Isabel Tuson
71 lines
4.7 KiB
JSON
71 lines
4.7 KiB
JSON
{
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"type": "bundle",
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"id": "bundle--182e2e6b-4854-469a-9ba8-36b94fb96348",
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"spec_version": "2.0",
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"objects": [
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{
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"id": "attack-pattern--dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd",
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"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"name": "Lockscreen Bypass",
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"description": "An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen.\n\n### Biometric Spoofing\nIf biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: SecureIDNews-Spoof)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID). Android has similar mitigations.\n\n### Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force\nAn adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (\"shoulder surfing\") the device owner's use of the lockscreen passcode. \n\n### Exploit Other Device Lockscreen Vulnerabilities\nTechniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.",
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"external_references": [
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{
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"source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461",
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"external_id": "T1461"
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},
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{
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"source_name": "SRLabs-Fingerprint",
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"description": "SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.",
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"url": "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/"
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},
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{
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"source_name": "SecureIDNews-Spoof",
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"description": "Zack Martin. (2016, March 11). Another spoof of mobile biometrics. Retrieved September 18, 2018.",
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"url": "https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/"
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},
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{
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"source_name": "TheSun-FaceID",
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"description": "Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple\u2019s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.",
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"url": "https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/"
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},
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{
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"source_name": "Apple-TouchID",
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"description": "Apple. (2015, November 3). About Touch ID security on iPhone and iPad. Retrieved December 23, 2016.",
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"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587"
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},
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{
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"source_name": "Wired-AndroidBypass",
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"description": "Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.",
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"url": "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/"
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},
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{
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"source_name": "Kaspersky-iOSBypass",
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"description": "Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.",
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"url": "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/"
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}
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],
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"object_marking_refs": [
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"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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],
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"type": "attack-pattern",
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"kill_chain_phases": [
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{
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"kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
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"phase_name": "initial-access"
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}
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],
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"modified": "2019-02-03T17:08:07.111Z",
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"created": "2017-10-25T14:48:24.488Z",
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"x_mitre_platforms": [
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"Android",
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"iOS"
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],
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"x_mitre_tactic_type": [
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"Post-Adversary Device Access"
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],
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"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
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"x_mitre_old_attack_id": "MOB-T1064"
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}
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]
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} |