Files
cti/enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd.json
2026-04-27 15:21:34 -04:00

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{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a7244acf-119c-41b2-a30c-f9c2f58ac526",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd",
"created": "2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"revoked": false,
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001",
"external_id": "T1098.001"
},
{
"source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence",
"description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/"
},
{
"source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS",
"description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/"
},
{
"source_name": "SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation",
"description": "Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5"
},
{
"source_name": "Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals",
"description": "Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.",
"url": "https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/"
},
{
"source_name": "Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024",
"description": "Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. (2024, June 6). Lacework Labs. Retrieved July 1, 2024.",
"url": "https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts"
},
{
"source_name": "GCP SSH Key Add",
"description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add"
},
{
"source_name": "Permiso Scattered Spider 2023",
"description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
"url": "https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud"
},
{
"source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death Video",
"description": "Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815"
},
{
"source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death",
"description": "Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.",
"url": "https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords",
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Enforce Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication with legacy applications using app passwords. Retrieved May 28, 2024.",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
"description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
},
{
"source_name": "Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024",
"description": "Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, and Jonathan Leathery. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved May 28, 2024.",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations"
},
{
"source_name": "Expel Behind the Scenes",
"description": "S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
"url": "https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/"
},
{
"source_name": "Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0",
"description": "SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12, 2023.",
"url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/"
},
{
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
}
],
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"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"modified": "2025-10-24T17:49:04.839Z",
"name": "Additional Cloud Credentials",
"description": "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\n\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)\n\nAdversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the <code>CreateLoginProfile</code> API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)\n\nIn Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user\u2019s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
],
"x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Expel",
"Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix",
"Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)",
"Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber",
"Alex Soler, AttackIQ",
"Dylan Silva, AWS Security",
"Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security",
"Arun Seelagan, CISA"
],
"x_mitre_deprecated": false,
"x_mitre_domains": [
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],
"x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
"x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"x_mitre_platforms": [
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],
"x_mitre_version": "2.8"
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]
}