeated by the user for now. Play with
compiler options, included libraries, and runtime environments
for maximum entropy before you hit the temmplates.
Defenders should watch for:
Using this in conjunction with WMI/PS remoting or other MSFT
native distributed execution mechanism can bring malware labs
to their knees with properly crafted templates.
The powershell code to generate the binaries also provides a
convenient method to leave behind complex trojans which are not
yet in binary form, nor will they be until execution (which can
occur strictly in memory avoiding disk access for the final
product).
==============
On responsible disclosure: I've received some heat over the years
for prior work in this arena. Everything here is already public,
and has been in closed PRs in the R7 repo for years. The bad guys
have had this for a while (they do their homework religiously),
defenders need to be made aware of this approach and prepare
themselves to deal with it.
This commit adds MSF-side support for listing currently loaded drivers
on the machine that Meterpreter is running on. It doesn't add a UI-level
command at this point, as I didn't see the need for it. It is, however,
possible to enumerate drivers on the target using the client API.
Also, the capcom exploit is updated so that it no longer checks for the
existence of the capcom.sys file in a fixed location on disk. Instead,
it enumerates the currently loaded drivers using the new driver listing
function, and if found it checks to make sure the MD5 of the target file
is the same as the one that is expected. The has is used instead of file
version information because the capcom driver doesn't have any version
information in it.
This commit includes:
* RDI binary that abuses the SMEP bypass and userland function pointer
invocation that is provided by the driver.
* Related metasploit module.
* Associated make.build to build from command line.
* Updated command line build file.
This also includes the beginnings of a new set of functions that help
with the management/automation of kernel-related work on Windows for
local priv esc exploits.
Fixed an issue where the exploit would drop to interactive password prompt by default on newer ruby version which rendered the exploit unusable. It now properly forces pubkey authentication instead and proceeds with the bypass as expected.
Multiple DLL side loading vulnerabilities were found in various COM
components.
These issues can be exploited by loading various these components as an
embedded
OLE object. When instantiating a vulnerable object Windows will try to
load one
or more DLLs from the current working directory. If an attacker
convinces the
victim to open a specially crafted (Office) document from a directory
also
containing the attacker's DLL file, it is possible to execute arbitrary
code with
the privileges of the target user. This can potentially result in the
attacker
taking complete control of the affected system.
These modules call check() in the exploit() function and expected to get a CheckCode::Vulnerable, now that check() returns Appears instead of Vulnerable they always refuse to run.
I've flipped the logic, based on examples in other modules, now they refuse to run only if check() positively returns Safe.
RageLtMan